Van Aleric Jackson v. State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 1, 2002
• Docket: 09-00-00324-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-00-324 CR

VAN ALERIC JACKSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Court No. 78883

O P I N I O N

Van Aleric Jackson was convicted of aggravated robbery. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(3)(A) (Vernon 1994). Jackson's first point of error alleges that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the finding that Jackson caused bodily injury; the second point of error alleges that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a finding that Jackson "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly" caused bodily injury; and the third alleges that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conviction because Jackson never "struck, hit, touched, contacted or pushed" the complaining witness.

Background

The complainant, age 77, testified that he parked his car in front of a Beaumont convenience store to buy cigarettes. He left his keys in the ignition. When he came back outside, a man was sitting in the driver's seat of the complainant's car. The complainant reached in the car window to get his car keys, but was pushed back. The man in the car tried to close the car door, and the complainant tried to pull it open. The complainant testified that when he told the man to get out of his car, the man replied that "he's driving the car off and I better get -- better keep my distance or get away." As the two continued to struggle over the door, he "kept slamming it across my -- the ends of my fingers[,]" according to the complainant. His testimony continued as follows:

Q. All right. So eventually did he get the car started?

• Yes. He got it started and he got it in gear and I was holding onto the car some -- in some manner and he drove forward and my -- my hands came loose from the door. It was slammed. And I was trying to hold onto the car. . . .

Q. Were you dragged at all any time, Judge?

A. Well, the momentum of the car, yes, threw me to the -- threw me to the ground and --

Q. How far do you think you were dragged by the car before you were able to let go of the car?

A. About my body length. I'm 5'11.

. . . .

Q. And after you were able to let go of the car, did you -- where did your body go?

• I went forward and I didn't get any abrasions on my hand but my left knee hit the ground, as did my right elbow and -- I got a cut through my khaki pants and on my left knee, and I later found out that I had gotten an abrasion like a strawberry to my right elbow.

The complainant stated that the injury to his right elbow eventually became infected, requiring treatment with antibiotics. "It hurt considerably." The elbow "kept [him] awake a couple of nights" and was eventually X-rayed to determine whether the bone was chipped.

A second prosecution witness testified that it "looked as if [complainant] had his hands in the door and there was a struggle for the door and his hands were getting slammed into the door." He testified that he saw the complainant fall and also that "I had to spin out of the way to keep from having the car hit me." A police officer who responded testified that the victim's hands were bruised and that his left knee had an abrasion.

Legal Sufficiency

We will address the third point of error first, since a finding of legal insufficiency would entitle Jackson to acquittal. See Moron v. State, 779 S.W.2d 399, 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). In evaluating the legal sufficiency of evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We consider all evidence presented at trial, although we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the jury. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Jackson contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction, because (A) he "at no time ever struck, hit, touched, contacted or pushed the complaining witness"and (B) "there is no evidence of injury."

Evidence that a victim was dragged with an automobile can support an aggravated robbery or aggravated assault conviction of the driver. See Gilchrest v. State, 904 S.W.2d 935, 939 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1995, no pet.); see also Cole v. State, 46 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd); Noyola v. State, 25 S.W.3d 18, 20 (Tex. App--El Paso 1999, no pet.); and Sneed v. State, 803 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd.). The legal sufficiency of the evidence under Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(3)(A) is not called into question merely because the implement used to inflict bodily harm was a car rather than a fist. Jackson's first argument lacks merit.

Jackson's second contention, that there is no evidence of bodily injury, also lacks merit. "'Bodily injury' means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition." Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(8) (Vernon 1994). The Court of Criminal Appeals has held:

This definition appears to be purposefully broad and seems to encompass even relatively minor physical contacts so long as they constitute more than mere offensive touching. In fact, the degree of injury sustained by a victim and the "type of violence" utilized by an accused appear to be of no moment[.]

Lane v. State, 763 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). The complainant testified that appellant slammed the door repeatedly on the complainant's fingers, that his knee was cut and that the injury to his elbow became infected, painful enough to "ke[ep] me awake a couple nights" and to require antibiotics and an X-ray. Photographs of the injuries to the complainant's hands and knee were entered into evidence. A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant inflicted bodily injury on the complainant. Point of error three is overruled.

Factual Sufficiency

In reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge, we conduct a review of all the evidence, both for and against the finding, to determine whether proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination. See King, 29 S.W.3d at 563. We compare the evidence that tends to prove the existence of the fact in dispute to the evidence that tends to disprove it. Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 164 (Tex. Crim App. 1997). We will reverse the factfinder's determination only if a manifest injustice has occurred. See King, 29 S.W.3d at 563.

Jackson's first point of error challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence that he inflicted bodily injury on the complainant, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence that he used "violence" against the complainant. We find the evidence of bodily injury discussed above factually, as well as legally, sufficient to sustain the verdict. Dragging a victim with a motor vehicle constitutes violence. Point of error one is overruled.

Jackson's second point of error argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to prove a culpable mental state. The Penal Code states that someone commits robbery if he "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another" in the course of committing theft. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1994). The indictment and jury charge tracked this statutory language. Jurors may infer knowledge and intent from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused. See Martinez v. State, 844 S.W.2d 279, 283 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1992, pet. ref'd). The complainant testified that, as he tried to get Jackson out of the car, Jackson "said he's driving the car off and I better get -- better keep my distance or get away." Jackson then continued to slam the car door on the complainant's fingers, and put the car in gear and drove off, although the complainant was still trying to hold on to the car. The testimony that Jackson repeatedly slammed the door on the victim's fingers is itself factually sufficient to allow the jury to find that Jackson intended to cause bodily injury; the testimony that he then accelerated with the victim still holding on to the car makes the evidence of intent overwhelming. Jackson's second point of error is overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

________________________________

DAVID B. GAULTNEY Justice

Submitted on March 29, 2002

Opinion Delivered May 1, 2002

Do Not Publish

Before Walker, C.J., Burgess, and Gaultney, JJ.