Van Wert County Law Library Ass'n v. Stuckey

94 N.E.2d 32, 60 Ohio Law. Abs. 1, 42 Ohio Op. 1, 1949 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 241
CourtVan Wert County Court of Common Pleas
DecidedDecember 30, 1949
DocketNo. 19789
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 94 N.E.2d 32 (Van Wert County Law Library Ass'n v. Stuckey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Van Wert County Court of Common Pleas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Van Wert County Law Library Ass'n v. Stuckey, 94 N.E.2d 32, 60 Ohio Law. Abs. 1, 42 Ohio Op. 1, 1949 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 241 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1949).

Opinion

OPINION

By McNEILL, J.

The Van Wert County Law Library Association filed its petition asking for declaratory judgment. The petition in[5]*5dicates that the auditor of Van Wert County has not made a certificate showing the liability of each municipal corporation to the Law Library Association. The auditor does not deny that the certificate should be made but has stated that insufficient data is provided to him by such municipal corporations to make such a certificate. In addition, many other questions relative to the interpretation of the Law Library Sections have been raised. As these are numerous, they will be taken up separately in each part of the opinion.

General

1. See. 3056 and §3056-2 GC are modified by the provisions of §3056-3 GC.

In interpreting §3056-3 GC it would be simpler to find that it does not apply to municipal corporations or courts of common pleas, as §3056 and §3056-2 GC seemingly provide for the distribution of all fines received by them. However, all three sections were enacted at the same time, and it is apparent that the legislature intended that all should be operative.

2. Sec. 3056-3 GC does not provide an additional maximum liability for payments by municipalities, courts of common pleas, or probate courts, to the law library association but the limitation provided in §3056-3 GC is limited by the provisions of §3056 and §3056-2 GC.

To hold that payments to a law library association for violations of the Liquor Control Act as provided in §3056-3 GC shall be made in addition to the total amount payable under §3056 and §3056-2 GC would necessarily mean that all payments provided in §3056-3 GC are in addition to the limits provided in the other sections. Thus, payments because of violations of the State Traffic Law would be unlimited as no limit is provided in §3056-3 GC. The Court does not feel this was the intention of the legislature as a reading of all the act shows an intent to specifically limit the liability of courts of common pleas and by municipalities. Therefore, when a clerk of the court of common pleas has paid $1250.00 under §3056-2 GC to a law library association or a municipality has paid the amount provided in the certificate of the auditor under §3058 GC, they shall make no further payments to a law 'library association whether or not $1200.00, has been paid because of violations of the Liquor Control Act. However, even if the maximum under the certificate has not been reached, no more than $1200.00 may be paid for violations of the Liquor Control Act.

3. The maximum of $1200.00 provided in §3056-3 GC is $1200.00 for each municipal corporation; $1200.00 for the [6]*6courts of common pleas of a county or probate court, and $1200.00 for all of the justices of peace courts for monies to be paid because of Liquor Control Act violations.

Some confusion is caused by the use of the word “treasurer” in said section. In §§3056 and 3056-2 GC the term “clerk” is used. In reading the sections together the reasonable interpretation is' that when “treasurer” is used in §3056-3 GC it must be read as “clerk” when considering the court of common pleas and municipalities, and “treasurer” in the reference to justices of the peace, as these are the county offices that make payments to law library associations. Sees. 3056, 3056-1, 3056-2 GC.

4. Secs. 3056, 3056-1, 3056-2, 3056-3 GC and Secs. 6064-59 and 1183-4 GC are compatible. The enactment of §1183-4 GC does not repeal by implication §§3056, 3056-1, 3056-2 and 3056-3 GC.

In Greenville v. Law Library Association, 21 O. O. 238, the court held that the enactment of §3056-3 GC by implication overruled §1181-5 now §1183-4 GC. A similar decision was announced in Law Library Association v. Parker, 22 O. O. 170. If this Court follows a similar view it necessarily would be held that the enactment of §1183-4 GC, October 11, 1945, would by implication repeal all parts of §3056-3 GC that are inconsistent therewith. However, an examination of the second case indicates that although the court announced the above rule of law, it did not actually so hold. In the Greenville case, the court held that §3056-3 GC overruled §1181-5 GC by implication in so far as they were incompatible, §1181-5 GC providing that if an arrest were made by a state highway patrolman, 50 per cent of the fine should go to the state and 50 per cent to a local subdivision. The court ruled that 50 per cent of all fines arising from arrests made by state highway patrolmen should go to the law library association; 25 per cent to the local subdivision; and 25 per cent to the state. Thus it was held that §3056-3 GC did repeal §1181-5 GC in that 50 per cent of the fines must go to a law library association, regardless of the effect of §1181-5 GC. However, the court’s interpretation of the compatibility of §3056-3 with §6064-59 GC was not completely consistent with the above holding.

In the Warren case, although the court announced the same rule of law, its actual holding was that the 50 per cent of traffic fines payable to a law libraray association under §3056-3 GC was only 50 per cent of that available to the local subdivisions and therefore, 25 per cent went to a law library association, 25 per cent to the local subdivision, and 50 per. cent to the state. Thus, in the Warren case, it actually [7]*7was found that the sections were compatible, even if part of the language used seemed to indicate otherwise, or necessarily, the decision would have been the same as in the Green-ville case.

This court is of the opinion that the actual decision reached in the Warren case is the proper one. This court does not feel that each time the legislature re-enacts or recodifies a section or makes some minor changes that they intend to repeal all other sections relating to-fines. This matter is con-' fusing enough in its present state without making such a ruling. If such a ruling were followed, each time there was a minor change or reeodification of the laws relating to fines, the complete distribution would be thereby changed. Such repeals by implication are not favored and should not be indulged in if any other reasonable construction may be found. 37 O. Jur. 401.

5. In construing §§3058, 3056-1, 3056-3, 3056-3 GC and §1181-4 and §6064-59 GC together, the combined meaning of these sections is that the monies or per cent of monies payable to a law library association by local subdivisions or other local authorities as provided in §§3056, 3056-1, 3056-3 and 3058-3 GC " is only that per cent of money available to the local subdivision or county.

Generally, if by law only a part of a fine is made available to a local subdivision • or a county, then the percentage payable to the law library association under §3056 to 3056-3 GC is only a percentage of that available to such municipality or county and is not a percentage of the whole amount. Sec. 3056 to §3056-3 GC provide for payments to a law library association by units the size of a county or smaller. It is apparent that the provisions of §3056 to §3056-3 GC only apply to funds that would be distributed to such subdivisions except for such sections and does not apply to funds payable to the state. Thus, §3056 to §3056-3 GC are still applicable to monies payable to local subdivisions.

6.

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Bluebook (online)
94 N.E.2d 32, 60 Ohio Law. Abs. 1, 42 Ohio Op. 1, 1949 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 241, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/van-wert-county-law-library-assn-v-stuckey-ohctcomplvanwe-1949.