Vale v. Phoenix Ins. Co.

U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania

Vale v. Phoenix Ins. Co.

28 F. Cas. 867, 1 Wash. C. C. 283

CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania

DecidedApril 15, 1805

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 28 F. Cas. 867 (Vale v. Phoenix Ins. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Vale v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 28 F. Cas. 867, 1 Wash. C. C. 283 (circtdpa 1805).

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Opinion

WASHINGTON, Circuit Justice

(charging jury). In contracts of insurance, good faith, a fair, open, and candid conduct, on the side of both parties, is essential. The underwriter is never supposed to know of the particular circumstances attending the property insured, other than is disclosed to him by the assured; taking the risk which the assured is unwilling to bear. He ought to have every means of estimating its extent, in the power of the assured to give; because, as he consents to run the risk for a stipulated consideration, and since the amount of the consideration is a matter of calculation, which must depend upon the degree of danger, he does not stand upon equal or fair ground with the other contracting party; unless he is equally informed of facts within the private knowledge of that party, which may be material to the risk. The rule therefore is clearly settled, ihat a concealment of facts material to the risk, and within the knowledge of the insured, and which the insurer is not bound to know, vitiates the policy. The first question then is, were the facts related by Captain Kenris, material to the risk? Would a missing ship, under the circumstances of this vessel, be insured at the same premium, with one exposed only to the common hazards of such a voyage? If you answer this affirmatively, the riexv question is, were these facts known to the plaintiff? I do not mean, is a knowledge of them brought home clearly to the plaintiff; but are you satisfied upon the evidence, that he must have heard of them before he wrote his letter, or before it left Newbera. He did not write for some days after the arrival of Kenris. The report he brought, and the apprehensions it occasioned in this small town, were general. It had got [868]*868to the ears of the new insurance office, and determined that conduct, and this was known to the plaintiff. There is strong ground to suspect, from the evidence, that he knew all this before his letter was sent off. Of this, however, you must judge; and, if you are of opinion that he did know it, and that the facts were material to the risk, your verdict ought to be for the defendants.

The jury found for the defendants.

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WASHINGTON, Circuit Justice

(charging jury). In contracts of insurance, good faith, a fair, open, and candid conduct, on the side of both parties, is essential. The underwriter is never supposed to know of the particular circumstances attending the property insured, other than is disclosed to him by the assured; taking the risk which the assured is unwilling to bear. He ought to have every means of estimating its extent, in the power of the assured to give; because, as he consents to run the risk for a stipulated consideration, and since the amount of the consideration is a matter of calculation, which must depend upon the degree of danger, he does not stand upon equal or fair ground with the other contracting party; unless he is equally informed of facts within the private knowledge of that party, which may be material to the risk. The rule therefore is clearly settled, ihat a concealment of facts material to the risk, and within the knowledge of the insured, and which the insurer is not bound to know, vitiates the policy. The first question then is, were the facts related by Captain Kenris, material to the risk? Would a missing ship, under the circumstances of this vessel, be insured at the same premium, with one exposed only to the common hazards of such a voyage? If you answer this affirmatively, the riexv question is, were these facts known to the plaintiff? I do not mean, is a knowledge of them brought home clearly to the plaintiff; but are you satisfied upon the evidence, that he must have heard of them before he wrote his letter, or before it left Newbera. He did not write for some days after the arrival of Kenris. The report he brought, and the apprehensions it occasioned in this small town, were general. It had got [868]*868to the ears of the new insurance office, and determined that conduct, and this was known to the plaintiff. There is strong ground to suspect, from the evidence, that he knew all this before his letter was sent off. Of this, however, you must judge; and, if you are of opinion that he did know it, and that the facts were material to the risk, your verdict ought to be for the defendants.

The jury found for the defendants.

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Bluebook (online)

28 F. Cas. 867, 1 Wash. C. C. 283, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vale-v-phoenix-ins-co-circtdpa-1805.

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