Valspar Corp. v. Nguyen

2012 Ohio 2710
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 13, 2012
Docket11 CAE 12 0116
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 2012 Ohio 2710 (Valspar Corp. v. Nguyen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Valspar Corp. v. Nguyen, 2012 Ohio 2710 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

[Cite as Valspar Corp. v. Nguyen, 2012-Ohio-2710.]

COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

VALSPAR CORPORATION : JUDGES: : : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. -vs- : : Case No. 11 CAE 12 0116 HUNG NGUYEN : : : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 10 CVH 03 0437

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 13, 2012

APPEARANCES:

For Appellant: For Appellee:

ESTER D. HARBER ANNE LITTLE 4153 Cadillac Ct., Suite E 24 Huber Village Blvd. Columbus, OH 43232 Westerville, OH 43081 Delaney, P.J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Hung Nguyen appeals the November 29, 2011

judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion for

summary judgment of Plaintiff-Appellee Valspar Corporation.

{¶2} This case comes to us on the accelerated calendar. App. R. 11.1, which

governs accelerated calendar cases, provides in pertinent part:

(E) Determination and judgment on appeal.

The appeal will be determined as provided by App.R. 11.1. It shall be

sufficient compliance with App.R. 12(A) for the statement of the reason

for the court's decision as to each error to be in brief and conclusionary

form.

The decision may be by judgment entry in which case it will not be

published in any form.

This appeal shall be considered in accordance with the aforementioned rule.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶3} Nguyen was the business manager for Wholesale Autobody Materials

Mobile Outlet, also known as WAMMO, LLC.

{¶4} Valspar is a Minnesota corporation that sells auto paints and equipment.

{¶5} On December 10, 2008, Valspar entered into an agreement with

WAMMO for the supply of goods to WAMMO. In order to secure the agreement,

Nguyen signed a Personal Guaranty Agreement on December 23, 2008. The

Personal Guaranty Agreement establishes the extension of credit from Valspar to

WAMMO in consideration of the Guarantor’s guarantee of payment. Nguyen signed the Personal Guaranty Agreement as Guarantor. Under the Personal Guaranty

Agreement, Valspar may maintain a right of action against the Guarantor and the

Company jointly, the Company and Guarantor individually, or solely against the

Guarantor.

{¶6} On March 19, 2010, Valspar filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract with

Guarantee in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. Valspar named WAMMO

and Nguyen as defendants. Valspar claimed it was owed $47,138.58 for goods and

services credited to the defendants as of June 25, 2009. Nguyen answered the

Complaint and filed a Counterclaim against Valspar. Valspar dismissed the action

against WAMMO on July 21, 2010 without prejudice. The action remained pending

against Nguyen.

{¶7} Valspar filed its motion for summary judgment on November 4, 2010.

Nguyen responded to the motion. On November 29, 2011, the trial court granted

summary judgment in favor of Valspar. The trial court also found Nguyen’s

counterclaim to be moot and dismissed the same.

{¶8} It is from this judgment Nguyen now appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶9} Nguyen raises two Assignments of Error:

{¶10} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF APPELLEE AND AGAINST APPELLANT.

{¶11} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING

APPELLANT PERSONALLY LIABLE ON AN UNCONSCIONABLE AND

UNENFORCEABLE GUAURANTY.” STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶12} This matter is before the Court upon a ruling on a motion for summary

judgment. Summary judgment proceedings present the appellate court with the

unique opportunity of reviewing the evidence in the same manner as the trial court.

Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36, 506 N.E.2d 212 (1987). As

such, we must refer to Civ.R. 56(C) which provides, in pertinent part:

Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits,

transcripts of evidence in the pending case and written stipulations of

fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. * * * A summary judgment shall not be rendered

unless it appears from such evidence or stipulation and only from the

evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one

conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the

motion for summary judgment is made, such party being entitled to have

the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party's favor.

{¶13} Pursuant to the above rule, a trial court may not enter summary

judgment if it appears a material fact is genuinely disputed. Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio

St.3d 421, 429, 674 N.E.2d 1164 (1997), citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280,

662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). ANALYSIS

I., II.

{¶14} We will consider Nguyen’s first and second Assignments of Error

together. Nguyen’s argument on appeal focuses on the enforceability of the Personal

Guaranty Agreement. He raises multiple arguments to show there is a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether the Personal Guaranty Agreement is enforceable

against him for the debt of WAMMO. Upon our de novo review, we find reasonable

minds can only conclude Nguyen is personally liable under the terms of the Personal

Guaranty Agreement.

{¶15} A guaranty is a promise by one person to pay the debts of another. 52

Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Guaranty and Suretyship, Section 3 . We review the Personal

Guaranty Agreement under the law of contracts. It is a fundamental principle in

contract construction that contracts should “be interpreted so as to carry out the intent

of the parties, as that intent is evidenced by the contractual language.” Skivolocki v.

East Ohio Gas Company, 38 Ohio St.2d 244, 313 N.E.2d 374 (1974), paragraph one

of the syllabus. A reviewing court should give the contract's language its plain and

ordinary meaning unless some other meaning is evidenced within the document.

Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Company, 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 374 N.E.2d 146 (1978).

UNCONSCIONABILITY

{¶16} In his appeal, Nguyen argues the Personal Guaranty Agreement is not

enforceable against him because it contains unconscionable terms. We have

reviewed Valspar’s motion for summary judgment and Nguyen’s response filed in the

trial court. In the trial court briefing, Nguyen did not raise the issue of unconscionability, but argues it for the first time on appeal. It is well established that a

party cannot raise any new issues or legal theories for the first time on appeal.” Dolan

v. Dolan, 11th Dist. Nos. 2000-T-0154 and 2001-T-0003, 2002-Ohio-2440, at ¶ 7,

citing Stores Realty Co. v. Cleveland, 41 Ohio St.2d 41, 43, 322 N.E.2d 629 (1975).

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2012 Ohio 2710, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/valspar-corp-v-nguyen-ohioctapp-2012.