Vallette v. Whitewater Valley Canal Co.

28 F. Cas. 926, 4 McLean 192
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Indiana
DecidedMay 15, 1847
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 28 F. Cas. 926 (Vallette v. Whitewater Valley Canal Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vallette v. Whitewater Valley Canal Co., 28 F. Cas. 926, 4 McLean 192 (circtdin 1847).

Opinion

McLEAN, Circuit Justice.

This is an application for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. The bill alleges that on the 20th day of January, 1842, the legislature of Indiana passed “An act to incorporate the Whitewater Valley Canal Company,” with power to make contracts, sue and be sued, and do all things necessary to effectuate the objects of the association. And in the same act, the state transferred to the association all its rights to the line of the canal from the Ohio river to the National road, at Cambridge, and all the expenditures by the state hereon, on condition that after the lapse of fifteen years, and after the completion of the canal by the company, the state should have the right td resume the canal, with the privileges granted, “upon paying to said company the full amount of their expenditure upon the same.” Power is given to the corporation to- borrow money, and when necessary, to increase the stock of the company, to erect mills and other hydraulic works, to fix the rate of tolls, etc. After the organization of the company, by the election of its officers, they created a loan for the benefit of the corporation, of one hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars, and for part thereof, issued bonds for the payment of one thousand dollars each, one hundred and twelve of which bonds bearing date 1st of January, 1845, were issued and delivered to the complainant, payable to him or bearer. On these bonds, interest at the rate of seven per cent, was payable semi-annually, at the city of New York, until the payment, of the principal sum, which was payable in ten years, being part of the first and only loan of one hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars; and the faith of the company and their effects, both real and personal, were inevitably pledged; and said bonds were to have a preference over all debts that might thereafter be created by the company. And in default of said payments it was agreed that the holders of the bonds might enter immediately into the receipt of the tolls and water rents, and the incomes of said company, by applying to the circuit or district court of the United States, or any court of justice, to appoint a receiver of the incomes of said company, and apply the proceeds to the payment of the interest on said bonds, etc. And it was agreed, that should the interest have to be collected by legal process, there should be adjudged to the holder ten per cent, as liquidated damages. The company also executed to the complainant four other bonds of similar character and amount, except as to their date and time of payment. Two of these bonds are now due, and the other two will be due in July next. That there is now due the sum of five thousand seven hundred and fifty, dollars for interest, and also one thousand dollars on the obligation which became due in July, 1847, which it seems the defendant refuses to pay. And the complainant states that the corporation has, within a few months, contracted other debts, and has, in violation of law, caused about seventy thousand dollars in bonds to be prepared to be issued, and has issued about twenty thousand dollars of the same, and threatens to issue the balance thereof for the purpose of being' used as a circulating medium, and as a substitute for bank notes, in the form of promissory notes, by which said company' promises to pay, two years after date, to - or bearer five dollars, (and other notes from that sum to twenty dollars,) for value received, with interest at the rate of six per cent, per annum; and which notes on- their face are agreed to be received by said company, at all times, for tolls and- water rents, etc. And the complainant avers, that the corporation has lands and personal property, debts due, and cash on hand to a large amount. That the corporation owes, as he has been informed, over two hundred thousand dollars. That if the said notes be received in payment of tolls and water rents, the sum due to the complainant as aforesaid, can not be paid; and he prays that the defendant may be enjoined from selling or disposing of any of the real or personal estate of the company, and from issuing or circulating any promissory notes of the character before described. Also from receiving them for the tolls and water rents due and to become due. In its answer the corporation admits, the organization of the company, the issuing of the bonds and the sum due to the complainant as alleged by him. It states that by a great rise of water in White river, an extensive injury was done to the cabal, to repair which ninety thousand dollars were required. That these injuries, if not speedily repaired, would have been ruinous to the canal. That, failing to raise funds to make the repairs in any other manner, the plan of issuing the promissory notes complained of was adopted. These notes, the defendants in sist, are not in violation of law.

Several objections were made to the jurisdiction of the court:

1. That there is a remedy at law. This is an equitable mortgage, and is a peculiar subject of equity. The objects of the complainant are clearly not attainable at law. He may recover a. judgment against the corporation, but its tolls and water rents can not be reached in that form. And it appears, from the face of the contract, these were looked to by the parties as a means of payment. This remedy is incorporated into the contract, and it is a part of it. On the tolls and water rents, therefore, the plaintiff has a lien preferable to all others now shown, [928]*928-which may be enforced in a court of equity, but can not be in a court of law. And this is the main object of the bill.

2. It is also insisted that it does not sufficiently appear that the place where the corporation does its business, is within the state ■of Indiana. To this it must be answered, that the place where the functions of this corporation are discharged, must, necessarily, be within the state of Indiana. It can ■exercise no extra-territorial power on this subject. But from the face of the charter, it is seen that the work to be accomplished is within the limits of the state.

3. It is further objected, that the complainant was for himself and others interested, -and that it does not appear who those persons are, and that some or all of them, may be citizens of Indiana, who could not come in as co-plaintiffs. If this supposition be true, it would be a sufficient objection to their being made plaintiffs. They are not now plaintiffs, and this objection may be considered when they shall apply to be made so.

4. Again, it is insisted that the rights of the holders of the promissory notes alleged to be Illegal are involved, and that they should be made parties. So far as the question of illegality is concerned, it is not material that they should be made parties. Whether these notes be in violation of law, is distinctly presented by the prayer of the bill, that the corporation should be enjoined from issuing any further notes of similar character, which they are about doing, and which, it is alleged, they have no power to do. As well might it be objected, when a defense is made involving the legality of a promissory note, that the rights of others holding similar notes would be affected. If these notes, now in circulation, are to be treated as valid, and the 'question is made, whether the payment of them out of the tolls and water rents, as pledged upon their face, the objection that the holders are not mide parties, is not without force. In this aspect, the question is one of preference, and that point is not raised in the bill; and it is supposed could not be, unless the holders of the paper were given.

5. The state of Indiana is not a necessary party.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
28 F. Cas. 926, 4 McLean 192, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vallette-v-whitewater-valley-canal-co-circtdin-1847.