Valerie McDonald v. Navy Federal Credit Union, et al.

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided March 13, 2026·No. 2:25-cv-01192·Unknown

Opinion

Valerie McDonald, 2:25-cv-01192-JAD-MDC

Plaintiff(s), ORDER vs. Navy Federal Credit Union, et al., Defendant(s). Defendant Experian filed a Motion to Extend Time (ECF No. 34) and pro se plaintiff McDonald filed a Motion to Strike (ECF No. 36). The Court GRANTS the Motion to Extend Time nunc pro tunc and GRANTS the Motion to Strike. The defendants have leave to amend their affirmative defenses. I. MOTION TO EXTEND TIME A. Legal Standard Rule 6(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, states: “the court may, for good cause, extend the time…on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” Id. See also LR IA 6-1(a)(“A request made after the expiration of the specified period will not be granted unless the movant or attorney demonstrates that the failure to file the motion before the deadline expired was the result of excusable neglect.”) Rule 6(b) "[is] to be liberally construed to effectuate the general purpose of seeing that cases are tried on the merits." Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 459 (9th Cir. 1983). The excusable neglect doctrine exists to prevent a victory by default. Newgen, LLC. v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2016) (observing that it is "the general rule that default judgments are ordinarily disfavored). // B. Analysis The response to the complaint was due on December 31, 2025, but the defendant did not move for an extension of time until January 6, 2026. See ECF Nos. 30 and 34. Defendant argues that good cause exists (rather than excusable neglect) to extend the deadline to respond until January 9, 2026, due to the holidays and unavailability of both the client and counsel during this period. ECF No. 34 at 2. The defendant filed its answer on January 9, 2026. ECF No. 35. Plaintiff filed a combined1 opposition and a Motion to Strike the defendant’s answer. ECF No. 36. Plaintiff argues in her opposition that counsel Inku Nam is acting without authority in this case because defendant is represented by counsel in Virginia. Id. But large corporations that do business nationwide often have lawyers from various jurisdictions assisting on matter. Thus, Mr. Nam’s role is commonplace and proper. As Defendant argues in its response, Mr. Nam was retained to represent Experian in this matter and that John Komisin is national counsel assigned to this case but has not entered an appearance. See Waite v. Clark County Collection Service, LLC, 606 Fed. Appx. 864, 866 (9th Cir. 2015) (“An attorney who does not physically appear in court, sign pleadings, or serve as the exclusive contact with the client or opposing counsel has not appeared.”). As to the timing of defendant’s Motion to Extend Time, the Court cautions the defendant that it must follow the rules and appropriate standards, as it makes no mention of the excusable neglect standard in its Motion to Extend Time per FRCP 6 or LR IA 6-1(a). Since Courts prefer to resolve issues on the merits, however, and the defendant has already filed its answer, the Court grants defendant’s Motion to Extend Time pursuant to its inherent authority to control the docket. Ferdik v.

1 In the future, when plaintiff seeks multiple types of relief, she must follow Local Rule IC 2-2(b), which states that “For each type of relief requested or purpose of the document, a separate document must be filed, and a separate event must be selected for that document. Examples: (i) separate documents must be filed for a response to a motion and a countermotion, with the appropriate event selected for each document, rather than filing a response and a countermotion in one document; (ii) separate documents must be filed for a motion to dismiss and a motion to sever, rather than filing a motion to dismiss and to sever in one document.” Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992)(“District courts enjoy the inherent authority to manage the cases on their docket.”). A. Legal Standard "The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial." Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (simplified), overruled on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517, 114 S. Ct. 1023, 127 L. Ed. 2d 455 (1994).

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Valerie McDonald v. Navy Federal Credit Union, et al., (D. Nev. 2026).

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