Vasquez-Vasquez v. Blanche

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANA WENDY VASQUEZ-VASQUEZ; A. No. 25-6888 R. C.-V., Agency Nos.

A201-898-018

Petitioners, A201-898-017 v.

MEMORANDUM*

TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted August 14, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: LEE, MENDOZA, JR., and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Ana Wendy Vasquez-Vasquez and her minor son A.R.C.-V., citizens of El Salvador, seek review of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying their

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

**

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning and supplements that reasoning with its own analysis, we review both decisions to the extent the BIA relied on the grounds the IJ considered. Bhattarai v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016); Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011). We review the BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence and legal questions de novo. Mendoza-Pablo v. Holder, 667 F.3d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 2012).

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioners did not endure past harm rising to the requisite level of persecution. Here, the two instances in which MS-13 gang members threatened Petitioners were seemingly unrelated and remote in time to each other. See Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Mere threats, without more, do not necessarily compel a finding of past persecution.” (citation modified)); Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasizing that this court is “most likely to find persecution where threats are repeated, specific and combined with

1 A.R.C.-V. was included as a derivative beneficiary on Ms. Vasquez-

Vasquez’s asylum application and filed separate applications for asylum and related relief that raised claims independent from those included in Ms. Vasquez- Vasquez’s applications.

3

confrontation or other mistreatment” and “are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm” (citation modified)). Further, although A.R.C.-V. was present when Ms. Vasquez-Vasquez was threatened at gunpoint, there is no testimonial or documentary evidence to demonstrate that he was aware of, or even affected by, this incident. Cf. Hernandez-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 1042, 1044– 46 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding error because the IJ did not “measure the degree of [the petitioners’] injuries by their impact on children of their ages” when petitioners supplemented their testimony with a psychiatric evaluation). Moreover, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that A.R.C.-V. did not suffer past persecution when he was pushed down the stairs by his cousin. See Rusak v. Holder, 734 F.3d 894, 895–96 (9th Cir. 2013) (concluding that “physical abuse and harassment” petitioner experienced as a child by teachers and classmates on account of her deafness was not persecution). In making these determinations, the BIA also properly acknowledged and considered A.R.C.-V.’s minor age. See Hernandez-Ortiz, 496 F.3d at 1046.

Petitioners also failed to establish they have an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution if removed to El Salvador. Petitioners argue that their fear of harm is not limited to the two gang members who previously threatened them but encompasses their “fear of MS-13 and allied actors more broadly,” particularly because A.R.C.-V. is nearing “gang-recruitment age.” However, “[a]sylum is not

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available to victims of indiscriminate violence, unless they are singled out on account of a protected ground.” Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the noncitizen’s future persecution claim based on his fear of “potential criminal attacks from random . . . assailants”). Accordingly, because Petitioners did not establish they suffered past harm rising to the requisite level of past persecution, or that they have an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of their asylum and withholding of removal claims.2 2. Further, based on the record here, “a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to find [Petitioners] eligible for CAT protection” because they failed to establish it is more likely than not that they will be tortured if returned to El Salvador. Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010). First, because Petitioners’ alleged past harm does not rise to the requisite level of persecution, “it necessarily falls short of the definition of torture” CAT requires. Sharma, 9 F.4th

2 Petitioners further argue that the BIA improperly refused to consider their claim that they fear direct persecution by government actors. However, the BIA properly deemed this assertion unexhausted as Ms. Vasquez-Vasquez only testified that reporting the incidents with the gang members to the El Salvadoran police would be futile and dangerous. See Honcharov v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1293, 1295–97 (9th Cir. 2019) (The BIA is “an appellate body whose function is to review, not to create, a record, and it would be inappropriate to force it to consider new issues on appeal by judicial fiat” (citation modified)).

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at 1067. Second, Petitioners failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that they will be harmed upon their return to El Salvador, rendering their fear of torture speculative. See Andrade v. Garland, 94 F.4th 904, 915 (9th Cir. 2024) (“Because the allegations of torture rest on a hypothetical chain of events, CAT relief cannot be granted unless each link in the chain is more likely than not to happen.” (citation modified)). And the country condition evidence “do[es] not indicate that [Petitioners] would face any particular threat of torture beyond that of which all citizens of [El Salvador] are at risk.” Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 706–07 (9th Cir. 2022).

PETITION DENIED.3

3 Petitioners’ motion to stay removal, Dkt. No. 3, is DENIED.