Valerie Marie Valle v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In the

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00025-CR

VALERIE MARIE VALLE, Appellant V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 124th District Court Gregg County, Texas

Trial Court No. 55997-B

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Valerie Marie Valle pled guilty to burglary of a habitation, a second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(c)(2) (Supp.). Valle was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for two years. Later, the State alleged that Valle violated the terms and conditions of her community supervision, moved to adjudicate her guilt, and revoked her community supervision. After Valle pled true, the trial court found the State’s allegation true, revoked Valle’s deferred adjudication community supervision, found her guilty of burglary of a habitation, and sentenced her to five years’ imprisonment. Valle appeals.

Appellate counsel for Valle presents a hybrid brief.

On one hand, Valle’s appellate counsel presents an Anders1 brief addressing Valle’s Sixth Amendment2 protection of her liberty interest. Valle’s appellate counsel, upon review of the record, finds no arguable grounds to set aside the revocation of community supervision, the adjudication of guilt, and the five-year prison sentence. Based on that assessment, Valle’s appellate counsel moves to withdraw. Valle responded.3 On the other hand, Valle’s appellate counsel appeals the imposition of attorney’s fees (on grounds that Valle was, and remains, indigent) and the imposition of a $550.00 fine.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

1 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

2 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

3 “[T]he pro se brief that Appellant filed in response to [her appellant] counsel’s filing of an Anders brief is not dual representation . . . .” Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Instead, it “is a response to [her appellate] counsel attempting to withdraw from [her] case.” Id.

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Anders Analysis The brief submitted by Valle’s appellate counsel presents an Anders analysis regarding the conviction and sentence of incarceration. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 743–44. Appellate counsel goes on to challenge the imposition of fines in the brief, as well as the reimbursement of the cost of court-appointed trial counsel. This Court considers the Anders portion of such briefs, as well as the additional portions. See Hall v. State, No. 06-25-00131-CR, 2026 WL 1129773, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 27, 2026, no pet) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Consequently, we begin with the Anders analysis.

When an appointed counsel’s “good-faith review of the law and record suggests to [her]

no plausible grounds for appeal, appointed counsel’s ‘duty to withdraw is based upon [her] professional and ethical responsibilities as an officer of the court not to burden the judicial system with false claims, frivolous pleadings, or burdensome time demands.’” Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (quoting In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding)). The “Anders brief” is an adjunct of appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw. See id. “The purpose of the Anders brief is to satisfy the appellate court that the appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw is, indeed, based upon a conscientious and thorough review of the law and facts . . . .” Id. An appellant has a right to file a pro se response in opposition to the Anders brief. Id. at 319.

The Court may not grant the motion to withdraw until it has performed its own evaluation of the record. Id. (citing Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83 (1988)).

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Appellate counsel filed a motion with this Court seeking to withdraw as counsel in this appeal. We have conducted an independent review of the record and the Anders brief. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Valle’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief stating that she reviewed the record and found no genuinely arguable issues that could be raised on appeal. The brief outlines the procedural history of the case and summarizes the evidence presented during the trial court proceedings. Since appellate counsel has provided a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced, that evaluation meets the requirements of Anders. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 743–44; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 318–19.

On May 28, 2025, appellate counsel mailed to Valle copies of the brief and the motion to withdraw, and informed Valle of her right to review the record and to file a pro se response. On July 8, 2025, Valle moved for access to the record. On July 11, 2025, appellate counsel provided the record to Valle. On July 15, 2025, this Court granted Valle’s motion for access to the record, acknowledged that appellate counsel had sent the record to Valle, and set August 29, 2025, as the deadline for Valle’s pro se response. Valle submitted a pro se response on August 29.

We have reviewed the appellate record and Valle’s pro se response and have independently determined that no reversible error exists. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 826–27. In the Anders context, once we determine that no reversible error exists, we must affirm the trial court’s judgment. Id.

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I. Fine Valle challenges the assessment of the $550.00 fine included in the judgment adjudicating guilt. At the sentencing hearing, the following exchange took place:

THE COURT: . . . . I’ll also impose the remainder of the fine.

Is there any reason at law why sentence should not be formally pronounced?

[COUNSEL FOR VALLE]: No, Judge.

Both the order placing Valle on deferred adjudication community supervision and the judgment adjudicating guilt assessed fines of $550.00. The November 25, 2024, bill of costs (which was incorporated from the November 22, 2024, order placing Valle on deferred adjudication community supervision) shows a $500.00 “General Fine” and a “CRIME STOPPERS FEE” of $50.00. The January 31, 2025, bill of costs (which was incorporated from the January 30, 2025, judgment) shows a $500.00 “General Fine” and a “CRIME STOPPERS FEE” of $50.00. The 2025 bill of costs does not show that any amount was paid during Valle’s community supervision. At the conclusion of the adjudication hearing, the trial court stated it would “impose the remainder of the fine.” Both the order placing Valle on deferred adjudication community supervision and the judgment include itemizations of the fines which reflect a general fine of $500.00, and a “Repayment of Reward Fine” of $50.00.4 “[F]ines generally must be orally pronounced in the defendant’s presence.” Armstrong v.

State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “As a general rule, when the oral

4 Valle challenges the entirety of the fine as set forth in the judgment ($550.00) on pronouncement grounds, and only pronouncement grounds. Accordingly, we address pronouncement, and only pronouncement.

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pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment vary, the oral pronouncement controls.” Ette v. State, 559 S.W.3d 511, 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “[W]hen guilt is adjudicated, the order adjudicating guilt sets aside the order deferring adjudication, including the previously imposed fine.” Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Hall, 2026 WL 1129773, at *3 (quoting Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 502).

“[D]ue process requires that the defendant be given fair notice of all of the terms of h[er]

sentence, so that [s]he may object and offer a defense to any terms [s]he believes are inappropriate.” Burt v. State, 445 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). This need not always include an exact dollar amount at the time of pronouncement. See id. at 759–60. In Burt, the trial court told the defendant that restitution would be ordered in an amount to be agreed upon by the defendant and the State. Id. at 759. As it turned out, the State and the defendant could not agree, so due process required a restitution hearing to set the dollar amount. Id. at 760. But if they had agreed, it would not have violated due process to incorporate the agreed sum into the judgment even though that exact sum had not been pronounced at sentencing. Id. at 760–61.

Here, Valle had the bill of costs even before being placed on deferred adjudication, the order placing her on deferred adjudication, and the updated bill of costs (which remained identical in pertinent part). If Valle had any questions about what the trial court meant by “remainder,” she had the opportunity to object. She did not do so. Therefore, we find that Valle did not preserve her complaint against the fine. See Hernandez v. State, No. 07-24-00383-CR, 2025 WL 1230487, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 28, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

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designated for publication) (determining that appellant waived any argument “about the trial court’s failure to pronounce an exact dollar amount for the fine”).

Therefore, we find Valle’s fine issue unpreserved.

II. Attorney Fees Valle also challenges the portion of the trial court’s judgment requiring her to reimburse the cost of appointed trial counsel. The trial court’s judgment of January 30, 2025, contains a reimbursement order for $725.00. The record reveals the composition of that sum. The November 22, 2024, order placing Valle on deferred adjudication community supervision called for her to reimburse $425.00 in appointed trial-counsel fees incurred to that date. On January 2, 2025, Valle requested appointed trial counsel regarding the State’s motion to revoke community supervision. The trial court approved that request on January 4, 2025. Between then and the hearing on the motion to revoke, trial counsel incurred $300.00 in attorney’s fees. That is reflected in the updated attorney’s fees balance of $725.00 on the January 31, 2025, bill of costs, which was incorporated from the trial court’s January 30, 2025, judgment.

Because Valle did not appeal from the order placing her on deferred adjudication, she cannot challenge the initial $425.00 attorney fee reimbursement via this appeal. See King v. State, No. 06-25-00187-CR, 2026 WL 1828326, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 24, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Riles v. State, 452 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)); Bell v. State, No. 06-24-00106-CR, 2024 WL 4879479, at *2 (Tex. App.— Texarkana, Nov. 25, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Riles, 452 S.W.3d at 337).

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Regarding reimbursement of the remaining $300.00 in attorney’s fees, we review a defendant’s “ability to pay” an attorney’s fee reimbursement using the “a basis” test. King, 2026 WL 1828326, at *5.

There was no discussion during the January 30, 2025, revocation hearing of a basis for reimbursement.5 The record is silent regarding Valle’s work history, as well as her ability to work.

Accordingly, we find that the “a basis” test was not met. Therefore, we find for Valle, in part. Regarding Valle’s ability-to-pay the $750.00 in trial-counsel attorney fees which were incurred and approved, $425.00 of which Valle did not challenge her ability to pay when she was placed on deferred adjudication, and $300.00 of which Valle does not have the present ability to pay. However, this does not mean that we strike the additional $300.00 in attorney’s fees from the trial court’s judgment. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN arts. 26.04(p), 26.05(g), (g-1) (Supp.). As the trial court’s judgment does not contain an ability-to-pay finding, no modification of the trial court’s judgment is required. III. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Jeff Rambin

Justice

5 In some instances, the plea papers contain a bill of costs, or a bill of costs in progress, bearing the signature of the defendant. See King, 2026 WL 1828326, at *2. The bill of costs in this record does not bear Valle’s signature.

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CONCURRENCE IN PART AND DISSENT IN PART I concur with the Anders analysis and section I of the majority opinion. Regarding section II of the majority opinion, I agree that there is no factual basis in the record to support the determination that Valle had the ability to pay any attorney fees for court-appointed counsel during revocation. Even so, I would modify the trial court’s judgment and bill of costs by deleting the assessment of the additional $300.00 in attorney fees. See Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

Scott E. Stevens

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: September 23, 2025 Date Decided: August 21, 2026

Do Not Publish