Valentine v. Crocs, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedApril 15, 2024
Docket3:22-cv-07463
StatusUnknown

This text of Valentine v. Crocs, Inc. (Valentine v. Crocs, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Valentine v. Crocs, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2024).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 7 8 MARTHA VALENTINE, et al., Case No. 22-cv-07463-TLT (PHK) 9 Plaintiffs,

10 v. ORDER RE: DISCOVERY LETTER BRIEF NO. 2 RESOLVING DISPUTES 11 CROCS, INC., RE: CUSTOMER COMPLAINTS, FORMULA DOCUMENTS, AND 12 Defendant. SHRINKAGE DOCUMENTS 13 Re: Dkt. 63

14 15 This is a putative class action brought by Plaintiffs Martha Valentine, Ruby Cornejo, and 16 Tiffany Avino (collectively “Plaintiffs”) against Defendant Crocs, Inc. concerning “shoes that 17 Defendant sells made of 90% or more Croslite® material.” [Dkt. 33 at ¶¶ 1-2]. The case has been 18 referred to the undersigned for all discovery purposes. See Dkt. 46. 19 Now before the Court is a joint discovery letter brief regarding three disputes: (1) 20 Defendant’s responses to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests seeking customer complaints relating to 21 shrinkage of Crocs products; (2) Defendant’s responses to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests for 22 shrinkage documents related to Crocs shoes other than the Classic Clog and Classic Bae; and (3) 23 Defendant’s responses to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests for finished shoe shrinkage test results. 24 [Dkt. 63]. The Court finds the disputes suitable for resolution without oral argument. Civil L.R. 25 7-1(b). 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) delineates the scope of discovery in federal civil 27 actions and provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that 1 need not be admissible to be discoverable. Id. Relevancy for purposes of discovery is broadly 2 defined to encompass “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that 3 could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” In re Williams-Sonoma, Inc., 947 F.3d 535, 4 539 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1978)); 5 see also In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., No. 18-MD-2843 VC (JSC), 6 2021 WL 10282215, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2021) (“Courts generally recognize that relevancy 7 for purposes of discovery is broader than relevancy for purposes of trial.”) (alteration omitted). 8 While the scope of relevance is broad, discovery is not unlimited. ATS Prods., Inc. v. 9 Champion Fiberglass, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 527, 531 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Relevancy, for purposes of 10 discovery, is defined broadly, although it is not without ultimate and necessary boundaries.”). 11 Information, even if relevant, must be “proportional to the needs of the case” to fall within the 12 scope of permissible discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) 13 emphasize the need to impose reasonable limits on discovery through increased reliance on the 14 common-sense concept of proportionality: “The objective is to guard against redundant or 15 disproportionate discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that 16 may be directed to matters that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry. The [proportionality 17 requirement] is intended to encourage judges to be more aggressive in identifying and 18 discouraging discovery overuse.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 19 amendment. In evaluating the proportionality of a discovery request, a court should consider “the 20 importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative 21 access to the information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the 22 issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” 23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 24 The party seeking discovery bears the burden of establishing that its request satisfies the 25 relevancy requirements under Rule 26(b)(1). La. Pac. Corp. v. Money Mkt. 1 Inst. Inv. Dealer, 26 285 F.R.D. 481, 485 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The resisting party, in turn, has the burden to show that the 27 discovery should not be allowed. Id. The resisting party must specifically explain the reasons 1 speculative arguments. Id.; see also Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 2 1975) (“Under the liberal discovery principles of the Federal Rules defendants were required to 3 carry a heavy burden of showing why discovery was denied.”). 4 The Court has broad discretion and authority to manage discovery. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. 5 Co. v. Lee Inv. LLC, 641 F.3d 1126, 1136 n.10 (9th Cir. 2011) (“District courts have wide latitude 6 in controlling discovery, and their rulings will not be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse of 7 discretion.”); Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Int., 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). As part of its 8 inherent discretion and authority, the Court has broad discretion in determining relevancy for 9 discovery purposes. Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) 10 (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Court’s discretion extends to 11 crafting discovery orders that may expand, limit, or differ from the relief requested. See 12 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (holding trial courts have “broad discretion to 13 tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery”). For example, the Court may 14 limit the scope of any discovery method if it determines that “the discovery sought is unreasonably 15 cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less 16 burdensome, or less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). 17 This case is still in the precertification stage. The class certification discovery cutoff is 18 April 26, 2024, with a class certification motion due on May 31, 2024. See Dkt. 59. 19 Precertification discovery lies entirely within the Court’s sound discretion. Artis v. Deere & Co., 20 276 F.R.D. 348, 351 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 21 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009)). In the context of class certification, discovery must be limited so that it 22 does not place an undue burden on the opposing party. Valentine v. Crocs, Inc., No. 22-cv-07463- 23 TNT (PHK), 2023 WL 7461852, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2023) (citing Montano v. Chao, No. 24 07-cv-00735-CMA-KMT, 2008 WL 5377745, at *3 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 2008)). A court in its 25 sound discretion may permit limited and targeted non-burdensome discovery on class certification, 26 where the proponent demonstrates such discovery is in the interests of justice and consistent with 27 the language and spirit of Rule 23. Id. (citing Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 214 F.R.D.

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