Vance Owen D/B/A Owen & Associates and CGT Law Group International, L.L.P. v. Noe De Los Santos, Sr., Individually

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 19, 2008
• Docket: 04-06-00899-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-06-00899-CV

Vance Owen d/b/a OWEN & ASSOC., and

CGT LAW GROUP INTERNATIONAL, L.L.P.,

Appellants

v.

Noe DE LOS SANTOS, SR., Individually, et al., Appellees

From the 49th Judicial District Court, Zapata County, Texas Trial Court No. 5847 Honorable Manuel R. Flores, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 19, 2008

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

Appellants, Vance Owen d/b/a Owen and Associates ("Owen"), and CGT Law Group International, L.L.P. ("CGT"), file this appeal seeking to vacate the findings of fact and conclusions of law, unseal the trial court proceedings and judgment, and vacate that part of the sealed judgment, if any, that adjudicates their interests. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Factual and Procedural Background

On or about June 23, 2004, a fire occurred at the home of Daniel Mercado ("Mercado") in Zapata County, Texas. Several members of the Silva and De Los Santos families were injured in the fire, while still others lost their lives. The law firm of Gonzalez & Associates represented the plaintiffs and filed suit against various defendants, including Mr. Mercado, Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc., and Fred's Fine Furniture, Inc.

On November 29, 2006, the case settled and a hearing was held. The record reflects that Doug Gwyther, an attorney with CGT, and Bill Owen, an attorney with Owen & Associates, were present at the hearing for the purpose of "auditing the proceedings" since there was a separate case pending in Nueces County "over disputes relating to certain claims and certain attorney fee interests in this case." Both Gwyther and Owen stated that they had not intervened in the suit and were not otherwise parties; moreover, neither Gwyther nor Owen had been served with notice of the hearing which was for the express purpose of entering the settlement agreement. Nevertheless, at Gonzalez's request, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law which purported to adjudicate CGT's and Owen's contractual rights to the contested attorneys' fees. The trial court also barred Gwyther and Owen from attending any further proceedings in the case and sealed the records of a subsequent hearing, along with the final judgment.

CGT and Owen appeal, raising the following issues: 1) the trial court abused its discretion in entering findings of fact and conclusions of law as to CGT and Owen who were not parties to the suit; 2) the trial court abused its discretion in sealing the proceedings related to the entry of the final judgment and the final judgment itself; and 3) the trial court erred in entering a judgment against CGT and Owen who were not parties to the suit.

We have reviewed the sealed documents which consist of Volume II of the Reporter's Record and the final judgment, along with supporting documents. No mention of either CGT or Owen is found throughout any of these sealed documents. More specifically, neither CGT nor Owen are parties to the final judgment. Accordingly, before we are able to reach the merits of CGT's and Owen's issues, we must first determine whether parties who have had findings of fact and conclusions of law entered against them have standing to appeal when the judgment does not name them and does not otherwise affect those parties' rights.

Standing

It is well settled that a person who is not a party to the trial court judgment has no standing to complain of that judgment. See e.g., In re J.A., 225 S.W.3d 7, 11 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2005, pet. denied) (holding that without standing, a person may not complain of a judgment to which he was not a party and which imposes no obligation upon him); Stroud v. Stroud, 733 S.W.2d 619, 620-21 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, no writ) (finding that parties who are strangers to a judgment have no right to seek review on appeal); Jernigan v. Jernigan, 677 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1984, no writ) (right to seek review on appeal is limited to those whose rights are concluded by judgment in question). Further, an appellate court has no jurisdiction over an appeal by an appellant who lacks standing. See In re M.C.R., 55 S.W.3d 104, 106-07 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2001, no pet.).

An exception to the general rule that a nonparty to a judgment does not have standing to appeal exists provided the person seeking to appeal is found to be a party pursuant to the doctrine of virtual representation or is otherwise bound by the judgment, and the privity of estate, title or interest is apparent from the record of the cause below. Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc. v. McDonald, 810 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1991, writ denied); Jernigan, 677 S.W.2d at 140. To demonstrate standing as a party under the doctrine of virtual representation, the person attempting to appeal must show that he is bound as a privy to the judgment. Benson v. Anderson, 899 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.]1995, writ denied). "A privy is one so connected in law with a party to the judgment as to have such an identity of interests that the party to the judgment represented the same legal right." Id. (quoting McDonald, 810 S.W.2d at 890); see Am. Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Cardenas, 717 S.W.2d 707, 708 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (an indemnitor bound by a judgment against the indemnitee has standing as a party under the doctrine of virtual representation for purposes of appealing the judgment against the indemnitee, subject to certain exceptions).

Discussion

Here, CGT and Owen were not parties to the suit and are not parties to the judgment. Nevertheless, the trial court entered no fewer than thirteen findings of fact and conclusions of law which purport to affect their interests. The question then is whether these findings of fact and conclusions of law are sufficient to somehow establish an exception under the doctrine of virtual representation or otherwise demonstrate that CGT and Owen are bound by the judgment. McDonald, 810 S.W.2d at 889.

We find no authority that expressly provides that findings of fact and conclusions of law as to persons who are not parties to either the suit or the trial court judgment are sufficient to establish an exception under the doctrine of virtual representation, thereby establishing an exception to the general rule that a person who is not a party to the trial court judgment has no standing to complain of that judgment. Id. However, in a case decided by this court over sixty years ago, this court questioned the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law that purported to bind a nonparty to a suit. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. H. Rouw Co., 271 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1954, writ dism'd). Indeed, in H. Rouw Co., this court stated,

[w]e are at a loss to know how the court could make a judgment that would bind [the nonparty] as against [the plaintiff] when [the nonparty] is not a party to the suit. Whether [the nonparty] will sue and recover against [the plaintiffs] was not before the court, and the court could write no judgment in this case denying [the nonparty its] rights should [the nonparty] seek to assert them. Those findings and conclusions, so far as the rights of [the nonparty] are concerned, are suppositions.

Id.

In this case, CGT and Owen were not parties to this suit or to any judgment; additionally, the findings of fact and conclusions of law, standing alone, are "suppositions" that can not bind CGT or Owen to any judgment in this case. Benson, 899 S.W.2d at 275; H. Rouw Co., 271 S.W.2d at 671. Accordingly, CGT and Owen have no standing to seek appellate review of such judgment. In re J.A., 225 S.W.3d at 11; Stroud, 733 S.W.2d at 620-21; Jernigan, 677 S.W.2d at 140. Appellants' issues are denied.

On December 28, 2007, appellees, Noe De Los Santos, Sr., Individually, et al., filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, arguing that: 1) the appeal was moot because a related suit had been nonsuited; or alternatively, 2) CGT and Owen lacked standing since they were not attorneys. Because we dismiss on other grounds, appellees' Motion to Dismiss Appeal is MOOT.

Conclusion

As CGT and Owen lack standing, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Karen Angelini, Justice