Valldejuli Rodríguez v. Aqueduct & Sewer Authority of the Commonwealth

99 P.R. 890
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedMay 11, 1971
DocketNo. R-66-289
StatusPublished

This text of 99 P.R. 890 (Valldejuli Rodríguez v. Aqueduct & Sewer Authority of the Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Valldejuli Rodríguez v. Aqueduct & Sewer Authority of the Commonwealth, 99 P.R. 890 (prsupreme 1971).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Appellant, plaintiff in the original complaint, claimed compensation for mental anguish and physical sufferings and for expenses allegedly incurred as a result of a fall which he suffered on September 19, 1963, around 1:00 to 1:15 in the afternoon when he slipped near a sewer on Comercio Street, San Juan. He alleged in his complaint that when he fell on the pavement his whole suit and body became dirty from the fecal matter and sewage which came out from the sewer system, which had overflowed on account of the torrential rains which had fallen on that day, suffering, also, bruises on different parts of his body, and that he developed an umbilical hernia which required surgery for its restoration. He requested a compensation of $88,500 which he reduced afterwards to $38,500, when he desisted during the trial from the item of $50,000 for damages sustained by his wife.

The Superior Court granted the complaint based on the joint negligence of the Aqueduct Authority and the Govern[892]*892ment of the Capital, attributable to its insurer, appellee herein, fixing appellant’s damages in the amount of $500.

The principal contention in the appeal relies on the assigned error of the trial court in concluding that plaintiff’s hernia was not produced by the fall which the latter suffered on the day of the accident, but even if it were so, the compensation of $500 for damages and $100 for attorney’s fees is exceedingly unfair and inadequate considering the proven damages.

The Superior Court received the testimony of two surgeons. The first, Dr. José Noya Benitez, testified that he examined appellant on the day following the accident; that he presented “a swelling in the umbilical region, small, but that when he made an effort or coughed, it grew in size” (Tr. Ev. 14). He diagnosed the condition as “an umbilical hernia recently acquired or developed” recommending that the patient be operated on to correct the defect (Tr. Ev. 15). Dr. Noya performed the operation. There were no complications of any kind and the patient was discharged from the hospital seven days later (Tr. Ev. 16). In his testimony, Dr. Noya testified that he arrived at the conclusion that the hernia had been caused by the trauma of the fall. He grounded this opinion solely on the history given to him by the patient denying having felt “. . . anything or having had any indisposition or any swelling in that area” (Tr. Ev. 18) previously. He also testified, that from the examination and operation which he performed he could not determine whether the hernia had been caused by the accident (Tr. Ev. 37).

Basically the trial court understood that it had to decide a problem of causality. In other words, whether a causal relationship existed between the effort of the fall and the umbilical hernia which appellant developed.

The Superior Court adjudged this question adverse to the view of plaintiff’s physician. It decided that plaintiff’s hernia was not produced by the fall which he suffered. The [893]*893court accepted the opinion of the medical expert Dr. Alfredo D’axtmayer relying on the same and on other authorities in the matter which it cited to adjudicate the controversy.

The reading of the testimonies of the physicians should not leave any doubt that the testimony of Dr. D’axtmayer against Dr. Noya’s did not raise a conflict about the question of causality. Doctor D’axtmayer examined appellant two years after the operation. He testified that on the date of said examination “the only thing” he presented “was a scar about three inches long, transversally oriented, below the navel (Tr. Ev. 61); and that on that date he could not determine “whether there was a hernia, and I can determine even less what kind of hernia, I did not see him with the hernia” (Tr. Ev. 71).

Doctor D’axtmayer’s testimony technically could not, therefore, be used to support the determination of the court to the effect that “. . . plaintiff’s hernia was not produced by the fall which he suffered on the day before his operation.” (Finding of Fact No. 11, italics ours.)

Placed in perspective, the scope of Dr. D’axtmayer’s testimony was, in our judgment, to raise a controversy about sufficiency of evidence to reach a determined medical conclusion rather than a conflict of evidence about the question of causality. On the one hand Dr. Noya had testified, as we have seen, that his conclusion that the hernia had been caused by the trauma of the fall was, based solely on the history which the patient gave him, and also, that on the grounds of the examination and operation which he performed he could not determine whether the hernia had been caused by the accident.

Doctor D’axtmayer, on the other hand, was emphatic in his opinion. The findings in the operation are more objective, in his judgment, than the history and that if those findings were not present he would say that the hernia was not traumatic (Tr. Ev. 64-69). Further on, answering questions of [894]*894the judge, he explained why, in his judgment, a conclusion that the hernia was traumatic based solely on the patient’s history cannot be reached. The doctor explained that when an operation is performed “there has to be something in the tissues, hemorrhage or something . . . some finding.” (Tr. Ev. 84.)

“A — That is, the tissues of the abdominal wall indicate, whether in the navel or wherever it is ... if a person receives' an injury, trauma or contusion or if there is any tearing, the capillaries or small veins have to rupture, there has to be hemorrhage, it must have left a hemorrhage, small or big, but it must have left a hemorrhage, not like when one makes an incision that the blood is fresh and red, but two days later it is a little bit old, already dark blood, maybe coagulated, blotting the tissues, and that creates, produces inflammation, or a reaction in the tissues which are not normal any more, besides there being a hernia.
Q — If a person falls, a great fall, and falls in a sitting position or sideways and there is no hemorrhage, you do not agree?
A — Then the hernia is not caused by the fall, if those findings are not present.” (Tr. Ev. 85.)

In our opinion, the key question raised by Dr. D’axtmayer’s testimony centered about the sufficiency of the medical evidence introduced by appellant to establish the relationship of cause and effect between the sudden effort of the latter in falling and the appearance of the hernia. But the fact that the judge placed the controversy beyond said ambit is not by itself decisive to the solution of this appeal, nor demands a different result from that evidenced by the judgment appealed from.

It is known that the trial courts, as well as this Court, in the exercise of their reviewing power, have ample discretion in the weighing of expert testimony, being able even to adopt their own view in the weighing or evaluation of the same or to reject it even though it turns out to be technically correct. Prieto v. Maryland Casualty Co., 98 [895]*895P.R.R, 583 (1970); Concepción Guzmán v. Water Resources Authority, 92 P.R.R. 473 (1965).

For appellant the sudden effort of his fall and the umbilical hernia which he developed were not disassociated facts.

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99 P.R. 890, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/valldejuli-rodriguez-v-aqueduct-sewer-authority-of-the-commonwealth-prsupreme-1971.