Van Laundry v. Corinthian, LLC

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 9, 2025
• Docket: 1620 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S05040-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

VAN LAUNDRY, INC. A/K/A D/B/A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF VAN'S LAUNDROMATS, INC., A/K/A : PENNSYLVANIA D/B/A VANS LAUNDROMATS, INC. : : Appellant : : : v. : : No. 1620 EDA 2024 : CORINTHIAN, LLC A/K/A 835 : CORINTHIAN, LLC A/K/A D/B/A 835 : CORINTHIAN STREET, LLC, : FISHTOWN ROYAL DE, LLC, AND : RYAN KIM :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 23, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 220201636

VAN LAUNDRY, INC. A/K/A D/B/A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF VAN'S LAUNDROMATS, INC., A/K/A : PENNSYLVANIA D/B/A VANS LAUNDROMATS, INC. : : : v. : : : 835 CORINTHIAN, LLC, FISHTOWN : No. 1740 EDA 2024 ROYAL DE, LLC, AND RYAN KIM : : Appellants :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 23, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 220201636

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 9, 2025 ____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S05040-25

Appellant/Cross-Appellee Tenant Van Laundry, Inc. a/k/a d/b/a Van’s

Laundromats, Inc., a/k/a d/b/a Vans Laundromats, Inc. (hereinafter “Tenant”

or “Appellant Tenant”) and Cross-Appellants 835 Corinthian, LLC, Fishtown

Royal DE, LLC, and Ryan Kim (hereinafter “Landlord” or “Cross-Appellant

Landlord”) file an appeal and cross-appeal, respectively, from the trial court’s

judgment entered on May 24, 2024. After careful consideration, we affirm all

aspects of the trial court’s judgment except for its award of damages in the

amount of $31,617.00 to Appellees/Cross-Appellants Landlords and against

Appellant/Cross-Appellee Tenant, which award is vacated and remanded for

reassessment consistent with this decision.

The trial court sets forth the relevant procedural history of the instant

case:

Plaintiff/Appellant Tenant Laundromat commenced this action [in tort and contract] by way of filing a writ of summons on February 15, 2022. Appellant Tenant then filed a complaint on July 23, 2022, [to] which Defendant/Cross-Appellant Landlord filed an answer with new matter and counterclaim [asserting breach of contract] on January 4, 2024. [During discovery, Tenant presented evidence that its laundromat equipment was damaged by heavy rains entering the interior of the business through an alleged negligently conducted roof repair by Landlord] After discovery concluded, this matter proceeded to a bench trial.

On January 8, 2024, a bench trial was held in which the trial court received testimony and documentary evidence from both parties. The trial court heard from Mark Evans, a former employee of Appellant Tenant (N.T. 01/08/24, 27-59), Jack Burkhardt, Appellant Tenant’s mechanical engineering expert in valuation of laundromat equipment (N.T. 01/08/24, 89-103), Mao Khai Van, owner of Appellant Tenant, with interpreter (N.T. 01/08/24, 104- 156), and Ryan Kim, member of Cross-Appellant Landlord (N.T. 01/08/24, 157-191).

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The parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law after the trial. On January 22, 2024, the trial court issued its finding, which found for Appellant Tenant Laundromat on one of its claims in the amount of $25,000.00, for Cross-Appellant Landlord on one of its claims in the amount of $31,617, [and offset the awards to arrive at a remainder of $6,617 in Cross- Appellant/Landlord’s favor].

[After denying on the merits both Appellant Tenant’s and Cross- Appellant Landlord’s respective post-trial motions by Order of May 23, 2024, the trial court entered judgment in the same May 23, 2024, filing.]

Appellant Tenant filed a notice of appeal on June 13, 2024, and on the same day the trial court issued, and the parties received, notice of a [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b) Order onto Appellant Tenant, [who] timely responded on July 5, 2024. Cross-Appellant Landlord filed a notice of appeal on June 20, 2024, and on June 21, 2024, the trial court issued, and the parties received, notice of a 1925(b) Order onto Cross-Appellant Landlord, [who] timely responded on July 11, 2024.

Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 7/25/2024, at 2-4. 1 ____________________________________________

1 Based on this procedural history, we reject the trial court’s conclusion that

Appellant Tenant and Cross-Appellant Landlord have filed untimely appeals and/or appeals from unappealable orders requiring dismissal due to a jurisdictional defect. While it is true that both Tenant and Landlord filed notices of appeal erroneously purporting to appeal from the order and decree entered on January 23, 2024, both filings occurred only after the trial court had entered its May 24, 2024, judgment relating to all prior orders that had disposed of all claims and all parties after the denial of their respective post- trial motions. It is well-settled that an appeal properly lies from the entry of judgment following the trial court's disposition of post-trial motions. Fanning v. Davne, 795 A.2d 388 (Pa. Super. 2002). Nevertheless, our court has exercised jurisdiction over appeals where a notice of appeal purports the appeal is taken from an order preceding the entry of judgment. See Siana v. Noah Hill, LLC, 322 A.3d 269, 275-276 (Pa. Super. 2024) (appellate jurisdiction exercised despite appellants’ defective notice of appeal purporting to appeal from order awarding counsel fees rather than from judgment entered several days later on the award; defect deemed harmless where (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Plaintiff/Appellant Tenant Laundromat raises the following issues in its

appeal:

1. Was it an abuse of discretion and error of law for the trial court (going against the weight of the evidence) to award $31,617.00 in damages in favor of the Appellees/Cross- Appellants [Landlord] per the Order dated January 22, 2024, in that the weight of the evidence was so contrary to the court’s decision because (1) the undisputed evidence showed that any alleged damages against Appellant[/Tenant Laundromat] was capped at six (6) month’s [sic] rent under Paragraph 10 of the Lease?

2. Was it an abuse of discretion and error of law for the trial court to determine per the Order dated January 22, 2024, that the Parties stipulated at trial that the 10/18/21 Notice demonstrated clear and convincing evidence that the Appellees/Cross-Appellants [Landlord] notified Appellant/Cross-Appellee [Tenant Laundromat] when Use and Occupancy Taxes were allegedly due and/or unpaid taxes were due and/or that the [Landlord] ever demonstrated that notice was ever provided to [Tenant] regarding unpaid taxes?

Brief of Appellant Tenant Laundromat at 5.

Defendant/Cross-Appellant Landlord raises the following issue in its

cross-appeal:

Whether the trial court committed an error of law or abuse of discretion when it found in favor of Plaintiff-Appellant in the amount of $25,000.00 on its claims against Defendant- ____________________________________________

timely appeal was taken after entry of judgment and caused no prejudice to opposing party); Cf King v. Hinkle, (non-precedential decision cited for persuasive value pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)) No. 259 WDA 2024, 2025 WL 79038, at *1 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 13, 2025) (appeal erroneously taken from order denying post-trial motion held to have caused no jurisdictional defect impeding review where notice of appeal related forward to the date on which judgment was entered). Accordingly, no jurisdictional defect impedes our review.

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Appellee/Cross-Appellant for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment?

Brief of Cross-Appellant Landlord, at 1.

Regarding both Tenant’s second enumerated issue and Landlord’s sole

issue on appeal, our review of the record, party briefs, and the Honorable

Carmella Jacquinto’s well-reasoned and comprehensive 32-page Pa.R.A.P.

opinion leads us to conclude these issues merit no relief. Briefly addressing

Tenant’s second issue, in which he challenges the trial court’s determination

that Landlord provided Tenant with notice of default and the consequential

responsibility of Tenant under the lease to pay any unpaid real estate taxes,

we observe that the trial court explains on pages 14 to 16 of its opinion that

it deemed Landlord’s testimony more credible than Tenant’s testimony on this

discrete issue of notice. In its present assessment of this second weight of

the evidence claim advanced by Tenant, the trial court perceives in its fact-

finding and determination thereon no palpable abuse of discretion or mistake

that shocks one’s sense of justice that would be necessary to grant Tenant

relief on his issue. Our review yields no reason to disturb its exercise of

discretion on this issue.

Similarly, the trial court aptly denied Landlord’s sole issue assailing the

trial court’s decision to find in favor of Tenant’s quiet enjoyment claim. As

explained on pages 20 to 35, the trial court discerned no abuse of discretion

shocking the conscience in its determination that Tenant’s claim of breach of

quiet enjoyment under the lease was supported by evidence of both Tenant’s

continued payments of monthly rent after the expiration of the parties’ 10-

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year lease and Landlord’s acceptance of such payments, which constituted a

holdover tenancy relationship enabling Tenant to prevail on his contract-based

claim.

On reviewing both issues, we find no basis under our standard and scope

of review, infra, to disturb the court’s judgment respective to them.

Accordingly, as the trial court’s opinion disposes of said issues after engaging

in a comprehensive review supported by appropriate reference to the record

and legal authority, we affirm the trial court’s judgment pertaining to said

issues based on the trial court’s opinion.

We turn, then, to address Tenant’s first issue. The scope and standard

of review applicable to this weight of the evidence claim are as follows:

[O]ur scope of review on a weight of the evidence claim is very limited. We will respect the trial court's findings with regard to credibility and weight of the evidence unless it can be shown that the lower court's determination was manifestly erroneous, arbitrary and capricious or flagrantly contrary to the evidence.

[Rissi v. Cappella, 918 A.2d 131, 140 (Pa. Super. 2007)] (quoting Hollock v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 842 A.2d 409, 417 (Pa. Super. 2004)). In In re M.B., 228 A.3d 555 (Pa. Super. 2020), this Court quoted the principles governing a weight of the evidence claim as stated by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049 (Pa. 2013). There, the Court explained:

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. ... It has often been stated that a new trial should be

-6- J-S05040-25

awarded when the [factfinder's] verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.

An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the trial court:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court's determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

In re M.B., 228 A.3d at 566 (quoting Clay, 64 A.3d at 1054-55) (internal citations, quotations, and emphasis omitted). “One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence[.]” Id. (quoting Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055).

Alkozbari v. Wanaselja, 313 A.3d 209 (Pa. Super. 2024) (emphases in bold

added).

Tenant contends the trial court engaged in an erroneous weighing of the

evidence relating to the extent of his liability for damages stemming from

Tenant’s purported default under the parties’ lease. Specifically, Tenant

argues the damages award must be vacated and recalculated because the trial

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court failed to apply the damages cap appearing in the parties’ lease, which

lease, the trial court had concluded, continued to bind the parties at the time

in question. We agree.

Our review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion in resolving this

post-trial issue against Tenant leads us to find that the trial court simply

denied the existence of, and thus did not consider at all, the damages cap

provision present in the lease. In so doing, the trial court failed to incorporate

into its exercise of discretion a most essential consideration bearing on what,

if any, damages Tenant owes for default under the lease.

In the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing this issue, it

summarily explains that Tenant argued in its post-trial motion and again in its

appeal “that paragraph 10 of the Lease capped damages but said paragraph

does not contain/mention any such language[,]” and the trial court ends its

discussion of the matter there. Our independent review of the record strongly

suggests the trial court’s truncated review of this issue was influenced by

Tenant’s post-trial and appellate filings inadvertently transposing the lease

page and paragraph numbers relating to the damages cap provision.

Nevertheless, both the provision’s location within the lease and its

content already had been accurately conveyed multiple times throughout the

litigation by counsel for Tenant, such that we cannot accept the exercise of

discretion, or lack thereof, manifest in the court’s summary rejection of this

issue.

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Counsel for Tenant identified the damages cap provision within the

lease, recited the provision verbatim in both written submissions and in open

court during trial, and advanced the position that the cap applies to any

purported default Tenant may be found to have committed and prevails over

all other provisions in the Lease by its very terms. Specifically, in his pretrial

filings, opening argument at trial, examination of witnesses, submission of the

lease into evidence, closing arguments, and post-trial motion, counsel for

Tenant indicated correctly that the lease agreement caps Tenant’s liability

upon default to no more than “6 months base rent or base rent for the

remainder of the term, whichever is less.”2 N.T. at 21 and 153.

During examination of a witness at trial, counsel for Tenant correctly

directed the court to the page and paragraph of the lease articulating the

damages cap provision in question. N.T. at 153. In both his post-trial motion

and again in the appellate brief for Tenant, however, counsel mistakenly

indicated the damages cap provision is in “Paragraph” 10 of the lease when it,

instead, appears in Paragraph 20 that begins on “Page” 10, as counsel for

____________________________________________

2 Paragraph 20, DEFAULT, provides in relevant part:

For good and valuable consideration, Landlord agrees to the following provision: Notwithstanding any provision in this Lease to the contrary, Landlord and Tenant agree that Tenant’s liability upon default shall not exceed 6 months base rent or base rent for the remainder of the term, whichever is less.

Parties’ Lease Agreement, at Paragraph 20, pages 10-11.

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Tenant correctly apprised the court during his examination of a witness.

Landlord and the trial court have seized on counsel’s error to conclude,

summarily, that “Paragraph 10” does not contain a damages cap.

Counsel’s transposition of page and paragraph in what is a relatively

short and easily navigated lease would have been readily discerned and

overcome by the exercise of judicial review meeting the standards necessary

to address properly the Tenant’s post-trial assertion that the damages award

of $31,617.00 went against the weight of the evidence showing the damages

cap provision within the lease applied to the facts at hand. Therefore, we find

the trial court erred when it failed to address in any meaningful way Tenant’s

post-trial motion asserting that evidence at trial proved he should have

benefitted from the existence of a lease provision expressing that Landlord

agrees, for good and valuable consideration, that a described cap shall apply

to Tenant’s default-related damages.

Accordingly, we vacate judgment on this basis alone and remand to the

trial court, which shall determine whether the weight of the evidence adduced

at trial established that the damages cap set forth in the parties’ lease applied

to the damages assessed against Tenant and, if so, to what effect.

Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Murray joins the memorandum.

Judge Bowes files a concurring and dissenting memorandum.

- 10 - J-S05040-25

Date: 4/9/2025

- 11 - 03:18 PM Circulated 02/14/2025 0318

VAN LAUNDRY, INC. INC. :• COURT OF COMMON PLEAS •• PHILADELPHIA COUNTY •• CIVIL DIVISION

V. v. FEBRUARY TERM, 2022 No. 220201636

SUPERIOR COURT 835 CORINTHIAN, .. 1620 EDA 2024 ,_ • -- .% g c LLC ET AL •• 1740 EDA 2024 •

OPINION - -- Jo 7 d 1/ji _• E s � 0. N cn e �� Do 7 JACQUINTO, J. e 3 ne Ve .. 0; -e N 4-- e 5 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court hereby 9

submits this Opinion detailing the reasons the trial court's May

24 Order ((Order 24,2024 Order Order dated May 232024, 23 ,2024, notice provided on

May 24 24,2024; See Pa.R.A.P. 108(b)), which denied Appellant Van

Laundry, Inc.'s Post-Trial Motion, denied Cross-Appellant's Post-

Trial Motion, and entered judgment In in the aggregate in favor of

Cross-Appellant and against Appellant, should be affirmed. As

discussed herein below, it is respectfully suggested that the

Appellant's relief sought be denied, the Cross-Appellant's relief

sought be denied, and the trial court's May 24 24,2024 Order be

affirmed. OPFL0.Van Laundry, no. Vs 83 Corinthian, Uc [ACH]

1 IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIVIIIIIIIIIIB III IAN 22020163600149 220201636001a49

PURSUANTTO COPIES SENT PURSUANT Pa.R.C.P. TOP.RC P 236(b) D. KELLY 07/25/2024 236/) D,KELLY PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY

Appellant Appellant commenced this action by way of filing aa writ of

summons on February 15, 2022. Appellant then filed a a complaint

on July 23, 2022, which Cross-Appellant filed an answer with new

matter and counterclaim on March 1, 2023. Appellant answered

Cross-Appellant's Cross-Appellant's counterclaim on January 4, 2024. After

discovery concluded, this matter proceeded to aa bench trial.

On January 8, 2024, aa bench trial was held in which the trial

court received testimony and documentary evidence from both

parties. parties. The trial court heard from Mark Evans, aa former

employee of Appellant employee Appellant ((N.T. N.T. 01/08/24, 27-59), lack Jack Burkhardt,

expert ((N.T. Appellant's mechanical engineering expert N.T. 01/08/24, 63-

83), Andrew Walls, Appellant's expert in valuation of llaundromat aundromat

equipment ((N.T. equipment N.T. 01/08/24, 89-103), Mao Khai Van, owner of

Appellant, Appellant, with interpreter interpreter ((N.T. N.T. 01/08/24, 104-156), and Ryan

Kim, member of Cross-Appellant Cross-Appellant ((N.T. N.T. 01/08/24, 157-191). The

parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law

after the trial. On January 22, 2024, the trial court issued its

finding, which found for Appellant on one of its finding, its claims in the

2z $ 25,000, for Cross-Appellant on one of its claims iin amount of $25,000, n

$ 31,617, thus, in the amount of $31,617, in the aggregate found in favor of

Cross-Appellant and against Appellant in the amount of $6,617. $ 6,617.

On February 2, 2024, Appellant filed aa timely Post-Trial

Motion. Due to complications with Cross-Appellant's counsel, the

trial court issued issued an Order, placing the matter in deferred status

for 60 days in in order for Cross-Appellant to retain new counsel.

Cross-Appellant responded to Appellant's Post-Trial Motion on

April 16, 2024. On the same day, Cross-Appellant filed its own

Post-Trial Motion, which Appellant responded to on May 6, 2024.

The trial court then entered an Order on May 23, 2024, denying

Appellant's Appellant's Post-Trial Motion, denying Cross-Appellant's Post-Trial

Motion, and entering judgment in favor of Cross-Appellant and

against Appellant iin against n the aggregate. Parties were given notice of

.the the trial court's May 23, 2024 Order the following day, May 24,

2024.

Appellant Appellant filed a a notice of appeal on June 13, 2024 and on

the same day, the trial court issued and the parties received

notice of aa 1925(b) Order onto Appellant, which was timely

3 responded to on July 5, 2024. Cross-Appellant filed a a notice of

appeal on June 20, 2024 and on June 21, 2024 the trial court

iissued ssued and the parties received notice of aa 1925(b) Order onto

Cross-Appellant, which was timely responded to on July 11, 2024.

ISSUES

Per the Appellant's 1925(b) Statement, the issue raised on

appeal is as follows:

I. ""It I. It was an abuse of discretion and error of llaw aw by the trial

court ((going court going against the weight of the evidence) to award

$31,617.00 in in damages in favor of the the [[Cross-Appellant] Cross-Appellant]

per the Order dated January 23, 2024, iin n that the weight

of the evidence was so contrary to the aforementioned

decision because because ((1) 1) the undisputed evidence showed that

any alleged damages against any against [Appellant] [Appellant] were capped at

six ((6) 6) months rent under Paragraph 10 of the Lease; Lease; ((2) 2)

[Cross-Appellant] never demonstrated through clear and

convincing evidence that they notified notified [Appellant] [Appellant] when

Use and Occupancy Taxes were allegedly due iin n

accordance with the Lease; Lease; ((3) 3) and the Parties never

4 4 stipulated at trial that the 10/18/21 Notice demonstrated

that the the [Appellant] owed [[Cross-Appellant] [Appellant] owed Cross-Appellant] $31,617.00 $ 31,617.00 in

unpaid taxes as rent rent ((which which was the core disagreement as

to the case and controversy) and where where [[Cross-Appellant] Cross-Appellant]

never raised the alleged collection of unpaid taxes as a a

the [Appellant]." Counterclaim against the [Appellant]."

1925(b) Statement, the issues Per the Cross-Appellant's 192S(b)

raised on appeal are as follows:

I. This Court erred by finding finding in favor of Plaintiff Van

Laundry, Inc. (" Plaintiff") and against 835 Corinthian, LLC ("Plaintiff")

on Count IIof the Complaint Complaint (the (the ""Complaint") Complaint") in the

$ 25,000.00 for breach of the covenant of quiet amount of $25,000.00

enjoyment, pursuant to paragraph paragraph 33 of the Lease Lease (the (the

"Lease") entered into by the parties hereto.

II. Specifically, this Court committed error by failing to find

that, after September 2020, Plaintiff became aa holdover

tenant and was, thus, not entitled to the covenant of quiet

enjoyment from September 2020 onward.

5 III. Additionally, this Court committed error by failing to

recognize that, by Mr. Van's own admission at trial, he

never provided written notice of renewal to 835 Corinthian

or iits predecessor- in- interest in accordance with the ts predecessor-in-interest

terms and conditions of the Lease.

IV. This Court committed error by failing to recognize that

Plaintiff did not produce any written evidence at trial of

renewal of the expired term of the Lease Lease (the (the '"Lease Lease

Term") . Term").

V. Furthermore, this Court committed error by failing to hold

that, because Plaintiff was aa holdover tenant without any

llegal egal or equitable right to possession of the subject leased

premises ((the premises the ""Leased Leased Premises"), Plaintiff was was not

entitled to the benefits of the covenant of quiet enjoyment

contained in in the Lease.

VI. VI. Additionally, Additionally, this this Court Court committed committed error error by by failing failing to to find find

that Plaintiff's Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceedings

discharged and/or dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims

66 regarding the expired Lease, iincluding ncluding Plaintiff's claim for

breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.

in favor of VII. Lastly, this Court committed error by finding in

Plaintiff, where aa balancing of the equities definitively

weighed against Plaintiff, which had failed to pay any rent weighed against

on account of the Lease Premises after December 2020,

despite continuing to store its equipment at the Leased

Premises until March 2023 without providing 835

Corinthian, LLC any compensation.

ARGUMENT

I. Preliminarily, Preliminarily, Appellant's and Cross-Appellant's appeals should be quashed as the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction jurisdiction over this matter due to parties' failure to appeal from aa final order.

Regarding whether appellate jurisdiction exists,

'"[j]urisdiction is "[jlurisdiction is purely a a question of llaw; aw; the appellate standard

of review is is de novo and the scope of review plenary." Iron Cty City

Constr., Inc. v. y. Westmoreland Wooded Acres, Inc., 2023 PA Wooded Acres,

528 ((2023). Super 5, 288 A.3d 528 2023).

The Superior Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all

appeals coming from final orders of the courts of common pleas. 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 742 742 ((emphasis emphasis added). A A final

order is an order that disposes of all claims and all parties.

Additionally, ""no Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). Additionally, no order of a a court shall be

appealable until it has been entered upon the appropriate docket

in the trial court." Pa.R.A.P. 301(a). 301(a). "An "An interlocutory order, on

the other hand, is any order that does not dispose of all claims

and all parties. Basically, final orders end aacase. Interlocutory

orders do not." Barak Barak v. Karolizki, 2018 PA Super 258, 196 A.3d

215 ((2018) 208, 215 2018) ((internal internal citations and quotations omitted).

"Generally, an appeal will only be permitted from aa final order

unless otherwise permitted by statute or rule of court." Fanning Fanninq.

v. Davne, 2002 PA Super 45, 795 A.2d 388 388 ((2002). 2002). There are

exceptions, none of which apply to the instant matter, to

appealing an interlocutory order. See Pa.R.A.P. 311; Pa.R.A.P.

312; and Pa.R.A.P. Pa. -R.A.P. 1311. Furthermore, Furthermore, ""the the notice of

appeal ... shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order appeal...shall

from which the appeal is taken." Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).

In the matter at hand, the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction

over this appeal as the parties' failed to take an appeal from aa

s 8 final order and this cannot be cured because the time to take an

appeal from a appeal afinal order has elapsed. The trial court iissued ssued iits ts

finding in in the aggregate in in favor of Cross-Appellant and against

Appellant via its its January 23, 2024 Order, in in which the parties

received notice of such on January 25, 2024. Both parties took

their respective appeals from this January 25, 2024 Order. Order. ((See See

Appellant's Appellant's and Cross-Appellant's notices notices of appeal). Said Order is is

iinterlocutory nterlocutory and not final because even though iitt disposed of all

claims and all parties, the judgment was not entered on the

docket, which is is a a prerequisite under the Pennsylvania Rules of. of

Appellate Procedure. The only final order Appellate order in this this case case with which which

the Superior Court would have jurisdiction over iis s the May 24,

2024 Order, which disposed of both parties' post-trial motions

and entered judgment judgment on the docket. With both parties appealing

aa non-final order and there being no applicable exception to

appealing an interlocutory interlocutory order, the Superior Court lacks lacks

jurisdiction over jurisdiction over the instant instant appeal. Moreover, under under the the

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, the deadline to file aa

timely appeal was June 24, 2024, which was thirty days after the

99 parties received notice of the trial court's May 24, 2024 Order

that denied the post-trial post- trial motions and entered the judgment on

the docket. Remand to rectify the timeliness issue would be

ineffective, as such deadline to take an appeal from aa final order

has already passed. Therefore, it is respectfully suggested that

both appeals be quashed, and the trial court's May 24, 2024

Order, which denied Appellant's Post-Trial Motion, denied Cross-

Appellant's Post-Trial Motion, and entered judgment in the

aggregate in favor of Cross-Appellant and against Appellant, be

affirmed.

APPELLANT'S ISSUES

II. In the event it is determined the parties did invoke the Superior Court's jurisdiction by timely appealing a final a final order, order, the the trial court court properly properly denied denied the the Appellant's requesting ]JNOV Appellant's Post-Trial Motion requesting NOV and new trial due to the trial court's finding does not shock one's sense of justice.

In an abundance of caution, as appellate cases have

discussed parties couching sufficiency of the evidence claims as

claims of going against the weight of the evidence, the trial court

wants to point out that any issue/argument on appeal as to the

sufficiency of the evidence has been waived for Appellant's failure 10 to move for directed verdict at trial. See Haan v. y. Wells, 2014 PA

Super 226, 103 A.3d 60, 68 Super 68 ((2014). 2014). Therefore, any

issue/argument on appeal pertaining to sufficiency of the

evidence is waived. In Appellant's Post-Trial Motion, they sought

relief in the form of JNOV and new trial. Appellant's only issue on

appeal alleges the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred by appeal alleges

going against going against the weight of the evidence, and the trial court will

discuss the weight of the evidence issue in those contexts.

Assuming arguendo Assuming arguendo that the Appellant timely appealed from

aa final order, which it did not, the applicable standard of review is

as follows:

"Appellate "Appellate review of aa weight claim is aa review of the the [[trial trial court's] exercise of discretion, not of the underlying underlying question question of whether the verdict is against the weight weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, presented, an appellate appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a a trial court's determination that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting granting or denying a a new trial is the lower court's conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight against weight of the evidence and that a a new trial should be granted granted in the interest of justice. The factfinder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the 11 ---- ------- -----

witnesses. The trial court may award a a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a a new trial only when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. In determining whether this standard has been met, appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge's discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted where the facts and inferences of record disclose a a palpable abuse of discretion. When aafact finder's verdict is so opposed to the demonstrative facts that looking at the verdict, the mind stands baffled, the intellect searches in vain for cause and effect, and reason rebels against the bizarre and erratic conclusion, it can be said that the verdict is shocking. However, [[i]f However, i]f there is any support in the record for the trial court's decision to deny the appellant's motion for a a new trial based on weight of the evidence, then we must affirm. An appellant appellant is not entitled to aa new trial where the evidence presented was conflicting and the fact- finder could have decided in favor of either party."

Spencer v. Spencer y. Johnson, 2021 PA Super 48, 249 A.3d 529, 566 (2021).

Furthermore, Furthermore, "[ t]rial courts have broad discretion to grant or "[t]rial

deny new trials and each review of a deny a challenge challenge to a a new trial

begin with an analysis of the underlying conduct or order must begin

omission by by the trial court that formed the basis for the

motion." Harman v, v. Borah, 562 Pa. 455, 465-66, 756 A.2d 1116,

1121-22 ((2000). 1121-22 2000). -There is a "There atwo-step process that aatrial court 12 must follow when responding to aa request for aa new trial. trial, First,

the trial court must decide whether one or more mistakes

occurred at trial. Second, iiff the trial court determines that aa

mistake occurred, it must determine whether the mistake was

sufficient basis for granting aa new trial. It is well- settled llaw well-settled aw that,

absent aa clear abuse of discretion by the trial court, appellate

courts must not interfere with aatrial court's authority to grant or

deny a a new trial." [d. Id.

Here, Cross-Appellant filed aa counterclaim against Appellant

sounding in in breach of contract, regarding the Lease between the

parties. In the counterclaim, amongst other averments, Cross-

Appellant averred that that ""Counterclaim Counterclaim Plaintiff has suffered

significant damages significant damages as a a direct result of the actions and inactions inactions

of Counterclaim Defendant... WHEREFORE, Counterclaim Plaintiffs Defendant..WHEREFORE,

835 Corinthian, LLC, Fishtown Royal DE LLC and Ryan Kim

demand judgment in its its favor and against Counterclaim

Defendant Van Laundry Inc. in in an amount in excess of $50,000, $ 50,000,

together punitive damages, together with punitive damages, costs, interest, and other relief."

No preliminary preliminary objections were ever made to the counterclaim's

13 averments regarding specificity. Furthermore, the record is is

devoid of Appellant making an objection at trial to any testimony

regarding unpaid real estate taxes on the grounds of not being

plead nor was anything raised in the Appellant's proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of llaw aw as to failure to plead any

counterclaim regarding regarding real estate taxes, therefore, that issue issue

would be waived under Pa.R.A.P. 302. Moving on, the Lease

between the parties reads at Paragraph 23 that, "Tenant will be

responsible for paying Tenant's prorated portion of the real estate

tax..." At Paragraph 36, it reads,

"Landlord agrees to notify Tenant iin n writing in accordance with this Lease of any back charges due under this Lease...All Lease ... All parties agree and acknowledge that time is is of the essence with respect to these matters. In the event that Landlord does not appropriately notify Tenant within ninetyninety ((90) 90) days of the date upon upon which said charges charges had become due, Landlord agrees that it has waived iits ts rights to said back charges.." charges..."

At trial, trial, the parties parties stipulated to an October 18, 2021 letter from

Cross-Appellant's former counsel, providing notice to Appellant of

the unpaid real estate taxes iin $ 31,617. The n the amount of $31,617.

14 following exchange occurred at trial during Appellant's cross- following

examination of Cross-Appellant's member Ryan Kim,

"Q. So did you ever send Mr. Van a a tax bill? A. Isn't it his responsibility to pay the taxes? taxes -- Q. Are the taxes -- who are the taxes mailed to? A. He was also supposed to pay the rent, but he didn't pay the rent. Why would he pay the taxes? Q. Q. Is it the landlord's job to provide notice of the taxes? A. He also gets the same taxes, does he not? how - Q. So how - A. It's also public record, right? THE COURT: Counsel. Ask the question. Go ahead. Q. How do you expect him to pay aa bill he may not have? Did you ever send him? A. IIdirected it to my attorney. Q. So did your attorney send aa writing asking him to pay the tax bill? A. Yes. A. Q. When IIsay attorney, Mr. Kashkashian? A. Yes. Q. You have that communication? MR. ADLER: P-8. It's already stipulated. MR. TAYLOR: That would be, the first communication would be - MR. ADLER: The first communication was P-7. P-8, yOu you asked about taxes. BY MR. TAYLOR: Q. Not until October 18, 2021, that you made your first request for taxes? A. Does that mean it's not due? He didn't pay it."

(N.T. 01/08/24, 176-177).

Based on the record and after aa review of the previously-

mentioned evidence, the trial court properly denied Appellant's

• Post-Trial Motion seeking JNOV and new trial on the grounds of

going against going against the weight of the evidence because the finding

against Appellant against Appellant does not shock one's sense of justice as it is not

contrary to the evidence presented at trial. The trial court in this contrary

case was free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to

determine the credibility of the witnesses. Operating as factfinder

in aa non-jury non-jury case, the trial court was entitled to believe Cross-

Appellant testimony/evidence over Appellant testimony/evidence

to conclude Appellant is liable for the unpaid real estate taxes

owed to Cross-Appellant. The facts and inferences of the record

do not disclose aa palpable abuse of discretion, which is needed to

reverse the trial court's finding. Moreover, with no mistake

occurring at trial, there exists no reason to grant a occurring a request for aa

new trial. Thus, with the finding not shocking one's sense of

justice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied justice,

Appellant's request for for ]JNOV NOV and new trial.

Appellant argued in its Post-Trial Motion and in its sole issue

on appeal that paragraph 10 of the Lease capped damages but

said paragraph does not contain/mention any such language.

16 - - - -- ---------

Appellant Appellant also mentions use and occupancy tax in its sole issue

raised on appeal, however, this is of no concern because the trial

court did not make a a finding regarding use and occupancy tax

and/or, in the alternative, such an issue that that ""Cross-Appellant Cross-Appellant

never demonstrated through clear and convincing evidence..."

was waived by Appellant for failure to move for directed verdict at

trial. Therefore, it is respectfully suggested that the Appellant's

relief sought be denied, and the trial court's May 24, 2024 Order,

which denied Appellant's Post-Trial Motion, denied Cross-

Appellant's Post-Trial Motion, and entered judgment in the

aggregate in favor of Cross-Appellant and against Appellant, be aggregate

CROSS-APPELLANT'S ISSUES CROSS-APPELLANT'S

III. In the event it is determined the parties did invoke the Superior Superior Court's jurisdiction by timely appealing a final order, a order, the trial court properly denied the Cross-Appellant's Post-Trial Motion requesting Cross-Appellant's JNOV due to the trial court's finding not being an ]NOV abuse of discretion, but rather, supported by the evidence.

As stated previously, the trial court wants to point out that

any issue/argument any issue/argument on appeal as to the sufficiency sufficiency of the

17 evidence has been waived for Cross-Appellant's failure to move

for directed verdict at trial. See Haan v. Wells, 2014 PA Super

226, 103 A.3d 60, 68 68 ((2014). 2014). Therefore, any iissue/argument ssue/argument on

appeal pertaining to sufficiency of the evidence is waived. In

Appellant's Post-Trial Motion, they sought relief in in the form of

JNOV. Cross-Appellant raised several iissues ssues on appeal, all of

which will be collectively discussed herein but only in in a a weight of

the evidence context due to Cross-Appellant's waiver of any

sufficiency arguments.

Assuming arguendo that the Appellant timely appealed from

aafinal order, which it did not, the applicable standard of review is

"Appellate review of aaweight claim is a a review of the the [[trial trial court's] exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a a trial court's determination that the verdict is is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting granting or denying denying a a new trial is the lower court's conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence. evidence and that a a new trial should be granted granted in the interest of justice. 18 The factfinder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. witnesses. The trial court court may may award a a judgment judgment notwithstanding notwithstanding the verdict or a a new trial only when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of of, justice. In determining whether this standard has been met, appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge's judge's discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted where the facts and inferences of record disclose a a palpable abuse of discretion. When a a fact finder's verdict is so opposed to the demonstrative facts that looking at the verdict, the mind stands baffled, the intellect searches in vain for cause and effect, and reason rebels against the bizarre and erratic erratic conclusion, it can can be be said said that that the the verdict is shocking. However, However, [[i]f i]f there is any support in the record for the trial court's decision to deny the appellant's appellant's motion for a a new trial based on weight of the evidence, then we must affirm. An appellant appellant is not entitled to a a new trial where the evidence presented presented was conflicting conflicting and the fact- finder could have decided in favor of either party."

Spencer v. Johnson, 2021 PA Super 48, 249 A.3d 529, 566 Spencer y. (2021).

Under Pennsylvania Pennsylvania law, holdover tenancies are created

"[w]hen a "[w]hen a tenant remains in possession after the termination of aa

lease, the landlord has the choice of treating such a a tenant[ tenant[ ...... ]]as as

aatenant holding holding over." Reading Reading Terminal Merchants Ass'n by

19 Asteris y, v. Samuel Rappaport Assocs., Ass0cs., 310 Pa. Super. 165, 173-

74, 456 A.2d 552, 556 556 ((1983). 1983). Moreover,

"[f]or [f]or aa tenancy to result from aa holding over, the llandlord andlord must exercise his election, iindicating ndicating his consent to the tenancy. Usually this consent will be manifest by accepting rent ... The llaw rent..The aw is is clear that when aa tenant iis s possession under aa lease continues as a a hold over tenant, the llaw aw implies implies aa new lease lease on the same terms and subject to the same covenants and conditions as those contained in the original llease." ease."

Id.

Here, Paragraph 33 of the Lease states, in part,

"Landlord covenants, warrants, and represents that upon commencement of the Lease term, Landlord has full right and power to exeute and perform this Lease, and to grant the estate demised herein; and that Tenant, upon payment of the rent herein reserved and performance of the covenants and agreements hereof, shall peaceable and quietly have, hold and enjoy the Premises and all rights, easements, covenants, and privileges belonging or in any any way appertaining thereto, during the the Term of this Lease...Should Landlord fail to uphold and perform the aforementioned covenants, Landlord" Landlord and Tenant agree that Tenant's damages will be significant and difficult to fully ascertain, and therefore it it is is agreed that Tenant's damages shall be agreed to be in $ 25,000. This payment is in the amount of $25,000. is not to be construed as aa penalty, but as liquidated damages."

Paragraph 2 2 of the Lease states, in in part, "The iinitial nitial term of

this Lease is is ten ten ((10) 10) years from the Commencement Date of this 20 Lease. Tenant has the option to renew this Lease for ((1) 1)

additional five ((5) 5) year renewal term by a a written notice..."

At trial, Appellant's Appellant's former employee, Mark Evans, testified

the following on direct examination,

"Q. Good afternoon. My name is is Jon Taylor. I I am counsel for Van Laundry LLC Incorporated. Were you ever employed by Van Laundry? A. Yes. Q. What was was -- -- when were you employed? A. The first time or? Q. When did your appointment start? A. When I I first got hired not at that shop, at the other shop, 2019. Q. And when did you start working at the location location at Corinthian Avenue? A. Couple months later. later. Q. What was your job at the Corinthian Avenue location? location? A. My job was to make sure the people doing the laundry, making, selling the stuff like detergents and everything, and helping anybody who needed help. Q. Can you briefly describe what the condition of the exterior of the property on December 25, 2020, was? A. It was water was coming down. Q. II am asking, the question I I asked was about the condition of the property. What was the condition like? A. It was fine. Q. Was any work being done on the property? A. Yes. Upstairs on the second, third floor. Q. Any roof work being done on the property? A. II guess it was. Q. Why do you believe there was roof work done on the property? A. Guy kept saying he needed a a tarp. 21 Q. What do you mean by tarp? A. He needed a atarp to cover the roof. Q. Q. What What was was the the tarp that that was was covering covering the the roof? What did it it look look like? A. It was blue. Q. And was the blue tarp tightly fastened to the roof? Loosely? A. I I don't don't -- -- sounded like it it was loose when it was blowing iin n the wind. You can hear it. Q. Q. Were you you working at the premises on December 25, '2020? 2020? A. Yes. Q. Can you describe what happened on that day? Q. A. The water was coming down from the ceiling fans, from the lights, the walls, the panel, the electrical panel. Like the whole place was lleaking eaking all over the place, behind the dryers and everything. Q. Was it raining outside? A. A. Yes. Q. Was it Q. it raining aa lot? lot? AA little? A. Raining aa lot. It was raining inside too. Q. So what did you do to to -- can you give an iideadea of how much water was coming through? A. IIput the buckets, IIput the trashcans first near the washers to try to catch the water, but it it was filling up too fast. And then I I had the little trashcans, but they were filling up pretty fast. So I, like, dumped them, them, like, six six times. times. It It was a a lot lot of of water. Q. Do you recall how many washers were in in the Laundromat? laundromat? A. Give me a a second on that. I I can't. Q. Do you you recall how many dryers were in in the laundromat? laundromat? A. IIthink 29. Q. Were there roughly roughly the same amount of washers and dryers or were the numbers different? A. They were different. I I am used to--to --

zz Q. Wait. Well, IIam not going to stop you. My question is roughly more dryers or more washers or llessess dryers? A. IIthink more washers. Q. Did you call the owner of Van Laundromat? A. Mr. Van, yes. Q. Did he come to the premises? A. He told me to lock up and get out of there. Q. Was there any concern about the electrical box during the rain? A. When I I said to the contractors, you know, you got water coming coming out the electrical box, they said we'll look look at it. it. MR. ADLER: Objection. Hearsay. THE COURT: Sir, you can't say what anybody told you. I I will sustain that. You can say what you observed, you know, what you learned, learned, not what anybody said to you, you,. okay? BY MR. TAYLOR: Q. Did you observe the electrical box? A. Yes. Q. What did you see? A. There was leaking out of it. it. Q. Did business resume at that laundromat laundromat after the rain? A. No. Q. So Q. so was the business closed down after that? A. Yes."

(N.T. 01/08/24, 27-31).

Appellant's Appellant's owner testified the following on direct examination,

`"Q. "Q. II will ask another question. On December 25, 2020, did the premises have water damage? A. Yes. Q. And was that water damage described earlier by Mr. Evans who testified earlier? A. That's before. 23 -----

Q. Okay. Did you stop paying rent after the laundromat got damaged by the rain? A. So the check II submitted for December 20 supposed to cover up up until January the 20th. THE COURT: What year? January 2021? THE WITNESS: Twenty-one, yes. BY MR. TAYLOR: Q. Did youyou pay pay rent for February 2021? A. No. Q. Why? Q. A. Because IIasked him to make the repair, but he couldn't repair for me to reopen the place. Q. Why couldn't you reopen? A. Because the ceiling fell down. Okay. So the electrical, IIcould not turn it back on. IIwas afraid it was going to start a a fire. Q. Why were you afraid to use the electrical? A. Because IIknow around Christmas time the rain came down from the third floor down. It came down to my office and the whole electric panel was wet. my Q. Can you use the laundry machines? Q. A. IIwas afraid to open. Q. Could you open the business to the public? A. No, II cannot do."

(N.T. 01/08/24, 117-118). 117-118)

Appellant's owner further testified on cross-examination,

""Q. Is there a "Q. a written notice showing that the lease has been extended? Anything in writing? A. So I I remember that I I reminded every time IImake the payment payment at Maria house, and I I remember 7 7 or 88 months' prior prior to expiration expiration that IItold her and I I tell her that she need to remember that IIhave an option for that 5-year extension. Q. But did she ever give you a a written option for the 5- year extension? 24 A. ((In In English) Don't worry. IImake Sure sure -- - MR. ADLER: Objection. THE COURT: That's the answer to your question. THE WITNESS: WITNESS: (Through (Through interpreter) interpreter) Every time IIsay that, she keep saying don't worry, don't worry worry - MR. ADLER: But it's it's hearsay. THE COURT: That's his answer to your question. WITNESS: -- THE WITNESS: -- you will get your 5 5 years. MR. ADLER: Move to strike. THE COURT: Overruled. I I want to know what happened. Overruled. THE WITNESS: She said don't worry, I I will make sure you have the 5 5 years. THE COURT: Nothing was in writing, correct, sir? THE WITNESS: Correct."

(N.T. 01/08/24, 135-136).

Ryan Kim, member of Cross-Appellant, testified as follows,

"Q. So when you say say ""contractor," contractor," who was the contractor? A. Level Up. Q. Who hired Level Up? Was it it the corporation 835 Corinthian Street LLC or was it it Fishtown Royal DE? Is that an LLC? Which corporation hired them? A. Fishtown Royal.

Q. A A roof did lleak eak in in December 2020; is is that correct? A. During repairs it may have leaked leaked one day and then got repaired the next day as we were constructing the roof. Q. Why do you think the roof was leaking? A. We were in the middle of construction."

(N.T. 01/08/24, 158; 162).

25 Instantly, in In sum, the record reflects the following: 1) l}

Appellant never provided the required written notice to exercise

the additional five-year period, which means that the Lease

between the parties expired in In September 2020; 2) aa holdover

tenancy was created when Appellant remained in in possession of

the lleased eased premises and Cross-Appellant kept accepting rent until

Appellant ceased paying paying rent rent after December 2020; 3) 3) in in

December 2020, which would be before Appellant stopped paying paying

rent and during the holdover tenancy, the lleased eased premises

became infiltrated infiltrated with water as a a result of Cross-Appellant's

construction on the roof, which resulted iin n Appellant not being being

able to use the lleased eased premises. Thus, while being aa holdover

tenant iin n December 2020, meaning all covenants and conditions

from the original llease ease remain in in effect, the Appellant's right to Appellant's right

quiet enjoyment of the leased premises under Paragraph 33 of the

Lease was breached by Cross-Appellant when the leased premises

became flooded due to rain infiltration infiltration from the construction

Cross-Appellant was having done to the roof.

26 With all sufficiency arguments waived on appeal for Cross-

Appellant's Appellant's failure to move for directed verdict at trial, based on

the record and after aa review of the previously mentioned

evidence, the trial court properly denied Appellant's Post-Trial

Motion seeking JNOV because the finding against Appellant does

not shock one's sense of justice as iit t is is not contrary to the

evidence presented at trial. The trial court in this case was free to

believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the

credibility of the witnesses. Operating as factfinder iin n aa non-jury

case, the trial court was entitled to believe Appellant

testimony/evidence over Cross-Appellant testimony/evidence to

conclude Cross-Appellant iis s lliable iable for breaching paragraph 33of

the Lease. The facts and inferences inferences of the record do not disclose

aa palpable abuse of discretion, which is needed to reverse the

finding. Thus, with trial court's finding. with the finding finding not not shocking one's one's

sense of justice, the trial court did not abuse iits ts discretion when it

denied Appellant's request for JNOV.

Cross-Appellant also argues that the trial court's finding

went against a a balancing of the equities, but as previously

27 discussed, the record shows Appellant was a a holdover tenant with

the original Lease still controlling, which supports the trial court's

finding that paragraph 3 3 of the Lease was violated. Thus, with the

finding not shocking one's sense of justice, the trial court did not finding

abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant's request for ]JNOV. NOV.

Cross-Appellant also argues on appeal that the trial court

violated the llaw aw of the case doctrine. The llaw aw of the case doctrine

"...refers to a a family of rules which embody the concept that aa

court involved involved in in the later phases of aa litigated matter should not

reopen questions decided by another judge of that same court or

by a a higher court in in the earlier phases of the matter." True R.R.

Assocs., L.P. v. ASS0CS., L.P, y, Ames True Temper, Temper, Inc., Inc,, 2016 PA Super 282, 152

336-37 ((2016). A.3d 324, 336-37 2016). "To "To determine whether the law law of the

case doctrine applies, applies, aa court court must examine the the rulings at iissue ssue

in in the context of the procedural posture of the case." Mariner

Chestnut Chestnut Partners, v. Lenfest, 2016 PA Super 277, 152 A.3d Partners, L.P. y.

282-83 ((2016). 265, 282-83 2016). "[ It] prevents a "[It] acourt from addressing an

issue previously was resolved by a issue that previously a court of concurrent

jurisdiction." jurisdiction." Ramsay v. Pierre, 822 A.2d 85, 92 92 ((2003). 2003).

28 Cross-Appellant argues that the trial court here must abide

by the July 8, 2024 Order entered in in the case of Van Laundry,

Inc. v. 835 Corinthian, LLC at trial court case number 220201468.

Said Order reads as follows, "AND NOW, this 7 7th day of July,

2022, upon consideration of the Petition for Preliminary

Injunction filed by plaintiff, the responses thereto, and all other

matters of record in in this action and the related actions, it it is is

ORDERED that said Petition is is DENIED." Furthermore, said Order

had aafootnote that explained,

"Petitioner seeks repossession of premises it rented to "petitioner operate aa llaundromat, aundromat, but itit has not yet produced written evidence of an alleged renewal of the expired Lease's term. Petitioner has not, at this point, shown a a llikelihood ikelihood of success on the merits of its its claim for restoration of possession, although it may have a a claim for money damages."

(July 8, 2022 Order, case number 220201468, Exhibit P-& iin n the

trial court case below) below) ((emphasis emphasis added).

The trial court's finding, discussed more above, does not run

afoul of violating the llaw aw of the case doctrine because the finding

has nothing to do with Appellant regaining possession of the

lleased eased premises, but rather, Cross-Appellant's conduct causing

29 the lleased eased premises to become damaged by water all while

Appellant was aa holdover tenant with the same covenants and

conditions from the original lease in effect. The evidence at trial

clearly showed that the Appellant did not provide the required

written notice to renew the Lease and the trial court's finding is

consistent with that fact. Moreover, the July 8, 2022 Order even

suggested iin n the footnote that Appellant may have aaclaim for

money damages, which it did, and the trial court here discussed

iits ts finding previously. Also, the July 8, 2022 Order is is from a a

different matter. The trial court was not involved involved iin n the llater ater

phases of that matter and did not reopen questions decided by

judge of that same court in another judge in the earlier phases of that

other matter, so the trial court fails to see how the law of the the.

case doctrine applies.

Lastly, the Cross-Appellant argued that the bankruptcy

proceedings Appellant was iinvolved proceedings nvolved in dismissed all claims

pertaining pertaining to the Lease. The Bankruptcy Court Order reads as

follows, "The estate of the above-named above- named debtor has been fully

administered. IT IS ORDERED on this 28" 28th day of December 2020

30 that: 1. All fees due under 28 U.S.C. 1930 have been paid; and 2.

The matter of: Van's Laundromats, Inc. Inc. - Case No. 18-15955 18-15955 - - MDC - MDC - Chapter 11 is is hereby CLOSED."

(Bankruptcy Order, Exhibit P-8 in the trial court case below).

Said Order provides nothing explicit as to its its effect on Appellant's

claims under the Lease as a a holdover tenant. Cross-Appellant

provided only argument without any supporting llegal egal authority as

to this iissue. ssue. Without more, the trial court properly denied Cross-

Appellant's Post-Trial Motion for JNOV.

Therefore, iitt is is respectfully suggested that the Cross-

Appellant's relief sought be denied, and the trial court's May 24,

2024 Order, which denied Appellant's Post-Trial Motion, denied

Cross-Appellant's Post-Trial Motion, and entered judgment in in the

aggregate in aggregate in favor of Cross-Appellant and against Appellant, be

CONCLUSION

Based on the forgoing, it it is respectfully suggested that the

Appellant's relief sought, and Cross-Appellant's relief sought, be

denied, and the trial court's May 24, 2024 Order, which denied

31 Appellant's Post-Trial Motion, denied Cross-Appellant's Post-Trial

Motion, and entered judgment in the aggregate in favor of Cross-

Appellant and against Appellant against Appellant, be affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

_I?

CA' y r ELLA LLA JACQUINTO; JACQUINTG, J..

32 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Todd Marvin, Jr., Law Clerk to the Honorable Carmella

Jacquinto, hereby certify that on ee UT the 7e' sy day or of

�J_ ' · ��l ,•_ l.,\, )LV, '-a-�,, 2024, by first-class mail, aatrue and correct copy �

of the attached attached opinion was served upon the following:

TAYLOR, WILLIAM JON 1900 JFK BLVD., APT. 709, SUITE 1888 PHILADELPHIA PA 19103

HAMILTON, JOHN ALEXANDER NOCHUMSON, ALAN KLYASHTORNY, NATALIE KLEIN, JARED N N NOCHUMSON PC 11 S S BROAD ST., SUITE 1000 PHILADELPHIA, PA 19107