VASSEGHI v. IBRAHIM

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedFebruary 5, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-10324
StatusUnknown

This text of VASSEGHI v. IBRAHIM (VASSEGHI v. IBRAHIM) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
VASSEGHI v. IBRAHIM, (D.N.J. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHRISTOPHER VASSEGHI, Plaintiff, anus Civil Action No, 24-10324 (KMW) (EAP) □ OPINION DR. IHAB IBRAHIM, et al, Defendants.

WILLIAMS, District Judge: This matter comes before the Court on the Court’s sua sponte screening of Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) and the Court’s review of Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1-1). Having reviewed the application, this Court finds that leave to proceed in forma pauperis is warranted in this matter, and the application is granted. Because Plaintiff shall be granted in forma pauperis status in this matter, this Court is required to screen his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C, § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismiss any claim which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks relief from an immune defendant. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently confined at South Woods State Prison. (See ECF No. 3.) In March 2023, Plaintiff was scheduled for ostomy reversal surgery at a private hospital. (ECF

No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff, however, was at that time a state pre-trial detainee housed in the Hudson County Correctional Center. (id) He asked Defendant Dr. Ibrahim to be permitted to undergo the surgery. (d.) While Ibrahim denied him permission to undergo the surgery at the private hospital in question, he instead referred him to a surgeon who did work for the jail so that the surgery could go forward. (d. at 5-6.) Ibrahim referred him to Defendant Dr. Ottley, a surgeon at the Jersey City Medical Center, (Ud. at 6.) Ottley saw Plaintiff and told him he would perform the surgery. (/d.} As part of preparation and recovery for the surgery, Ottley advised Plaintiff he would need to refrain from taking medication he had been prescribed for Crohn’s disease. (/d.) Plaintiff alleges that Ottley overlooked the severity of his Crohn’s disease, and as a result the ostomy reversal surgery was a failure, resulting in Plaintiff undergoing hospitalization and a second surgery to replace the ostomy. (/d) This course of events, Plaintiff alleges, led to permanent harm to his intestines and severe pain and discomfort, (/d.) Between May 2023, when the surgeries occurred, and the filing of the complaint in November 2024, Plaintiff alleges he had not received medication for his Crohn’s disease and had not undergone further follow up medical appointments outside of the jail. (id) Plaintiff states that he has been told he needs to see a gastroenterologist and another surgeon. (/d. at 7.) Although Plaintiff seems to allege jail officials have delayed his treatment, he does not allege any involvement by Ibrahim or Ottley in the alleged issues after the “botched” ostomy surgeries. (/d. at 5-8.)

Il. LEGAL STANDARD Because Plaintiff shall be granted in forma pauperis status, this Court is required to screen his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pursuant to the statute, this Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Ad “The

legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)Gi) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),” Schreane vy. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v, Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)), In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a district court is required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008), but need not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 US. 265, 286 (1986). A complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but must contain “more than an unadorned, the- defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S, 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,’” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it provides only “’naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Jd. (quoting Bell AHantic vy, Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Jd (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that provides facts “merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). Jd. (quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at 557). While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed in conducting such an analysis, pro se litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 Gd Cir, 2013).

Hl. DISCUSSION In his complaint, Plaintiff seeks to raise a federal civil rights claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendant Ibrahim, and a state law medical malpractice claim against Defendant Ottley. To make out a Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs, a plaintiff must plead facts which, if proven, would show that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Natale, 318 F.3d at 582. This requires Plaintiff to plead facts showing both that the plaintiff had a sufficiently serious medical need and that the defendants engaged in acts or omissions which would permit the inference that they knew of and disregarded “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Jd. (quoting Farmer vy. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). A medical need is sufficiently serious where it “has been diagnosed as requiring treatment or [is a need that] is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity of a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988). As deliberate indifference “requires more than inadequate medical attention or incomplete medical treatment,” see King v. Cnty. of Gloucester, 302 F.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Michael Malik Allah v. Thomas Seiverling
229 F.3d 220 (Third Circuit, 2000)
Clarence Schreane v. Seana
506 F. App'x 120 (Third Circuit, 2012)
Kelley Mala v. Crown Bay Marina
704 F.3d 239 (Third Circuit, 2013)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Phillips v. County of Allegheny
515 F.3d 224 (Third Circuit, 2008)
King v. County of Gloucester
302 F. App'x 92 (Third Circuit, 2008)

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