Vance v. Royal Clay Manuf'g Co.

82 F. 251, 13 Ohio F. Dec. 821, 1897 U.S. App. LEXIS 2737
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Ohio
DecidedSeptember 1, 1897
DocketNo. 5,532
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 82 F. 251 (Vance v. Royal Clay Manuf'g Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vance v. Royal Clay Manuf'g Co., 82 F. 251, 13 Ohio F. Dec. 821, 1897 U.S. App. LEXIS 2737 (circtndoh 1897).

Opinion

TAFT, Circuit Judge.

This cause, which was begun by a bill filed by certain stockholders in the Eoyal Clay Manufacturing Company to set aside a deed of assignment for the benefit of the creditors of all the property of the company, made without proper authority by the president and secretary to J. Eoss Alexander, and which was, by intervening petitions aud by cross bill, subsequently given the form of a suit in the nature of a creditors’ bill, and of one to foreclose a real-estate mortgage upon the property, comes on now to be heard upon the report of the master appointed to take evidence and find the facts and report his conclusions of law' as to the amount and priorities of the claims of creditors against the property of the Eoyal Clay Manufacturing Company. 1 have examined the record with considerable care, have read all the evidence before the master, [252]*252and, after a consideration of tke briefs of counsel, have reached the conclusion that in all respects the report of the master should be confirmed. The attorney for the receivers who was appointed by the court to defend the interests of the stockholders against lien and other creditors has filed a number of exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the master. It may be well to state in a summary way the issues which he has made, and the conclusions which I have reached in regard to them. Many of the claims which the master has found to be valid against the company are based on cognovit notes given by the president, A. J. Baggs, and the secretary, H. W. Khoads. It is objected on behalf of the stockholders that Baggs and Bhoads had no special authority given to them by the board of directors to contract such obligations, and that any one receiving such notes from the president and secretary was charged with knowledge that they did not bind the company. The master finds that the board of directors was fully advised of and fully approved of the action of Baggs and Rhoads in contracting the debts, and in giving-evidence of them in the form of cognovit notes.- The evidence satisfies me beyond a doubt that all the directors knew that Baggs was in the habit of giving such notes for debts of the corporation, and that he had general authority to contract debts for the company in this form.

The attorney for the stockholders disputes the finding of the master as to the indebtedness of- the company to the Deposit Bank of Dennison, Ohio, or to its assignee, Bailey. It seems that neither Baggs nor Rhoads made entries of the items of this indebtedness upon the books of the Royal Clay Manufacturing Company, although all interested were cognizant of the existence of a large indebtedness at one time. There is no doubt that the indebtedness does appear upon the books of the bank, and the bank-deposit book was eight times balanced without objection by either Baggs or Rhoads, and each balance showed the indebtedness which is objected to. The complaint is rested rather on the looseness with which Baggs did business than on any defect in the evidence which the bank produces of the indebtedness.

W. B. Simpson was one of the directors of the Royal Clay Manufacturing Company and one of the executive committee of the board. He indorsed much of the company’s paper. The bonds of the company to the amount of $100,000 were issued by the company, but they were not all of them sold. Bonds to the par value of twenty-nine thousand dollars, with the acquiescence of the board of directors, were used by Simpson as collateral for debts of the company contracted with West Virginia banks and other creditors. These banks and other creditors now appear as holders of the bonds, and ask that their claims be allowed to the extent shown by them to be valid, and that the mortgage securing the bonds be foreclosed, so that they may derive the benefit to which they are entitled from their collateral. An exception is taken t'o the finding of the master in favor of these creditors on the ground that, after the bonds had been deposited as collateral with these creditors, and at the last meeting of the board of directors, these bonds, amounting to $29,000, were sold [253]*253to W. B. Simpson in consideration of Ms assuming the debts which they were pledged t:o secure. Whether this was a valid action by the board of directors or not, taken, as it was, at a special meeting, of which two of the directors had no notice, is not, it seems to me, material. Such a contract with Simpson did not create a novation of the indebtedness as between the creditors who held the notes of the company and the bonds as collateral and the Boyal Clay Manufacturing Company, however it might affect the relations of Simpson and the company to the indebtedness. Hence the exception to the allowance of these claims and their priority, so far as the collateral is concerned, is overruled.

The only other exception to which it is necessary to advert is that directed to the finding of the master that certain levies of execution in favor of the Citizens' National Bank of New Philadelphia, Ohio, and S. O’Donnell and others secure to the judgment claims of these execution creditors a priority in the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the personal property upon which the executions were levied. It is first objected that the judgments were void because rendered on cognovit notes which Baggs, as president, had no authority ro make. I have already approved the finding of the master that there was authority to make such notes derived from the course • of business of the board of directors, and the acquiescence of the board in Baggs' conduct of the business. It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider the question of the conclusiveness .of the judgment: on such notes, and whether the judgment can he collaterally attacked on the ground that there was no authority to make the notes, because the finding of this court is that there was authority, and that the debts were valid debts. The second question raised is as to the validity of the execution. The sheriff, after the deed of assignment was made by Baggs, as president, and Rhoads, as secretary, to J. Ross Alexander, trustee, and before the receiver was appointed herein, went to the yard of the Royal Olay Manufacturing Company, and, having in view all the personal property, made levies thereon. He at once notified Baggs, the president, who was in charge for the company, that.he had made the levy, and put the custody of <the personalty for him in Baggs, which Baggs accepted. The master finds this to be the fact on the positive statement of (he sheriff and two persons who accompanied him, and Baggs does not deny it. When the receiver appointed by this court went; to the premises, he found no one in charge, but he was advised by the sheriff that the sheriff had possession of (he personal property, and, in order to prevent a conflict of jurisdiction, a stipulation was entered into between the sheriff and the receiver by which the receiver agreed to take possession and dispose of the goods under order of the court without prejudicing t.he right of the sheriff to assert, any lien which this court might determine that the judgment creditors had by reason of his levies. Under the decisions in Ohio, especially those in Murphy v. Swadener, 33 Ohio St. 85, and Acton v. Knowles, 14 Ohio St. 28, the levy lost nothing of its validity from the circumstance that the sheriff placed the goods in the hands of Baggs, the president of the company, as his custodian. Baggs' temporary ah-[254]*254sence from the grounds at tbe time the receiver entered them is not an abandonment of his possession as custodian, and therefore there was a lawful levy on the personal property by the sheriff in force at the time the receiver took possession.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Central Trust Co. v. Worcester Cycle Mfg. Co.
114 F. 659 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut, 1902)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
82 F. 251, 13 Ohio F. Dec. 821, 1897 U.S. App. LEXIS 2737, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vance-v-royal-clay-manufg-co-circtndoh-1897.