Valencia Cardenas v. Garland

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 15, 2024
Docket23-845
StatusUnpublished

This text of Valencia Cardenas v. Garland (Valencia Cardenas v. Garland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Valencia Cardenas v. Garland, (9th Cir. 2024).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 15 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

JORGE HUMBERTO VALENCIA No. 23-845 CARDENAS; VERENICE SALADO VARGAS; JORGE BRIAN VALENCIA Agency Nos. A202-097-983 SALADO; JOSE DILAN VALENCIA A202-097-950 SALADO; SAMANTHA VALENCIA A202-097-951 SALADO, A202-097-952 A202-097-953 Petitioners, v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted May 13, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: COLLINS, H.A. THOMAS, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Petitioners Jorge Humberto Valencia Cardenas; his wife, Verenice Salado

Vargas; and his three children, Jorge Brian Valencia Salado, Jose Dilan Valencia

Salado, and Samantha Valencia Salado, all natives and citizens of Mexico, petition

for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upholding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). an order of an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying their applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture

(“Torture Convention”). 1 We have jurisdiction under § 242 of the Immigration and

Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “We review the agency’s factual findings under

the ‘extremely deferential’ substantial-evidence standard, under which we treat

such findings as ‘conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled

to conclude to the contrary.’” Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th

Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). We deny the petition.

1. Petitioners forfeited any review of the agency’s denial of their claims for

asylum and withholding of removal because they failed to present any argument in

their opening brief as to why the BIA’s reasons for rejecting these claims were

erroneous. See Hernandez v. Garland, 47 F.4th 908, 916 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding

that issues not specifically raised and argued in a party’s opening brief are

forfeited).

2. Petitioners’ claims for relief under the Torture Convention were based on

the argument that, because Valencia Cardenas had been targeted for extortion and

had been beaten by members of the Knights Templar cartel, he and his entire

1 Valencia Cardenas’s wife and three children filed separate applications based on the same underlying factual contentions as in Valencia Cardenas’s application. They are also derivative beneficiaries of Valencia Cardenas’s asylum application. See Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 782 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that, unlike asylum, derivative relief is not available with respect to withholding of removal or relief under the Torture Convention).

2 family faced a likelihood of future torture if removed to Mexico. The BIA upheld

the IJ’s denial of this claim on the ground that Petitioners had failed to show that

they faced a risk of torture “inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent

or acquiescence of, a public official acting in an official capacity or other person

acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1); see also Andrade-Garcia

v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016). As the BIA noted, it was undisputed

that Valencia Cardenas was threatened and attacked by private actors, not by

anyone acting in an official capacity. The BIA concluded that, because Valencia

Cardenas “did not report any incidents to the police” and because the “country

condition evidence” did not otherwise establish that Mexican authorities would

acquiesce in the torture of Petitioners, Petitioners had failed to show that they were

entitled to relief under the Torture Convention. Substantial evidence supports

these conclusions.

Petitioners contend that the BIA and the IJ erred in concluding that Valencia

Cardenas had not filed a police report, arguing that this conclusion improperly

disregards his testimony “that he requested help from the prosecutor’s office

through his brother.” But Petitioners ignore the fact that the IJ specifically found

that Valencia Cardenas did not testify “with veracity with respect to the issues of

his police report.” Given the shifting and inconsistent statements that Valencia

Cardenas made on that score, which the IJ analyzed at some length, substantial

3 evidence supports this adverse credibility determination. Having disbelieved that

aspect of Valencia Cardenas’s testimony, the IJ permissibly found that Petitioners

had failed to establish that Valencia Cardenas had reported the incidents to the

police, and the BIA properly upheld that finding.

The agency was not compelled to conclude that the remaining evidence

established that Mexican authorities would acquiesce in the torture of Petitioners.

In addition to general country conditions evidence, Petitioners point to Valencia

Cardenas’s testimony that his brother experienced similar extortion and, when he

reported it to authorities, he “was told to go home.” The agency was not required

to find these points, which did not directly bear on Petitioners’ circumstances, to be

dispositive here. See B.R. v. Garland, 26 F.4th 827, 845 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding

that agency properly found generalized evidence of violence in a country

insufficient to establish that government would acquiesce in the petitioner’s

torture); Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (same).

PETITION DENIED.2

2 Petitioners’ motion for stay of removal (Dkt. 2) is denied as moot.

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Related

Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder
600 F.3d 1148 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Nelson Andrade-Garcia v. Loretta E. Lynch
828 F.3d 829 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Emilia Velasquez-Gaspar v. William Barr
976 F.3d 1062 (Ninth Circuit, 2020)
B. R. v. Merrick Garland
26 F.4th 827 (Ninth Circuit, 2022)
Jose Hernandez v. Merrick Garland
47 F.4th 908 (Ninth Circuit, 2022)

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