Vanecek v. Vanecek
This text of 517 P.2d 1206 (Vanecek v. Vanecek) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This appeal involves the nature of service required to give the domestic relations court jurisdiction [174]*174to modify so much of a divorce or dissolution-of-marriage decree as provides for the custody, support and welfare of minor children.
In 1971, prior to the effective date of the present “dissolution” statutes, the plaintiff, hereinafter called the mother, filed a suit for divorce, seeking a divorce and custody of the minor children, including custody of a four-year-old child who is the subject of the controversy at bar.
In 1972, the defendant, hereinafter called the father, moved the domestic relations court for an order transferring custody of the child to him. He attempted to serve the motion upon the mother by mailing a copy to the attorney who had represented her in the divorce case.
In any event, no appearance on the motion was [175]*175made by or on behalf of the mother, and an ex parte order was entered on December 22, 1972, transferring custody of the child from the mother to the father. Immediately thereafter the father obtained physical custody of the child and continues to have the child with him.
ORS 107.135, adopted by the 1971 legislature as part of the dissolution-of-marriage law, modified the former statutory provision relating to the power of the court to modify custody decrees by adding the italicized language:
“(1) The court has the power at any time after a decree is given, upon the motion of either party and after service of notice on the other party in the manner provided by law for service of a summons, to:
“(a) * * * modify so much of the decree as may provide for the * * * custody * * * of the minor children * * *.
ÍÍ-M # * # # 3?
Why the father, when he could not find the mother within the state, did not obtain service by publication, [176]*176ORS 15.110,15.130 (2), we need not consider here since we dismiss the appeal because an order quashing service is not an appealable order.
“* * * [A]n order quashing service of summons, regardless of the trial court’s reasons, is not appealable. If the plaintiff cannot by any means proceed any further, or prefers not to do so, he must secure a judgment of dismissal in order to obtain review * * *" Ter Har v. Backus, 256 Or 288, 290, 473 P2d 143 (1970).
By the same token, we find it difficult to' understand why the mother merely moved to quash service rather than moving to set aside the order transferring custody on the ground that it was void for want of jurisdiction. See, Salitan et al v. Dashney et al, 219 Or 553, 347 P2d 974, 81 ALR2d 532 (1959).
Hopefully, if everyone involved concerns himself primarily with the welfare of the child, any further proceedings deemed' desirable in the interest of the child’s welfare will take place before he is again moved. See, R. v. R., 15 Or App 464, 516 P2d 476 (1973).
Appeal dismissed.
We are here dealing only with the power of a domestic relations court and not with the power of a juvenile court to affect the status of children.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
517 P.2d 1206, 16 Or. App. 173, 1974 Ore. App. LEXIS 1156, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vanecek-v-vanecek-orctapp-1974.