Van Horn v. Lewis

79 F. Supp. 541
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJune 23, 1948
DocketCivil Action No. 1651—48
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 79 F. Supp. 541 (Van Horn v. Lewis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Van Horn v. Lewis, 79 F. Supp. 541 (D.D.C. 1948).

Opinion

GQLDSBOROUGH, Justice (Orally).

In this case the trustee, Van Horn, sues trustees Lewis and Bridges, and in the important matters which are involved the *542 question is as <to whether or not the trustee, Van Horn, has to concur in the detailed basis upon which pension payments are to be made. And also objection is made that the pension fund cannot be paid for those who were not employees of the operators when the Bituminous' Coal Agreement was entered into in 1947, and also cannot be paid to those who were not employees of the operators at any time.

As I remember it, those were the two important questions.

I don’t think there is any great difficulty in making an analysis of the situation. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that subsection (B) of section (c) of Title 29 U.S.C.A. § 186 is not only an exception but a limitation, the Court is of the opinion that the Bituminous Wage Agreement of 1947 is in no way violative of that provision.

The provision says that, “The detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with the employer.”

The Bituminous Wage Agreement of 1947 was an agreement with the employers, and it states specifically, “It is further agreed that the detailed basis upon which payments from the fund will be made shall be resolved in writing by the aforesaid trustees at their initial meeting, or at the earliest practicable date that may be by them thereafter agreed upon.”

Now, the operators elected that the detailed basis should be worked out in that way. So the Court thinks that Section 186 was literally complied with. In other words, the payment shall be made as specified in a written agreement with the employer. And the employer specified that they should be made by this Board of Trustees, all three of them. And when I say all three of them I mean there should be no difference between the power and the duties of any of the three trustees.

The agreement also states that: “The operators signatory hereto do hereby appoint Ezra Van Horn of Cleveland, Ohio, as their representative on said Board of Trustees. The United Mine Workers of America do hereby appoint John L. Lewis of Washington, D. C., as its representative on the Board of Trustees.

“It is further stipulated and agreed by the joint contracting parties that the aforesaid two Trustees shall with all dispatch designate and name a third and neutral trustee. Said three trustees so named and designated shall constitute the Board of Trustees to administer the fund herein created.” .

That is, the operators agreed that these three trustees should work out the detailed basis and should also administer the fund.

Then, in the matter of actuarial basis, which is one of the difficulties contended for by the trustee Van Horn, he says the actuarial basis has not been worked out.

Well, what happened was this: These trustees, that is, the two trustees Van Horn and Lewis, and Murray who was then the third trustee, began to work on this thing last September, and I think in November they agreed on an actuary.

The results the actuary reached were not satisfactory to Lewis and there was another actuarial computation made which was not satisfactory.

And then a third actuary made his report, the actuary selected, I think, by Mr. Lewis; Latimer was his name. And he said that the actuarial basis was sound.

Now, of course, the Court knows from a rather long business experience that actuaries can reach very many different conclusions if they want to reach them.

I once knew of an insurance actuary, a rather famous one, who claimed he could reach any conclusion you asked him to reach.

So that in April of 1948, when it was very necessary to administer this fund— the matter had become critical- — the two trustees, Lewis and Van Horn, agreed upon Senator Bridges as the third trustee (Murray having previously resigned).

Now, the third trustee made a suggestion which was agreeable to the trustee Lewis, and this is what he said; this was the resolution which he offered and which was adopted by Lewis and by him.

“Be it further resolved, that a pension of $100 per month shall be paid, subject to amendment or modification at any time *543 as experience in the operation of the fund may dictate or require, to each eligible and qualified member of the United Mine Workers of America who on May 29, 1946, attained or thereafter attained the age of 62 years and who lias served 20 years in the coal industry in the United States and who has retired from service in the bituminous coal industry in the United States on a date subsequent to May 28, 1946; that the effective date for the payment of pensions shall be as of the date that the member of the United Mine Workers of America has retired from the bituminous coal industry in the United States after attaining the age of 62 years and has served 20 years in the industry; but no member of the United Mine Workers of America shall be eligible or qualified for a pension in accordance with the foregoing who retired from the bituminous coal industry in the United States prior to May 29, 1946.”

Now this is significant:

“Be it further resolved, that at the earliest practicable date following the adoption of this resolution there shall be formulated detailed rules and regulations subject to approval by the trustees, to effectuate the payment of said pensions upon the terms and conditions hereinabove specified and in conformity with reasonable and proper administration of said funds.
“Be it further resolved, that the trustees reserve the right to modify, include or amend the above terms and conditions at any time both as to the amount of pension payments and the qualifications for eligibility, together with the right to modify or amend the rules and regulations herein above provided for, as upon review by the trustees, experience obtained in the operation of the fund may require.”

That resolution was adopted. The Court sees nothing about the resolution which is not in accordance with the Bituminous Wage Agreement, and Section 186 which we have discussed.

This was a new venture, and it was perfectly proper, within the limits of any sort or propriety, to adopt a tentative plan because the fund had to he administered.

The Court is asked to say that there is something about that plan which is so remote from the letter and spirit of the Bituminous Wage Agreement, and of the statute, Section 186, that the Court has a right and should interfere and prevent the adoption of the arrangement set forth in the resolution and voted for by two of the trustees.

Of course, the Court thinks, as I have indicated, that the arrangement was reasonable and proper, being easily within the power of the trustees to make.

One thing should be kept eternally in mind in this connection, and that is that this agreement was not made between the operators and the employees. It was made between the operators and the United Mine Workers of America, which is a very different proposition.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bruch v. Firestone Tire And Rubber Company
828 F.2d 134 (Third Circuit, 1987)
Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
828 F.2d 134 (Third Circuit, 1987)
Thomas v. Reading Anthracite Company
264 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pennsylvania, 1966)
Donaldson v. Madison Borough
213 A.2d 33 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1965)
Pennington v. United Mine Workers Of America
325 F.2d 804 (Sixth Circuit, 1963)
Lewis v. Gilchrist
198 F. Supp. 239 (N.D. Alabama, 1961)
Szuch v. Lewis
193 F. Supp. 831 (District of Columbia, 1960)
MYTHALYK v. Lewis
158 A.2d 305 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1960)
Pavlovscak v. Lewis
168 F. Supp. 839 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1958)
Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp.
259 F.2d 346 (Sixth Circuit, 1958)
Ruth v. Lewis
166 F. Supp. 346 (District of Columbia, 1958)
Yonce v. Miners Memorial Hospital Ass'n
161 F. Supp. 178 (W.D. Virginia, 1958)
Hobbs v. Lewis
159 F. Supp. 282 (District of Columbia, 1958)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
79 F. Supp. 541, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/van-horn-v-lewis-dcd-1948.