VALERIE RENAE JACKSON v. SARAH M. JACK

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: May 5, 2023
• Docket: A23A0106
• Status: Published

Opinion

FIFTH DIVISION MCFADDEN, P. J., BROWN and MARKLE, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

May 5, 2023

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A23A0106. JACKSON v. JACK et al.

MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.

Valerie Renae Jackson appeals the directed verdict granted to Sarah M. Jack

and James Jack in Valerie Jackson’s personal injury lawsuit stemming from a rear-

end collision. Because some evidence creates a jury question on the issue of whether

Sarah Jack was negligent when she suddenly stopped her car in a continuous lane of

traffic, we reverse.

1. Facts and procedural posture.

“In reviewing the grant of a motion for a directed verdict, this [c]ourt applies

the ‘any evidence’ test and construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the

losing party.” Cottrell v. Smith, 299 Ga. 517, 518 (I) (788 SE2d 772) (2016). So

viewed, the evidence shows that Sarah Jack was driving through Macon on North Avenue headed to Interstate 16 West. She was driving in the far right lane, which was

a continuous, dedicated right-turn lane that turned onto the interchange for Interstate

16. Although a traffic light was present at the intersection, it governed the other lanes

of traffic; a stop was not required in the continuous lane even if the traffic light were

red. A sign stated that traffic in the continuous lane was to keep moving.

Sarah Jack suddenly stopped, and Valerie Jackson drove into the back of her

car. Valerie Jackson was injured in the collision.

Sarah Jack told the responding law enforcement officer that she stopped

because “her traffic signal had turned red” and that when she came to a stop, traffic

from the road to the east started to proceed forward to Interstate 16 West. The

responding law enforcement officer concluded that Valerie Jackson was at fault,

although he did not cite her.

Valerie Jackson sued Sarah Jack for negligence and James Jack under a theory

of vicarious liability. The case went to trial. After Valerie Jackson had presented her

case, the trial court granted the Jacks’ motion for directed verdict, finding that Valerie

Jackson had failed to present evidence that Sarah Jack was negligent and that

accordingly, there was no basis to find James Jack vicariously liable. Valerie Jackson

filed this appeal.

2 2. Directed verdict.

Valerie Jackson enumerates that the trial court erred by granting a directed

verdict because there are disputed issues of fact. We agree.

“In rear-end collision cases the liability, degree of liability, or lack of liability

on the part of any involved driver depends upon a factual resolution of the issues of

diligence, negligence, and proximate cause. . . . [T]hese issues should be resolved,

except in . . . very rare cases . . . , by the jury and not by trial and appellate judges.”

Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jones, 236 Ga. 448, 451 (224 SE2d 25) (1976).

Valerie Jackson presented some evidence that created a jury question on the

issue of Sarah Jack’s negligence. Valerie Jackson presented evidence that the

continuous lane in which she and Sarah Jack were driving was not governed by the

traffic light at the nearby intersection. But Sarah Jack said that she stopped because

the light was red. And although in her appellate brief Sarah Jack asserts that the

evidence shows that “she stopped due to traffic merging from the left,” Sarah Jack did

not testify or tell the responding law enforcement officer that she stopped because of

merging traffic. The testimony at trial was that she told the responding law

enforcement officer that her “traffic signal had turned red[, s]he came to a stop, and

traffic from Emory Highway[, the road to the east,] started to proceed forward to I-16

3 West.” Construed in the light most favorable to Valerie Jackson, there is at least some

evidence to create a jury question on the issue of Sarah Jack’s negligence. See

Cottrell, 299 Ga. at 518 (I). See also Beckett v. Monroe, 249 Ga. App. 615, 616-617

(2) (548 SE2d 131) (2001) (whether the driver of a car that was rear-ended was

negligent for suddenly stopping was a question for the jury); Johnstone v. Malone

Office Equip. Co., 192 Ga. App. 137, 138 (1) (384 SE2d 208) (1989) (jury was

authorized to find that proximate cause of rear-end collision was the abnormal

suddenness of the stop of the lead vehicle).

The trial court erred in granting the Jacks’ motion for directed verdict and we

reverse. We do not reach Valerie Jackson’s remaining enumerations of error.

Judgment reversed. Brown and Markle, JJ., concur.