Van Houten v. Pine

38 N.J. Eq. 72
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery
DecidedFebruary 15, 1884
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 38 N.J. Eq. 72 (Van Houten v. Pine) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Van Houten v. Pine, 38 N.J. Eq. 72 (N.J. Ct. App. 1884).

Opinion

The Chancellor.

This suit is brought by the widow of James H. Van Houten, who died June 11th, 1878, against William E. Pine, president, and Charles H. Ingalls, secretary and treasurer of The Masonic Mutual Life Insurance Company of the City of Newark, N. J.,” an unincorporated beneficial association located at Newark, to recover $1,000 which she claims are due to her under the by-laws of the society. The suit is really against the company, but inasmuch as it is unincorporated and its membership is very numerous (over eleven hundred), the bill is maintained against the two officers above named alone. Van Houten v. Pine, 9 Stew. Eq. 133. The by-laws provide that on the death of any member it shall be the duty of the treasurer, within thirty days after receiving notice thereof, to pay $1,000 to the widow or family of the deceased, or to the person to whom the deceased may have directed the money to be paid; or if there be no widow or family or designated person, then the payment is to be made to his next of kin; and in case there be no widow, children, designated person or next of kin, then the treasurer is to appropriate towards the payment of the funeral expenses so much as necessary, not exceeding the amount to which the widow would have been entitled if there were a widow; and if after the payment of those expenses there be any amount remaining, the excess is to go into the permanent fund of the company. In April, 1877, Van Houten made application for membership of the society, and was admitted in May following. On the 7th of the latter month there was issued and delivered to him a certificate [74]*74that he had been duly elected a member and was entitled to all the benefits of the association under its by-laws. He continued to be a member, as the complainant insists, up to the time of his death; but the defendants, on the other hand, allege that his membership ceased on his failure to pay, within the time limited for the purpose by the first section of the sixth article of the bylaws then in force, two certain assessments payable by him and of which he was notified, as they insist, a second time on the 30th of April, 1878. They also insist that by his default he forfeited all his rights and privileges of membership. The section of the by-laws just referred to as it stood at that date (it has since been amended) provided that upon the death of any member of the company it should be the duty of the treasurer and secretary (the same person) to notify the members thereof, and that thereupon each surviving member should, within ten days after the date of the notice, pay into the treasury the sum of $1, and in case he should neglect to pay it within ten days he should be again notified by the same officer, in which case he should pay the sum- pf $1.10; and if that money should not be paid within ten days after such second notice, the name of the delinquent should be erased from the roll of members, and he should forfeit all claims upon the company; provided, however, the board of directors should have power to re-instate him upon his appearing before it, if a resident of Newark, and rendering a satisfactory excuse (or, if not a resident of that city, by sending a written excuse for his default) and paying the sum in arrear. The facts of the case appear to be that Van Houten was notified by notice dated April 30th, 1878, to pay $2.20 in respect of the death of two members. The notice purported to be a second notice by its terms as well as by the amount of money required to be paid. The time, ten days, limited by the by-laws for the payment, expired on Friday. On the evening of the previous Monday, the defendant, Mr. Pine, then president, and Messrs. William M. Clark and Seymour Tucker, both directors of the company, called to see Van Houten at his house, where he was then lying sick. At the end of the call, after Mr. Pine had left the room, Van Houten, according to Mr. Clark’s testimony, spoke to Mr. Tucker in the [75]*75presence of Mr. Clark and Mrs. Van Houten on the subject of the assessments, stating that he had received a second notice for them that the time for making payment would expire on the then next Friday, that he expected to receive some money on the following Monday, and that if Mr. Tucker would pay the assessments for him he would re-imburse him when he received that money. Mr. Tucker making no reply, Van Houten said that if he, Tucker, did not like to wait until that time he would send and get the money for him at once, to which Mr. Tucker replied that it was not necessary, that he would attend to the matter. Mrs. Van Houten and Mr. Tucker both corroborate Mr. Clark in this statement in all material respects. Mr. Tucker forgot the matter until Saturday, when he went to Mr. Ingalls, the secretary and treasurer, to pay an assessment of his own — one subsequent to that before mentioned. He then offered to pay the-assessments for Van Houten, but Mr. Ingalls refused to take-payment, saying that he had dropped Van Houten from the roll for non-payment of the assessments. On the following Monday Mr. Tucker informed Van Houten of the fact that he had forgotten the matter until Saturday, and that he then offered to pay the money but it was refused, and Mrs. Van Houten then gave Mr. Tucker the money and requested him to try to induce Mr. Ingalls to reconsider the matter and to accept payment. Mr. Tucker took the money and saw Mr. Ingalls on the subject again, but he persisted in his refusal to receive the money. At the next monthly meeting of the board of directors, Van Houten appeared before the board and requested to be re-instated on payment of the assessments. The reason he gave for not having paid was, that he relied on Mr. Tucker to attend to the matter for him. The board refused to re-instate him. They never, however, at any time, by any direct vote, ordered that his name-should be erased from the roll, or otherwise directly declared that his membership was at an end. The bill states that there was, at the time of the transaction under consideration, a custom in vogue of giving a third notice to delinquent members, and there appears to be some ground for the statement. Indeed, it is-admitted by the answer that such a notice was given by Miv [76]*76Ingalls to Van Houten in or about November, 1877. It also ■appears that if such notices were given it was without express authority of the board of directors, and not in pursuance of the provisions of the by-laws. The view which I take of the case, however, renders it unnecessary to dwell upon that subject. The •complainant also claims that there never was but one notice of th-e assessments in question given to Van Houten, and that that was what purported to be a second notice. But it is enough to say on that head that Van Houten never at any time made any excuse or claim to re-instatement on that ground, nor did he ever allege that the notice which purported to be a second notice was the only notice he had received on the subject to which it related; but,, on the other hand, in his conversation with Mr. Tucker, before stated, he spoke of the notice as being a second notice, and treated it as such. Not only did he not claim that it was the first notice he had received, but his anxiety to comply with the provisions of the by-laws in pursuance of it as a second notice is evidence that it was, in fact, to him what it purported to be, the second notice which had been given to him for payment of the assessments.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
38 N.J. Eq. 72, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/van-houten-v-pine-njch-1884.