Vanderlan v. Jackson HMA LLC

District Court, S.D. Mississippi·Decided May 20, 2025·No. 3:23-cv-00258·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI NORTHERN DIVISION

W. BLAKE VANDERLAN, M.D. PLAINTIFF V. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-CV-258-DPJ-ASH JACKSON HMA, LLC D/B/A CENTRAL MISSISSIPPI MEDICAL CENTER A/K/A MERIT HEALTH CENTRAL – JACKSON DEFENDANT

ORDER

This case is before the Court following an in camera review of documents either withheld from production or produced with redactions by Defendant Jackson HMA, LLC, d/b/a Central Mississippi Medical Center a/k/a Merit Health Central – Jackson. See Order [165] at 21‒23. Plaintiff W. Blake Vanderlan, M.D., challenges Jackson HMA’s assertion of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine as to the withheld and redacted documents. Having reviewed unredacted copies of the documents in question, the Court rules as follows.1 The attorney-client privilege “limits the normally broad disclosure requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.” EEOC v. BDO USA, L.L.P., 876 F.3d 690, 695 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 232 F.R.D. 467, 472 (E.D. Pa. 2005)). A party asserting that a communication is covered by the privilege “must prove: (1) that [it] made a confidential communication; (2) to a lawyer or his subordinate; (3) for the primary purpose of securing either a legal opinion or legal services, or assistance in some legal proceeding.” Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 121 F.3d 971, 974 (5th Cir. 1997)) (emphasis in Robinson). “[I]n the corporate setting, the attorney-client privilege may apply to

1 The Court and the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural background, so this Order omits them. communications with in-house counsel, [but] ‘the attorney-client privilege attaches only to communications made for the purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice or services, not business or technical advice or management decisions.’” Jolivet v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 340 F.R.D. 7, 26 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (quoting Stoffels v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 406, 411 (W.D. Tex. 2009)).

“[T]he work-product doctrine is distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege.” United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.11 (1975). It “insulates a lawyer’s research, analysis of legal theories, mental impressions, notes, and memoranda of witnesses’ statements from an opposing counsel’s inquiries.” Adams v. Mem. Hermann, 873 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Dunn v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 927 F.2d 869, 875 (5th Cir. 1991)). “It protects materials prepared in anticipation of litigation, whether those materials were prepared by the attorney or by agents of the attorney.” Id. With these standards in mind, the Court addresses the documents, which it has categorized into six distinct batches, in light of the arguments raised by Vanderlan.

Batch One. Batch One includes documents Bates labeled JHMA-BV-17900‒04, 17909‒ 12, and 20736‒39. They are Exhibits 27, 28, and 44 to Vanderlan’s Motion to Compel [131] and are listed as Items 291, 287, and 90 on Jackson HMA’s privilege log. Jackson HMA asserts the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine as to the redacted portions of the documents, which are all strings of email correspondence from December 2013 and May 2014 following a phone call from Vanderlan to “Angela Willard at Jackson HMA” in which Vanderlan “report[ed] ‘14 violations against [Jackson] HMA.’” Vanderlan Mem. [135] at 27 (quoting Dec. 23, 2013 Willard Email (JHMA-BV-017912)). Among those included on the email strings are in-house attorneys Steve Clifton, Clifton Smith, Sally McKee, and Mary Parsons. Baldwin Aff. [142-8] ¶¶ 10, 12. Vanderlan says the emails “appear to have been generated in the normal course of business as Jackson HMA considered how to respond to Dr. Vanderlan’s call” “regardless of the fact that [they were] copied to in-house counsel.” Vanderlan Mem. [135] at 27. Jackson HMA,

on the other hand, argues that the redacted portions of the emails “reflect instructions from legal counsel and information provided to counsel which was gathered in anticipation of litigation and at the direction of legal counsel.” Welch Decl. [131-2] at 291 (May 10, 2024 Seanor Letter). Having reviewed unredacted versions of the documents in camera, the Court agrees with Jackson HMA, based on the context and the substance of these communications, that the redacted portions of the emails contain communications protected by the attorney-client privilege and were generated for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance. It does not appear to the Court that these communications concern business advice rather than legal advice. But even if they did involve some degree of business advice, it is clear that the manifest purpose of

the communications was to seek or give legal advice in response to Vanderlan stating he had knowledge about violations that he thought Jackson HMA “would like to resolve before he went to other authorities.” Dec. 23, 2013 Willard Email (JHMA-BV-17903). Because the Court finds that the attorney-client privilege applies, it need not analyze the applicability of the work-product doctrine. See Enron Corp. Sav. Plan v. Hewitt Assocs., L.L.C., 258 F.R.D. 149, 161 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (“If the court decides that the attorney-client privilege applies, [it] do[es] not reach the question whether the work product doctrine applies.” (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981); Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 401 n.1 (1998))); Ferko v. NASCAR, 218 F.R.D. 125, 136 (E.D. Tex. 2003) (“Courts ordinarily apply the work-product doctrine only after deciding that the attorney-client privilege does not apply.” (citing Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 397)). Batch Two. Batch Two includes documents Bates labeled JHMA-BV-17955‒56 and 19614. They are Exhibits 29 and 34 to Vanderlan’s Motion to Compel [131] and are listed as Items 257 and 254 on Jackson HMA’s privilege log. Jackson HMA claims the attorney-client

privilege and work-product doctrine as to the former and only the work-product doctrine as to the latter. The documents are both email strings beginning with an unredacted May 6, 2014 email from one Jackson HMA employee, Laura Knight, to another, Charlotte Dupre, about some weekend issues “inolv[ing] Vanderlan.” May 6, 2014 Knight Email (JHMA-BV-17956); see Baldwin Aff. [142-8] ¶ 18. Vanderlan believes the redacted emails that follow “appear to have been generated in the usual course of business, i.e., the hospital’s investigation into one of its physicians.” Vanderlan Mem. [135] at 28. Jackson HMA states that the emails, which were “sent on the day that Jackson HMA sued Vanderlan for breaching his contract with the hospital,” “reflect communications with in-house and outside counsel and communications in which

hospital personnel are collecting information for the lawsuit at the direction of counsel.” Jackson HMA Mem. [143] at 32‒33 (CM/ECF pagination); see Baldwin Aff. [142-8] ¶ 26.

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Related

United States v. Robinson
121 F.3d 971 (Fifth Circuit, 1997)
United States v. Nobles
422 U.S. 225 (Supreme Court, 1975)
Upjohn Co. v. United States
449 U.S. 383 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Swidler & Berlin v. United States
524 U.S. 399 (Supreme Court, 1998)
United States v. Davis
873 F.3d 343 (First Circuit, 2017)
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.
232 F.R.D. 467 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2005)
Stoffels v. SBC Communications, Inc.
263 F.R.D. 406 (W.D. Texas, 2009)