NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 7 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM ESTUARDO VALDEZ, No. 23-3880 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:20-cv-11256-HDV-AGR v. MEMORANDUM* LELAND DUDEK, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Hernan Diego Vera, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 4, 2024** Pasadena, California
Before: OWENS, LEE, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
William Estuardo Valdez appeals from a district court order affirming the
Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of his applications for disability income
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). benefits and supplemental security income benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review the district court’s order upholding the ALJ’s denial of social
security benefits de novo. Larson v. Saul, 967 F.3d 914, 922 (9th Cir. 2020). We
reverse the ALJ’s decision only if it “was not supported by substantial evidence in
the record as a whole or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard.” Ahearn v.
Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
“If the evidence ‘is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the
ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.’” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)).
1. The ALJ did not err by discounting Valdez’s testimony regarding his
subjective pain and symptoms. An ALJ can discount a claimant’s testimony about
the severity of his or her symptoms only by offering “specific, clear and convincing
reasons for doing so.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014)
(internal citation and quotation omitted). Furthermore, the ALJ’s “specific, clear
and convincing reasons” must be supported by “substantial evidence.” Treichler v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, the ALJ
cited at least two clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for
discounting Valdez’s testimony.
2 23-3880 First, the ALJ found that Valdez’s testimony was not consistent with the
objective medical evidence. “When objective medical evidence in the record is
inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it
as undercutting such testimony.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir.
2022) (emphasis in original).
Here, the ALJ found that the objective medical evidence was inconsistent with
“the level of severity alleged in [Valdez’s] written statements and his testimony at
the hearing.” In support of this finding, the ALJ recounted, among other things, a
2018 physical examination that noted Valdez displayed full range of motion of his
neck and no tenderness to palpation in his lumbar or cervical spine; imaging that
ranged from normal to mild findings over a period of time; and a 2017 functional
assessment that noted Valdez was able to “sit, stand, walk, eat, bathe, crouch, stoop,
kneel, crawl, climb, and write independently.” Additionally, the ALJ noted that in
July 2013, shortly after his injury, Valdez “displayed lower extremity weakness,
tenderness and spasms of the thoracolumbar spine, restricted range of motion of the
back, and positive straight leg raising tests bilaterally,” but that “his gait was normal,
and he exhibited intact sensation.” Taken together, this objective medical evidence
was a specific, clear and convincing reason to discount Valdez’s testimony.
Second, the ALJ found that Valdez’s testimony was not consistent with the
“conservative” medical treatment that Valdez received. “[E]vidence of
3 23-3880 ‘conservative treatment’ is sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding
severity of an impairment.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007)
(citation omitted).
Here, the record shows that shortly after Valdez’s injury, his physician
recommended a “trial of conservative [treatment],” which included chiropractic
care, pain medication, a back brace, heating pad, and cold pack. This explicit
reference to “conservative” treatment suggests that more aggressive options were
available but not prescribed and thus supports the ALJ’s finding. Additionally, the
record indicates that Valdez never received a sacroiliac joint injection (SI) even
though such an injection can be appropriate for the type of symptoms Valdez
reported. Indeed, one was approved shortly after his injury, but Valdez failed to
schedule it. It does not appear he received it at a future date or that it was ever
prescribed again. Thus, the ALJ’s finding that Valdez received relatively
conservative treatment was a “specific, clear and convincing” reason for rejecting
Valdez’s testimony.
2. The ALJ did not err by giving “no weight” to Dr. Perdikis’s opinion
regarding Valdez’s physical limitations. If a treating physician’s opinion is
contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may reject the opinion only by providing
“specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Trevizo
v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal citation and quotation
4 23-3880 omitted). Here, the ALJ gave “no weight” to the medical opinion of treating
physician Dr. Perdikis. In support of its decision to give no weight to the opinion,
the ALJ provided at least two specific and legitimate reasons supported by
substantial evidence.
First, the ALJ found Dr. Aaron Coppelson’s medical notes from shortly after
Valdez’s injury, which indicated Valdez could return to work, contradicted Dr.
Perdikis’s opinion. Approximately three months after Valdez’s injury, Valdez saw
Dr. Coppelson, a U.S. Health Works Medical Group doctor he had seen at least two
times previously. Dr. Coppelson’s treatment notes from that visit note that although
an SI had been approved, Valdez failed to schedule an appointment to get it. Dr.
Coppelson told Valdez he thought it was “remarkable” that he “could be in [as] much
pain as he described but not bother[] even making one phone call.” Valdez told Dr.
Coppelson he had been waiting for the office to call him to schedule the injection.
The treatment notes state Dr. Coppelson believed he had “bent over backwards” for
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 7 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM ESTUARDO VALDEZ, No. 23-3880 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:20-cv-11256-HDV-AGR v. MEMORANDUM* LELAND DUDEK, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Hernan Diego Vera, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 4, 2024** Pasadena, California
Before: OWENS, LEE, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
William Estuardo Valdez appeals from a district court order affirming the
Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of his applications for disability income
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). benefits and supplemental security income benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review the district court’s order upholding the ALJ’s denial of social
security benefits de novo. Larson v. Saul, 967 F.3d 914, 922 (9th Cir. 2020). We
reverse the ALJ’s decision only if it “was not supported by substantial evidence in
the record as a whole or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard.” Ahearn v.
Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
“If the evidence ‘is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the
ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.’” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)).
1. The ALJ did not err by discounting Valdez’s testimony regarding his
subjective pain and symptoms. An ALJ can discount a claimant’s testimony about
the severity of his or her symptoms only by offering “specific, clear and convincing
reasons for doing so.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014)
(internal citation and quotation omitted). Furthermore, the ALJ’s “specific, clear
and convincing reasons” must be supported by “substantial evidence.” Treichler v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, the ALJ
cited at least two clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for
discounting Valdez’s testimony.
2 23-3880 First, the ALJ found that Valdez’s testimony was not consistent with the
objective medical evidence. “When objective medical evidence in the record is
inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it
as undercutting such testimony.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir.
2022) (emphasis in original).
Here, the ALJ found that the objective medical evidence was inconsistent with
“the level of severity alleged in [Valdez’s] written statements and his testimony at
the hearing.” In support of this finding, the ALJ recounted, among other things, a
2018 physical examination that noted Valdez displayed full range of motion of his
neck and no tenderness to palpation in his lumbar or cervical spine; imaging that
ranged from normal to mild findings over a period of time; and a 2017 functional
assessment that noted Valdez was able to “sit, stand, walk, eat, bathe, crouch, stoop,
kneel, crawl, climb, and write independently.” Additionally, the ALJ noted that in
July 2013, shortly after his injury, Valdez “displayed lower extremity weakness,
tenderness and spasms of the thoracolumbar spine, restricted range of motion of the
back, and positive straight leg raising tests bilaterally,” but that “his gait was normal,
and he exhibited intact sensation.” Taken together, this objective medical evidence
was a specific, clear and convincing reason to discount Valdez’s testimony.
Second, the ALJ found that Valdez’s testimony was not consistent with the
“conservative” medical treatment that Valdez received. “[E]vidence of
3 23-3880 ‘conservative treatment’ is sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding
severity of an impairment.” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007)
(citation omitted).
Here, the record shows that shortly after Valdez’s injury, his physician
recommended a “trial of conservative [treatment],” which included chiropractic
care, pain medication, a back brace, heating pad, and cold pack. This explicit
reference to “conservative” treatment suggests that more aggressive options were
available but not prescribed and thus supports the ALJ’s finding. Additionally, the
record indicates that Valdez never received a sacroiliac joint injection (SI) even
though such an injection can be appropriate for the type of symptoms Valdez
reported. Indeed, one was approved shortly after his injury, but Valdez failed to
schedule it. It does not appear he received it at a future date or that it was ever
prescribed again. Thus, the ALJ’s finding that Valdez received relatively
conservative treatment was a “specific, clear and convincing” reason for rejecting
Valdez’s testimony.
2. The ALJ did not err by giving “no weight” to Dr. Perdikis’s opinion
regarding Valdez’s physical limitations. If a treating physician’s opinion is
contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may reject the opinion only by providing
“specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Trevizo
v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal citation and quotation
4 23-3880 omitted). Here, the ALJ gave “no weight” to the medical opinion of treating
physician Dr. Perdikis. In support of its decision to give no weight to the opinion,
the ALJ provided at least two specific and legitimate reasons supported by
substantial evidence.
First, the ALJ found Dr. Aaron Coppelson’s medical notes from shortly after
Valdez’s injury, which indicated Valdez could return to work, contradicted Dr.
Perdikis’s opinion. Approximately three months after Valdez’s injury, Valdez saw
Dr. Coppelson, a U.S. Health Works Medical Group doctor he had seen at least two
times previously. Dr. Coppelson’s treatment notes from that visit note that although
an SI had been approved, Valdez failed to schedule an appointment to get it. Dr.
Coppelson told Valdez he thought it was “remarkable” that he “could be in [as] much
pain as he described but not bother[] even making one phone call.” Valdez told Dr.
Coppelson he had been waiting for the office to call him to schedule the injection.
The treatment notes state Dr. Coppelson believed he had “bent over backwards” for
Valdez despite “negative diagnostic studies,” and that he had given Valdez “the
benefit of the doubt” in “maintain[ing] him essentially off work.” The treatment
notes then state Valdez is to “return to his regular job duties immediately.”
Valdez argues that although the ALJ found “the treatment records from U.S.
Health Works Medical Group conflict with the opinion from Dr. Perdikis,” the ALJ
failed to explain “what evidence in these records allegedly contradicts Dr. Perdikis’s
5 23-3880 opinions.” Although the exhibit cited by the ALJ is rather large and contained
multiple records from U.S. Health Works Medical Group, the ALJ discussed the
opinion of Dr. Coppelson one page earlier in its decision, including his
recommendation that Valdez return to his regular job duties immediately. In other
words, there is no reason believe that the ALJ’s reference to “claimant’s treatment
notes from U.S. Health Works Medical Group shortly after his injury and alleged
onset date,” would mean anything other than—or at least not include—Dr.
Coppelson’s notes as described earlier in its decision. Thus, Dr. Coppelson’s
statement that Valdez could return to his regular job duties immediately was a
specific and legitimate reason to discount Dr. Perdikis’s opinion.
Second, the ALJ found Dr. Perdikis’s opinion was contradicted by the
“conservative” medical treatment Valdez received. For the same reasons set forth
above, the conservative treatment Valdez received is a specific and legitimate reason
to discount Dr. Perdikis’s opinion.
AFFIRMED.
6 23-3880