Vanja Kojuharova v. Petar Stefanov.

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court
DecidedJuly 24, 2025
Docket24-P-0509
StatusUnpublished

This text of Vanja Kojuharova v. Petar Stefanov. (Vanja Kojuharova v. Petar Stefanov.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vanja Kojuharova v. Petar Stefanov., (Mass. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-509

VANJA KOJUHAROVA

vs.

PETAR STEFANOV.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Vanja Kojuharova (mother) appeals from an October 26, 2023

modification judgment (second modification judgment) entered by

a judge of the Probate and Family Court, modifying the parties'

divorce judgment to alter the amount of child support owed by

Petar Stefanov (father). Specifically, the mother challenges

the portions of the second modification judgment related to the

attribution of her current gross income, the calculation of the

father's gross income, and the retroactive date from which the

father owes child support. For reasons stated below, we affirm

in part and vacate in part.

Background. We summarize the trial judge's relevant

findings, supplementing them with undisputed facts in the record, and reserving other facts for later discussion. See

Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 288 (2009).

On October 19, 2017, the parties divorced and shared legal

custody of their three children, with the mother having primary

physical custody. The husband was obligated to pay the wife

$265 per week in child support. At the time of the divorce, the

mother worked as a senior software engineer at Harvard

University and the father worked as a biomedical manufacturing

technician at Fikst,1 an engineering consultant.

Two years later, on November 5, 2019, the father filed a

complaint for modification seeking primary physical custody of

their oldest child, and a recalculation of child support

payments. On November 21, 2019, a Probate and Family Court

judge issued a temporary order granting the father primary

physical custody of the oldest child and ordering weekly

parenting time with the mother. On June 3, 2020, the mother

filed her own complaint for modification. After a trial, on May

25, 2021, a Probate and Family Court judge issued a modification

of judgment (first modification judgment) to reflect the

significant changes in circumstances since the original support

agreement -- mainly the fact that the oldest child had been

living with the father, as agreed to by the parties. After

1 In 2022, the husband's employer, FIKST, was acquired by his current employee, Rebuild FIKST.

2 applying the Child Support Guidelines, the father's child

support obligation was removed and the mother was obligated to

pay weekly child support to the father.

On March 16, 2022, the mother filed a complaint for

modification on the May 25, 2021 modification of judgment and

soon after filed a motion to suspend child support. On June 22,

2022, a trial commenced on the sole issue of the mother's

request for a reduction or elimination of child support. On

October 26, 2023, a second modification judgment was issued by a

judge in the Probate and Family Court, terminating the mother's

obligation to pay weekly child support and renewing the father's

obligation to pay child support. The mother subsequently filed

a motion to amend the second modification judgment, which was

denied. This appeal followed.2

Discussion. The mother's argument centers around her

disagreement with the judge's findings regarding both the

mother's salary and the father's salary when determining the

final child support obligation. Under G. L. c. 209C, § 9 (a),

"if the court finds a parent chargeable with the support of a

child," the court shall order the parent, in accordance with

G. L. c. 209C, § 9 (c), to make payments "toward the current

2 The notice of appeal did not address the motion to amend the second modification judgment and on appeal the mother makes no separate argument related to it.

3 support and maintenance of the child." See Department of

Revenue v. Mason M., 439 Mass. 665, 669 (2003). To determine

the specific amount of child support, judges are required to

follow the Massachusetts Child Support Guidelines (guidelines).

See G. L. c. 209C, § 9 (c); Mason M., supra. "Our review of a

child support modification judgment is limited to whether the

judge's factual findings were clearly erroneous, whether there

were other errors of law, and whether the judge appears to have

based [her] decision on the exercise of sound discretion."

Lizardo v. Ortega, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 687, 691-692 (2017). "The

standard of review reflects substantial, but not unlimited,

deference to the judge who saw the witnesses and heard the

evidence." Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 293 (2009).

1. Attribution of income to the mother. In the second

modification judgment, the judge determined that for child

support purposes the mother's gross weekly income was $2,541.

The mother argues that the judge abused her discretion in making

this determination because this figure is an estimation of the

mother's total gross income if she worked full-time, rather than

a reflection of her actual gross income, which is twenty percent

less because of her reduced hours. We disagree.

It is within the province of the trial judge to make income

attributions "where a finding has been made that either party is

capable of working and is unemployed or underemployed." Fehrm-

4 Cappuccino v. Cappuccino, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 525, 531 (2016),

quoting Child Support Guidelines § I.E. Relevant factors that

the court considers when determining income level include the

needs and care of the children, specific circumstances of the

parent, and the availability of employment at the attributed

income level. See Child Support Guidelines § I.E. (2023).

Additionally, "[i]f the Court makes a determination that either

party is earning less than he or she could earn through

reasonable effort, the Court should consider potential earning

capacity rather than actual earnings in making its child support

order." Id. at § I.E.(2).

In this case, we discern no abuse of discretion where the

judge considered all relevant factors when determining that the

mother's full-time salary should be attributed for calculating

child support. Here, the mother by her own admission had

initially reduced her hours to eighty percent because of the

COVID-19 pandemic and the unique demand for childcare at the

time. However, the judge made specific findings that the

children have since returned to full-time in-person school in

the fall of 2021. The mother alleges that she is still unable

to return to full-time work despite the availability of

increased hours because of demands related to the children's

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Related

Hoegen v. Hoegen
43 N.E.3d 718 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2016)
Fehrm-Cappuccino v. Cappuccino
90 Mass. App. Ct. 525 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2016)
Levitan v. Rosen
124 N.E.3d 148 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2019)
Boulter-Hedley v. Boulter
711 N.E.2d 596 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1999)
Department of Revenue v. Mason M.
790 N.E.2d 671 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2003)
Pierce v. Pierce
916 N.E.2d 330 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2009)
Johnston v. Johnston
649 N.E.2d 799 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1995)
Chace v. Curran
881 N.E.2d 792 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2008)
Whelan v. Whelan
908 N.E.2d 858 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 2009)

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Bluebook (online)
Vanja Kojuharova v. Petar Stefanov., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vanja-kojuharova-v-petar-stefanov-massappct-2025.