Valinda Smith v. Department of Agriculture

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedFebruary 10, 2023
DocketDA-3443-16-0139-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Valinda Smith v. Department of Agriculture (Valinda Smith v. Department of Agriculture) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Valinda Smith v. Department of Agriculture, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

VALINDA L. SMITH, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-3443-16-0139-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DATE: February 10, 2023 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Terrence J. Johns, New Orleans, Louisiana, for the appellant.

Sandy S. Francois, New Orleans, Louisiana, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND ¶2 The facts material to the dispositive jurisdictional issue are undisputed. The appellant received a time-limited promotion, effective June 29, 2014, from her GS-6 Procurement Technician position to a GS-7 Acquisitions Specialist position pursuant to an employment training opportunity under the agency’s Career Enhancement Program (CEP). Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 34, Initial Decision (ID) at 2; IAF, Tab 20 at 15, 20. The Standard Form 50 (SF-50) documenting the personnel action reflected that the promotion was made pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 335.102 and not to exceed (NTE) June 28, 2015. 2 IAF, Tab 20 at 20. Although the time-limited promotion originally was scheduled to expire by June 28, 2015, the agency extended it to July 26, 2015. IAF, Tab 21 at 7. On or about August 29, 2015, two months after the expiration date of the appellant’s temporary promotion, the agency retroactively returned her to her GS-6 2 Under 5 C.F.R. § 335.102(f), agencies have the authority to “[m]ake time-limited promotions to fill temporary positions . . . for a specified period.” The regulation further states that “the employee may be returned at any time to the position from which temporarily promoted, or to a different position of equivalent grade and pay, and the return is not subject to the procedures in parts 351, 432, 752, or 771 of this chapter.” 5 C.F.R. § 335.102(f)(1). 3

Procurement Technician position effective June 28, 2015. IAF, Tab 30 at 5; ID at 2 & n.2. ¶3 The appellant filed a Board appeal alleging that she was constructively demoted because she completed the agency’s CEP training, and, therefore, the agency was required to retain her at the higher-grade level. IAF, Tab 1 at 4, 6, Tab 22 at 1, Tab 28 at 1; ID at 2-3. The appellant also alleged that the job announcement for the promotion did not indicate that it was for an NTE position, that the agency paid her as if the position was permanent, and that the agency improperly reclassified the promotion as temporary. IAF, Tab 25 at 4-5; ID at 3. The appellant further alleged that the agency improperly returned her to her former position without informing her that it was ending her promotion and that the agency did not inform her that she could appeal her reduction in grade. IAF, Tab 9 at 3; ID at 3. The appellant also raised claims of discrimination based on her race, color, disability, and age. IAF, Tab 1 at 6. ¶4 The administrative judge explained the Board’s criteria for establishing jurisdiction over her appeal and directed the appellant to meet her jurisdictional burden of proof. IAF, Tab 18 at 1-2. The agency responded by filing a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the termination of a temporary promotion is excluded from the types of adverse actions that are appealable to the Board. IAF, Tab 21 at 4-5; ID at 5, 12. The administrative judge found that the appellant had raised a sufficient question of fact as to whether the terms of the agency’s training program required her to be promoted and, therefore, that she was entitled to a jurisdictional hearing. IAF, Tab 22 at 1. ¶5 After holding a hearing on the jurisdictional issue, the administrative judge granted the agency’s motion and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ID at 1; IAF, Tab 33, Hearing Compact Disc. In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that CEP positions are temporary 52 -week training programs and that the failure of the appellant’s supervisor to take action following the expiration of her CEP training period did not render her 4

time-limited CEP promotion permanent. ID at 6, 8. The administrative judge also found that the appellant knew her CEP promotion was limited in duration and that she failed to complete the required CEP training. ID at 9 -10. ¶6 The administrative judge further found that the vacancy announcement specified that the appellant’s CEP position was temporary, with an option to become permanent only upon satisfactory completion of training and performance requirements, and that “promotion is neither implied nor guaranteed.” ID at 9. In addition, the vacancy announcement specified that the employee would be returned to her position of record if the training and performance requirements were not met. Id. Based on these findings, the administrative judge concluded that the appellant failed to establish by preponderant evidence that the CEP position gave her greater rights than those granted to a temporarily promoted employee under 5 C.F.R. § 335.102(f) and that she had no appeal rights because the termination of her temporary promotion clearly met the definition of an excluded action described in 5 C.F.R. § 752.401(b)(12). ID at 10-11. Accordingly, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to fulfill her burden of showing that the Board has jurisdiction over her appeal . ID at 11-12.

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Valinda Smith v. Department of Agriculture, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/valinda-smith-v-department-of-agriculture-mspb-2023.