Varketta v. General Motors Corp.

295 N.E.2d 219, 34 Ohio App. 2d 1, 63 Ohio Op. 2d 8, 1973 Ohio App. LEXIS 863
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 12, 1973
Docket31635
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 295 N.E.2d 219 (Varketta v. General Motors Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Varketta v. General Motors Corp., 295 N.E.2d 219, 34 Ohio App. 2d 1, 63 Ohio Op. 2d 8, 1973 Ohio App. LEXIS 863 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973).

Opinion

KrEnzleR, J.

Plaintiff, Deborah Varketta, a minor, and her parents, filed a complaint in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County for money only against the defendants, Callender Chevrolet, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Callender, and General Motors Corporation, hereinafter referred to as General Motors.

The complaint alleges that the defendant, General Motors, is licensed to do business in Ohio and that it manufactures and sells automobiles through dealerships; that the defendant, Callender, is a dealership located in Ashta-bula,. Ohio, and is engaged in the business of selling automobiles to the general public.

Plaintiffs further allege that the defendant, Callender, sold plaintiff, James Varketta, a 1966 Chevrolet, which was manufactured and constructed by defendant, General Motors.

The substance of the balance of the complaint is that an accident occurred, and as a result of the accident the plaintiff, Deborah Varketta, sustained injuries and damages, for which she is seeking judgment against the defendants. Her parents are seeking recovery from defendants of sums expended for medical care and treatment of Deborah,

*3 General Motors answered by general denial. Defendant, Callender, answered by general denial and also asserted the affirmative defense of contributory negligence.

On May 28,1971, Callender raised the issue of improper venue (C. R. 3(C)(1)) by filing a motion to transfer the complaint to the Ashtabula County Common Pleas Court, Civil Rule 12 (B)(3). Callender maintains that venue is not properly laid in Cuyahoga County because it is an automobile agency in Ashtabula, Ohio, and Civil Rule 3(B) (2) requires that the action be brought in Ashtabula County. Further, the principal place of business of the co-defendant, General Motors, is not in Cuyahoga County but in Detroit, Michigan.

The plaintiff argues against the motion to transfer and maintains that when there are multiple defendants the plaintiff may bring the action where venue is proper as to any one defendant, and that because General Motors has appointed an agent to receive service of process in Cuya-hoga County, Civil Rule 3 (B) (11) provides an available forum in this county against General Motors, and consequently, Civil Rule 3(E) makes Cuyahoga County the proper forum against defendant Callender. In other words, the plaintiff maintains that because venue is proper in Cuya-hoga County as to the defendant, General Motors, under Civil Rule 3 (B) (31), it is a proper forum as to the remaining defendant, Callender, under Civil Rule 3(E).

Defendant, General Motors, filed a brief in opposition to the motion to transfer and agrees with plaintiffs’ position and: argues that venue is properly laid in Cuyahoga County, because General Motors maintains several places of business in this County and has appointed the CT Corporation as its statutory agent for service of process. Civil Rule 3(B) (11). Defendant, General Motors, also contends that because Cuyahoga County is the proper forum as to General Motors under Civil Rule 3(B) (11) it is the proper' forum as to all parties in a multi-party suit under the pro-visions of Civil Rule 3(E), and since venue is properly laid for General Motors in Cuyahoga County, venue is proper for the co-defendant, Callender.

*4 The trial court granted the motion to transfer the case from Cuyahoga County to Ashtabula County. The trial court found that the plaintiffs are residents of Ashtabula County, that the defendant, Callender, has its principal place of business in Ashtabula County, and that the defendant, General Motors, does not have its principal place of business in Cuyahoga County within the meaning and intent of Civil Rule 3(B) (2), and that the proper venue lies in Ashtabula County, the principal place of business of defendant, Callender, under Civil Buie 3(B) (2).

Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to this court and have assigned the following errors:

1. The court committed prejudicial error in granting a motion for a change of venue by one of the defendants when the action was properly venued as to the other defendant pursuant to Buie 3 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. '

2. The court committed prejudicial error in not holding and determining that a summons and process may issue to a non-resident defendant when the action is properly venued as to the other defendant in an action where there are multiple defendants.

3. The court committed prejudicial error in ordering the transfer of this action to Ashtabula County upon the motion of only one defendant in a joint action against two defendants, especially where one of the defendants made no objection to the venue of the action.

The issues in this case will be determined by an interpretation of Civil Rules 3(B)(1) through (11), 3(C)(1) and 3(E), which are recited below.

C. R. 3(B) Venue: Where proper. Any action may be venued, commenced and decided in any court in any county. When applied to county and municipal courts “county” as used in this rule shall be construed where appropriate, as the territorial limits of those courts. Proper venue lies in any one or more of the following counties:

(1) The county in which the defendant resides;

(2) The county in which the defendant has his principal place of business;

*5 (3) A county in which the defendant conducted activity which gave rise to the claim for relief;

(4) A county in which a public officer maintains his principal office if suit is brought against him in his official capacity;

(5) A county in which the property, or any part thereof, is situated if the subject of the action is real property or tangible personal property;

(6) The county in which all or a part of the claim for relief arose; or, if the claim for relief arose upon a river, or other watercourse, or a road, which is the boundary of the state, or of two or more counties, in any county bordering on such river, watercourse, or road, and opposite to the place where the claim for relief arose;

(7) In actions described in Rule 4.3 (out-of-state service) in the county where plaintiff resides;

(8) In an action against an executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee, in the county in which he was appointed;

(9) In actions for divorce, annulment or for alimony in the county in which the plaintiff is and has been a resident for at least ninety days immediately preceding the filing of the complaint;

(10) If there is no available forum in subsections (1) through (9) of this subdivision, in the county in which plaintiff resides; has his principal place of business or regularly and systemically conducts business activity;

(11) If there is no available forum in subsections (1) through (10) of this subdivision:

(a) In a county in which defendant has property or debts owing to him subject to attachment or garnishment;

(b) In a county in which defendant has appointed an agent to receive service of process or wherein such agent has been appointed by operation of law.

O. R. 3(0) Change of venue.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
295 N.E.2d 219, 34 Ohio App. 2d 1, 63 Ohio Op. 2d 8, 1973 Ohio App. LEXIS 863, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/varketta-v-general-motors-corp-ohioctapp-1973.