Van Suetendael v. Van Suetendael

New York Court of Appeals

Van Suetendael v. Van Suetendael

56 N.E.2d 563, 293 N.Y. 233, 1944 N.Y. LEXIS 1309

CourtNew York Court of Appeals

DecidedJuly 19, 1944

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 56 N.E.2d 563 (Van Suetendael v. Van Suetendael) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Van Suetendael v. Van Suetendael, 56 N.E.2d 563, 293 N.Y. 233, 1944 N.Y. LEXIS 1309 (N.Y. 1944).

Pincite

Opinion

Per Curiam.

The cause of action against defendant Achille O. Van Suetendael individually accrued no later than February, 1929, when that defendant rendered an accounting but omitted any reference to the decedent’s interest in the real estate and bank accounts. At that time the decedent’s adult son already knew that the estate had an interest in these assets. The action not having been commenced until November, 1940, this cause of action was barred by the ten-year Statute of Limitations (Civ. Prac. Act, §§ 15, 53).

The cause of action against both defendants as directors of Phillipsburgh Construction Company accrued no earlier than December 15, 1937, when that corporation was dissolved. It was therefore not barred by any Statute of Limitations. The evidence amply supported the findings of the courts below on this phase of the case.

*236 The judgment of Special Term, as modified by the Appellate Division, should be further modified by striking out the second, third and fourth decretal paragraphs thereof, and, as so modified, affirmed, without costs.

Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacher, JJ., concur.

Judgment accordingly.

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Per Curiam.

The cause of action against defendant Achille O. Van Suetendael individually accrued no later than February, 1929, when that defendant rendered an accounting but omitted any reference to the decedent’s interest in the real estate and bank accounts. At that time the decedent’s adult son already knew that the estate had an interest in these assets. The action not having been commenced until November, 1940, this cause of action was barred by the ten-year Statute of Limitations (Civ. Prac. Act, §§ 15, 53).

The cause of action against both defendants as directors of Phillipsburgh Construction Company accrued no earlier than December 15, 1937, when that corporation was dissolved. It was therefore not barred by any Statute of Limitations. The evidence amply supported the findings of the courts below on this phase of the case.

*236 The judgment of Special Term, as modified by the Appellate Division, should be further modified by striking out the second, third and fourth decretal paragraphs thereof, and, as so modified, affirmed, without costs.

Lehman, Ch. J., Loughran, Rippey, Lewis, Conway, Desmond and Thacher, JJ., concur.

Judgment accordingly.

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Bluebook (online)

56 N.E.2d 563, 293 N.Y. 233, 1944 N.Y. LEXIS 1309, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/van-suetendael-v-van-suetendael-ny-1944.

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