Vaughn, Billy v. Kenneth Parsons d/b/a Performance Mechanical

2015 TN WC 68
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedJune 19, 2015
Docket2014-06-0020
StatusPublished

This text of 2015 TN WC 68 (Vaughn, Billy v. Kenneth Parsons d/b/a Performance Mechanical) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vaughn, Billy v. Kenneth Parsons d/b/a Performance Mechanical, 2015 TN WC 68 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2015).

Opinion

COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION

EMPLOYEE: BILLY VAUGHN DOCKET NO. 2014-06-0020

STATE FILE NO. 69385-2014 EMPLOYER: KENNETH PARSONS D/B/A PERFORMANCE MECHANICAL DATE OF INJURY: JULY 20, 2014

JUDGE: JOSHUA BAKER INSURANCE CARRIER: NATIONWIDE

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

THIS CAUSE came before the undersigned Workers' Compensation Judge on June 1, 2015, for a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Kenneth Parsons d/b/a Performance Mechanical (Mr. Parsons). The Court conducted the hearing by telephone. Attorney Gary Wilkinson represented Mr. Parsons at the hearing. Billy Vaughn, the employee, participated without an attorney.

HISTORY OF THE CLAIM

Mr. Vaughn filed a Petition for Benefit Determination on September 4, 2014, seeking medical and temporary disability benefits for an injury that he allegedly suffered July 20, 2014, when he moved “big rocks” at a swimming pool construction site. On November 3, 2014, Mr. Vaughn requested an Expedited Hearing for medical and temporary disability benefits. Mr. Parsons also filed an Expedited Hearing request.

Following an in-person hearing, the Court issued an Expedited Hearing Order on December 22, 2014, denying Mr. Vaughn’s request for temporary disability and medical benefits. In the Order, the Court deemed Mr. Vaughn’s claim noncompensable based on the Court’s finding that Mr. Parsons never employed Mr. Vaughn.

The Court convened an Initial Hearing on February 22, 2015, and issued an Initial Hearing Order on February 19, 2015. The Initial Hearing Order provided deadlines for completing discovery and set the claim for a Compensation Hearing on June 18, 2015. The Initial Hearing Order also required the parties to submit a witness and exhibit list to the Court no later than twenty (20) days before the Compensation Hearing. On March 6, 2015, Mr. Wilkinson sent Mr. Vaughn a request for admissions. Mr. Wilkinson also noticed Mr. Vaughn for a deposition that same day. Mr. Vaughn did not respond to the request for admissions and did not attend the deposition.

On April 24, 2015, Mr. Parsons filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Mediation and Hearing Procedure Rule 0800-02-21-.14(3) (hereinafter referred to as “Rule .14(3) motion”). In that same motion, Mr. Parsons also requested that the Court deem requests for admissions, to which Mr. Vaughn failed to respond, admitted. Mr. Wilkinson sent Mr. Vaughn a copy of the motion. The Court set the motion for a telephonic hearing.

At the hearing, the Court granted Mr. Parsons’ motion to deem the requests for admissions admitted pursuant to rule 37.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. After the Court deemed the requests admitted, the parties argued the Rule .14(3) motion.

Issue

Whether the Court should dismiss Mr. Vaughn’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits.

Mr. Parsons’ Contentions

Mr. Parsons seeks dismissal of Mr. Vaughn’s claim for two reasons. First, Mr. Parsons argues that Mr. Vaughn cannot carry his burden of proving that Mr. Parsons employed him on the date of the accident particularly in light of the admitted facts. Second, Mr. Parsons argues that Mr. Vaughn has refused to cooperate in discovery and has also failed to abide by the Court’s Initial Hearing Order. Mr. Parsons argues that dismissal is an appropriate sanction for Mr. Vaughn’s failure to obey this Court’s order and failure to cooperate in discovery.

Mr. Vaughn’s Contentions

Mr. Vaughn opposes dismissal. He argues that he should be allowed to go forward to the final Compensation Hearing in an attempt to prove his case. With respect to the failure to cooperate in discovery, Mr. Vaughn denied that he received the request for admissions and stated that he did not attend the deposition because he had already given Mr. Parsons a statement.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions

Rule 0800-02-21-.14(3) of the Mediation and Hearing Procedures of the Division of Workers’ Compensation provides that, where a claim is denied on grounds of compensability following an Expedited Hearing, the employer may file a motion to dismiss the claim. The rule states that the injured employee shall file a response to the employer’s dismissal motion within thirty (30) days after its filing and, thereafter, the Court shall set the motion for a hearing. Mr. Vaughn did not file a response within the designated time period.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(c)(1) (2014) provides that the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure govern all procedures before the Court of Workers’ Compensation

2 Claims, “unless an alternate procedural…rule has been adopted by the administrator.” Section 50-6-239(c)(1) (2014) further provides that “[w]henever the administrator has adopted an alternate procedural…rule that conflicts with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure…the rule adopted by the administrator shall apply.”

Rule .14(3) provides a procedural mechanism for the potential dismissal of a workers’ compensation claim which, by definition, is tied to a procedure—an Expedited Hearing—that is unique to the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims. As such, a Rule .14(3) motion is distinct from the dismissal mechanisms (motions to dismiss and for summary judgment) provided for in the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. For that reason, the Court finds that a Rule .14(3) motion to dismiss is an alternate procedure as contemplated by section 50-6-239(c)(1) (2014) and that the determination of a Rule .14(3) motion is not governed by the standards and procedures applied to motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

By definition, a Rule .14(3) motion may be filed only after the Court denies a claim on the grounds of compensability following an Expedited Hearing. Implicit in finding of compensability at the Expedited Hearing is a determination that the evidence introduced at the Expedited Hearing did not establish that the injured worker would likely prevail at a Final Compensation Hearing. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(1) (2014).

That being the case, Rule .14(3) provides a procedural mechanism by which an employer can force an injured worker to address the evidentiary inadequacies that resulted in the adverse decision at the Expedited Hearing. If, in response to the employer’s Rule .14(3) motion, the injured worker does not resolve the evidentiary inadequacies in his or her claim or articulate a clear and present intent to do so, the consequence is dismissal of the injured worker’s claim.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(c)(6) (2014) provides that “[a]t a hearing the employee shall bear the burden of proving each and every element of the claim… .” Mr. Parsons’ Rule .14(3) motion brings before the Court the issue of whether Mr. Vaughn can carry his burden of proving that he worked for Mr. Parsons on the date of the injury.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-103(a) (2014) provides that “[e]very employer and employee subject to this chapter, shall, respectively, pay and accept compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment without regard to fault as a cause of the injury or death[.]” Accordingly, the scope of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law contemplates an employer paying workers’ compensation benefits to its injured employee. The law defines an “employee” as “every person, including a minor, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed…in the service of an employer…under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(11)(A) (2014).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Black v. Dance
643 S.W.2d 654 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1982)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2015 TN WC 68, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vaughn-billy-v-kenneth-parsons-dba-performance-mechanical-tennworkcompcl-2015.