Vakea Johnson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 29, 2016
• Docket: 49A02-1602-CR-337
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 29 2016, 9:01 am regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Barbara J. Simmons Gregory F. Zoeller Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Caryn N. Szyper Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Vakea Johnson, September 29, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1602-CR-337 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Linda E. Brown, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49G10-1407-CM-36595

Robb, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1602-CR-337 | September 29, 2016 Page 1 of 5 Case Summary and Issue [1] Following a bench trial, Vakea Johnson was convicted of Class A misdemeanor

battery. Johnson appeals, raising the sole issue of whether the evidence is

sufficient to support her conviction. Concluding the evidence is sufficient, we

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] The facts most favorable to the verdict reveal Johnson and Amelia Knight both

worked at an Indianapolis daycare. On July 9, 2014, the daycare manager

unexpectedly called Knight on her day off to arrange a meeting. When Knight

arrived at the daycare, there were around six or seven people waiting in the

conference room, including Johnson, Johnson’s mother Ms. Starks, and

Johnson’s sister Kiesha Johnson. The manager called the meeting to

investigate an incident involving Knight and Johnson’s nephew, a child cared

for by the daycare. Knight allegedly grabbed Johnson’s nephew’s arm and

scratched him. During the meeting, Starks became irritated and struck Knight,

knocking her to the ground. Knight testified she tried to stand up, but Johnson

hit her face with a “[c]losed fist” and then “fist[s] start[ed] flying everywhere.”

Transcript at 15. During the fight, Knight sustained bruises and scratches to her

head, neck, and chest. Shortly thereafter, Officer Christopher Cooper of the

Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department arrived at the daycare. By this

time, Johnson had left and only Knight, Starks, and the daycare manager

remained.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1602-CR-337 | September 29, 2016 Page 2 of 5 [3] The State charged Johnson with battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A

misdemeanor.1 At trial, Johnson took the stand in her own defense and

testified she stayed home on July 9, 2014 and was never present at the daycare.

The trial court found Johnson guilty as charged and entered judgment of

conviction. The trial court sentenced Johnson to 365 days; ordering Johnson to

serve 180 days in home detention, suspending 183 days to probation, and

awarding Johnson two days of credit time. The trial court also ordered

Johnson to attend an anger management course and complete twenty-four

hours of community service. Johnson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision I. Standard of Review [4] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction,

appellate courts are “markedly deferential to the outcome below.” Bowman v.

State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1181 (Ind. 2016). We will neither reweigh the evidence

nor re-examine witness credibility, and we “must consider only the probative

evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.” Drane v. State, 867

N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). When

appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it

“most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.” Id. (citation omitted). Appellate

1 The State also filed charges against Starks; however, those charges were dismissed.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1602-CR-337 | September 29, 2016 Page 3 of 5 courts will affirm the conviction unless “no reasonable fact-finder could find the

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jenkins v. State, 726

N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000).

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence [5] To convict Johnson of battery, the State was required to prove she knowingly or

intentionally touched Knight in a “rude, insolent, or angry manner.” Ind. Code

§ 35-42-2-1(b)(1) (2014). The offense is a Class A misdemeanor if it results in

bodily injury to another person. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c) (2014). “‘Bodily

injury’ means any impairment of physical condition, including physical pain.”

Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-29. At trial, Knight testified Johnson struck her face with

her fist. She also testified she sustained several injuries to her face, neck, and

chest, and that those injuries caused her pain. Although Johnson denied she

was present at the daycare on July 9, 2014, the trial court clearly did not find

her credible.

[6] Johnson argues her testimony denying her presence at the daycare center

creates reasonable doubt about her guilt. Johnson essentially asks that we

assess witness credibility and reweigh the evidence in her favor, which is the

role of the fact-finder, not the role of this court. Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904,

906 (Ind. 2005). The trial court specifically stated, “[t]his case comes down to

witness credibility. I find that the State has met its burden beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Tr. at 39. Further, Knight’s testimony constituted sufficient evidence

to support Johnson’s conviction. See Lay v. State, 933 N.E.2d 38, 42 (Ind. Ct.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1602-CR-337 | September 29, 2016 Page 4 of 5 App. 2010) (noting a conviction may be sustained by the uncorroborated

testimony of a single witness or victim), trans. denied. Accordingly, we find no

reason to disturb Johnson’s conviction.

Conclusion [7] The evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support Johnson’s conviction.

We therefore affirm.

[8] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1602-CR-337 | September 29, 2016 Page 5 of 5