Van Den Toorn v. Leeming

70 F. 251, 1895 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 24, 1895
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 70 F. 251 (Van Den Toorn v. Leeming) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Van Den Toorn v. Leeming, 70 F. 251, 1895 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1895).

Opinion

BROWN, District Judge.

The above libel was filed to "enforce the payment of a general average contribution against one of the consignees of cargo on board the steamship Schiedam, which arrived in this port from Rotterdam on July 14, 1891. When 816 miles, to the eastward of Sandy Hook, on the evening of July 10th, between half past 7 and 8 o’clock, a crack 18 inches long was discovered on one side of the main shaft, mostly inside of the after bearing, and about 2 feet from the crank. This was temporarily repaired during, the 24 hours following by drilling the shaft, which was 14⅞ inches in diameter, and inserting two iron bolts 11 inches long and If in diameter, across the line of the crack. The ship then proceeded on her voyage at about three-fourths of full speed (making 37 or 38 revolutions per minute instead of 50 to 52, full speed) without interruption for 38⅛ hours to within about 16 miles of Sandy Hook, when, after having thus made about 300 miles, the shaft suddenly broke wholly off at about 10 a. m. of July 13th, at the original place of fracture. The fractured parts, riding each other, carried away the bearings, damaged the bed plate and channel way, and did much other injury to the machinery. At about 2 p. m. of the same day, the ship was. taken in tow by a tug, and reached quarantine at Staten Island at 9 p. m. For this latter towage service, $1,000 was allowed as salvage compensation. The Schiedam, 48 Fed. 923.

A general average account was afterwards adjusted, amounting in all to $17,508.65. In this charge was included not only the ex[253]*253pense of the towage last named, with other items concerning which there is but slight difference, but also charges to the amount of about $13,000 on account of the damage done to the vessel and machinery by the last violent breakdown of the shaft. Ao charge was made for the cracked shaft itself, nor for any injury supx>osed to have been done to the bearings before the repair to the shaft was made.

If the crack found on July ll(k arose through any unfitness of the crank shaft at the time of sailing, that would constitute unseaworthiness of the sldp in that regard, ahd any claim of general average would he excluded through this fault of the ship (1 Pars. Shipp. & Adm. 383; The Ontario, 37 Fed. 220; Strang v. Scott, 14 App. Cas. 601, 608), unless the exceptions in the bill of lading excuse the ship from the consequences of this defect. In the case of The Laertes, 12 Prob. Div. 187, the bill of lading excepted “any liability for loss or damage through latent defects in the machinery,” and the general average claim was allowed. In the present case the bill of lading excepts the “consequences of defects in the machinery,”-nothing being expressly said concerning latent defects at the time of sailing. In The Caledonia, 157 U. S. 124, 15 Sup. Ct. 537, it was held by a majority of the court that an exception of “loss or damage from steam boilers and. machinery or defects therein” (the word “latent” not being used) did not excuse the ship for damage arising from the breaking of the crank shaft through a latent defect existing at the commencement of the voyage.

The decision of the supreme court in that case would be controlling, if it were ascertained that the breaking of the crank shaft in tills case arose from defects existing at the beginning of the voyage. Ao direct issue, however, lias been made on that point, and the evidence is comparatively meager. The extracts from the log show that (luring several days from June 27ih to June 30th, the ship met heavy weather, “terrible, high, confused sea”; “the vessel rolling and pitching, terrible heavy, and laboring difficult; strong racing engine; shipped continually heavy head seas.” Some damage was done to the ship, and gome articles were carried away. On the 30th the steamer was stopped for an hour on account of some work to be done to the engine. Ten days afterwards the log notes “fresh breeze, high, confused sea, the vessel pitching and rolling very heavily, shipped much wafer over the foreship.” On the evening of the following day, July 11th, the crack in the engine was discovered.

The long interval that elapsed after the very heavy weather and the racing of the engine, ending on June 30th, and the little bad weather afterwards, throws some uncertainty on tlie question wheth-eí 1he crack in the shaft arose from the effects of the previous heavy weather upon a sound shaft, or whether the shaft was unsound at the time of sailing. In the absence, however, of any specific issue upon this point, it should, perhaps, be assumed here that the break did not arise from any defect or weakness at the time when the ship sailed.

The ground upon which a general average is claimed for the damage arising from the break is, that it was an extraordinary expense, [254]*254and a sacrifice voluntarily incurred by tbe ship through the endeavor to make port by a repair for the benefit of all, and in lieu of a large salvage claim which would otherwise have been necessarily incurred for towage some 300 miles, and which would' have been a general average charge; that the danger of the violent break, and of the consequent injury to the vessel, was foreseen; that this danger was such that it was not the duty of the ship as carrier to incur it at her own risk; and that as the risk was taken with deliberation, and in the exercise of a reasonable judgment by the master in choosing different modes to extricate the ship from her helpless condition, the consequences of the break, while going on under repair, were, in effect, a voluntary sacrifice by the ship, entitling her to be compensated on the principies of general average by all the interests benefited; and that although the service rendered by this sacrifice was not completely successful, it nevertheless brought the ship so nearly into port as very greatly to reduce the final salvage incurred.

For the defense it is contended that the circumstances are not sufficient to bring the case within any acknowledged rules of general average; and no adjudication has been brought to the attention of the court in any strictly analogous case.

As regards expenses sought .to be recovered by general average, ‘‘it is quite certain,” says Parsons (1 Shipp. & Adm. 381) “that there must be here, as elsewhere, a sacrifice which is voluntary, necessary, and effectual.”

Was this damage a sacrifice of that character? To support the voluntary nature of this loss, the libelant cites particularly the case of The Star of Hope, 9 Wall. 203, where the master of the ship, which had a fire in the hold, was compelled in order to avoid speedy destruction, to enter an unknown and uninhabited harbor, in doing which the vessel stranded. The vessel there took in water enough to put out the fire; then she was got off, went to a port of repair, and subsequently reached her destination; and it was held that the damage arising from the stranding and the subsequent necessary repairs were general average. The certainty of danger, and the contemplation and expectation of stranding by the master, being sufficient evidence that the will of man contributed to the stranding sufficiently to make the stranding voluntary, within the requirements of general average. That the sacrifice was necessary, and saved ship and cargo, was not disputed.

So here it is claimed that proceeding with the imperfectly repaired shaft was deliberately done in full contemplation of the liability to the damage that subsequently occurred. There are marked differences, however, between the two cases.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
70 F. 251, 1895 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/van-den-toorn-v-leeming-nysd-1895.