Vallez-Cortes v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 14, 2023
• Docket: 21-87
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 14 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUAN CARLOS VALLEZ-CORTES, No. 21-87

Petitioner, Agency No. A073-988-927

v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 10, 2023** Pasadena, California

Before: GILMAN***, FORREST, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Juan Carlos Vallez-Cortes petitions for review of an order of the Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal from an order of an

immigration judge (IJ) denying his applications for withholding of removal and

relief under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Convention Against

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. Torture (CAT). Vallez-Cortes is a citizen of Mexico. We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “Because the BIA agreed with the IJ’s reasoning and

added some of its own, we review the BIA’s decision and those parts of the IJ’s

decision upon which it relied.” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1059 (9th Cir.

2021). We deny the petition for review.

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that

Vallez-Cortes does not qualify for withholding of removal because he was not a

member of either of his proposed particular social groups. Vallez-Cortes argues

that he is part of a proposed social group of individuals with “property

ownership/landownership,” but he admits that he does not own any land in

Mexico. Vallez-Cortes further argues that he is a member of the Garcia

Gutierrez family. But substantial evidence—including Vallez-Cortes’s own

testimony that his brother is his only family in Mexico—supports the agency’s

determination that Vallez-Cortes does not have a familial relationship with the

Garcia Gutierrez family. Cf. Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015)

(discussing the family as a particular social group).

Although we need not consider the agency’s alternative grounds for

denying relief, substantial evidence also supports the agency’s conclusion that

Vallez-Cortes did not show that the people who robbed the Garcia Gutierrez

family are persons whom the “government is unable or unwilling to control.”

Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006). The record

reflects that Mexican authorities investigated and prosecuted one of the robbers,

2 21-87 who received jail time. See Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1063

(9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (looking “to evidence of how the police responded

to . . . requests for protection” to determine whether there was an “acquiescent

government”).

2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Vallez-

Cortes does not qualify for CAT relief. Vallez-Cortes points to country

conditions reports discussing violence in Mexico. But generalized evidence of

violence and crime is insufficient to prove that a specific individual faces a

likelihood of mistreatment rising to the level of torture. Lalayan v. Garland, 4

F.4th 822, 840 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that submitted country reports were

insufficient to establish eligibility for CAT relief because they did not indicate

any particularized risk of torture). To the extent that Vallez-Cortes points to the

robbery of the Garcia Gutierrez family to argue particularized risk, substantial

evidence supports the agency’s determination that Vallez-Cortes is not a

member of the family. In any event, Vallez-Cortes has not shown that the

robbery was “an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment that is

specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering,”

which is required for mistreatment to amount to torture. Lopez v. Sessions, 901

F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

PETITION DENIED.

3 21-87