Valerie Flores v. Cory Lettman et. al.
This text of Valerie Flores v. Cory Lettman et. al. (Valerie Flores v. Cory Lettman et. al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _____________________________________________________________________ Valerie Flores, Plaintiff, v. 1:25-CV-1833 (AJB/MJK) Cory Lettman et. al., Defendant. _____________________________________________________________________ Valerie Flores, Plaintiff pro se Mitchell J. Katz, U.S. Magistrate Judge To the Honorable Anthony J. Brindisi, U.S. District Judge: ORDER & REPORT- RECOMMENDATION On December 31, 2025, Flores began this action by filing a Complaint and moving for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)
(Dkts. 1, 2). The Clerk sent Flores’s Complaint and IFP application to this Court for review. (Dkts. 1, 2). I. BACKGROUND In either 2002 or 2003 Cory Lettman stalked and harassed Flores
in Wisconsin. (Complaint, Dkt. 1, at pg. 4). About a decade later, Lettman purportedly went to Flores’s office at the University of Wisconsin Madison. (Id.). Someone vandalized Flores’s desk, so Lettman “could have been the culprit.” (Id.). In 2019, Lettman sent Flores a message on Facebook, but she did not see the message for
nearly a year. (Id.). In either 2020 or 2021 Flores began having problems in her apartment. Lettman “could have been the culprit,
again.” (Id.). Allegedly in March 2024, Lettman followed Flores to several locations in Wisconsin and California. II. IFP APPLICATION Flores declares in her IFP applications that she is unable to pay
the filing fee. (Dkt. 2). And after reviewing her application, this Court finds that Flores is financially eligible for IFP status
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW Because the District Court and Flores, who is a prolific pro se litigant, are familiar with §1915’s standard of review, the Court need not repeat it. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
IV. DISCUSSION The District Court should dismiss Flores’s Complaint because the incidents are time barred, and the Complaint does not state a claim. To start, most of Flores’s claims are likely time barred. In New York, claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 must be filed within three years of the date a claim accrues.1 Section 1983 claims generally accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the
basis of the claim. See Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013). Assuming that her allegations assert claims, Flores’s 2003, 2019,
and 2021 claims are all likely time barred. As none of the incidents occur in New York, the statute of limitations for California and Wisconsin may apply. In California,
§1983 claims have a two-year statute of limitations. See Doe #1 M.L. v. San Bernardino Sheriff Dep’t, 753 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2024). So under California law, Flores’s 2003, 2019, and 2021 claims are
likely time barred. In Wisconsin, §1983 claims have a six-year statute of limitations. See D'acquisto v. Love, No. 20-C-1034, 2020 WL 5982895, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 8, 2020). So only the 2003 claim is clearly time
barred. That said, the Court analyzes the Complaint’s merits for clarity. As to Flores’s 2024 incidents (and the merits of the 2003, 2019, and 2021 incidents), Flores has failed to state a claim. Flores is well
1 The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). aware that “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” are “simply not enough to state a claim.” Flores v. Credit
One Bank, No. 1:25-CV-683 (GTS/MJK), 2025 WL 1684254, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. June 16, 2025) (cleaned up) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (recommending denial of Flores’s Complaint because it fails to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8); see also Flores, Plaintiff, v. Wells Fargo, No. 1:25-CV-1755 (MAD/MJK), 2025 WL
3704290 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2025) (same). Yet her Complaint only includes conclusory statements. In consequence, the District Court should dismiss Flores’s Complaint.
As a very important aside—the District Court lacks personal matter jurisdiction over the Defendants. Flores pleads that all of the Defendants live in Wisconsin, Idaho, or California. (Complaint, Dkt. 1,
at pg. 2). Worse yet, Flores’s Complaint—liberally construed—does not indicate that any Defendant has any connection to New York. (Id. at 2- 4). More to the point, Flores does not allege that any actions occurred in
New York. (Id. at 2-4). In consequence, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over these Defendants. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 554 F. App’x 30, 31–32 (2d Cir. 2013) (“As Smith alleged no facts in the claims against the New Hampshire defendants that indicate a connection with the state of New York, dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction was appropriate.”). Flores should be allowed to amend her Complaint. Generally,
before courts dismiss a pro se complaint or any part of the complaint on its own, they should afford the plaintiff the opportunity to amend at least once; but leave to re-plead may be denied where any amendment
would be futile. See Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993). Futility is present when the problem with a plaintiff’s causes of action is substantive such that better pleading will not cure it.
See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Here, there is no futility because Flores can amend her Complaint to include facts that make out each claim. Thus, the Court
recommends finding no futility. V. CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP (Dkt. 2) is
GRANTED; and it is further RECOMMENDED, the District Court dismiss Flores’s Complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE and WITH LEAVE TO AMEND because it fails to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; and it is further ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation on Plaintiff by regular mail.” Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.1(c), the parties have 14 days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN 14 DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Small v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 6386(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(e), 72.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _____________________________________________________________________ Valerie Flores, Plaintiff, v. 1:25-CV-1833 (AJB/MJK) Cory Lettman et. al., Defendant. _____________________________________________________________________ Valerie Flores, Plaintiff pro se Mitchell J. Katz, U.S. Magistrate Judge To the Honorable Anthony J. Brindisi, U.S. District Judge: ORDER & REPORT- RECOMMENDATION On December 31, 2025, Flores began this action by filing a Complaint and moving for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)
(Dkts. 1, 2). The Clerk sent Flores’s Complaint and IFP application to this Court for review. (Dkts. 1, 2). I. BACKGROUND In either 2002 or 2003 Cory Lettman stalked and harassed Flores
in Wisconsin. (Complaint, Dkt. 1, at pg. 4). About a decade later, Lettman purportedly went to Flores’s office at the University of Wisconsin Madison. (Id.). Someone vandalized Flores’s desk, so Lettman “could have been the culprit.” (Id.). In 2019, Lettman sent Flores a message on Facebook, but she did not see the message for
nearly a year. (Id.). In either 2020 or 2021 Flores began having problems in her apartment. Lettman “could have been the culprit,
again.” (Id.). Allegedly in March 2024, Lettman followed Flores to several locations in Wisconsin and California. II. IFP APPLICATION Flores declares in her IFP applications that she is unable to pay
the filing fee. (Dkt. 2). And after reviewing her application, this Court finds that Flores is financially eligible for IFP status
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW Because the District Court and Flores, who is a prolific pro se litigant, are familiar with §1915’s standard of review, the Court need not repeat it. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
IV. DISCUSSION The District Court should dismiss Flores’s Complaint because the incidents are time barred, and the Complaint does not state a claim. To start, most of Flores’s claims are likely time barred. In New York, claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 must be filed within three years of the date a claim accrues.1 Section 1983 claims generally accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the
basis of the claim. See Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013). Assuming that her allegations assert claims, Flores’s 2003, 2019,
and 2021 claims are all likely time barred. As none of the incidents occur in New York, the statute of limitations for California and Wisconsin may apply. In California,
§1983 claims have a two-year statute of limitations. See Doe #1 M.L. v. San Bernardino Sheriff Dep’t, 753 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2024). So under California law, Flores’s 2003, 2019, and 2021 claims are
likely time barred. In Wisconsin, §1983 claims have a six-year statute of limitations. See D'acquisto v. Love, No. 20-C-1034, 2020 WL 5982895, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 8, 2020). So only the 2003 claim is clearly time
barred. That said, the Court analyzes the Complaint’s merits for clarity. As to Flores’s 2024 incidents (and the merits of the 2003, 2019, and 2021 incidents), Flores has failed to state a claim. Flores is well
1 The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). aware that “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” are “simply not enough to state a claim.” Flores v. Credit
One Bank, No. 1:25-CV-683 (GTS/MJK), 2025 WL 1684254, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. June 16, 2025) (cleaned up) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (recommending denial of Flores’s Complaint because it fails to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8); see also Flores, Plaintiff, v. Wells Fargo, No. 1:25-CV-1755 (MAD/MJK), 2025 WL
3704290 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2025) (same). Yet her Complaint only includes conclusory statements. In consequence, the District Court should dismiss Flores’s Complaint.
As a very important aside—the District Court lacks personal matter jurisdiction over the Defendants. Flores pleads that all of the Defendants live in Wisconsin, Idaho, or California. (Complaint, Dkt. 1,
at pg. 2). Worse yet, Flores’s Complaint—liberally construed—does not indicate that any Defendant has any connection to New York. (Id. at 2- 4). More to the point, Flores does not allege that any actions occurred in
New York. (Id. at 2-4). In consequence, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over these Defendants. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 554 F. App’x 30, 31–32 (2d Cir. 2013) (“As Smith alleged no facts in the claims against the New Hampshire defendants that indicate a connection with the state of New York, dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction was appropriate.”). Flores should be allowed to amend her Complaint. Generally,
before courts dismiss a pro se complaint or any part of the complaint on its own, they should afford the plaintiff the opportunity to amend at least once; but leave to re-plead may be denied where any amendment
would be futile. See Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993). Futility is present when the problem with a plaintiff’s causes of action is substantive such that better pleading will not cure it.
See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Here, there is no futility because Flores can amend her Complaint to include facts that make out each claim. Thus, the Court
recommends finding no futility. V. CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP (Dkt. 2) is
GRANTED; and it is further RECOMMENDED, the District Court dismiss Flores’s Complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE and WITH LEAVE TO AMEND because it fails to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; and it is further ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation on Plaintiff by regular mail.” Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.1(c), the parties have 14 days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN 14 DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Small v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 6386(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(e), 72.
Digitally signed by . Mitchell J Katz Dated: January 13th, 2026 Mechel bed Date 0096.01.13 / 11:31:55 -05'00' Hon. Mitchell J. Katz U.S. Magistrate Judge
2 The Clerk shall also provide Plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
2020WL5982895 OnlytheWestlawcitationiscurrentlyavailable. UnitedStatesDistrictCourt,E.D.Wisconsin. Maxine-JohniseD'ACQUISTO,Plaintiff, v. OfficerKeziahLOVE,andJaneandJohnDoes1–5,Defendants. CaseNo.20-C-1034 | Signed10/08/2020 AttorneysandLawFirms Maxine-JohniseD'Acquisto,Milwaukee,WI,prose. JohnA.Griner,IV,Chapin&Associates,Brookfield,WI,forDefendants. DECISIONANDORDERDENYINGDEFENDANT'SMOTIONTODISMISS WilliamC.Griesbach,UnitedStatesDistrictJudge *1 Plaintiff Maxine-Johnise D'Acquisto, proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants Officer Keziah Love (incorrectly identified in the complaint as Katia Love) and five unidentified defendants, all employeesattheFondduLacCountyJail,violatedhercivilrightswhileshewasincustodyasapretrialdetainee.D'Acquisto was permitted to proceed on her Fourteenth Amendment claims of excessive force and deliberate indifference and a First Amendmentclaimofretaliation.CurrentlybeforethecourtisOfficerLove'smotiontodismissD'Acquisto’sclaimsastime- barred.Themotionwillbedenied. TheeventsgivingrisetoD'Acquisto’sclaimsoccurredonoraboutJanuary31,2017,andshefiledheractiononJuly9,2020. OfficerLovecontendsthattheapplicablestatuteoflimitationsisthreeyears.BecauseD'Acquistowaitedmorethanthreeyears tofileheraction,Lovecontendsitisbarred.OfficerLoveismistaken,however,becausethestatuteoflimitationsatthetime D'Acquisto filed her action was six years. The Wisconsin legislature shortened the statute of limitations to three years, but theeffectivedateofthenewstatutewasApril5,2018.Becausethestatuteoflimitationsineffectatthetimetheclaimarose controls,thesix-yearstatuteoflimitationapplies. Inassessingthetimelinessofclaimsbroughtunder42U.S.C.§1983,federalcourtslooktoanalogousstateactionstodetermine appropriatestatutesoflimitations.Wilsonv.Garcia,471U.S.261,275(1985)(“Weconcludethatthestatuteisfairlyconstrued asadirectivetoselect,ineachState,theonemostappropriatestatuteoflimitationsforall§1983claims.”)Morespecifically, “wherestatelawprovidesmultiplestatutesoflimitationsforpersonalinjuryactions,courtsconsidering§1983claimsshould borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions.” Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989). Officer Love argues that Wis. Stat. § 893.54 bars claims for negligent personal injury at three years and alternatively, Wis. Stat. § 893.57 barsclaimsforintentionaltortsattwoyears.OfficerLovelookstothewrongstatutes.InWisconsin,thestatesupremecourt has firmly established that the applicable residual statute for § 1983 claims is Wis. Stat. § 893.53. Hemberger v. Bitzer, 216 Wis.2d509,519,574N.W.2d656(1998)(“[W]eholdthatWis.Stat.§893.53,providingasix-yearstatuteoflimitations,is Wisconsin's general and residual personal injury statute of limitations. Therefore, it is applicable to claims brought under 42 U.S.C.§1983.”). subjecttothesix-yearlimitbecausetheeventsinquestionoccurredin2017,priortotheenactmentofthechange.SeeGutterv. Seamandel,103Wis.2d1,18,308N.W.2d403(1981)(“Thiscourthaspreviouslyheldthatintheabsenceofexpresslanguage inastatutewhichimposesanewstatuteoflimitationsstatingthatthestatutehasretroactiveeffectandintheabsenceofany legislativeintentthatanewstatuteoflimitationsbeappliedretroactivelytoacauseofactionthataccruedpriortotheeffective dateofthestatute,thiscourtwouldnotapplythenewstatuteoflimitationstocausesofactionaccruingpriortotheeffective date of the statute.” (citing Hunter v. Sch. Dist. Gale-Ettrick-Trempealeau, 97 Wis. 2d 435, 445, 293 N.W.2d 515 (1980))). Because nothing in the language of the amended version of § 893.53 suggests that it was to apply retroactively, the old six- yearstatuteoflimitationsapplies. *2 PlaintiffD'Acquistohasstatedaclaimforreliefandherclaimisnottime-barredundertheapplicablestatuteoflimitations. Therefore,DefendantLove'smotiontodismiss(Dkt.No.7)isDENIED. SOORDEREDatGreenBay,Wisconsinthis8thdayofOctober,2020. AllCitations NotReportedinFed.Supp.,2020WL5982895 EndofDocument ©2026ThomsonReuters.NoclaimtooriginalU.S.GovernmentWorks. 753F.Supp.3d1024 UnitedStatesDistrictCourt,C.D.California. JaneDOE#1M.L. v. SANBERNARDINOSHERIFFDEPARTMENT,etal. EDCV24-758-KK-SHKx | FiledOctober15,2024 Synopsis Background: Former pretrial detainee brought state court action against sheriff department, alleging that she was sexually assaultedbydepartmentstaffwhileincustody.Followingremovalanddismissalofcomplaint,detaineeamendedcomplaintto assertclaimssoundinginviolationsofherFourth,Eighth,andFourteenthAmendmentrights.Departmentmovedtodismiss. Holdings:TheDistrictCourt,KenlyKiyaKato,J.,heldthat: [1]California'stwo-yearstatuteoflimitationsforpersonalinjuryactionsbegantorun,evenifsubjecttotwo-yeartollingperiod whiledetaineewasincarcerated,ondatesofallegedsexualassaults; [2]detaineefailedtostateclaimforMonellliability;and [3]dismissalwouldbewithoutleavetoamend. Motiongranted. ProceduralPosture(s):MotiontoDismissforFailuretoStateaClaim. WestHeadnotes(17) [1] FederalCivilProcedure Insufficiencyingeneral Acomplaintmaybedismissedforfailuretostateaclaimonlywherethecomplaintlacksacognizablelegaltheory orsufficientfactstosupportacognizablelegaltheory.Fed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6). [2] FederalCivilProcedure Claimforreliefingeneral Inordertostateaclaimforrelief,acomplaintmustcontainsufficientallegationsofunderlyingfactstogivefairnotice andtoenabletheopposingpartytodefenditselfeffectively.Fed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6). [3] FederalCivilProcedure Limitations,lachesandprematurity of statute is apparent on face of complaint and it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts that wouldestablishtimelinessofclaim.Fed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6). 2Casesthatcitethisheadnote [4] CivilRights TimetoSue FederalCourts Civilrightsanddiscriminationcases Applicable statute of limitations for cause of action under § 1983 or § 1985 is statute of limitations established by forumstateforpersonalinjurytorts.42U.S.C.A.§§1983,1985. 3Casesthatcitethisheadnote [5] CivilRights TimetoSue Conspiracy Timetosue;limitationsandlaches Two-yearstatuteoflimitationsappliestoa§1983or§1985claimbroughtinCalifornia.42U.S.C.A.§§1983,1985; Cal.Civ.Proc.Code§335.1. 4Casesthatcitethisheadnote [6] FederalCourts Computationandtolling Whenafederalcourtappliestheforumstate'sstatuteoflimitations,thecourtalsoappliestheforumstate'stollingrules. 1Casethatcitesthisheadnote [7] LimitationofActions Civilrights LimitationofActions Convictionorimprisonmentforcrime Didclaimsaccrueondatesofallegedsexualassaults?Yes Former pretrial detainee's § 1983 claims under Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging that she was sexuallyassaultedbysheriffdepartmentstaffwhileincustody,accrued,andCalifornia'stwo-yearstatuteoflimitations forpersonalinjuryactionsbegantorun,evenifsubjecttotwo-yeartollingperiodwhiledetaineewasincarcerated, ondatesofallegedsexualassaults.U.S.Const.Amends.4,8,14;42U.S.C.A.§1983;Cal.Civ.Proc.Code§§335.1, 352.1(a). Morecasesonthisissue [8] CivilRights Criminallawenforcement; prisons California'stwo-yearstatuteoflimitationsforpersonalinjuryactions,ratherthanten-yearstatuteoflimitationsfor statelawclaimsofsexualassaultfiledinCaliforniastatecourt,applied,followingremovalofactiontofederalcourt, toformerpretrialdetainee's§1983claimsunderFourth,Eighth,andFourteenthAmendments,allegingthatshewas sexuallyassaultedbysheriffdepartmentstaffwhileincustody.U.S.Const.Amends.4,8,14;42U.S.C.A.§1983; Cal.Civ.Proc.Code§335.1. 3Casesthatcitethisheadnote [9] CivilRights Actsofofficersandemployeesingeneral; vicariousliabilityandrespondeatsuperioringeneral [10] CivilRights GovernmentalOrdinance,Policy,Practice,orCustom A municipality is liable under § 1983 only when execution of local government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts injury. 42 U.S.C.A.§1983. [11] CivilRights GovernmentalOrdinance,Policy,Practice,orCustom A plaintiff may establish municipal liability under § 1983 by showing: (1) the alleged constitutional violation was committed pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local governmental entity, (2) the constitutional violation was committed by a governmentofficialwithfinalpolicy-makingauthority,or(3)agovernmentofficialwithfinalpolicy-makingauthority ratifiedasubordinate'sunconstitutionalconductandthebasisforit.42U.S.C.A.§1983. 1Casethatcitesthisheadnote [12] CivilRights LackofControl,Training,orSupervision; KnowledgeandInaction Plaintiff may establish municipal liability under § 1983 by showing municipality failed to train its employees and suchfailuretotrainamountstodeliberateindifferencetoconstitutionalrightsofpersonswithwhomemployeescome intocontact.42U.S.C.A.§1983. [13] CivilRights Complaintingeneral In order to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a § 1983 Monell claim must consist of more thanmereformulaicrecitationsoftheexistenceofunlawfulpolicies,conducts,orhabits.42U.S.C.A.§1983;Fed. R.Civ.P.12(b)(6). 1Casethatcitesthisheadnote [14] CivilRights Arrest,search,anddetention Allegations,byformerpretrialdetaineewhoallegedthatshewassexuallyassaultedbysheriffdepartmentstaffwhile incustody,regardingdepartment'sallegedpolicyorpracticeofconductingcavitysearches,wereinsufficienttostate claimforMonellliabilityin§1983actionassertingclaimsunderFourth,Eighth,andFourteenthAmendments,where practiceofconductingcavitysearcheswasnotperseunconstitutional,andallegationswereotherwisewereboilerplate andconclusory.U.S.Const.Amends.4,8,14;42U.S.C.A.§1983. [15] FederalCivilProcedure Amendments Althoughleavetoamendshouldbefreelygiven,courtmaydenyleavetoamendwhereamendmentwouldprejudice opposingparty,produceunduedelayinlitigation,orresultinfutilityforlackofmerit.Fed.R.Civ.P.15(a)(2). 1Casethatcitesthisheadnote [16] FederalCivilProcedure Formandsufficiencyofamendment; futility couldnotpossiblycurethedeficiency.Fed.R.Civ.P.15(a)(2).
[17] FederalCivilProcedure Pleadingover Amendmentofformerpretrialdetainee'sfirstamendedcomplaintasserting§1983claimunderFourth,Eighth,and FourteenthAmendmentsallegingthatshewassexuallyassaultedbysheriffdepartmentstaffwhileincustodywould befutile,andthusdismissalofclaimwouldbewithoutleavetoamend,whereclaimwasbarredbyCalifornia'stwo- year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and detainee was previously allowed to amend complaint to cure pleading deficiencies but failed to do so. U.S. Const. Amends. 4, 8, 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code§335.1. Morecasesonthisissue AttorneysandLawFirms *1026 JamesLloydWest,RhysKenney,LilianAvedian,MarcJ.BernandPartnersLLP,ShermanOaks,CA,forJaneDoe #1M.L. AnitaKayClarke,ShannonLinGustafson,AmyR.Margolies,LynbergandWatkinsAPC,Orange,CA,forSanBernardino CountySheriffsDepartment. AmyR.Margolies,ShannonLinGustafson,LynbergandWatkinsAPC,Orange,CA,forSanBernardinoCountySheriffCentral DetentionCenter. Proceedings:(InChambers)OrderGRANTINGDefendant'sMotiontoDismiss[Dkt.29] KENLYKIYAKATO,UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTJUDGE I. INTRODUCTION OnAugust13,2024,plaintiff“JaneDoe#1M.L.”1 (“Plaintiff”)filedtheoperativeFirstAmendedComplaint(“FAC”)against defendantsSanBernardinoCountySheriffCentralDetentionCenter,SanBernardinoCountySheriff'sDepartment,andDoes1 through100(“Defendants”),allegingviolationsofPlaintiff'sFourth,Eighth,andFourteenthAmendmentrights.ECFDocket No. (“Dkt.”) 27, FAC. On August 27, 2024, defendant San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department (“Defendant”) filed the instantMotiontoDismisstheFACandMotiontoStrikePortionsoftheFAC(“Motion”).Dkt.29. The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L.R. 7-15. For the reasonssetforthbelow,Defendant'sMotionisGRANTED. II. BACKGROUND A.PROCEDURALHISTORY OnSeptember20,2023,PlaintifffiledaComplaintraisingsevencausesofaction:(1)“ViolationofCivilRights,”(2)“Breachof MandatoryDuty”pursuanttoSection815.6oftheCaliforniaGovernmentCode,(3)intentionalinflictionofemotionaldistress, (4)battery,(5)sexualharassmentpursuanttoSections51.9and *1027 52oftheCaliforniaCivilCode,(6)negligence,and (7)negligentsupervision.Dkt.1-1at¶¶30-80.TheComplaintallegedmultipleinstancesofsexualassaultwhilePlaintiffwas inDefendant'scustody.Id.¶¶20-26.OnApril11,2024,Defendantsremovedthisactiontofederalcourt.Dkt.1. On June 17, 2024, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. Dkt. 19. On July 31, 2024, the Court issued an OrdergrantingDefendant'sMotiontoDismiss.Dkt.26.First,theCourtconcludedPlaintiff'sstatelawclaimswerebarredby Defendant'simmunityunderCalifornia'sGovernmentTortClaimsAct.Id.at4.Second,theCourtconcludedPlaintiff'sFourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 5-7. The Court, therefore,dismissedtheComplaintwithleavetoamend.Id.at7-8. OnAugust13,2024,PlaintifffiledtheoperativeFACagainstDefendantsreallegingnearlyidenticalfactsfromtheComplaint. FAC.However,intheFAC,Plaintiffassertsonlyasinglecauseofactionfor“ViolationofCivilRights”2 againstallDefendants. Id.¶¶34-42. OnAugust27,2024,DefendantfiledtheinstantMotionpursuanttoFederalRulesofCivilProcedure12(b)(6)and12(f).Dkt. 29. First, Defendant moves for dismissal of the FAC pursuant to California's statute of limitations and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure12(b)(6)forfailuretostateaclaimuponwhichreliefcanbegranted.Id.at13-17.Second,Defendantmovestostrike Plaintiff'srequestforpunitivedamagespursuanttoFederalRuleofCivilProcedure12(f)onthegroundpunitivedamagesare notavailableagainstapublicentity.Id.at24. OnSeptember12,2024,PlaintifffiledanOppositiontotheMotion.Dkt.31.OnSeptember19,2024,Defendantfiledareply insupportoftheMotion.Dkt.34. Thematterthusstandssubmitted. B.RELEVANTFACTS On August 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative FAC. FAC. Notably, Plaintiff does not allege any new facts to cure the deficienciesidentifiedintheCourt'sJuly31,2024Order,dkt.26. Rather, the FAC realleges Plaintiff was transferred to the San Bernardino County Sheriff Central Detention Center (“Central Detention Center”) in 2008 “to serve a sentence on a first offense.” FAC ¶ 20. Plaintiff realleges, in approximately 2013, correctionalofficersattheCentralDetentionCenterperformedcavitysearchesonPlaintiffinhercellbeforesexuallyassaulting her.Id.¶¶21,23.Plaintifffurtherrealleges,thatsameyear,adoctorattheCentralDetentionCentersexuallyassaultedPlaintiff inthedoctor'sofficewhileanurse“pinned[Plaintiff]down.”Id.¶¶22,24.Plaintiffreallegesshereportedtheseincidentsto “theSheriff'sdepartment,psychologistandcaseattorney.”Id.¶26.Asaresultoftheseallegedincidents,Plaintiffexperienced “seriousbodilyharm,painandsuffering,[and]extremeemotionalandmentaldistress[.]”Id.¶31.Plaintiffagainseeksactual damages,punitivedamages,andattorney'sfeesandcosts.Id.¶¶31-33. III. LEGALSTANDARD [1] AcomplaintmaybedismissedforfailuretostateaclaimpursuanttoFederalRuleofCivilProcedure12(b)(6)“onlywhere thecomplaintlacksacognizablelegaltheoryorsufficientfactstosupportacognizablelegaltheory.” *1028 Mendiondov. CentinelaHosp.Med.Ctr.,521F.3d1097,1104(9thCir.2008).Inconsideringwhetheracomplaintstatesaclaim,acourtmust “construethepleadingsinthelightmostfavorabletothenonmovingparty,”Cappv.Cnty.ofSanDiego,940F.3d1046,1052 (9thCir.2019)(quotingKnievelv.ESPN,393F.3d1068,1072(9thCir.2005)),acceptingastrueallfactualallegationsinthe complaintanddrawingallreasonableinferencesinthenonmovingparty'sfavor.Morenov.UtiliQuest,LLC,29F.4th567,573 (9thCir.2022).Thecourt,however,neednotacceptastrue“alegalconclusioncouchedasafactualallegation.”Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127S.Ct.1955,167L.Ed.2d929(2007)). [2] Althoughacomplaintneednotincludedetailedfactualallegations,it“mustcontainsufficientfactualmatter,acceptedas true,to‘stateaclaimtoreliefthatisplausibleonitsface.’”Cookv.Brewer,637F.3d1002,1004(9thCir.2011)(quotingIqbal, 556U.S.at678,129S.Ct.1937).Aclaimisfaciallyplausiblewhenit“allowsthecourttodrawthereasonableinferencethat thedefendantisliableforthemisconductalleged.”Id.Thecomplaint“mustcontainsufficientallegationsofunderlyingfactsto givefairnoticeandtoenabletheopposingpartytodefenditselfeffectively.”Starrv.Baca,652F.3d1202,1216(9thCir.2011). IV. DISCUSSION A.THESTATUTEOFLIMITATIONSBARSPLAINTIFF'SSECTION1983CLAIM 1.ApplicableLaw [3] AclaimissubjecttodismissalunderFederalRuleofCivilProcedure12(b)(6)onthegroundthatthestatuteoflimitations hasexpired“when‘therunningofthestatuteisapparentonthefaceofthecomplaint’”and“itappearsbeyonddoubtthatthe plaintiffcanprovenosetoffactsthatwouldestablishthetimelinessoftheclaim.”VonSaherv.NortonSimonMuseumofArt atPasadena,592F.3d954,969(9thCir.2010)(citationsomitted). [4] [5] TheapplicablestatuteoflimitationsforacauseofactionunderSection1983orSection1985isthestatuteoflimitations establishedbytheforumstateforpersonalinjurytorts.Wallacev.Kato,549U.S.384,387,127S.Ct.1091,166L.Ed.2d973 (2007); see also Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying same statute of limitationstoSection1983andSection1985claims).Hence,thestatuteoflimitationsforaSection1983orSection1985claim broughtinCaliforniaistwoyears.SeeCal.CodeCiv.Proc.§335.1(establishingatwo-yearstatuteoflimitationsforpersonal injuryactions). [6] Additionally,whenafederalcourtappliestheforum state's statuteoflimitations,thecourtalso appliestheforumstate's tollingrules.Sotov.Sweetman,882F.3d865,871-72(9th Cir.2018).UnderCalifornialaw,astatuteoflimitationsistolled whileaplaintiffisincarcerated,uptoamaximumoftwoyears.Cal.CodeCiv.Proc.§352.1(a). 2.Analysis Here,theCourtconstruesPlaintiff'sclaimsforviolationsoftheFourth,Eighth,andFourteenthAmendmentsasclaimsbrought pursuantto42U.S.C.§1983(“Section1983”)andMonell.SeeFAC¶¶34-42. Plaintiffremainedincarceratedfortwoyearsfollowingtheallegedinstancesofsexualassault,thecombinedfour-yearstatute oflimitationsexpiredinapproximately2017.Soto,882F.3dat871-72; *1029 Cal.CodeCiv.Proc.§352.1(a).Plaintiffhas not asserted – nor do the allegations in the FAC establish – any other basis for tolling.3 Hence, the instant action – filed in September2023–isuntimelybyapproximatelysixyears. [8] Plaintiffarguessheisentitledtoaten-yearstatuteoflimitationspursuanttoSection945.9(c)(1).Dkt.31at10.However, while state law claims of sexual assault filed in California state court may be timely pursuant to the longer ten-year statute of limitations, federal courts must apply a single applicable statute of limitations to avoid confusion and inconsistency. See Owensv.Okure,488U.S.235,249-50,109S.Ct.573,102L.Ed.2d594(1989)(holdingthat“wherestatelawprovidesmultiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the ... statute for personal injuryactions”).Thus,Plaintiff'sSection1983claimissubjecttoCalifornia'stwo-yearstatuteoflimitationsforpersonal-injury claims.Bonneauv.CentennialSch.Dist.No.28J,666F.3d577,579(9thCir.2012)(“[T]heSupremeCourtexplainedthata state's residual personal injury statute of limitations, not a range of specialized statutes of limitations, should be applied to § 1983claimstopreventunnecessarylitigationandpreservetheefficacyofthe§1983remedy.”). Hence,Plaintiff'sFACistimebarred.Accordingly,Defendant'sMotionisGRANTED. B.PLAINTIFFFAILSTOALLEGEAMONELLCLAIM 1.ApplicableLaw [9] [10] Section1983establishesacauseofactionbasedontheviolationofconstitutionalorotherfederalrightsbypersons actingundercolorofstatelaw.However,amunicipalitymaynotbesuedunderSection1983“foraninjuryinflictedsolelyby itsemployeesoragents.”Monellv.Dep'tofSoc.Servs.,436U.S.658,694,98S.Ct.2018,56L.Ed.2d611(1978).Rather,a municipalityisliableunderSection1983only“whenexecutionof[thelocal]government'spolicyorcustom,whethermadeby itslawmakersorbythosewhoseedictsoractsmayfairlybesaidtorepresentofficialpolicy,inflictstheinjury[.]”Id. [11] [12] AplaintiffmayestablishmunicipalliabilityunderSection1983byshowing:(1)theallegedconstitutionalviolation wascommitted“pursuanttoaformalgovernmentalpolicyoralongstandingpracticeorcustomwhichconstitutesthestandard operatingprocedureofthelocalgovernmentalentity,”(2)theconstitutionalviolationwascommittedbyagovernmentofficial with“finalpolicy-makingauthority,”or(3)agovernmentofficialwith“finalpolicy-makingauthority”ratifiedasubordinate's unconstitutionalconductandthebasisforit.Gillettev.Delmore,979F.2d1342,1346(9thCir.1992)(internalquotationmarks omitted). Alternatively, a plaintiff may establish municipal liability under Section 1983 by showing a municipality failed to trainitsemployeesandsuchfailuretotrainamountsto“deliberateindifference”totheconstitutionalrightsofthepersonswith whomtheemployeescomeintocontact.CityofCantonv.Harris,489U.S.378,388,109S.Ct.1197,103L.Ed.2d412(1989). [13] “In order to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a Monell claim must consist of more than mere formulaic recitations of the existence of *1030 unlawful policies, conducts or habits.” A.B. v. City of Santa Ana, No. SACV-18-1553-DOC-ADSx,2019WL1578380,at*3(C.D.Cal.Feb.11,2019)(quotingAnakinv.ContraCostaReg'lMed. Ctr.,No.16-cv-0161-MEJ,2016WL1059428,at*3(N.D.Cal.Mar.17,2016)). 2.Analysis [14] Here,evenassumingPlaintiff'sFACwasnotbarredbythestatuteoflimitations,Plaintifffailstostateaclaimuponwhich relief may be granted. Plaintiff provides no new facts from which one can infer a plausible Monell claim.4 While Plaintiff nowcitesDefendant'spracticeofconductingcavitysearches,FAC¶27,thispracticeisnotperseunconstitutional.See,e.g., Bullv.City&Cnty.ofSanFrancisco,595F.3d964,975(9thCir.2010)(balancingtheneedforinvasivestripsearcheswith anarrestee'spersonalrights).Thus,theallegationthatDefendanthasapolicyofconductingcavitysearches,isinsufficientto toestablishDefendant'sliabilityunderSection1983,becausetheydonotplausiblydemonstrate(1)theallegedsexualassaults werecommittedbyanofficialwithfinalpolicy-makingauthority,(2)anofficialwithfinalpolicy-makingauthorityratifiedthe sexualassaults,(3)theallegedsexualassaultsweretheresultofanunconstitutionalcustom,practice,orpolicy,or(4)Defendant failedtotrainitscorrectionalofficersandsuchfailuretotrainamountedtodeliberateindifferencetotheconstitutionalrights ofinmates.SeeGillette,979F.2dat1346;CityofCanton,489U.S.at388,109S.Ct.1197. Hence, the allegations in the FAC are insufficient to state a claim for Monell liability against Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant'sMotionisGRANTED. C.LEAVETOAMEND 1.ApplicableLaw [15] [16] Leavetoamendshouldbe“freelygiven.”Fomanv.Davis,371U.S.178,182,83S.Ct.227,9L.Ed.2d222(1962); seealsoFed.R.Civ.P.15(a)(2)(“Thecourtshouldfreelygiveleave[toamend]whenjusticesorequires.”).Nevertheless,a courtmaydenyleavetoamendwhereamendment“wouldprejudicetheopposingparty,produceanunduedelayinthelitigation, orresultinfutilityforlackofmerit.”Jacksonv.BankofHaw.,902F.2d1385,1387(9thCir.1990).Amendmentwouldbefutile where“allegationofotherfactsconsistentwiththechallengedpleadingcouldnotpossiblycurethedeficiency[.]”Telesaurus VPC,LLCv.Power,623F.3d998,1003(9thCir.2010). *1031 2.Analysis [17] Here,amendmentwouldbefutile.First,Plaintiff'sclaimisbarredbythestatuteoflimitations.SeePlattElec.Supplyv. EOFFElec.,Inc.,522F.3d1049,1060(9thCir.2008)(affirmingdistrictcourt'sdismissalofatime-barredclaimwithoutleave to amend because “any amendments would have been futile”). Moreover, with respect to Plaintiff's failure to state a Monell claim,Plaintiffwasprovidedanopportunity,buthasfailedtocurethedeficienciespreviouslyidentifiedbytheCourt.Rutman WineCo.v.E.&J.GalloWinery,829F.2d729,738(9thCir.1987)(statingadistrictcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionwhen denyingleavetoamendwheretheamendedpleadingdidnotcurethedeficienciesidentifiedinthepriorpleading).Accordingly, theFACisDISMISSEDWITHOUTLEAVETOAMEND.5 V. CONCLUSION Forthereasonssetforthabove,Defendant'sMotionisGRANTEDandtheFACisDISMISSEDWITHPREJUDICEAND WITHOUTLEAVETOAMEND.(JS-6) ITISSOORDERED. AllCitations 753F.Supp.3d1024 Footnotes 1 Plaintiffseekstoproceedanonymouslyinthismatterinlightofherallegationsofsexualassault.SeeFAC¶3. 2 Plaintiff'sFACappearstobepredicateduponallegedviolationsoftheFourth,Eighth,andFourteenthAmendmentsto theUnitedStatesConstitution.FAC¶¶34-42. 3 WhiletheCourtwouldnormallypermitPlaintiffleavetoamendtoassertother,possiblebasesfortolling,inlightofthe Court's finding in III.B.1. that Plaintiff has, once again, failed to state a claim for Monellliability, the Court declines topermitleavetoamendforthatpurpose. 4 Plaintiff'sonlynewallegationsareconclusoryallegations,whichsimplyrecitethestandardunderMonell.FAC¶¶27-30. Specifically,Plaintiffalleges(1)“Defendantshadacustomandpracticeofsubjectinginmatestocavitysearches,”(2) “DefendantsratifiedthesexualassaultsperformedhereinbyandthroughanofficialofDefendantswhohadfinalpolicy- makingauthority,”(3)“Defendantsfailedtotraintheircorrectionalofficersproperlytopreventunconstitutionalcavity searches, sexual assaults on inmates ... thereby constituting a deliberate indifference,” and (4) “cavity searches and resulting sexual assault alleged herein were proximately caused by Defendants’ actions ....” Id. These allegations are no more than a “formulaic recitation” of the elements of a Monell claim. See Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892,900-01(9thCir.2011)(affirmingdismissalofMonellclaimswhereaplaintiffallegedonlythat“DefendantCITY's policiesand/orcustomscausedthespecificviolationsofPlaintiff'sconstitutionalrightsatissueinthiscase”). 5 InlightofthisOrder,theCourtdeclinestoaddressDefendant'srequesttostrikePlaintiff'srequestforpunitivedamages. Seedkt.29at24.Nevertheless,astheCourtnotedinitspriororder,dkt.26,“[a]samatteroflaw,municipalitiesare notliableforpunitivedamagesunderSection1983.”Jamesv.CityofLongBeach,18F.Supp.2d1078,1081n.6(C.D. Cal.1998).Moreover,Plaintiffconcedespunitivedamagesarenotavailable.Dkt.31at13. EndofDocument ©2026ThomsonReuters.NoclaimtooriginalU.S.GovernmentWorks. 2025WL1684254 OnlytheWestlawcitationiscurrentlyavailable. UnitedStatesDistrictCourt,N.D.NewYork. ValerieFLORES,Plaintiff, v. CREDITONEBANKetal.,Defendant. 1:25-CV-683(GTS/MJK) | SignedJune16,2025 AttorneysandLawFirms ValerieFlores,ProSe. ORDERandREPORT-RECOMMENDATION MITCHELLJ.KATZ,UnitedStatesMagistrateJudge *1 TOTHEHONORABLEGLENNT.SUDDABY,U.S.DistrictJudge: PlaintiffbeganthisactiononMay28,2025,byfilingacomplaint,andmovingforleavetoproceedinformapauperis(“IFP”) (Dkts.1,2).TheClerksentPlaintiff'scomplaintandIFPapplicationtothisCourtforreview.(Dkts.1,2). I.BACKGROUND A.Facts The Defendant, Credit One Bank, a company with a principal place of business in Nevada, sent Plaintiff, a resident of New York,a$30billfor“threemonthsstraight”foracreditcardtheyissuedherbutthatshewasunableuse.(Complaint,Dkt.1, at4).1 Plaintiffpaidthebillsviamoneyorderfromanow-closed-checkingaccount.(Id.).Sometimelater,CreditOneBank issuedPlaintiffarefundandPlaintiffclaimsthatthebankadmitteditsentheradefectivecreditcard.(Id.).Ayearandahalf later,CreditOneBanksolda$60.00balancetoacollectionagency.(Id.). B.ProceduralHistory Plaintiff now sues Credit One Bank, Resurgent Capital Services, a company headquartered in Ohio, and LVNV Funding, a companyheadquarteredinSouthCarolina,forviolatingtheFairCreditReportingAct(“FRCA”),“libel/slanderwithmalicious intent,” and “intentional tort” (Id. at 2, 3) (cleaned up). Plaintiff is seeking “the average going rate for a personal injury of $75,000”becausetheDefendants’“actionshavehurt”hercreditandreputation.(Id.at4). II.IFPAPPLICATION PlaintiffdeclaresinherIFPapplicationthatsheisunabletopaythefilingfee.(Dkt.2).Afterreviewingherapplication,this CourtfindsPlaintiffisfinanciallyeligibleforIFPstatus. III.STANDARDOFREVIEW oftheallegationsinthecomplaintunder28U.S.C.§1915.Thatstatuterequiresacourttodismissacase—atanytime—ifit determinesthattheactionis(1)frivolousormalicious;(2)failstostateaclaimonwhichreliefmaybegranted;or(3)seeks monetaryreliefagainstadefendantwhoisimmunefromsuchrelief.See28U.S.C.§1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). Whendeterminingwhetheranactionisfrivolous,courtsmustconsiderwhetherthecomplaintlacksanarguablebasisinlawor infact.SeeNeitzkev.Williams,490U.S.319,325(1989),abrogatedonothergroundsbyBellAtl.Corp.v.Twombly,550U.S. 544(2007);28U.S.C.§1915.Dismissaloffrivolousactionsisappropriatetopreventabusesofcourtprocessandtodiscourage thewasteofjudicialresources.Neitzke,490U.S.at327;Harkinsv.Eldredge,505F.2d802,804(8thCir.1974). Tobesure,courtshaveadutytoshowliberalitytowardproselitigantsandmustuseextremecautionwhensuaspontedismissing prosecomplaintsbeforeadversepartieshavebeenservedandhadanopportunitytorespond.SeeFitzgeraldv.FirstE.Seventh St.TenantsCorp.,221F.3d362,363(2dCir.2000)(findingthatadistrictcourtmaydismissafrivolouscomplaintsuasponte evenwhenplaintiffhaspaidthefilingfee).Butcourtsstillhavearesponsibilitytodeterminethataclaimisnotfrivolousbefore permittingaplaintifftoproceed.Seeid. IV.DISCUSSION *2 TheCourtrecommendsdismissingallPlaintiff'sclaimsforthreereasons.First,Plaintiff'sclaimsagainstDefendantsLVNV funding and Resurgent Capital Services are deficient under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Second, Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege that Credit One Bank a is credit reporting agency within the meaning of the FRCA. Third, the FRCA limits Plaintiff's ability to bringstate-law-tortclaims. A.FederalRulesofCivilProcedure8 Pleadings must contain, among other things, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief...”Fed.R.Civ.P.8(a)(2).“Thepurposeof”Rule8“istogivefairnoticeoftheclaimbeingassertedso”adverseparties have “the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense, and determine whether the doctrine of res judicataisapplicable.”Floresv.Graphtex,189F.R.D.54,55(N.D.N.Y.1999)(cleanedup).Therulealsorequiresthepleading toinclude“ashortandplainstatementofthegroundsforthecourt'sjurisdiction”and“ademandforthereliefsought[.]”Fed. R.Civ.P.8(a)(1),(3).“Although‘notechnicalformisrequired,’theFederalRulesmakeclearthateachallegationcontained inthepleading‘mustbesimple,concise,anddirect.’”Colev.Smrtic,No.1:24-CV-847,2024WL4870495,at*2(N.D.N.Y. 2024)(quotingFed.R.Civ.P.8(d)).Allegations“sovagueastofailtogivethedefendantsadequatenoticeoftheclaimsagainst them”aresubjecttodismissal.Sheehyv.Brown,335F.App'x102,104(2dCir.2009)(summaryorder). Indeed,tosurvivedismissalforfailuretostateaclaim,acomplaintmustcontainsufficientfactualmatter,acceptedastrue,to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550U.S.544,570(2007)).“Threadbarerecitalsoftheelementsofacauseofaction,supportedbymereconclusorystatements donotsuffice.”Ashcroft,556U.S.at678(cleanedup). TheCourtrecommendsdismissingPlaintiff'sclaimsagainstDefendantsLVNVFundingandResurgentCapitalServices.The ComplaintdoesnotidentifyhowDefendantsLVNVFundingorResurgentCapitalServicesharmedher.Infact,thecomplaint doesnotidentifywhatactionseitherpartytook.Seegenerally(Complaint,Dkt.1).Inessence,Plaintiff'sComplaintisnothing morethana“unadorned,the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-meaccusation.”Ashcroft,556U.S.at678.Andthatissimplynot enoughtostateaclaim.See,e.g.,Lessonv.JaneDoe,No.1:25-CV-00188(AMN/TWD),2025WL1291533(N.D.N.Y.May5, 2025)(AdoptingReportandRecommendationwhichdismissedaplaintiff'sexcessiveforceclaimbecausethatplaintifffailed to“identifywhatforce”wasusedagainsthimor“howitwasexcessive.”). 2 dutyimposedunderthestatute.”Casellav.EquifaxCreditInfo.Servs.,56F.3d469,473(2dCir.1995)(citationsomitted).For anysuchviolation,“thecreditreportingagencyisliabletotheconsumerforactualdamagessustained,thecostsoftheaction togetherwithreasonableattorney'sfees,and,inthecaseofwillfulnoncompliance,punitivedamages.”Id.(cleanedup). *3 To make out a § 1681(e)(b) claim, plaintiffs must show “whether the challenged credit information is accurate; if the informationisaccurate,nofurtherinquiryintothereasonablenessoftheconsumerreportingagency'sproceduresisnecessary.” Watsonv.Caruso,424F.Supp.3d 231,244(D.Conn.2019).Butiftheinformationisinaccurate,plaintiffsmustthen show thatthe:(1)“consumerreportingagencywasnegligentorwillfulinthatitfailedtofollowreasonableprocedurestoassurethe accuracyofitscreditreport;”(2)“consumerreportingagencyreportedinaccurateinformationabouttheplaintiff;”(3)“plaintiff wasinjured;and”(4)“consumerreportingagency'snegligenceproximatelycausedtheplaintiff'sinjury.”Id.(cleanedup). Plaintiff'sclaimagainstCreditOneBankcannotstandbecausethebankisnotacreditreportingagency.SeeOwusuv.NewYork StateIns.,655F.Supp.2d308,327(S.D.N.Y.2009)(holdingthatHSBCisnotaconsumerreportingagency justbecauseit reportedcustomerinformation.).“TheFCRAdoesnotimposeobligationsuponacreditorwhomerelypassesalonginformation concerningparticulardebtsowedtoit.”DiGianniv.Stern's,26F.3d346,349(2dCir.1994)(cleanedup).Simplyput,Credit OneBankisacreditorandbank,butnotmore.SoPlaintiffcannotplausiblyraiseaFRCAclaimagainstCreditOneBank.See Anthonyv.GECap.RetailBank,321F.Supp.3d469,478(S.D.N.Y.2017)(grantingsummaryjudgmentontheplaintiff'sFRCA actionagainstSynchronybankbecausetheplaintiffdidnotpresentevidencethatSynchronywasaconsumerreportingagency). ButshouldtheDistrictCourtdeterminethatCreditOneBankisacreditreportingagency,Plaintiff'scomplaintdoesnotplausibly allege that the credit information is inaccurate. A “credit report is inaccurate ... when it is patently incorrect or when it is misleadinginsuchawayandtosuchanextentthatitcanbeexpectedtohaveanadverseeffect.”Khanv.EquifaxInfo.Servs., LLC, No. 18-CV-6367, 2019 WL 2492762, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2019) (collecting cases) (cleaned up). Here, Plaintiff's claimsarespeciousatbest.PlaintiffallegesthatCreditOneBankissuedheracreditcardthatsheneverused,chargedherthree timesoverthecourseofthreemonths,butshepaidthebillsviamoneyorder.(Complaint,Dkt.1,at4).Itstrainscredulityto believe that Credit One Bank charged Plaintiff for a defective card for three months and she paid those bills—without ever callingthebanktoaskwhatshewasbeingchargedfor. C.StateLawClaims TheDistrictCourtshoulddismissPlaintiff'sstate-law-tortclaimsbecausePlaintiffhasnotmadetherequisiteshowingofmalice orwillfulintenttoinjureher.Section1681h(e)oftheFCRAstatesthat“noconsumermaybringanyactionorproceedingin thenatureofdefamation,invasionofprivacy,ornegligencewithrespecttothereportingofinformationagainstanyconsumer reportingagency,anyuserofinformation,oranypersonwhofurnishesinformationtoaconsumerreportingagency,...except astofalseinformationfurnishedwithmaliceorwillfulintenttoinjuresuchconsumer.”15U.S.C.§1681h(e).Otherwisestated, “section1681h(e)preemptsdefamation[andotherstate-based]claimsagainstcreditreportingagenciesunlesstheallegedfalse information is furnished with malice or willful intent to injure the plaintiff.” Thompson v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, No. 20- CV-6101,2022WL2467662,at*10(E.D.N.Y.Feb.24,2022)(cleanedup).Plaintiffseekstobringanintentionaltortclaim againstDefendants.ButtheComplaintisdevoidofanyfactsshowingthatDefendantshaveactedwithmaliceorwillfulintent. So Plaintiff's claim, as it is, cannot stand. See Ogbon v. Beneficial Credit Servs., Inc., No. 10-CIV-3760 (PAE), 2013 WL 1430467at*10(S.D.N.Y.Apr.8,2013)(grantingsummaryjudgmentontheplaintiff'sdefamationandcommonlawtortclaims becausetheplaintifffailedtoallegefactsestablishingmalice)(collectingcases)(cleanedup).Asaresult,Plaintiff'sintentional tortclaimsshouldbedismissed. D.OpportunitytoAmend *4 Generally,beforecourtsdismissaprosecomplaintoranypartofthecomplaintonitsown,theyshouldaffordtheplaintiff theopportunitytoamendatleastonce;butleavetore-pleadmaybedeniedwhereanyamendmentwouldbefutile.SeeRuffolov. Here,thereisnofutilityforthreereasons.First,PlaintiffcanaddfactstomaketheComplaintRule8compliant.Second,Plaintiff cansetforthfactsconcerningacreditreportingagencywhosheallegestookadverseactionconcerninghercreditreportthatshe allegesviolatesFCRAandaddthatpartyasadefendant.Third,Plaintiffcanaddfacts,ifaccurate,toestablishthatDefendants actedwithmaliceorwillfulintent,toproveherstate-tort-lawclaims. V.CONCLUSION WHEREFORE,basedonthefindingsabove,itis ORDERED,thatPlaintiff'smotiontoproceedIFP(Dkt.2)isGRANTED3;anditisfurther RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants LVNV Funding and Resurgent Capital Services, should be dismissedunderFed.R.Civ.P.8WITHOUTPREJUDICEandWITHLEAVETOAMEND;anditisfurther RECOMMENDED,Plaintiff'sFRCAclaimDefendantCreditOneBankshouldbedismissedWITHOUTPREJUDICEand WITHLEAVETOAMEND;anditisfurther RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff's state-tort-law claims against all Defendants should be dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICEandWITHLEAVETOAMEND;anditisfurther ORDERED,thatwhilePlaintiffmayfileobjectionstothisOrderandReport-Recommendation,beforePlaintiffsubmitsany amendedpleading,sheshouldwaitfortheDistrictCourttoruleontheaboveOrdersandRecommendations,anditisfurther ORDERED,thattheClerkoftheCourtserveacopyofthisOrderandReport-RecommendationonPlaintiffbyregularmail.4 Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.1(c), the parties have 14 days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.1993)(citingSmallv.SecretaryofHealthandHumanServices,892F.2d15(2dCir.1989));28U.S.C.§636(b)(1);Fed. R.Civ.P.6(a),6(e),72. AllCitations SlipCopy,2025WL1684254 Footnotes 1 AllpagereferencesaretotheCM/ECFpaginationsystem. 2 For this analysis, the Court is assuming that Plaintiff is bringing an action under § 1681(e)(b). That statute says: “Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. §1681(e)(b). hemayincurinthefutureregardingthisaction,includingbutnotlimitedtocopyingand/orwitnessfees. 4 TheClerkshallalsoprovidePlaintiffwithcopiesofallunreporteddecisionscitedhereininaccordancewithLebronv. Sanders,557F.3d76(2dCir.2009)(percuriam). EndofDocument ©2026ThomsonReuters.NoclaimtooriginalU.S.GovernmentWorks. 2025WL3704290 OnlytheWestlawcitationiscurrentlyavailable. UnitedStatesDistrictCourt,N.D.NewYork. ValerieFLORES,Plaintiff, v. WELLSFARGO,Defendant. 1:25-CV-1755(MAD/MJK) | SignedDecember19,2025 AttorneysandLawFirms ValerieFlores,Albany,NY,ProSe. ORDER&REPORT-RECOMMENDATION MitchellJ.Katz,UnitedStatesMagistrateJudge *1 TotheHonorableMaeA.D'Agostino,U.S.DistrictJudge: FloresbeganthisactiononDecember14,2025,byfilingacomplaint,andmovingforleavetoproceedinformapauperis(“IFP”) (Dkts.1,2).Floresalsofiledamotiontoappointcounsel.(Dkt.4).TheClerksentFlores'sComplaintandIFPapplicationto thisCourtforreview.(Dkts.1,2). I.BACKGROUND TheallegationsintheComplaintareasfollows:“WellsFargodiscriminatedagainst[Flores]andwouldnotallow[her]toapply forapersonalloanoropenanaccount.[WellsFargo]alsowouldnotallow[Flores]tocompletetheapplicationprocessover thephone.Theytold[Flores]tocomebackandwouldnottake[her]asawalkinandthentheyneverallowed[her]toschedule anappointment.Thenafamilymember'sphonenumberwassomehowforwardedtotheirautomatedsystemwhenthatfamily [member]nevercalledtherenorhasneverdonebusinessthereeither.[WellsFargo's]attorneyMichaelBurkeis/hasmaliciously defamed[her.]”(Complaint,Dkt.1,atpg.3). Flores requests “$100,000 which is the maximum amount [Wells Fargo] give[s] out on personal loans and $75,000 personal injury financial settlement due to reputation harm and defamation.” (Id. at pg. 4). She also requests an “injunction against” Wells Fargo's “employees and Michael Burke, Esq., and his law firm [for] harassment, stalking, and malicious reputational harm.”(Id.). II.IFPAPPLICATION Flores declares in her IFP application that she is unable to pay the filing fee. (Dkt. 2). After reviewing her application, this CourtfindsFloresisfinanciallyeligibleforIFPstatus. III.STANDARDOFREVIEW InadditiontodeterminingwhetherplaintiffsmeetthefinancialcriteriatoproceedIFP,courtsmustalsoreviewthesufficiency oftheallegationsinthecomplaintunder28U.S.C.§1915.Thatstatuterequiresacourttodismissacase—atanytime—ifit monetaryreliefagainstadefendantwhoisimmunefromsuchrelief.See28U.S.C.§1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). Whendeterminingwhetheranactionisfrivolous,courtsmustconsiderwhetherthecomplaintlacksanarguablebasisinlawor infact.SeeNeitzkev.Williams,490U.S.319,325(1989),abrogatedonothergroundsbyBellAtl.Corp.v.Twombly,550U.S. 544(2007);28U.S.C.§1915.Dismissaloffrivolousactionsisappropriatetopreventabusesofcourtprocessandtodiscourage thewasteofjudicialresources.Neitzke,490U.S.at327;Harkinsv.Eldredge,505F.2d802,804(8thCir.1974). Tobesure,courtshaveadutytoshowliberalitytowardproselitigantsandmustuseextremecautionwhensuaspontedismissing prosecomplaintsbeforeadversepartieshavebeenservedandhadanopportunitytorespond.SeeFitzgeraldv.FirstE.Seventh St.TenantsCorp.,221F.3d362,363(2dCir.2000)(findingthatadistrictcourtmaydismissafrivolouscomplaintsuasponte evenwhenplaintiffhaspaidthefilingfee).Butcourtsstillhavearesponsibilitytodeterminethataclaimisnotfrivolousbefore permittingaplaintifftoproceed.Seeid. IV.DISCUSSION *2 Below,the Courtreviews the sufficiency of Flores'sComplaintandaddresses her motion toappointcounsel. In Section IV.A.,theCourtrecommendstheDistrictCourtdismissFlores'sComplaintbecauseitfailstostateaclaim.1 InSectionIV.B., theCourtdeniesFlores'smotiontoappointcounsel. A.TheDistrictCourtshoulddenyFlores'sclaimbecauseherComplaintfailstostateaclaim. Pleadings must contain, among other things, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief...”Fed.R.Civ.P.8(a)(2).“Thepurposeof”Rule8“istogivefairnoticeoftheclaimbeingassertedso”adverseparties have “the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense, and determine whether the doctrine of res judicataisapplicable.”Floresv.Graphtex,189F.R.D.54,55(N.D.N.Y.1999)(cleanedup).Therulealsorequiresthepleading toinclude“ashortandplainstatementofthegroundsforthecourt'sjurisdiction”and“ademandforthereliefsought[.]”Fed. R.Civ.P.8(a)(1),(3).“Although‘notechnicalformisrequired,’theFederalRulesmakeclearthateachallegationcontained inthepleading‘mustbesimple,concise,anddirect.’”Colev.Smrtic,No.1:24-CV-847,2024WL4870495,at*2(N.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)). Allegations “so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them” are subject to dismissal. Sheehy v. Brown, 335 F. App'x 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order). To survive dismissalforfailuretostateaclaim,acomplaintmustcontainsufficientfactualmatter,acceptedastrue,tostateaclaimthat is“plausibleonitsface.”Ashcroftv.Iqbal,556U.S.662,678(2009)(quotingBellAtl.Corp.v.Twombly,550U.S.544,570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft,556U.S.at678(cleanedup). Flores'sComplaintdoesnotstateaclaim.FloresallegesthatWellsFargodiscriminatedagainstherbecausethebankwouldnot allowhertoapplyforapersonalloan,openanaccount,andWellsFargowouldnotallowFlorestocompletetheapplication process over the phone. (Complaint, Dkt 1, at pg. 3). Flores also claims that Michael Burke Esq.—Wells Fargo's purported attorneywhoisnotaDefendantinthisaction—harassed,stalked,anddefamedher.(Complaint,Dkt.1,atpg.1,3).Liberally construed, the Complaint does not allege a discrimination claim. The Complaint neither establishes that Flores is a part of a protectedclassnorwhatWellsFargodidtodiscriminateagainsther.Putanotherway,Flores'sComplaintisa“unadorned,the- defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. And that is not enough to state a claim. See, e.g., Lesson v. Jane Doe, No. 1:25-CV-00188 (AMN/TWD), 2025 WL 1291533 (N.D.N.Y. May 5, 2025) (Adopting Report and Recommendationwhichdismissedaplaintiff'sexcessiveforceclaimbecausethatplaintifffailedto“identifywhatforce”was usedagainsthimor“howitwasexcessive.”). B.TheCourtdeniesFloresmotiontoappointcounsel. to be of substance;” (2) “whether the indigent” person “is able to investigate the crucial facts concerning” their “claim;” (3) “whetherconflictingevidenceimplicatingtheneedforcross-examinationwillbethemajorproofpresentedtothefactfinder;” (4)“whetherthelegalissuesinvolvedarecomplex;and”(5)“whetherthereareanyspecialreasonswhyappointmentofcounsel wouldbemorelikelytoleadtoajustdetermination.”Busseyv.Moore,23-CV-247,2025WL1650792at*1(W.D.N.Y.June 11,2025)(cleanedup)(citingHodgesv.PoliceOfficers,802F.2d58(2dCir.1986)). *3 TheCourtisunawareofanyspecialreasonwhyappointmentofcounselinthiscaseiswarrantedatthistime.Mindfulof thescarcityofvolunteerlawyers,courtsmustallocatethatresourcewiththeutmostcare.SeeCooperv.A.SargentiCo.Inc.,877 F.2d170,172(2dCir.1989)(notingthat“[v]olunteerlawyertimeisapreciouscommodity.”).TheonlyfactswhichthisCourt maybaseitsdecisionastowhetherthislawsuitisofsubstancearethefactsstatedinFlores'scomplaint.Wheretherearemerely unsupportedallegations,themovingpartydoesnotmeetthefirstrequirementimposedbytheSecondCircuitforappointment of pro bono counsel. See Harmon v. Runyon, No. 96-CV-6080, 1997 WL 118379 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 1997). After the facts inthiscasehavebeendeveloped,Floresmayfileanewmotionforappointmentofcounsel,atwhichtime,theCourtwillbe better able to determine whether such appointment is warranted. Flores is advised that any renewed motion for appointment ofcounselmustbeaccompaniedbydocumentationthatsubstantiateshereffortstoobtaincounselfromthepublicandprivate sector.Thus,Flores'smotionforappointmentofcounselisdenied. V.CONCLUSION WHEREFORE,basedonthefindingsabove,itis ORDERED,thatPlaintiff'smotiontoproceedIFP(Dkt.2)isGRANTED;anditisfurther RECOMMENDED, the District Court dismiss Flores's Complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE and WITH LEAVE TO AMENDbecauseitfailstocomplywithFed.R.Civ.P.8;anditisfurther ORDERED,thatFlores'smotiontoappointcounselisdenied;anditisfurther ORDERED,thattheClerkoftheCourtserveacopyofthisOrderandReport-RecommendationonPlaintiffbyregularmail.2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.1(c), the parties have 14 days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN 14 DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citingSmallv.SecretaryofHealthandHumanServices,892F.2d15(2dCir.1989));28U.S.C.§636(b)(1);Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a),6(e),72. AllCitations SlipCopy,2025WL3704290 Footnotes 1 Theallegationsinthecomplaintplausiblyallegesubjectmatterjurisdictionbasedondiversity. Sanders,557F.3d76(2dCir.2009)(percuriam). EndofDocument ©2026ThomsonReuters.NoclaimtooriginalU.S.GovernmentWorks. 554Fed.Appx.30 ThiscasewasnotselectedforpublicationinWest'sFederalReporter. RULINGSBYSUMMARYORDERDONOTHAVEPRECEDENTIALEFFECT.CITATIONTOASUMMARY ORDERFILEDONORAFTERJANUARY1,2007,ISPERMITTEDANDISGOVERNEDBYFEDERALRULE OFAPPELLATEPROCEDURE32.1ANDTHISCOURT'SLOCALRULE32.1.1.WHENCITINGASUMMARY ORDERINADOCUMENTFILEDWITHTHISCOURT,APARTYMUSTCITEEITHERTHEFEDERALAPPENDIX ORANELECTRONICDATABASE(WITHTHENOTATION"SUMMARYORDER").APARTYCITINGA SUMMARYORDERMUSTSERVEACOPYOFITONANYPARTYNOTREPRESENTEDBYCOUNSEL. UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals,SecondCircuit. KevinEricSMITH,Plaintiff–Appellant, v. UNITEDSTATESofAmerica,etal.,Defendants–Appellees. No.13–292–cv | Dec.17,2013. Synopsis Background:Proseplaintiffbroughtcomplaintagainstfederal,stateandprivateentities,allegingtort,breachofcontract,and§ 1983claims.TheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheNorthernDistrictofNewYork,LawrenceE.Kahn,J.,2012WL6597835, dismissedthecomplaintwithprejudice.Plaintiffappealed. Holdings:TheCourtofAppealsheldthat: [1]stateanditsattorneygeneralwereentitledtosovereignimmunityfromclaims; [2]courtlackedpersonaljurisdictionoverNewHampshiredefendants; [3]denialofleavetoamendwasnotanabuseofdiscretion; [4]failuretoservedefendantswarranteddismissalofclaimsagainstthem;and [5]adverserulingsonthemeritsofthecasewereinsufficienttodemonstratejudicialbias. Affirmedinpart,andremandedinpart. ProceduralPosture(s):OnAppeal;MotiontoDismiss. WestHeadnotes(6) [1] FederalCourts SuitsAgainstStates; EleventhAmendmentandSovereignImmunity FederalCourts Prosecutorsandattorneysgeneral Under Eleventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution, state and its attorney general were entitled to sovereign 4Casesthatcitethisheadnote [2] FederalCourts Civilrightsanddiscrimination Federal district court in New York lacked personal jurisdiction over New Hampshire defendants in § 1983 action absentindicationofaconnectionwiththestateofNewYork.42U.S.C.A.§1983. 6Casesthatcitethisheadnote Morecasesonthisissue [3] FederalCourts Dismissalorotherdisposition Dismissalofclaimsin§1983actionforwantofpersonaljurisdictionshouldhavebeenwithoutprejudice.42U.S.C.A. §1983. 15Casesthatcitethisheadnote [4] FederalCourts Pleadingsandmotions Denial of leave to amend § 1983 complaint after dismissal for want of personal jurisdiction was not an abuse of discretion,whereflawswerefatalsubstantivedefectsthatcouldnotbecuredbyfurtherpleading.42U.S.C.A.§1983. 23Casesthatcitethisheadnote Morecasesonthisissue [5] FederalCivilProcedure Process,defectsin Failuretoservedefendantsin§1983actionwarranteddismissaloftheclaimsagainstthem.42U.S.C.A.§1983. Morecasesonthisissue [6] Judges BiasandPrejudice Adverserulingsonthemeritsin§1983actionwereinsufficienttoestablishjudicialbias.42U.S.C.A.§1983. Morecasesonthisissue *30 AppealfromajudgmentoftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheNorthernDistrictofNewYork(LawrenceE.Kahn, Judge). UPONDUECONSIDERATION,ITISHEREBYORDERED,ADJUDGED, *31 ANDDECREEDthatthejudgment andorderofthedistrictcourtisAFFIRMEDandREMANDED. AttorneysandLawFirms KevinEricSmith,Manchester,NH,prose. PaulaRyanConan,UnitedStatesAttorney'sOffice,Syracuse,NY;RobertJosephDietel,Gallagher,Callahan&Gartrell,P.C., Concord,NH;JonathanD.Hitsous,DeniseAnnHartman,NewYorkStateOfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,Albany,NY;Michael A.Cardozo,NewYorkCityLawDepartment,NewYork,NY,forDefendants–Appellees. PRESENT:ROBERTD.SACK,GERARDE.LYNCHandRAYMONDJ.LOHIER,JR.,CircuitJudges. SUMMARYORDER KevinEricSmith,plaintiff-appellantprose,seeksreviewofadistrictcourtdecisiondismissingwithprejudicehiscomplaint alleging,interalia,varioustort,breachofcontract,and42U.S.C.§1983claimsagainstanarrayoffederal,state,andprivate entities.ThedistrictcourtdismissedSmith'sclaimsagainstNewYorkStateandtheNewYorkAttorneyGeneral(“NewYork defendants”)withprejudiceunderFed.R.Civ.P.12(b)(6)onsovereignimmunitygrounds,hisclaimsagainsttheCityofConcord, NewHampshire,andtheConcordNewHampshirePoliceDepartment(“NewHampshiredefendants”)withprejudiceforlack ofpersonaljurisdiction,andhisclaimsagainstotherdefendantswithoutprejudiceforfailureofservice.Thedistrictcourtalso affirmedthedecisionofthemagistratejudgetodenySmithanextensionoftimetoserveprocesstotheremainingdefendants beyondthe60–daytimelimitrequiredbythecourt'slocalrules.Weassumetheparties'familiaritywiththeunderlyingfacts, theproceduralhistoryofthecase,andtheissuesonappeal. BecauseSmith'scomplaint(andotherdocumentshehassubmittedtothedistrictandappellatecourtsinthesubsequentlitigation) consistsofa“labyrinthianprolixityofunrelatedandvituperativechargesthatdef[y]comprehension,”Prezziv.Schelter,469 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir.1972), it would not have been inappropriate for the district court to dismiss it for failing to contain “a shortandplainstatementoftheclaim.”Fed.R.Civ.P.8(a)(2).However,inlightoftheliberalconstructiontraditionallyafforded thecomplaintsofproseplaintiffs,thedistrictcourtcommendablyundertookthedifficultefforttounderstandtheclaimsbeing madeinthecomplaintandaddressedthemontheirmerits. WereviewdenovodismissalsunderRule12(b)(6),Chambersv.TimeWarner,Inc.,282F.3d147,152(2dCir.2002),andfor lackofpersonaljurisdiction,Metro.LifeIns.Co.v.Robertson–CecoCorp.,84F.3d560,567(2dCir.1996),assumingastrue thestatementsinthecomplaintanddrawingallreasonableinferencesintheplaintiff'sfavor.Wereviewforabuseofdiscretion thedismissalforuntimelyserviceofprocess,seeZapatav.CityofN.Y.,502F.3d192,195(2dCir.2007),1 andthedenialof leavetoamendthecomplaint,Fomanv.Davis,371U.S.178,182,83S.Ct.227,9L.Ed.2d222(1962). [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] TheclaimsagainsttheNewYorkdefendantswereproperlydismissedongroundsofthesovereign immunityestablishedbytheEleventhAmendment.AsSmithallegednofactsintheclaims *32 againsttheNewHampshire defendantsthatindicateaconnectionwiththestateofNewYork,dismissalforlackofpersonaljurisdictionwasappropriate. BecausetheseflawsinSmith'scomplaint,evenliberallyread,arefatalsubstantivedefectsthatcouldnotbecuredbyfurther pleading,thedistrictcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionindenyingleavetoamend.2 SeeCuocov.Moritsugu,222F.3d99,112 (2d Cir.2000) (“[A] futile request to replead should be denied.”). Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in dismissing thechargesagainsttheremainingdefendantsforSmith'sfailuretoservethem,andaffirmingthemagistratejudge'sdenialof hisrequestforanextensionoftimetodoso,ashepresentednoreasonablejustificationforhisrequest.SeeZapata,502F.3d at193 (finding no abuse of discretion in denialof extension of time to serve process where plaintiff “advanced no colorable excusewhatsoeverforhisneglect.”).Finally,werejectasmeritlessSmith'saccusationsofbiasonthepartofthedistrictcourt judge and magistrate judge, for which he provides no factual support beyond adverse rulings on the merits of the case. See UnitedStatesv.GrinnellCorp.,384U.S.563,583,86S.Ct.1698,16L.Ed.2d778(1966)(“[A]llegedbiasandprejudicetobe disqualifyingmuststemfromanextrajudicialsourceandresultinanopiniononthemeritsotherthanwhatthejudgelearned fromhisparticipationinthecase.”). WehaveconsideredSmith'sremainingargumentsandfindthemtobewithoutmerit.Accordingly,weAFFIRMthejudgment of the district court, except tothe extentthat the matteris REMANDED to the district court with instructionsto modifythe judgmenttoreflectthatthedismissalastotheNewHampshiredefendantsiswithoutprejudicetorenewinajurisdictionwhere personaljurisdictionoverthedefendantscouldbeobtained. AllCitations 554Fed.Appx.30
Footnotes 1 ZapataconcernedadismissalunderFed.R.Civ.P.4(m),Zapata,502F.3dat195,butthesameprinciplewouldapplyby analogytodismissalspursuanttolocalrulesregardingexpeditedserviceofprocess.Cf.LoSaccov.CityofMiddletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir.1995) (affording “considerable deference” to a district court's application of local rules, and reviewingsuchapplicationforabuseofdiscretion). 2 The district court ordered that Smith's claims against the New Hampshire defendants be dismissed “with prejudice.” However,adismissalforwantofpersonaljurisdictioniswithoutprejudice.SeegenerallyElfenbeinv.Gulf&Western Indus.,Inc.,590F.2d445,449(2dCir.1978)(observingthatwhetheradismissaliswithorwithoutprejudicereferstothe “Resjudicataeffectofadismissal,”aquestiondistinctfromwhetherleavetoamendshouldbegranted).Thus,whilethe districtcourtappropriatelyconcludedthatSmith'sclaimsagainsttheNewHampshiredefendantsshouldbedismissed withoutleavetoamendbecauserepleadingintheNorthernDistrictofNewYorkcouldnotcurethejurisdictionaldefect, thedismissaldoesnotprecluderenewingthoseclaimsinajurisdictioninwhichpersonaljurisdictionoverthedefendants canbeobtained.Accordingly,thejudgmentbelowshouldbemodifiedinthisregard. EndofDocument ©2026ThomsonReuters.NoclaimtooriginalU.S.GovernmentWorks.
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Valerie Flores v. Cory Lettman et. al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/valerie-flores-v-cory-lettman-et-al-nynd-2026.