Van Valkenburgh v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Van Valkenburgh v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.

304 A.D.2d 382, 756 N.Y.S.2d 749, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3879

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 10, 2003

StatusPublished

This text of 304 A.D.2d 382 (Van Valkenburgh v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Van Valkenburgh v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 304 A.D.2d 382, 756 N.Y.S.2d 749, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3879 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2003).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Saralee Evans, J.), entered on or about June 6, 2002, which, to the extent appealed from, denied Philip Morris’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The motion court properly found that there was an issue of fact as to whether the grate surrounding a tree in front of Philip Morris’s premises at 120 Park Avenue was a dangerous condition. Likewise, whether plaintiffs tripping over the grate was in some measure attributable to alcohol consumption or rushing to the station on his part is a factual issue properly left for the jury.

[383]*383To the extent that defendant’s motion for summary judgment was premised upon its contention that it had neither actual nor constructive notice of the alleged hazard, it was properly denied in light of evidence sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the alleged hazard was created by defendant (cf. Ohanessian v Chase Manhattan Realty Leasing Corp., 193 AD2d 567 [1993]).

We have considered appellant’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, Ellerin and Williams, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Saralee Evans, J.), entered on or about June 6, 2002, which, to the extent appealed from, denied Philip Morris’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The motion court properly found that there was an issue of fact as to whether the grate surrounding a tree in front of Philip Morris’s premises at 120 Park Avenue was a dangerous condition. Likewise, whether plaintiffs tripping over the grate was in some measure attributable to alcohol consumption or rushing to the station on his part is a factual issue properly left for the jury.

[383]*383To the extent that defendant’s motion for summary judgment was premised upon its contention that it had neither actual nor constructive notice of the alleged hazard, it was properly denied in light of evidence sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the alleged hazard was created by defendant (cf. Ohanessian v Chase Manhattan Realty Leasing Corp., 193 AD2d 567 [1993]).

We have considered appellant’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, Ellerin and Williams, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

304 A.D.2d 382, 756 N.Y.S.2d 749, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3879, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/van-valkenburgh-v-philip-morris-companies-inc-nyappdiv-2003.

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