Varnit v. Varnit

Opinion

Varnit v Varnit

2026 NY Slip Op 04893

August 5, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Michael Varnit, appellant,

v

Shelly Varnit, respondent.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 5, 2026

2022-10154, (Index No. 53953/18)

Betsy Barros, J.P.

Helen Voutsinas

Donna-Marie E. Golia

Phillip Hom, JJ.

Hasapidis Law Offices, South Salem, NY (Annette G. Hasapidis of counsel), for appellant.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment dated March 31, 2022, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Nancy Quinn Koba, J.), dated November 7, 2022. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the defendant's motion for an award of counsel fees for Lauren Raysor, granted the defendant's separate motion for an award of counsel fees for Helen Wu, and denied those branches of the plaintiff's separate cross-motions which were to direct the defendant to reimburse the plaintiff for 50% of the fees for the trial testimony of a court-appointed forensic evaluator.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The parties were divorced by judgment dated March 31, 2022, after a nonjury trial. The defendant subsequently made separate motions for awards of counsel fees for her two attorneys, Lauren Raysor and Helen Wu. The plaintiff opposed. In addition, the plaintiff, who had paid almost all of the fees for the trial testimony of a court-appointed forensic evaluator, made two separate cross-motions, inter alia, to direct the defendant to reimburse the plaintiff for 50% of those fees. The Supreme Court granted the defendant's motions and denied those branches of the plaintiff's cross-motions. The plaintiff appeals.

Domestic Relations Law § 237 creates a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse. "'An award of counsel fees pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237(a) is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the issue is controlled by the equities and circumstances of each particular case'" (Fugazy v Fugazy, 210 AD3d 653, 655 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Sufia v Khalique, 189 AD3d 1499, 1502).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant's separate motions for an award of counsel fees. In a decision after trial, the court found that the defendant was the less monied spouse. The plaintiff did not, in his submissions to the court, successfully rebut the presumption under Domestic Relations Law § 237(a) that the defendant was entitled to payment of counsel fees. The court's award of counsel fees was based on the total financial circumstances of the parties, including the equitable distribution of assets between the parties and the plaintiff's separate property as well as the overall circumstances of this litigation (see Piccininni v Piccininni, 176 AD3d 880). Given the plaintiff's failure to demonstrate that his assets [*2]or his income had changed since the decision after trial, the court providently exercised its discretion in awarding counsel fees to the defendant.

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying those branches of the plaintiff's separate cross-motions which were to direct the defendant to reimburse him for 50% of the fees for the trial testimony of the court-appointed forensic evaluator (see Marchese v Marchese, 185 AD3d 571, 574; Greco v Greco, 161 AD3d 950, 952; Carlin v Carlin, 120 AD3d 734, 736).

BARROS, J.P., VOUTSINAS, GOLIA and HOM, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court