Van Rensselaer v. Whitbeck

4 How. Pr. 381
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMay 15, 1850
StatusPublished

This text of 4 How. Pr. 381 (Van Rensselaer v. Whitbeck) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Van Rensselaer v. Whitbeck, 4 How. Pr. 381 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1850).

Opinion

By the Court, Harris, Justice.

The first duty of assessors is, by diligent inquiry to ascertain who are the taxable inhabitants, and what is the taxable property, within their respective towns or wards. Having done this they are next to proceed to make, in a prescribed manner, an assessment roll. It is to contain four separate columns, in thq first of which is to be inserted the names of all the taxable inhabitants; in the second, the quantity of land taxable to each inhabitant; in the third, the full value of such land, and in the fourth, the full value of all the taxable personal property. In another part of the same assessment roll, separate from the other assessments, they are to designate, in a particular manner, the lands of non-residents. The first direction is, that the land to be as[385]*385sessed shall be designated by its name, if it be known by one. The rule of valuation is also prescribed. When the assessment-roll is completed, it is to be submitted to the examination of the inhabitants of the town or ward for twenty days, at the expiration of which time the assessors are required to meet to review the assessment upon the application of any person conceiving himself aggrieved. The assessors are then to sign the roll and attach thereto a certificate, the form of which is prescribed, and to deliver the roll, thus certified, to the supervisor. The essential thing to be done by the assessors is to determine who are to be taxed and what property is taxable. This is a matter within their jurisdiction. In making the determination they act judicially, and though they may proceed irregularly, yet, having jurisdiction of the subject-matter, their unreversed decisions cannot be questioned collaterally. If, for example, some other rule of valuation than that prescribed by the statute should be adopted, or if the assessors should refuse to value the estate of any person liable to taxation, at the sum specified in the affidavit of such person, it might, perhaps, furnish ground for reversing the proceedings, but it would not be ground for holding the assessment void upon a collateral question. (Marchant v. Langworthy, 6 Hill, 646.)

There are other provisions of the statute prescribing the duties of assessors which are obviously directory in their character. Of this description is the requirement in the 8th section that the assessors shall ascertain between the first days of May and July, who, and what property is taxable, and the 19th section requiring the assessors to complete their rolls on or before the first day of September; and the 27th section which requires the certified roll to be delivered to the supervisor of the town on or before the first day of October. These duties, though required, are not “ of the essence of the thing to be done,” and therefore are not essential to the validity of the assessment. So too, I think, the certificate required by the 26th section of the statute is to be regarded. H the assessors have performed their duty in making the assessment-roll, as they may be presumed to have done, the certificate amounts to nothing more than a solemn declaration on their part, that they have performed such duty. It forms no part of their adjudication, upon which the action of the board of supervisors, is to be taken. It is but the evidence of what the assessors have done, and therefore it seems to me would not, even in a direct proceeding, bringing in question the validity of the assessment, be the subject of review. At any rate the entire want of such certificate, much less the omission of the assessors to adopt the form prescribed in the statute, could not invalidate a tax [386]*386charged by the board of supervisors upon the persons and property specified in the assessmfent roll if the assessment itself were in all respects conformable to law.

The board of supervisors are required to examine the assessment rolls returned to them, for the single purpose of ascertaining whether the valuations of real estate in one town or ward, bear a just relation to those in the other towns or wards in the county, and if they do not, the board is authorized to change such valuation so as to produce such relation. It is also authorized to make any alteration in the description of the lands of non-residents, necessary to make such descriptions conformable to law. To these objects, the power of review, vested in the board of supervisors, is limited; any other errors committed by the assessors in the discharge of their duty, it is not within the province of the board of supervisors to notice. The assessment-rolls being returned to them, containing the names of the persons to be taxed, and the taxable property, and the assessors’ valuation of such property, it is the duty of the supervisors, after having examined and corrected the valuations and the descriptions of the lands of non-residents, to proceed to annex the tax list. Ho mere irregularity in the proceedings of the assessors would justify the supervisors in omitting the discharge of this duty. That the assessors in this case were guilty of a gross departure from a duty plainly defined by the statute, is obvious; and yet it is a matter within the knowledge of every one at all acquainted with the manner in which the duty of assessors is discharged, that the certificate which the assessors, in this instance, annexed to the assessment-roll, prepared by them, was the only certificate, which, as men of truth, they could subscribe. The law requires assessors to estimate all property, liable to taxation, at its full value, as they would appraise the same in the payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor. With this requirement of the statute before them, and acting under the obligation of their official oath, it is the uniform practice of assessors to estimate all real estate at a valuation greatly below its real value. There probably is not to be found a single instance in the state in which assessors have estimated the value of real estate according to the standard prescribed by the statute. The whole assessed value of the real estate, liable to taxation throughout the state, is probably less than half its real value. The real difference between the certificate before us, and that usually annexed to assessment rolls, is, that in this case, the assessors have, in fact, stated the truth, while others, in following the form prescribed by the statute, have certified to what they must have known to be untrue.

It is also insisted that the assessment of the plaintiff’s lands in Green-[387]*387bush, was illegal and void, because they were assessed as the lands of a resident of the town, and not in conformity with the provisions of the statute relating to the assessment of the lands of non-residents. I am unable to perceive that this objection is founded in fact. It appears that the lands of the plaintiff are entered in the assessment-roll by them selves, upon a page standing between the assessment of the taxable inhabitants of the town, and the assessment of the lands of non-residents. The plaintiff’s lands are designated in the assessment-roll, in a part thereof separate from the other assessments,” and this is all that the statute requires in this respect. I think, too, there is a substantial compliance with the statute in relation to description; as I understand the direction of the statute, it is enough, where the land of a non-resident is known by a name, to enter it in the assessment-roll by such name, and then to set down in two other columns the quantity and valuation of the land assessed. This was done in respect to each parcel of the plaintiff’s land.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
4 How. Pr. 381, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/van-rensselaer-v-whitbeck-nysupct-1850.