Vallejo v. Amgen, Inc.

274 F. Supp. 3d 922
CourtDistrict Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedMarch 31, 2017
Docket8:14-CV-50
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 274 F. Supp. 3d 922 (Vallejo v. Amgen, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vallejo v. Amgen, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 3d 922 (D. Neb. 2017).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER .

John M. Gerrard, United States District Judge

The plaintiff, Jan Vallejo, is suing the defendants in her personal capacity and as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased husband, Steve-Vallejo (“decedent”). The defendants, Amgen, Inc., Pfizer, Inc., and Wyeth, Inc., (collectively “Amgen”) have moved for summary judgment. For the reasons explained, below, Amgen’s motion will be granted.

BACKGROUND

Amgen manufactures, designs, distributes, sells, and supplies Enbrel, a prescription drug commonly used to treat, among other conditions, moderate to severe plaque psoriasis. The decedent suffered from psoriasis, and in 2004, he was prescribed Enbrel. Filing 142 at 2; filing 27 at 5. Vallejo alleges that, while on Enbrel, the decedent developed complications from myelodysplastic syndrome (“MDS”)—a disorder that can transform into leukemia or otherwise lead to severe bone marrow failure. Filing 142 at 3. The decedent died on May 21, 2011. Filing 27 at 5.

Vallejo claims that the decedent’s use of Enbrel is the direct and proximate cause of the injuries resulting in his death. Filing 27 at 5. Specifically, she alleges that Am-gen failed to warn the decedent or his physicians that Enbrel could cause MDS, and that Amgen demonstrated “conscious disregard” for the safety of patients in the design and sale of the drug. Filing 27 at 5. Her amended complaint raises claims for strict liability defective design, strict liability failure to warn, breach of express warranty, negligence, wrongful death, and loss of consortium. Filing 27.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for the motion, and must identify those portions of the record which the movant believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine, issue of material fact. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). If the movant does so, the non- ' movant must respond by submitting evi-dentiary materials that set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.

On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed in the light'most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts. Id. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences' from the evidence are jury functions, not those of a judge. Id. But the nonmovant must do moré than simply show that there is some metaphysi[924]*924cal doubt as to the material facts. Id. In order to show that disputed facts are material, the party opposing summary judgment must cite to the relevant substantive law in identifying facts that might affect the outcome of the suit. Quinn v. St. Louis County, 653 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2011). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovant’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could conceivably find for the nonmovant. Barber v. C1 Truck Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d 782, 791-92 (8th Cir. 2011). Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042. A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

DISCUSSION

The underlying dispute concerns causation: that is, whether Vallejo has adduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate a causal relationship between Enbrel and MDS. Amgen argues that no such evidence exists, citing Vallejo’s failure to procure expert testimony regarding Enbrel’s connection, if any, to the purported medical condition. Filing 142 at 2. It further suggests that, because expert testimony “is required to establish medical causation,” there is an absence of proof concerning an essential element of Vallejo’s claims. Filing 154 at 6. Vallejo disagrees, arguing that she need not present expert testimony. To support this contention, Vallejo points to a 2016 medical report in which Amgen allegedly concedes the causal relationship at issue. Filing 149 at 14. Thus, because Amgen purportedly “admits” causation, Vallejo asserts that “[a] skilled or professional expert does not need to testify[.]” Filing 149 at 14.

Before turning to the merits of these arguments, it is worth noting the complicated and contentious procedural history of this case—particularly as it pertains to the issue of medical causation. This history includes, at least for present purposes, several discovery-related orders from the magistrate judge dating back to May 2015. At that time, the magistrate issued a bifurcated (or phased) discovery plan, with the first phase limited to “general medical causation; that is, whether using Enbrel can cause MDS.”1 Filing 55 at 5; filing 63 at 1. In doing so, the magistrate recognized that “[Vallejo] cannot prevail on [her] claims of failure to warn absent prima facie evidence which casually links ingestion of Enbrel to Steve Vallejo’s illness and death.” Filing 55 at 4. Over the next several months, the magistrate judge ordered Amgen to turn over certain “adverse event reports” and “Enbrel studies,” and to produce for deposition Dr. Jan lies, Amgen’s global safety officer in charge of Enbrel. See filing 83 at 12-13. Amgen complied.

On August 10, 2016, the magistrate judge asked Vallejo’s counsel whether—in light of deposition testimony and medical disclosures—he had secured an expert witness. Filing 119 at 65. Counsel said yes. So, the following day, the magistrate ordered Vallejo to disclose all retained and non-retained experts “expected to testify at trial on behalf of the Plaintiff ... on the issue of whether ingesting Enbrel can cause MDS.” Filing 115 at 4. Vallejo responded, filing a “designation of experts for general causation.” Filing 121-1 at 2. There, Vallejo lists as her sole expert wit[925]*925ness “John Doe (Pfizer Employee).” Filing 121-1 at 2. This individual, Vallejo claims, “is expected to testify on general causation as to .whether Enbrel causes or contributes to the development of MDS in humans.” Filing 121-1 at 2.,

Following this disclosure, and at the conclusion of the first phase of discovery, Amgen moved for summary judgment.

Caúsation

Causation is, as both parties acknowledge, an essential element of Vallejo’s claims. Filing 149 at 18-14;' filing 142 at 9-14; see, Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 988 (8th Cir. 2001); Grant v. Pharmative, LLC, 452 F.Supp.2d 903, 907 (D. Neb. 2006); Roskop Dairy, LLC v. GEA Farm Tech., Inc., 292 Neb. 148, 871 N.W.2d 776, 794 (2015).

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Related

Jan Vallejo v. Amgen, Inc.
903 F.3d 733 (Eighth Circuit, 2018)

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Bluebook (online)
274 F. Supp. 3d 922, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vallejo-v-amgen-inc-ned-2017.