AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed July 23, 2013.
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-12-00412-CR
JASON ELI VASQUEZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F11-54710-M
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Moseley, Bridges, and Lang-Miers Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers
Appellant Jason Eli Vasquez appeals his conviction for murder. After appellant pleaded
guilty, a jury assessed his punishment at seventy years’ imprisonment. In one issue on appeal,
appellant argues that the trial court erred in excusing a prospective juror for cause. Because all
dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a),
47.4. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
During voir dire examination, the following exchange took place:
The Court: [Prospective juror], how are you, we brought you back in here because I have information that suggests that a person with the name of [prospective juror] was convicted of several theft cases? Prospective Juror: No.
The Court: Theft by check?
Prospective Juror: No.
The Court: Your date of birth June 1, 1959?
Prospective Juror: Yes, I have never been convicted of a check case.
The Court: Any questions from the State?
[Defense Attorney]: No questions.
[Prosecuting Attorney]: No questions, Your Honor, I believe the juror is qualified.
The Court: The dates I have are ’91 for one case and 1987 for the other case?
Prospective Juror: Ninety-one, and ’87, I haven’t been convicted of anything, so ...
The Court: Have you been charged with?
Prospective Juror: Eighty-seven, 91.
The Court: I actually show three cases, one was dismissed and two shows that you pled guilty to it?
Prospective Juror: No, I have never pled guilty to a check case. I had in ’97 there may have been, you know, where I had written a check, but that was taken care of. But I never had to do court or never any convictions, never any pleading guilty, no contest or anything of that nature.
[Prosecuting Attorney]: Can you just state your name for the record?
Prospective Juror: [Stated name.]
The Court: Mr. Jamison, any questions.
[Defense Attorney]: No questions, Your Honor. I believe she is qualified.
The Court: You may step outside, ma’am.
[Prosecuting Attorney]: Thank you, ma’am.
–2– Judge we would resubmit that her name and date of birth match. That she does remember having a theft by check case in ’87 [sic], which matches up with some, we believe she is one and the same as the person convicted.
The Court: Any response?
[Defense Attorney]: We would oppose that, Your Honor. I mean—
The Court: I am going to grant the State’s strike on the basis that the juror did say that she did have a theft case and that it was taken care of.
[Prosecuting Attorney]: And you said State’s strike.
The Court: For cause.
[Defense Attorney]: It is my understanding that she had a check case.
The Court: That’s what she has here, theft by check.
After the completion of voir dire, the State and the defense used all of their peremptory
challenges on other venirepersons.
APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
When it appears that a juror has been convicted of misdemeanor theft or a felony, the
juror is absolutely disqualified. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 35.16(a)(2), 35.19 (West
2006); Loughry v. State, 926 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref’d). We
review a trial court’s ruling on an absolute disqualification for an abuse of discretion. Chambers
v. State, 903 S.W.2d 21, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A trial court’s ruling on an absolute
disqualification is a question of fact. Id.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the trial court erred because the trial court excused the prospective
juror for cause based upon “unidentified information” in the court’s possession that a person with
the same name and birth date as the prospective juror had previous convictions for theft by
check. Appellant contends that “this Court should follow the logic and holding of Loughry[,]”
–3– 926 S.W.2d at 383–85, and conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in excusing the
prospective juror for cause. In Loughry, a prospective juror denied that she had been convicted
of theft. Id. at 384. But the State claimed that it had records showing that a person with her
name, birth date, and social security number had a theft conviction and challenged the
prospective juror for cause. Id. at 383–84. The trial court granted the State’s motion over the
defense’s objection. Id. at 384. On appeal, the court held that the trial court had abused its
discretion by improperly granting the State’s challenge for cause of the prospective juror. Id. at
383, 385. The court of appeals concluded:
[W]here, as here, a venireperson unequivocally denies a theft or felony conviction and the defendant questions the source of the State’s information supporting the challenge for cause, the State must disclose the basis for its information. For a trial court to determine that a venireperson is absolutely disqualified on the basis of indeterminate “records” and “evidence” in the possession of the prosecutor is an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 385.
Appellant recognizes that this case differs from Loughry because the trial court, rather
than the prosecution, possessed the information concerning the previous convictions, but
contends that “this appears to be a distinction without a difference.” Appellant argues that,
“without knowing the source of the information[,]” it was impossible for the defense to
determine the reliability of the information that the trial court possessed at the time the trial court
excused the prospective juror for cause and it is impossible for this Court to determine the
reliability of the information on appeal. Appellant also argues that it is impossible to determine
whether the information the trial court possessed was more reliable than the “repeated testimony,
under oath” of the prospective juror—whose name was “hardly an uncommon name”—that she
had no criminal convictions.
–4– The State argues that this case is distinguishable from Loughry because, here, (1) the trial
court, and not the State, possessed the records indicating the prospective juror’s previous
convictions, (2) appellant never challenged the records that the trial court possessed or requested
their disclosure, and (3) the prospective juror “admitted to having a prior theft by check case that
had been ‘taken care of.’”
We agree with the State that this case is distinguishable from Loughry. Here, the
prospective juror’s response that “in ’97 there may have been, you know, where I had written a
check, but that was taken care of” did not constitute an unequivocal denial that she had been
convicted of theft. Although she asserted that she “never had to do court or never any
convictions, never any pleading guilty, no contest or anything of that nature[,]” it was not clear
how the situation where she had “written a check” had been “taken care of.” In addition,
appellant did not question the source of the information that indicated that the prospective juror
had theft convictions as the defendant did in Loughry.
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AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed July 23, 2013.
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-12-00412-CR
JASON ELI VASQUEZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F11-54710-M
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Moseley, Bridges, and Lang-Miers Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers
Appellant Jason Eli Vasquez appeals his conviction for murder. After appellant pleaded
guilty, a jury assessed his punishment at seventy years’ imprisonment. In one issue on appeal,
appellant argues that the trial court erred in excusing a prospective juror for cause. Because all
dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(a),
47.4. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
During voir dire examination, the following exchange took place:
The Court: [Prospective juror], how are you, we brought you back in here because I have information that suggests that a person with the name of [prospective juror] was convicted of several theft cases? Prospective Juror: No.
The Court: Theft by check?
Prospective Juror: No.
The Court: Your date of birth June 1, 1959?
Prospective Juror: Yes, I have never been convicted of a check case.
The Court: Any questions from the State?
[Defense Attorney]: No questions.
[Prosecuting Attorney]: No questions, Your Honor, I believe the juror is qualified.
The Court: The dates I have are ’91 for one case and 1987 for the other case?
Prospective Juror: Ninety-one, and ’87, I haven’t been convicted of anything, so ...
The Court: Have you been charged with?
Prospective Juror: Eighty-seven, 91.
The Court: I actually show three cases, one was dismissed and two shows that you pled guilty to it?
Prospective Juror: No, I have never pled guilty to a check case. I had in ’97 there may have been, you know, where I had written a check, but that was taken care of. But I never had to do court or never any convictions, never any pleading guilty, no contest or anything of that nature.
[Prosecuting Attorney]: Can you just state your name for the record?
Prospective Juror: [Stated name.]
The Court: Mr. Jamison, any questions.
[Defense Attorney]: No questions, Your Honor. I believe she is qualified.
The Court: You may step outside, ma’am.
[Prosecuting Attorney]: Thank you, ma’am.
–2– Judge we would resubmit that her name and date of birth match. That she does remember having a theft by check case in ’87 [sic], which matches up with some, we believe she is one and the same as the person convicted.
The Court: Any response?
[Defense Attorney]: We would oppose that, Your Honor. I mean—
The Court: I am going to grant the State’s strike on the basis that the juror did say that she did have a theft case and that it was taken care of.
[Prosecuting Attorney]: And you said State’s strike.
The Court: For cause.
[Defense Attorney]: It is my understanding that she had a check case.
The Court: That’s what she has here, theft by check.
After the completion of voir dire, the State and the defense used all of their peremptory
challenges on other venirepersons.
APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
When it appears that a juror has been convicted of misdemeanor theft or a felony, the
juror is absolutely disqualified. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 35.16(a)(2), 35.19 (West
2006); Loughry v. State, 926 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref’d). We
review a trial court’s ruling on an absolute disqualification for an abuse of discretion. Chambers
v. State, 903 S.W.2d 21, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A trial court’s ruling on an absolute
disqualification is a question of fact. Id.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the trial court erred because the trial court excused the prospective
juror for cause based upon “unidentified information” in the court’s possession that a person with
the same name and birth date as the prospective juror had previous convictions for theft by
check. Appellant contends that “this Court should follow the logic and holding of Loughry[,]”
–3– 926 S.W.2d at 383–85, and conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in excusing the
prospective juror for cause. In Loughry, a prospective juror denied that she had been convicted
of theft. Id. at 384. But the State claimed that it had records showing that a person with her
name, birth date, and social security number had a theft conviction and challenged the
prospective juror for cause. Id. at 383–84. The trial court granted the State’s motion over the
defense’s objection. Id. at 384. On appeal, the court held that the trial court had abused its
discretion by improperly granting the State’s challenge for cause of the prospective juror. Id. at
383, 385. The court of appeals concluded:
[W]here, as here, a venireperson unequivocally denies a theft or felony conviction and the defendant questions the source of the State’s information supporting the challenge for cause, the State must disclose the basis for its information. For a trial court to determine that a venireperson is absolutely disqualified on the basis of indeterminate “records” and “evidence” in the possession of the prosecutor is an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 385.
Appellant recognizes that this case differs from Loughry because the trial court, rather
than the prosecution, possessed the information concerning the previous convictions, but
contends that “this appears to be a distinction without a difference.” Appellant argues that,
“without knowing the source of the information[,]” it was impossible for the defense to
determine the reliability of the information that the trial court possessed at the time the trial court
excused the prospective juror for cause and it is impossible for this Court to determine the
reliability of the information on appeal. Appellant also argues that it is impossible to determine
whether the information the trial court possessed was more reliable than the “repeated testimony,
under oath” of the prospective juror—whose name was “hardly an uncommon name”—that she
had no criminal convictions.
–4– The State argues that this case is distinguishable from Loughry because, here, (1) the trial
court, and not the State, possessed the records indicating the prospective juror’s previous
convictions, (2) appellant never challenged the records that the trial court possessed or requested
their disclosure, and (3) the prospective juror “admitted to having a prior theft by check case that
had been ‘taken care of.’”
We agree with the State that this case is distinguishable from Loughry. Here, the
prospective juror’s response that “in ’97 there may have been, you know, where I had written a
check, but that was taken care of” did not constitute an unequivocal denial that she had been
convicted of theft. Although she asserted that she “never had to do court or never any
convictions, never any pleading guilty, no contest or anything of that nature[,]” it was not clear
how the situation where she had “written a check” had been “taken care of.” In addition,
appellant did not question the source of the information that indicated that the prospective juror
had theft convictions as the defendant did in Loughry. And the Loughry court concluded that the
trial court abused its discretion when the trial court based its determination on “indeterminate
‘records’ and ‘evidence’ in the possession of the prosecutor[,]” which is not the case here where
the trial court possessed the records and evidence. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.21
(West 2006) (“The court is the judge, after proper examination, of the qualifications of a juror,
and shall decide all challenges without delay and without argument thereupon.”)
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing the prospective
juror for cause and resolve appellant’s sole issue against him.
–5– CONCLUSION
We resolve appellant’s sole issue against him and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Elizabeth Lang-Miers/ ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS JUSTICE
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47
120412F.U05
–6– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JASON ELI VASQUEZ, Appellant On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas No. 05-12-00412-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F11-54710-M. Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers, THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Moseley and Bridges participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 23rd day of July, 2013.
–7–