Me. Justice White,
after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The four questions certified are as follows:
“I. Is the tax imposed by sections 29 and 30 of the act of Congress of June 13, 1898, entitled 'An act to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures, and for other purposes/ with respect to Alfred G. .Vanderbilt’s interest under the seventeenth clause of the will of Cornelius Vanderbilt, a tax upon the transmission to and receipt by the'trustees of the property passing to them as trustees under the legacy out of which such interest arises?
"II. If the preceding question is answered in the negative, is the tax imposed under said act with respect-to. Alfred G. Vanderbilt’s interest under said seventeenth clause a tax upon the transmission to and receipt by said Alfred G. Vanderbilt of his beneficial interest in the property passing under such legacy?
"III. Did sections 29 and 30 of said act authorize the assessment and collection of a tax with respect to any of the rights or interests of Alfred G. Vanderbilt as a residuary legatee of the personal estate of Cornelius Vanderbilt under the seventeenth clause of the will, with the exception of his present right to receive the income of such estate until he attains the age of thirty years, prior to the time when, if ever, such rights or interests shall become absolutely vested in possession or .enjoyment?
. “IV. If the tax under sections 29 and 3Ó of said act was presently assessable and collectible upon all the interests of
Alfred G. Vanderbilt in said legacy, was the, clear valué of all such' interests, for the purposes of computing the tax, equal, to’ the full value of the property comprised in the legacy out of which such interests arose?”'
. “Whilst the questions, apparently, present distinct matters, yet underlying and involved in them all is the fundamental consideration whether the burden imposed .by the .war revenue • act was confined to'the interest of which Alfred G. Vanderbilt had the beneficial right of immediate' enjoyment, or whether, that burden also bore upon the, right to the residue which Alfred G. Vanderbilt might possess or enjoy in the future,, if he lived to the.ages specified-in the will,.upon the theory that' the right so to possess or enjoy, in the future'was technically vested. .To avoid, repetition we-therefore come at once to':the consideration of this subject in order that when we' have disposed of it- we-may be able, in the .light of--the correct construction of' the statute,, to' respond to the questions propounded, in so far as it may be found necessary to do so.
. Before coming, to the statute we put aside as pot- directly decisive of the question here presented a case referred to by both parties, that is,
Knowlton
v.
Moore,
178 U. S. 41. Whilst that case involved the constitutionality of. the act of Congress, with'whose'meaning hve -are here concerned, it required a construction of that act only to the extent necessary to enable it to be decided what was the. subject upon which the law levied the’tax, and whether the statute required the tax levied to be progressively increased by. reference to the, whole amount'of the estate- of the- decedent, or alone by -reference to .the particular legacy or distributive share upon-the right to suc•ceed to which the tax-bore. The case did-not,-therefore, pass on -the controversies here •' arising.
To state briefly , the. conflicting contentions of. the'parties as. to the meaning- of..4he .statute may serve to accentuate and narrow the question for decision. The proposition of the Government is thus - stated in - the -argument:
“First, vested remainders are taxed by the law of June 13,
1898, the tax attaching at the time of vesting; second,-.the tax is to be. assessed' and collected at the time of vesting; third, the-interest of Alfred-G. Vanderbilt in. the-principal of the residue, which the will provides he shall - be put in -full possession of, one-half at the age of 30, and the other half at the-age of 35, is a vested-remainder.”
. The contrary contentions, are as follows: First. That Congress in th.e act in question did not concern itself with s the mere technical vesting of the -title to possibly possess or enjoy in the future personal property; but, on the contrary, the act .subjected to' the death duties' which it imposed -only real and' beneficial interests. In other words, the proposition is that '' the act did not make subject to taxation a gift,-which, even if technically vested-in titlé, was-yet subject to be defeated in possession or enjoyment by the happening of a contingency .stated, in the will. The argument, therefore, is .that.where süch a gift was made by will, no tax could be imposed' until the time when, by the happening of the contingency stated, the right.to possess or enjoy had accrued. Second. That even if the statute imposed a tax upon vested'remainders the iñ-terest in question was a contingent and nota vested remainder.
The provisions of the act of 1898, which' require elucidation for'the-purpose of disposing of these contentions,, are contained in sections-29 and. 30. They are reproduced in the margin.
It will be observed that the. duties imposed in section 29 have relation to two classes, -first, legacies or distributive shares passing by death and arising from peréonal property; and, second any personal property or interest therein trans-
ferrecl by deed, grant, bargain,- sale or gift, .to-take effect in ■possession or enjoyment after the death -of the grantor .or bargainor, in- favor of any person or persons, or to any body or ' bodies, ^politic or corporaté, in trust or otherwise: As to this
second-class, the statute specifically makes the liability for taxation depend, not upon the mere vesting in a technical sense of title to the gift, but upon the actual possession or enjoyment thereof. By any fair construction the limitation as to possession or enjoyment expressed as to one class must be applied to the other, unless it be found that the statute, whilst treating the two as one and the same, for the purpose of the imposition of the death duty, has yet subjected them.
to different -rules. A consideration of the subsequent provisions of the section leaves no room for such a contention, since immediately following the designation of the two classes there are five distinct paragraphs, subjecting the passing of the property taxed in both classes to a different rate of tax,dependent upon the degree of relationship of the beneficiary to the decedent, and in each it is specifically provided that a tax is to be levied in respect only of a beneficial interest having
a
clear value.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Me. Justice White,
after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The four questions certified are as follows:
“I. Is the tax imposed by sections 29 and 30 of the act of Congress of June 13, 1898, entitled 'An act to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures, and for other purposes/ with respect to Alfred G. .Vanderbilt’s interest under the seventeenth clause of the will of Cornelius Vanderbilt, a tax upon the transmission to and receipt by the'trustees of the property passing to them as trustees under the legacy out of which such interest arises?
"II. If the preceding question is answered in the negative, is the tax imposed under said act with respect-to. Alfred G. Vanderbilt’s interest under said seventeenth clause a tax upon the transmission to and receipt by said Alfred G. Vanderbilt of his beneficial interest in the property passing under such legacy?
"III. Did sections 29 and 30 of said act authorize the assessment and collection of a tax with respect to any of the rights or interests of Alfred G. Vanderbilt as a residuary legatee of the personal estate of Cornelius Vanderbilt under the seventeenth clause of the will, with the exception of his present right to receive the income of such estate until he attains the age of thirty years, prior to the time when, if ever, such rights or interests shall become absolutely vested in possession or .enjoyment?
. “IV. If the tax under sections 29 and 3Ó of said act was presently assessable and collectible upon all the interests of
Alfred G. Vanderbilt in said legacy, was the, clear valué of all such' interests, for the purposes of computing the tax, equal, to’ the full value of the property comprised in the legacy out of which such interests arose?”'
. “Whilst the questions, apparently, present distinct matters, yet underlying and involved in them all is the fundamental consideration whether the burden imposed .by the .war revenue • act was confined to'the interest of which Alfred G. Vanderbilt had the beneficial right of immediate' enjoyment, or whether, that burden also bore upon the, right to the residue which Alfred G. Vanderbilt might possess or enjoy in the future,, if he lived to the.ages specified-in the will,.upon the theory that' the right so to possess or enjoy, in the future'was technically vested. .To avoid, repetition we-therefore come at once to':the consideration of this subject in order that when we' have disposed of it- we-may be able, in the .light of--the correct construction of' the statute,, to' respond to the questions propounded, in so far as it may be found necessary to do so.
. Before coming, to the statute we put aside as pot- directly decisive of the question here presented a case referred to by both parties, that is,
Knowlton
v.
Moore,
178 U. S. 41. Whilst that case involved the constitutionality of. the act of Congress, with'whose'meaning hve -are here concerned, it required a construction of that act only to the extent necessary to enable it to be decided what was the. subject upon which the law levied the’tax, and whether the statute required the tax levied to be progressively increased by. reference to the, whole amount'of the estate- of the- decedent, or alone by -reference to .the particular legacy or distributive share upon-the right to suc•ceed to which the tax-bore. The case did-not,-therefore, pass on -the controversies here •' arising.
To state briefly , the. conflicting contentions of. the'parties as. to the meaning- of..4he .statute may serve to accentuate and narrow the question for decision. The proposition of the Government is thus - stated in - the -argument:
“First, vested remainders are taxed by the law of June 13,
1898, the tax attaching at the time of vesting; second,-.the tax is to be. assessed' and collected at the time of vesting; third, the-interest of Alfred-G. Vanderbilt in. the-principal of the residue, which the will provides he shall - be put in -full possession of, one-half at the age of 30, and the other half at the-age of 35, is a vested-remainder.”
. The contrary contentions, are as follows: First. That Congress in th.e act in question did not concern itself with s the mere technical vesting of the -title to possibly possess or enjoy in the future personal property; but, on the contrary, the act .subjected to' the death duties' which it imposed -only real and' beneficial interests. In other words, the proposition is that '' the act did not make subject to taxation a gift,-which, even if technically vested-in titlé, was-yet subject to be defeated in possession or enjoyment by the happening of a contingency .stated, in the will. The argument, therefore, is .that.where süch a gift was made by will, no tax could be imposed' until the time when, by the happening of the contingency stated, the right.to possess or enjoy had accrued. Second. That even if the statute imposed a tax upon vested'remainders the iñ-terest in question was a contingent and nota vested remainder.
The provisions of the act of 1898, which' require elucidation for'the-purpose of disposing of these contentions,, are contained in sections-29 and. 30. They are reproduced in the margin.
It will be observed that the. duties imposed in section 29 have relation to two classes, -first, legacies or distributive shares passing by death and arising from peréonal property; and, second any personal property or interest therein trans-
ferrecl by deed, grant, bargain,- sale or gift, .to-take effect in ■possession or enjoyment after the death -of the grantor .or bargainor, in- favor of any person or persons, or to any body or ' bodies, ^politic or corporaté, in trust or otherwise: As to this
second-class, the statute specifically makes the liability for taxation depend, not upon the mere vesting in a technical sense of title to the gift, but upon the actual possession or enjoyment thereof. By any fair construction the limitation as to possession or enjoyment expressed as to one class must be applied to the other, unless it be found that the statute, whilst treating the two as one and the same, for the purpose of the imposition of the death duty, has yet subjected them.
to different -rules. A consideration of the subsequent provisions of the section leaves no room for such a contention, since immediately following the designation of the two classes there are five distinct paragraphs, subjecting the passing of the property taxed in both classes to a different rate of tax,dependent upon the degree of relationship of the beneficiary to the decedent, and in each it is specifically provided that a tax is to be levied in respect only of a beneficial interest having
a
clear value. Moreover, the meaning of the statute, fairly to be deduced from the reiteration in each of the five paragraphs of the beneficial interest and clear value as the subject of the tax, is greatly strengthened by the inference to be drawn from the fact that nowhere in the section is there contained language referring to technical estates in personalty or treating them as subject of taxation, despite the absence of the right to immediate possession or enjoyment. And coming to consider section 30, relating to the collection of the duty or tax imposed by section 29, the meaning of section 29, as just indicated, is made clearer. Thus by section 30 it is provided that “every executor, administrator or trustee, before payment and distribution [of a legacy or distributive share] to the legatées, or any parties entitled to beneficial interest therein, shall pay to the collector of the district of which the deceased person was a residént the amount of the duty or tax assessed upon such legacy or distributive share.” It also requires that the schedule, etc., to be furnished by an executor, administrator or trustee to a collector or deputy collector shall contain the name of each person having a beneficial interest in the property in the charge or custody of the executor, etc., with a statement “of the clear value of such interest.”
Thesev provisions harmonize with the meaning which we ' have ascribed to section 29, since they clearly import that the tax is to.be deducted from a beneficial interest which the beneficiary was entitled to enjoy, and from which, before payment or distribution, a deduction of the duty was to be made.
In view of the express provisions of the statute as to possession or enjoyment and beneficial interest and clear value, and of the absence of any express language exhibiting an intention to tax a mere technically vested interest in a case where the right to possession .or enjoyment was subordinated to an uncertain contingency, it would, we think, be doing violence to the statute to construe it as taxing such an 'interest before the period when possession or enjoyment had attached.. And such is the construction which has been affixed to some state statutes, the text of which, lent themselves more strongly to the construction that it was the intention to subject to immediate taxation merely technical interests, without regard to a present right to possess or enjoy.
Matter of Curtis,
142 N. Y. 219, 222;
Matter of Roosevelt,
143 N. Y. 120.
In the
Matter of Hoffman,
143 N. Y. 327, the court was called upon to construe the meaning of a statute, enacted in 1892, providing that “all taxes imposed by this act shall be due and payable at the time of the transfer, provided, however, that taxes upon the transfer of any estate, property or interest therein limited, conditioned, dependent or determinable upon the happening of any contingency or future event, by reason of which the fair market value thereof can,not be ascertained at the time of the transfer as herein provided shall accrue and become due and payable when the persons or corporations beneficially entitled thereto shall come into actual possession or enjoyment thereof.” Laws 1892, chap. 399, sec. 3. The court said:
“We are obliged to follow one of two lines of construction. We must open all the nice and difficult questions which arise under a will as to the vesting of technical .legal estates, although future and contingent, and assess the tax upon what are in reality only possibilities and chances, and so complicate the statute with the endless brood of difficult questions which gather about the construction of wills; or we must construe it in view of its aim and purpose and the object it seeks to ac
.complish, and so subordinate technical phrases to the facts of actual and practical ownership. For taxation is a hard fact, and should attach only to such ownership, and may properly be compelled to wait until chances and possibilities develop into the truth of an actual estate possessed, or to which there exists an absolute right of future possession. I am not shutting my eyes to the statutory language, which is quite broad. The property taxed may be an estate ‘for a' term of years or for life or determinable upon any future or ‘contingent estate,’ or ‘ a remainder, reversion or other expectancy,’ and the tables of mortality may be resorted to for the ascertainment of .values. And yet, it is the ‘fair market value,’ the ‘fair arid clear market value,’ which is to be assessed, and with the proviso that if that value cannot be at once ascertained, the .appraisal is to be adjourned. I can . scarcely imagine a contingency depending upon lives which mathematics could not solve by the doctrine of chances and-the averages of mortality, and there could hardly be an adjournment unless upon some rare contingency having no. averages, and the results in cases dependent upon lives might still leave the ‘fair and .clear market value’ in doubt and yield sums which no sale in-the market would produce.”
So, also, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in construing an inheritance tax law of that State, containing language identical in some respects with that found in the act of Congress, observed in
Billings
v.
The People,
189 Illinois, 472, 487:
“The tax imposed by section 1 of our statute is fixed upon the ‘ clear market value of the property received by each person’ at the prescribed rate, — that is, as shown, by the context, the clear market value of the beneficial interest so received. Surely, by such language it was not intended by the legislature that- the courts should undertake to ascertain the clear market value of a mere possible interest which,, from its very nature, could not have any market value, and which, for all practical purposes, such hs taxation, is incapable of valuation. The5 courts, in order to enforce the immediate collection of such
taxes, as the statute seems to contemplate' shall be done, cannot change the tax from one on succession to one on property; nor can they classify such remote and contingent interests, and fix the tax; or rate of tax upon the whole class, as possibly the. law-making power might do or provide for.. No other course is left. open in the practical administration of the statute than to postpone, as.' was dpne in this casé, the assess-' i'ng and collecting of the-tax upon such, remote and contingent interests'as. are'incapable of valuation and as to which the-x.. and the exemptions cannot be determined.” .
And see also
Howe
v.
Howe,
179 Massachusetts, 546, 550.
Indeed, in accord with its text and ■ in harmony with the principles of construction expounded in the cases just cited, the act .of 1898 was primarily construed by the officers charged with its administration as taxing- only beneficial interests where the right to possess or enjoy had accrued. The rulings^ of the Internal Revenue Department to t-his effect were without deviation .for sevéral yearfe.
The practice followed in carrying out the statute was illustrated-by the assessment whieh was made in the case considered in
Knowlton
v.
Moore,
178 U. S. 41, as exhibited in the schedule on page 44 of- the report of that case; It was also by this construction that the .tax in this case was originally assessed only upon the beneficial interest which was' being enjoyed by- Alfred G. Vanderbilt.
The change -of construction- was made because' the administrative officers .deemed it was required by the amendment of Mareh 2, 19Ó1, to the act of 1898- 31 Stat. 946. This is shown by a ruling-made by the Commissioner of Internal'Revenue on October 17, 1901, in which it was said (Treasury Decisions, -Internal Revenue, vol. 4,. p. 209):
“This office formerly held that the. .tax on reversionary interests was payable when the beneficiaries entered into the possession and enjoyment of their legacies.
“The amendment, to section 30 of the war-revenue law, approved March .2, 1901, which went into effect July 1, 1901,
necessitated a change in this ruling, and on July 20, 1901, this office ruled that reversionary interests which are vested are taxable oh their present worth.”
The case therefore reduces itself to this: Did the amendatory act of 1901 enlarge the act of 1898 so as to cause that act to embrace subjects of . taxation which were not included prior •to the amendment? The amendatory act, so far as necessary .to be considered for the purposes, of this question, reenacted sections 29 and 30 of the original act. The amendments which the administrative officers decided, made subject to taxation vested interests where the right of immediate possession or enjoyment had not accrued, and which had been treated as not taxable prior to'the. amendment were that the tax or duty should be due and payable in one year after the death of the person from whom the estate had passed, and that the executor, administrator or trustee should make return of the estate in his control within thirty days after taking charge thereof. Giving to these provisions their natural import, 'they 'imply only that a uniform period was fixed within which the obligation, should arise of paying the tax authorized to be levied by the original act, that is, the obligation of paying the duty on each beneficial interest which in .effect had vested in possession or enjoyment. The amendments, therefore, did not, in our opinion, justify the construction that Congress intended by adopting them to cause death duties to becoine due within one year as to legacies and distributive shares which were not capable of being immediately possessed or enjoyed, and were therefore not subject to taxation under the original act. This conclusion irresistibly follows when it is observed that no word is found in the amendatory act importing an intention to change the administrative construction which had theretofore prevailed from the beginning. On the contrary, the amenda-tory act reiterated without alteration the provisions found in the original act as to possession or enjoyment and beneficial interest and clear value. Indeed the amendatory act contained new provisions not expressly found in the original act,
supporting and adding cogency to the prior, administrative construction, such as the proviso at the close of section 30, as follows: •
“Any tax paid under the provisions óf sections twentyrnine and thirty'shall be deducted from the-particular legacy or distributive share on account of which the sum" is charged;” a provision plainly importing a practically contemporaneous right to receive the legacy or distributive share, and one which would b.e impracticable of execution if the tax was to. be -as? sessed and collected before the beneficiary and the rate of tax could certainly be ascertained.
Further elucidation as-.‘to the meaning of the amendatory act of 1901 is unnecessary in view .of the subsequent legislation of Congress. By the act of April 12, 1902, 32 Stat. 96, section 29 of the act of 1898, as amended on March.2, 1901, was repealed to-take effect on July 1, 1902. The repealing act, however, saved “All taxes or duties imposed by. section 29 of the act of June 13, 1898, and the amendments thereof, prior, to the taking .effect of this act.” On June 27, 1902, 32 Stat.' 406, an act was adopted, the third section , of which reads as follows:
“Sec. 3. That in all cases where an executor, administrator,' or trustee, shall have paid,- or shall hereafter pay, any tax upon any legacy or distributive share of personal property under the provisions of the act approved June thirteénth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, entitled ‘An act to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures, ’and for other purposes,’ and amendments thereof, the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to refund, out of any money in the Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, upon proper application being made to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, under such rules and regulations as may be prq-' scribed, so much of said tax as may'have been collected on contingent beneficial interests which shall not have become vested prior to July first, nineteen hundred and two. ( And nontax shall hereafter be assessed or imposed under said'act,
approved June thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, .upon or in respect of any contingent beneficial interest which shall not become absolutely vested in possession or enjoyment prior to said July first, • nineteen hundred and two.”
. In view of the provision for refunding' 'wé see no .escape from the conclusion that this statute was in a sense declaratory, of what we hold was the true construction of the act of 1898, and which, as we have seen, had prevailed prior to the. amendment of March 2, 1901, and which was only departed from by the administrative officer under a misconception of the import of that amendatory act. .There is no suggestion, that ány prior practice prevailed in the enforcement of. the act of 1898, calling for-the enacting of. the refunding clause, except the mistaken construction placed on the amendatory 'act of 1901. The act of 1902 was, therefore, a-legislative affirmance of the construction givéñ to the act of 1898, prior to the amendment of 1901.,. It follows that the act of 1902 was, moreover, a legislative repudiation of the. construction of the act of 1.898, now insisted on by the Government.. ■ It is, we think, incontrovertible that the taxes which the third section of the act of 1902 directs to be -refunded and.those' which it forbids the collection of in the future are one and the same in their nature. Any other view would destroy the unity of the section and cause its provisions to produce inexplicable conflict. From this, it results that the’ taxes "which are directed in the first sentence to he refunded,'because they had been-wrongfully collected on contingent beneficial interests which had not become
vested
prior to July 1,1902, were taxes. levied on such beneficial interests as had. not become
vested in possession or
enjoyment, prior to the date named, within the intendment of the subsequent 'sentence. In other words, the'' statute .provided for the .refunding of taxes collected finder 'the circum-, stances stated and;;a/t sthe-‘same time forbade like collections in' the future.
In view -of the text of the act of 1898 and the other considerations to which we have referred, we have not deemed it
necessary to advert to a contention made by the Government in argument,- that the true meaning of the act of 1898 is shown by the administrative construction placed upon the act of July 1, 1862, levying legacy taxes, 12 Stat. 43>2, 485, of which in effect the act of 1898 was a reproduction. It is undoubtedly true that both under the act of 1862 and the act of June 30, 1864, 13 Stat. 223, 285, there'was an administrative construction by which vested interests, although unaccompanied with the right of immediate possession or enjoyment, were treated as at once taxable. Without entering into details on the subject, we content ourselves with saying that it is also true that the correctness of that construction was in ¡effect repudiated by legislative action (act of July 13' 1866, 14 Stat. 98, 140), and was, moreover, in substance, treated as unsound by the reasoning of the opinion in
Clapp
v.
Mason,
94 U. S. 589.
Thus, by legislative- action and judicial interpretation,. it came to- pass that the acts of 1862 and 1864 signified exactly what we-now construe the act of 1898 to mean. It was doubtless this concordance of legislative action and judicial interpretation concerning the earlier acts which caused the administrative department of the Government, when the act of 1898 was adopted, to interpret that, act, not as the acts of 1862 and 1864 had been originally erroneously interpreted in administration, but in accord with the subsequent legislative and judicial construction which had been placed upon the language of those' acts, and which language in effect was repeated in the act of 1898.
Concluding, as we do, that there was no authority under the act of 1898 for taxing the interest of Alfred G. Vanderbilt, given him by the residuary clause of the will, cpnditioned on his attaining the • ages of thirty and thirty-five years', respectively, it is unnecessary .to determine whether- such interest was technically a vested remainder, as claimed by counsel for the Government. In passing, however, we remark that in a case recently decided by the Court of Appeals of New York,
Matter of Tracy,
179 N. Y. 501, it was declared
that such interest was a contingent and not a vested remainder.
Coming to apply the construction which we have given the statute to the solution of the questions propounded by the Court of Appeals, it follows that the first, second and fourth questions are unnecessary to be answered, and .the third question should be answered in the negative.
And it is so ordered.