Vasquez v. Washington Department of Veterans Affairs

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: July 8, 2025
• Docket: 3:23-cv-06178
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 GEORGE VASQUEZ, Case No. 3:23-cv-06178-TMC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 9 SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. 10 WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF 11 VETERANS AFFAIRS, 12 Defendant. 13

14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 Pro se Plaintiff George Vasquez worked for Defendant Washington State Department of 16 Veterans Affairs (“DVA”) for about seven months before he was fired. Mr. Vasquez, a veteran 17 living with several disabilities, alleges that DVA fired him because he made a request for a 18 reasonable accommodation after a coworker created a hostile work environment. Mr. Vasquez 19 brings these claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 20 DVA has now moved for summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Vasquez has failed to 21 show facts from which a jury could find a hostile work environment related to his disability or 22 that his firing was in retaliation for his accommodation request. Mr. Vasquez responded, arguing 23 that he has offered sufficient evidence to raise a question of material fact on these claims. 24 1 Accordingly, Mr. Vasquez requests that the Court deny the motion and allow the case to proceed 2 to trial. 3 Because Mr. Vasquez has not put forth evidence from which a reasonable jury could find

4 in his favor, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 39, and DISMISSES 5 the case with prejudice. 6 II. BACKGROUND The following background facts are either undisputed or viewed in the light most 7 favorable to Mr. Vasquez, the non-moving party. Additional material facts for each claim 8 brought by Mr. Vasquez are discussed in the sections corresponding to those claims. 9 George Vasquez is a veteran living with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).1 Dkt. 7-1 10 at 2, 4. Mr. Vasquez worked as an “IT service desk worker” with the Washington State 11 Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) from May 16, 2022, until DVA terminated his 12 employment on November 14, 2022. Id.; Dkt. 41 ¶ 3; Dkt. 40-1 at 6. In this role, Mr. Vasquez 13 offered “customer support for computers and IT items for DVA employees[.]” Dkt. 40-1 at 11. 14 Mr. Vasquez was hired to work a morning shift from 4:30 to 8:30 a.m. Id. at 12. But 15 Mr. Vasquez’s position at DVA began with a six-month probationary period. Dkt. 41 ¶ 3. During 16 the probationary period, he had to work a “part time day time shift so that he could properly be 17 trained in DVA IT service desk procedures.” Id. 18 19 20 21

22 1 Mr. Vasquez also alleges that his service-connected disabilities include “depressive disorder, and cognitive disorder with memory loss (adjustment disorder, personality disorder, and 23 residuals of stroke), residual pituitary tumor, tinnitus, lumbar strain, impairment of visual field.” Dkt. 7-1 at 6. 24 1 Mr. Vasquez’s supervisor, Jason Anderson, Dkt. 40-1 at 10, appointed Kimberley 2 Danley2 to be the “lead trainer” for Vasquez and another employee hired with him, Jeremy 3 Douglas. Dkt. 41 ¶ 3; Dkt. 42 ¶ 5. Danley had started about six months before Mr. Vasquez. 4 Dkt. 41 ¶ 2. Mr. Vasquez believed Danley was not a supervisor, but rather a “peer,” the “exact 5 same [type of] computer technician” as he was. Dkt. 40-1 at 19. 6 Mr. Vasquez found working with Danley to be a challenge. See, e.g., id. at 12–13, 23, 27. 7 Mr. Vasquez told Anderson that he viewed Danley’s actions towards him, “including 8 interrupting him when he was on the phone with customers, as being ‘unprofessional[.]’” Dkt. 41 9 ¶ 10. For example, Mr. Vasquez told Anderson that Danley would stand over him and Douglas, 10 correcting them repeatedly and “aggressive[ly].” Dkt. 40-1 at 26. Mr. Vasquez felt that Danley 11 was “trying to assert her dominance.” Id. Mr. Vasquez brought his concerns to Anderson, but felt 12 they were “brushed aside.” Id. at 27. Anderson instructed Danley to sit next to Vasquez, “so that

13 she could be at the same level as him, when attempting to assist and train him.” Dkt. 41 ¶ 11; 14 Dkt. 42 ¶ 8. But Mr. Vasquez felt the issue remained unresolved. Dkt. 40-1 at 28. He explained 15 that Danley would “sit there and tell [him] what to do every opportunity she had.” Id. 16 The situation did not improve. Mr. Vasquez testified that the environment was 17 “emotionally toxic.” Id. at 29. He explained that it “started affecting [his] sleep,” placing a new 18 type of “mental stress” on him. Id. at 30. On November 4, 2022, Mr. Vasquez emailed Jodi 19 McCauley, a Human Resources Consultant with DVA, Dkt. 43 ¶ 2, to request information about 20 submitting a reasonable accommodation request. Dkt. 43-1 at 2. He hoped to work the shift he 21 had originally been hired for, so that he would no longer be forced to work with Danley. Dkt. 46- 22

23 2 Danley is sometimes referred to as Kimberley Johnsen in the record. See, e.g., id.; Dkt. 40-1 at 24 15. Danley changed her last name from Johnsen to Danley. Dkt. 42 ¶ 1. 1 4 at 1. McCauley emailed back on November 7, apologizing for the delay, and asking for more 2 information about the kind of request Mr. Vasquez hoped to make. Dkt. 46-3 at 1. 3 On November 8, Anderson emailed McCauley with a separation request for Mr. Vasquez.

4 Anderson explained that he had “determined [Mr. Vasquez] is not a fit to our Service Desk.” 5 Dkt. 41-2 at 2. His email explained that Mr. Vasquez “has been making negative comments 6 about other IT staff and that we do not need them because [he] does not understand what they 7 do.” Id. Anderson also noted that Mr. Vasquez “refuse[d] to work with some of his coworkers 8 because he did not like some interactions with them[.]” Id. Anderson set Mr. Vasquez’s date of 9 separation for November 14, 2022. Id. There is no evidence in the record that shows, or from 10 which a jury could reasonably infer, that Anderson knew Mr. Vasquez had reached out to HR 11 with questions about the reasonable accommodation process before Anderson sent his separation 12 request.

13 On the morning of November 9, Mr. Vasquez formally sent a request for a reasonable 14 accommodation to Anderson and McCauley. Dkt. 40-1 at 4, 15. Mr. Vasquez wanted to “work 15 the hours that [he] was hired to do” so that he could remove himself from “the hostile work 16 environment that [Danley] had made in the office[.]” Id. at 12. He attached to the request a letter 17 to Anderson dated November 8. Id. at 5. Vasquez clarified that he wrote the letter on November 18 8 but sent it the morning of November 9. Id. at 16. 19 But the accommodations request was never completed. Based on Anderson’s earlier 20 request, Mr. Vasquez was officially separated from his probationary appointment on November 21 14, 2022. Dkt. 40-1 at 6. 22 Mr. Vasquez filed this case on December 21, 2023. Dkt. 1. Mr. Vasquez brought

23 discrimination and retaliation claims (for firing and creating a hostile work environment under 24 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); failing to provide a reasonable accommodation under 1 Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; discrimination under Section 501; creating a 2 hostile work environment under the Rehabilitation Act; age discrimination under the Age 3 Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA); discrimination under the Americans with

4 Disabilities Act (ADA); and national origin discrimination under Title VII. Dkt. 7-1 at 6–16. 5 DVA filed two motions to dismiss Mr. Vasquez’s complaint. See generally Dkt. 12; Dkt. 16. 6 On August 22, 2024, this Court granted in part and denied in part DVA’s motions to 7 dismiss. See generally Dkt. 27. The Court dismissed Mr. Vasquez’s ADA, ADEA, Section 501, 8 Title VII retaliation, and Title VII national origin discrimination claims with prejudice and 9 without leave to amend. See generally id. However, the Court construed his hostile work 10 environment claim as arising under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and declined to dismiss 11 it. Id. at 8. DVA then filed a third motion to dismiss. Dkt. 29. The Court granted the motion 12 because Mr. Vasquez had not alleged that DVA received federal funding. Dkt. 36 at 2. But, the

13 Court noted, Mr. Vasquez could easily remedy this error and granted him leave to amend his 14 complaint. Id. Mr. Vasquez cured that defect through his second amended complaint. Dkt. 37. 15 On May 23, 2025, DVA moved for summary judgment on this remaining claim. Dkt. 39. 16 Mr. Vasquez responded, Dkt. 46, and DVA replied. Dkt. 47. Mr. Vasquez moved for leave to file 17 a surreply, Dkt. 48, which the Court granted. Dkt. 49. Mr. Vasquez filed his surreply on June 23, 18 2025. Dkt. 50. The motion is ripe, and the briefing is now complete. 19 III. LEGAL STANDARD “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 20 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 21 Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable 22 jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 23 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 24 1 (1986)). The moving party has the initial burden of “‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the 2 district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” 3 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party meets its initial burden,

4 the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that 5 there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The moving party is entitled to 6 judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an 7 essential element of a claim in the case on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. 8 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 9 Conclusory, nonspecific statements in affidavits are not sufficient, and “missing facts” 10 will not be presumed. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990). Generally, 11 “‘[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn 12 in his favor.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Anderson, 477

13 U.S. at 255). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of 14 legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Anderson, 477 U.S. 15 at 255. Consequently, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “a District Court must 16 resolve any factual issues of controversy in favor of the non-moving party . . . .” Lujan, 497 U.S. 17 at 888 (internal quotations omitted). 18 IV. DISCUSSION Mr. Vasquez’s remaining claims arise under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 19 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a 20 disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, 21 be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 22 receiving Federal financial assistance[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Mr. Vasquez’s second amended 23 24 1 complaint (SAC) alleges both a claim for hostile work environment and a claim for retaliation 2 for engaging in protected activity. Dkt. 37 ¶¶ 50–74.3 The Court takes each claim in turn. 3 A. Claim for Hostile Work Environment 4 To survive summary judgment on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must 5 show: “(1) that he was subjected to verbal or physical conduct related to a protected 6 characteristic; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently 7 severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive 8 work environment.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003). 9 “To determine whether conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive . . ., we look at all 10 the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it 11 is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 12 unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Simpson v. DeJoy, 641 F. Supp.

13 3d 772, 792 (D. Ariz. 2022) (quoting Vasquez, 239 F.3d at 642). “[T]he required showing of 14 severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or 15 frequency of the conduct.” Mattioda v. Nelson, 98 F.4th 1164, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation 16 omitted). “The conduct must be both subjectively and objectively abusive.” Id. at 1176 (citation 17 omitted). Thus, “isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) are not sufficient to create an 18 actionable claim.” Id.4 19 3 Mr. Vasquez’s SAC contains several other claims. See id. 8–13, 18–19. These claims were 20 dismissed in a prior order. See generally Dkt. 27. Only Mr. Vasquez’s Section 504 claims remain. 21 4 The Court cites cases considering hostile work environment claims under both the Americans 22 with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because the standards are essentially the same. See, e.g., Boose v. Tri–County Metro. Transp. Dist. of Oregon, 587 F.3d 23 997, 1001 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.11 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Because the ADA was modeled on section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 24 1 “Whether the workplace is objectively hostile must be determined from the perspective of 2 a reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics.” Simpson, 641 F. Supp. 3d at 792 3 (quoting Fuller v. City of Oakland, Cal., 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended

4 (1995)). “Key factors in determining whether a work environment is hostile include: the 5 frequency of the conduct; the severity of the conduct; whether the conduct is physically 6 threatening or humiliating, as opposed to a mere utterance; and whether the conduct 7 unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 8 23 (1993). 9 As explained briefly above, the moving party—here, DVA—has the initial burden of 10 showing that there is an absence of evidence of support for the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex, 11 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party meets that burden, the non-moving party—Mr. Vasquez— 12 must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S.

13 at 248; see also Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 14 (9th Cir. 2000) (If a moving party “carries its burden of production, the nonmoving party must 15 produce evidence to support its claim or defense.”) (citing cases). If the non-moving party cannot 16 set forth specific facts on an essential element of their claim, then the claim must be dismissed. 17 Id. 18 Here, DVA has met its initial burden of showing that there is no evidence that Danley’s 19 actions toward Mr. Vasquez, however problematic, were undertaken because of his disability. 20 Mr. Vasquez describes Danley’s behavior as “bullying,” “assert[ing] her dominance,” and being 21 unnecessarily “assertive.” Dkt. 40-1 at 26–27. He claims that she “would grab the phone out of 22

23 ‘courts have applied the same analysis to claims brought under both statutes.’”)); see also Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 285 F.3d 1226, 1229 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that cases 24 interpreting the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are “interchangeable”). 1 [his] hand” if he was not following instructions. Id. at 30. The constant yelling “mentally 2 disturbed” him, and he described her behavior as an utter lack of “professionalism.” Id. at 31. 3 But, as DVA notes, Mr. Vasquez never describes any behavior that might show that he

4 suffered this treatment “because of” his disability. See Bruce v. Becerra, No. 3:23-CV-00214- 5 JES-JLB, 2025 WL 1382867, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 13, 2025) (“Plaintiff has failed to set forth 6 plausible allegations that he suffered discrimination or harassment ‘because of” a disability.”). 7 The first prong of the hostile work environment test requires that Mr. Vasquez show that he was 8 subjected to verbal or physical conduct related to his disability. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642; 9 Manatt v. Bank of Am., 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003) (similar). DVA points out that 10 Mr. Vasquez admits that Danley did not “subject him to name calling or insults or other conduct 11 based on his disability.”5 Dkt. 39 at 13. 12 DVA has met its initial burden to point out the absence of evidence that Danley’s actions 13 were because of Mr. Vasquez’s disability. Consequently, Mr. Vasquez must produce evidence to 14 support his claim. See Nissan, 210 F.3d at 1103. 15 But Mr. Vasquez has not offered any evidence that Danley’s actions were because of or 16 related to his disability. Throughout his deposition testimony, he never once states that Danley 17 knew of his disability, mentioned his disability when berating him, or singled him out for hostile 18 conduct compared to peers without a disability. See Dkt. 40-1 at 8–39. She may have been 19 constantly “in [his] face” and “yelling” at him. Id. at 31. She also may have yelled at him while 20 5 DVA argues that the lack of “name calling or insults” based on Mr. Vasquez’s disability is 21 conclusive here. Dkt. 39 at 13. That is incorrect. A work environment has crossed the threshold if “hostile conduct pollutes the victim’s workplace, making it more difficult for her to do her job, to 22 take pride in her work, and to desire to stay on in her position.” Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1095 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 23 (9th Cir. 1994)). This does not mean that an individual must show that a coworker used slurs. See id. A broader scope of hostile conduct may meet this standard if it is tied to the plaintiff’s 24 protected characteristic and is severe or pervasive. 1 on the phone and acted in an “insulting” manner. Id. at 32. But, even taking these facts in the 2 light most favorable to Mr. Vasquez, there is no evidence that Danley’s hostility was related to 3 Mr. Vasquez’s disability.

4 Mr. Vasquez also does not offer evidence that he faced increased scrutiny from Danley 5 because of his disability. Rather, the evidence shows that Mr. Vasquez was treated the same as 6 his coworker, Douglas. Mr. Vasquez was hired at the same time as Douglas. Dkt. 41 ¶ 3. 7 Anderson assigned Danley to train them both. Id. 8 Mr. Vasquez explained in his deposition testimony that Danley micromanaged both him 9 and Douglas. See, e.g., Dkt. 40-1 at 23. For example, Mr. Vasquez described one frustrating 10 incident in which he was asked to collect new computers with Douglas. Id. Danley told 11 Mr. Vasquez and Douglas to “take the boxes of computers from that pallet and stack them up 12 onto that pallet, which is a very commonsense thing to do. But she had to assert her dominance

13 and tell us how to do it, where to put it, even though we already had instructions from our 14 supervisor[.]” Id. 15 Mr. Vasquez also explained that Danley stood behind both him and Douglas when she 16 trained them. Id. at 27–28. In his deposition, Mr. Vasquez stated: 17 [Danley’s] assertiveness and her bullying was not a training tool for us. It was not making us any better. She was just being very disruptive. And the condescending 18 wa[y] she would stand behind us and tell us what to do while we are speaking with a customer and try to explain how to do our jobs. We were very proficient in what 19 we did. She didn’t have to take that role. But Mr. Anderson, our supervisor, allowed that to keep going in the workplace because she never corrected any of her actions. 20 Id. 21 Thus, considering the record in the light most favorable to Mr. Vasquez, the Court 22 concludes that Mr. Vasquez has not offered any evidence to support the first requirement of a 23 hostile work environment claim. Accordingly, the claim is dismissed. 24 1 B. Claim for Retaliation 2 To establish a prima facie Section 504 retaliation claim a plaintiff must show 3 (1) involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link

4 between the two. Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 389 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation 5 omitted). 6 Mr. Vasquez has satisfied the first two elements. First, Mr. Vasquez made a request for a 7 reasonable accommodation. Dkt. 46-3 at 1; Dkt. 46-4 at 1. “Making a request for an 8 accommodation is a protected activity.” Steenmeyer v. Boeing Co., 92 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1031 9 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (citing Coons v. Secretary of U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887 (9th 10 Cir. 2004)). Thus, the first element is met. 11 Second, Mr. Vasquez suffered an adverse employment action. On November 14, just five 12 days after Mr. Vasquez made his request for accommodation, he was formally separated from

13 DVA. Dkt. 46-5 at 1. In the retaliation context, “an action is cognizable as an adverse 14 employment action if it is reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected 15 activity.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000). DVA terminated 16 Mr. Vasquez’s employment. Dkt. 46-5. That easily satisfies the second element. 17 But the final element poses a more difficult question. The Ninth Circuit has recognized 18 that in some cases “causation can be inferred from timing alone where an adverse employment 19 action follows on the heels of protected activity.” Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1064–65 (citation 20 omitted). Nevertheless, “timing alone will not show causation in all cases[.]” Id. at 1065 (citation 21 omitted). 22 Here, Mr. Vasquez emailed Carla Wilson in the Human Resources Department on

23 November 3. Dkt. 46-2 at 3. She responded on November 3, and copied his Human Resources 24 Representative, McCauley, on the email. Id. at 1–2. Mr. Vasquez began a new chain with 1 McCauley on November 4 to inquire about submitting a request to Anderson for a reasonable 2 accommodation. Dkt. 46-3 at 2. McCauley responded to him on November 7. Id. at 1. 3 On November 8, Anderson emailed McCauley to submit a formal separation request for

4 Mr. Vasquez. Dkt. 41-2 at 2. Anderson provided several reasons as to why he felt separation was 5 necessary. Id. Anderson planned for separation on November 14, to offer time to confer with 6 other relevant employees. Id. 7 On November 9, Mr. Vasquez emailed both Anderson and McCauley with his 8 accommodation request. Dkt. 46-4 at 1. Shortly after, McCauley responded that she would 9 follow up with him that day or the next. Dkt. 46-3 at 1. The Court does not know if McCauley 10 did so or if she ever began processing the request. 11 If there were some evidence from which a jury could infer that Anderson knew of 12 Mr. Vasquez’s forthcoming accommodation request when he made the separation decision, this

13 is a scenario where “causation [could] be inferred from timing alone[.]” Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 14 1065. Mr. Vasquez’s adverse employment action—his termination—followed closely “on the 15 heels of [his] protected activity”—the accommodation request. Id.; see also Dkt. 46-4 at 1; 16 Dkt. 41-2 at 2; Dkt. 46-5. 17 But the Supreme Court has held that “[e]mployers need not suspend previously planned 18 transfers upon discovering that a Title VII suit has been filed, and their proceeding along lines 19 previously contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no evidence whatever of 20 causality.” Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272 (2001). Later cases have 21 explained that “[t]he fact that an adverse employment action occurred after a complaint was 22 lodged is ‘immaterial’ when the employer was already contemplating the action.”

23 See, e.g., Handson v. Overlake Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. C15-1772RSL, 2017 WL 1438037, at *7 24 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2017) (citing Breeden, 532 U.S. at 268); see also Shelley v. Bank of Am., 1 N.A., No. CV-10-5124 RMP, 2011 WL 5835126, at *6 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 2011) (“While 2 proximity in time may be a factor in determining whether an employer acted with retaliatory 3 purpose, evidence that an employer discharged an employee after it discovered that the employee

4 filed a complaint with the EEOC is immaterial where, as here, the employer had contemplated 5 that particular course of action prior to knowing of the complaint.”) (citation omitted). 6 Here, Anderson’s decision to separate Mr. Vasquez was made before Anderson knew of 7 the request. Dkt. 41 ¶ 15; Dkt. 43 ¶ 8. DVA has offered evidence that McCauley did not discuss 8 the accommodation request with Anderson before she received the November 8 separation 9 request. Dkt. 43 ¶ 8. And she did not play any role in the separation decision. Id.; see also 10 Dkt. 41 ¶ 14. DVA has also offered evidence that Anderson had “no knowledge of any request 11 by [Mr.] Vasquez for a reasonable accommodation prior to [his] decision to probationary 12 separate him.” Id. ¶ 16.

13 In response, Mr. Vasquez points the Court to an October 28 email to Anderson. Dkt. 46- 14 12. Mr. Vasquez states in the email that he feels he has met enough training goals and is prepared 15 to begin his morning shift. Id. at 1. The email certainly predates Anderson’s formal request to 16 separate Mr. Vasquez. See id. But Mr. Vasquez does not mention or allude to his disability in the 17 email. Id. Mr. Vasquez has not alleged that his need for a reasonable accommodation was 18 discussed before he sent the email. See id.; see also Dkt. 46; Dkt. 50. In his surreply, 19 Mr. Vasquez details only the November timeline, explaining: 20 Plaintiff submitted his request for reasonable accommodation on November 9, 2022, and was terminated on November 14, 2022. This five-day window, combined 21 with Defendant’s failure to address the accommodation or conduct any investigation, raises a genuine issue of material fact. Whether Plaintiff’s request 22 influenced the final decision is a question for the jury. Moreover, Defendant has not shown that the termination decision was finalized prior to November 9. 23 24 1 Dkt. 50 at 2. Mr. Vasquez is correct that, if Anderson had known of his request, there would be a 2 || genuine issue of material fact for the jury. But Mr. Vasquez has not offered any evidence to 3 counter Anderson and McCauley’s evidence that Anderson was unaware—an essential element 4 of causation. See, e.g., Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 797 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[A]t the 5 || time [the district manager] made the decision that directly resulted in the adverse action against 6 [one of the plaintiffs], he did not know that she had engaged in a protected activity. This breaks 7 || the requisite causal link[.]”); Gleason v. Filter Holdings, LLC, 737 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1070 (D. 8 Or. 2024) (explaining that the plaintiff needed to establish that the manager who made the 9 decision to transfer knew of her protected activity). 10 Thus, there are no remaining questions of material fact as to whether DVA retaliated 11 against Mr. Vasquez for his accommodation request. This claim is also dismissed. 12 Vv. CONCLUSION 13 For these reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 39, is GRANTED. The case

14 is DISMISSED with prejudice. 15 The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel of record and

16 || any party appearing pro se at said party’s last known address.

17 Dated this 8th day of July, 2025.

19 Tiffany M. Cartwright United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24