Vasquez-Merced v. Piovanetti-Lopez

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Vasquez-Merced v. Piovanetti-Lopez

243 A.D.2d 331, 662 N.Y.S.2d 766, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9885

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 16, 1997

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 243 A.D.2d 331 (Vasquez-Merced v. Piovanetti-Lopez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Vasquez-Merced v. Piovanetti-Lopez, 243 A.D.2d 331, 662 N.Y.S.2d 766, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9885 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).

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Opinion

Order, Family Court, New York County (Judith Sheindlin, J.), entered June 28, 1995, which dismissed respondent’s application for a downward modification of child support, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Family Court correctly held that the parties’ stipulation, approved by the Superior Court of Puerto Rico in August 1994, resolved any issues raised by respondent’s application for downward modification made in March 1994. In any event, even if we were to deem the instant application as one newly made after approval of the stipulation (cf, Matter of Funt v Funt, 65 NY2d 893), we would find no change in respondent’s circumstances since that time warranting a downward modification. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Rosenberger, Rubin and Andrias, JJ.

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Order, Family Court, New York County (Judith Sheindlin, J.), entered June 28, 1995, which dismissed respondent’s application for a downward modification of child support, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Family Court correctly held that the parties’ stipulation, approved by the Superior Court of Puerto Rico in August 1994, resolved any issues raised by respondent’s application for downward modification made in March 1994. In any event, even if we were to deem the instant application as one newly made after approval of the stipulation (cf, Matter of Funt v Funt, 65 NY2d 893), we would find no change in respondent’s circumstances since that time warranting a downward modification. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Rosenberger, Rubin and Andrias, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

243 A.D.2d 331, 662 N.Y.S.2d 766, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9885, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vasquez-merced-v-piovanetti-lopez-nyappdiv-1997.

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