Vanderkern v. Burr and Burton

CourtVermont Superior Court
DecidedOctober 23, 2025
Docket25-cv-2316
StatusUnknown

This text of Vanderkern v. Burr and Burton (Vanderkern v. Burr and Burton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Vermont Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vanderkern v. Burr and Burton, (Vt. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION Bennington Unit Case No. 25-CV-02316 207 South St Bennington VT 05201 802-447-2700 www.vermontjudiciary.org

Jeremy VanDerKern v. Board of Trustees of Burr and Burton Academy

ENTRY REGARDING MOTION Title: Motion to Dismiss (Motion: 1) Filer: Pietro J. Lynn Filed Date: July 11, 2025

Plaintiff Jeremy VanDerKern claims that Defendant, the Board of Trustees of Burr and Burton Academy, violated his employment agreement when it did not renew his teaching contract for a second school year. Mr. VanDerKern claims that the Board failed to comply with the statutory process of 16 V.S.A. § 1752, as mentioned in the agreement, and that nonrenewal required just cause, which the Board did not have.

The Board filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. V.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). It argues 16 V.S.A. § 1752 does not apply to Mr. VanDerKern because Burr and Burton Academy is an independent school, and 16 V.S.A. § 1752 governs dismissal of public school teachers. Therefore, there is no claim Mr. VanDerKern can bring on that ground. The Board also asserts the employment agreement grants the school wide discretion in the decision not to renew a teacher. Therefore, the school’s reason for not renewing Mr. VanDerKern was just cause, and the Board did not breach the contract.

Procedural Standard

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim faces a high bar. “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not favored and rarely granted.” Gilman v. Me. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2003 VT 55, ¶ 14, 175 Vt. 554 (mem.). “The legal theory of a case should be explored in the light of facts as developed by the evidence, and, generally, not dismissed before trial because of the mere novelty of the allegations.” Ass’n of Haystack Prop. Owners, Inc. v. Sprague, 145 Vt. 443, 447, 494 A.2d 122, 125 (1985). The court takes the nonmoving party’s factual allegations from the complaint as true and assumes the movant’s contravening assertions are false. Huntington Ingalls Indus., Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 2022 VT 45, ¶ 17, 217 Vt. 195. The court “also accept[s] all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts.” Ferry v. City of Montpelier, 2023 VT 4, ¶ 22, 217 Vt. 450 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court only grants a motion to dismiss when “it appears beyond doubt that there exist no facts or circumstances that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Amiot v. Ames, 166 Vt. 288, 291, 693 A.2d 675, 677 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Entry Regarding Motion Page 1 of 6 25-CV-02316 Jeremy VanDerKern v. Board of Trustees of Burr and Burton Academy In addition to the contents of a complaint, documents relied on in a complaint merge into the pleadings, and the court may take judicial notice of court decisions or documents without converting the 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment. In re Russo, 2013 VT 35, ¶ 16 n.4, 193 Vt. 594. The record for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes generally is limited to the four corners of the complaint and any attachments to it. Nash v. Coxon, 152 Vt. 313, 314–15, 565 A.2d 1360, 1361 (1989) (“[I]f matters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded by the court, the motion to dismiss must be treated as one for summary judgment” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As discussed above, however, documents sufficiently referred to and relied upon in the complaint may properly be considered in a motion to dismiss even if not attached to the complaint. See Kaplan v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 2009 VT 78, ¶ 10 n.4, 186 Vt. 605 (mem.).

To support the motion to dismiss, the Board attached full copies of the arbitrator’s decision and the employment agreement the school used during the 2022–2023 school year, documents which Mr. VanDerKern directly quoted and relied on in his complaint. The court takes judicial notice of these two documents as part of the pleadings in this case.

Allegations of the Complaint

On May 4, 2022, Mr. VanDerKern entered into an employment contract with the Board as a cinematography teacher for the school year running from August 20, 2022 to August 19, 2023. According to the employment contract, all conditions of employment were as provided in the Agreement Between the Board of Trustees of Burr and Burton Academy And the Burr and Burton Academy Teachers’ Association 2022–2027 and as required by law.

Article V of the agreement governed contract renewal. A contract would be renewed if the school administration determined that a teacher had performed satisfactorily. Agreement, art. V.A. at 11. No teacher could be denied renewal of their contract except for just and sufficient cause. Agreement, art. V.E. at 12. The grounds for just and sufficient cause listed in the Agreement was a non-exhaustive list of four items regarding teacher performance and behavior, and a fifth item “Reduction in Staff,” which had its own article of proceedings and seniority retention requirements. Id.; Agreement, art. XXV at 26–27. Teachers who worked at the school for three years or fewer, which applied to Mr. VanDerKern, were categorized as transitional teachers. Agreement, art. V.F. at 12. If a transitional teacher’s contract was not renewed due to unsatisfactory performance, the transitional teacher did not have a right to the grievance procedures for long term-teachers listed in Article XXIX. Id. Instead, “[a]ny transitional teacher may appeal a non-renewal of contract under the provisions of Title 16, V.S.A., Section 1752 b.”1 Id. at 12–13.

At the end of the 2022–2023 school year, school administration notified Mr. VanDerKern the school would not renew his contract due to a “precipitous decline in interest in [BBA’s] cinematography program.” Compl. at ¶ 7.

1 There is no 16 V.S.A. § 1752 b, however the parties’ pleadings indicate a mutual understanding that the statutory

section was 16 V.S.A. § 1752(b) (2021) as then in force on May 4, 2022, when Mr. VanDerKern was hired. See 2021, Adj. Sess., No. 111, § 1 (eff. May 11, 2022) (act creating current statute).

Entry Regarding Motion Page 2 of 6 25-CV-02316 Jeremy VanDerKern v. Board of Trustees of Burr and Burton Academy Mr. VanDerKern filed a grievance on March 27, 2023 and “also sought to appeal the non-renewal pursuant to 16 V.S.A. § 1752.” Id. at ¶ 9. The headmaster denied the grievance as Article XXIX did not apply to transitional teachers and stated the school was not bound by 16 V.S.A. § 1752, as the school was not a public school. Nevertheless, Mr. VanDerKern continued to attempt to follow the grievance procedures, appealing his termination to the Board, again mentioning he sought an appeal under 16 V.S.A. § 1752. The school then advertised a cinematography teaching position via all-employee email and posted the open position to the SchoolSpring website. At some point later, it hired a new teacher for the 2023–2024 school year. After the school posted the open teaching position, the Board refused Mr. VanDerKern’s grievance as a transitional teacher, and asserted the school was not bound by 16 V.S.A. § 1752. Mr. VanDerKern continued to follow the grievance process by submitting a demand for arbitration to the headmaster which cited the Board’s failure to meet with him “on or before 04/20/23 as required by 16 V.S.A. § 1752c.”2 Id. at ¶ 20.

The Board did not respond, and Mr. VanDerKern filed his demand with the American Arbitration Association. On June 27, 2023 the Board offered Mr. VanDerKern a hearing. Mr. VanDerKern notified the Board that he was moving forward with arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that Mr. VanDerKern did not have a right to arbitration because he was a transitional teacher.

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Related

In re Russo
2013 VT 35 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2013)
Stamp Tech, Inc. v. Lydall/Thermal Acoustical, Inc.
2009 VT 91 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2009)
Gilman v. Maine Mutual Fire Insurance
2003 VT 55 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2003)
Amiot v. Ames
693 A.2d 675 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1997)
Colby v. Umbrella, Inc.
2008 VT 20 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2008)
Northwood AMC Corp. v. American Motors Corp.
423 A.2d 846 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1980)
Kaplan v. MORGAN STANLEY & CO., INC.
2009 VT 78 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2009)
Ass'n of Haystack Property Owners, Inc. v. Sprague
494 A.2d 122 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1985)
Darryl R. Montague v. Hundred Acre Homestead, LLC
2019 VT 16 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2019)
Nash v. Coxon
565 A.2d 1360 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1989)
Charles Ferry v. City of Montpelier
2023 VT 4 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 2023)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Vanderkern v. Burr and Burton, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vanderkern-v-burr-and-burton-vtsuperct-2025.