Vajgert v. Lawson

2025 IL App (2d) 240383-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 9, 2025
• Docket: 2-24-0383
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (2d) 240383-U No. 2-24-0383 Order filed June 9, 2025

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

BRUCE J. VAJGERT, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Kane County. Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 21-SC-3348 ) THOMAS LORTON, ) Honorable ) Todd B. Tarter, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Jorgensen and Schostok concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Under its inherent power to enforce its judgments, the trial court had jurisdiction over fee petition that was filed more than 30 days after the underlying judgment, because the petition sought to recover fees and costs for efforts to collect the damages awarded in the judgment.

¶2 Plaintiff, Bruce J. Vajgert, appeals from an order denying, for lack of jurisdiction, his

postjudgment petition for attorney fees he incurred in seeking to collect on a default judgment for

overdue rent under a residential lease. We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider

plaintiff’s postjudgment fee petition. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the court to (1)

consider the postjudgment fee petition; (2) determine whether the lease entitled plaintiff to attorney 2025 IL App (2d) 240383-U

fees and costs for his postjudgment enforcement efforts and, if so; (3) enter an appropriate award

of attorney fees and costs.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On October 7, 2021, plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against defendant, Thomas

Lorton, alleging claims for breach of a residential lease by failing to pay rent, unjust enrichment,

and quantum meruit. Plaintiff sought an award of overdue rent and “all costs and reasonable

attorneys’ fees incurred in bringing [the] action.” On October 12, 2021, plaintiff served defendant

with a summons and complaint. Thereafter, defendant never appeared, answered, or otherwise

responded to the complaint.

¶5 On January 3, 2022, plaintiff filed a motion for a default judgment, asking the trial court to

“award *** Plaintiff its [sic] damages of $10,000.00 plus attorney’s fees and court costs, as

outlined in the attached Affidavit.” The attached affidavit indicated that, “to date,” plaintiff had

incurred $1,005 in attorney fees and $395.60 in costs. Plaintiff served defendant with the motion,

but defendant never responded. On January 26, 2022, following a hearing on the motion, at which

defendant did not appear, the trial court entered a default judgment. The court’s written order

stated, “[p]laintiff is awarded $10,000.00 in principal, $500.00 in attorney’s fees and $395.60 in

court costs.”

¶6 To collect on the default judgment, on March 31, 2022, plaintiff served a wage deduction

summons and notice on defendant’s employer, Original Concrete Pumping Service, Inc. (OCPS).

On July 11, 2022, because OCPS failed to appear or answer the wage deduction summons, the trial

court entered a conditional judgment against OCPS for $10,000. The court also continued the

matter to August 22, 2022, for confirmation of the conditional judgment. A summons to confirm

the conditional judgment was served on both defendant and OCPS. On August 22, 2022, because

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OCPS failed to appear and had otherwise not responded to the summons to confirm the conditional

judgment, the court entered an order confirming the conditional judgment. The court further

declared that “[f]inal judgment is entered this day *** against [OCPS] in the amount of $10,000.”

¶7 On November 30, 2022, plaintiff issued to OCPS a citation to discover assets. On February

14, 2023, OCPS filed a motion to quash the service of the March 31, 2022, wage deduction

summons. On June 23, 2023, the trial court denied OCPS’s motion to quash service and declared

that “[t]he final judgment entered on August 22, 2022[,] shall stand.”

¶8 On January 8, 2024, plaintiff filed a release and satisfaction of the $10,000 judgment

against OCPS but not the default judgment against defendant. That same day, the trial court

vacated the judgment against OCPS and dismissed the action against it.

¶9 On January 25, 2024, plaintiff filed a “Petition for Post-Judgment Attorneys’ Fees”

(postjudgment fee petition), seeking a judgment for attorney fees and costs against defendant for

plaintiff’s efforts in attempting to satisfy the January 26, 2022, default judgment against defendant.

Plaintiff relied on the following provision of the residential lease:

“16. PAYMENT OF COSTS. Except as provided by Illinois law, the Lessee further

covenants and agrees to pay and discharge all reasonable costs, attorneys’ fees and

expenses that shall be made and incurred by Lessor in enforcing the covenants and

agreements of this lease.”

Plaintiff sought attorney fees and costs related only to his postjudgment efforts to collect on the

default judgment against defendant, including the efforts to obtain a judgment against OCPS.

Plaintiff attached a copy of the default judgment, a copy of the lease, an attorney affidavit as to

fees and costs, and detailed billing records from March 7, 2022, through January 24, 2024.

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¶ 10 On March 13, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the postjudgment fee petition.

Following the hearing, the trial court entered a written order finding that it lacked jurisdiction over

the petition because (1) the January 26, 2022, default judgment awarded damages, attorney fees,

and costs; (2) the judgment “ha[d] not been vacated”; and (3) “[p]laintiff ha[d] not brought a

motion to vacate the judgment.”

¶ 11 On March 27, 2024, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the March 13, 2024, judgment.

In the motion, plaintiff argued that the default judgment was not final as to postjudgment attorney

fees and that the trial court retained jurisdiction to rule on a request for such fees.

¶ 12 At the June 7, 2024, hearing on the motion to reconsider, the trial court noted that the

default judgment, which awarded $500 in attorney fees, did not contain any language “reserving

or otherwise mentioning the plaintiff’s right to post-judgment attorney’s fees.” The court

concluded that the default judgment was final as to all claims for attorney fees due under the lease.

The court further commented that plaintiff did not file a timely motion attacking the default

judgment. Thus, the court reaffirmed that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the postjudgment fee

petition and denied the motion to reconsider. Plaintiff, in turn, filed this timely appeal.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the

postjudgment fee petition because (1) the lease provided that he could recover attorney fees and

costs related to enforcement of the judgment and (2) the default judgment was not final as to the

issue of postjudgment attorney fees and costs.

¶ 15 We initially note that defendant has not filed an appellee’s brief. However, because the

record is straightforward and we can easily decide the issues without the aid of an appellee’s brief,

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we will proceed to the merits of the appeal. See Ontiveroz v. Khokhar, 2025 IL 130316, ¶ 16 (citing

First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976)).

¶ 16 We begin with the threshold question of whether the trial court had jurisdiction to consider

plaintiff’s postjudgment fee petition. It did.

¶ 17 Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over a particular claim is a question of law, which

we review de novo. Millennium Park Joint Venture, LLC v. Houlihan, 241 Ill. 2d 281, 294 (2010).

In arguing that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the postjudgment fee petition, plaintiff

relies significantly on the terms of the written lease. In our view, the issue is more appropriately

resolved based on the well-established principles governing the trial court’s enforcement powers.

Although a trial court loses jurisdiction to amend a judgment 30 days after its entry, it retains

indefinite jurisdiction to enforce the judgment. Forman Real Property, LLC v. ESB 1836, Inc.,

2022 IL App (1st) 201267-U, ¶ 24 (citing In re Marriage of Allen, 343 Ill. App. 3d 410, 412

(2003)). A request to enforce a judgment is different from a request to modify the terms of that

judgment. Forman Real Property, LLC, 2022 IL App (1st) 201267-U, ¶ 25 (citing Director of

Insurance ex rel. State v. A & A Midwest Rebuilders, Inc., 383 Ill. App. 3d 721, 723 (2008)). Thus,

the expiration of the trial court’s jurisdiction to modify its original judgment does not limit its

jurisdiction to enforce that judgment. Forman Real Property, LLC, 2022 IL App (1st) 201267-U,

¶ 24 (citing Cities Service Oil Co. v. Village of Oak Brook, 84 Ill. App. 3d 381, 384 (1980)). Indeed,

a trial court has inherent authority to enforce its judgments regardless of how much time has passed

since the entry of the judgment. County of Cook v. Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor

Council, 358 Ill. App. 3d 667, 671-72 (2005). A trial court should enforce its judgments when

called upon to do so. Forman Real Property, LLC, 2022 IL App (1st) 201267-U, ¶ 24.

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¶ 18 Here, on January 26, 2022, the trial court entered a default judgment awarding plaintiff

$10,000 damages for breach of the lease, $500 in attorney fees, and $395.60 in court costs.

Thereafter, plaintiff attempted to enforce that judgment against defendant. In doing so, plaintiff

served a wage deduction summons on defendant’s employer, OCPS. Because OCPS neither

appeared nor answered, plaintiff obtained a $10,000 conditional judgment against OCPS.

Subsequently, the trial court confirmed the judgment against OCPS and denied OCPS’s motion to

quash service of the wage deduction summons. On January 8, 2024, plaintiff filed a release and

satisfaction of the $10,000 judgment against the OCPS, and the trial court vacated the judgment

and dismissed the action against OCPS.

¶ 19 Undoubtedly, plaintiff’s efforts to satisfy the January 26, 2022, judgment via its collection

efforts directed at OCPS constituted enforcement of that judgment. Thus, the trial court had

jurisdiction over those efforts due to its inherent enforcement authority.

¶ 20 We further hold that the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction to enforce the January 26,

2022, judgment extended to the postjudgment fee petition, which sought attorney fees related to

the postjudgment enforcement efforts. Thus, we conclude that the trial court, through its inherent

authority, retained jurisdiction over both plaintiff’s efforts to enforce the January 26, 2022,

judgment and his ultimate request for attorney fees and costs related to those enforcement efforts.

¶ 21 We note that the trial court, in considering its jurisdiction over the postjudgment fee

petition, construed the January 26, 2022, judgment as a final determination on the issue of attorney

fees both pre- and postjudgment; thus (so the court implied), an award of postjudgment fees would

necessarily be a modification of the January 26 judgment. We construe the January 26 judgment

differently; plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment asked only for an award of fees incurred “to

date.” Plaintiff did not seek any prospective relief on fees, nor can the January 26 written order be

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construed as granting or denying prospective relief. An award of postjudgment fees would be

entirely distinct from the January 26 judgment because the award would be based on events after

that judgment. We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction over the postjudgment fee petition

just as it had jurisdiction over the postjudgment enforcement efforts for which plaintiff sought

fees. Thus, we remand this matter to the trial court to consider plaintiff’s postjudgment fee petition.

¶ 22 We note that two issues remain to be decided: (1) whether the lease entitled plaintiff to

attorney fees and costs for his postjudgment enforcement efforts and, if so, (2) whether the fees

and costs sought were reasonable. However, as these issues were not decided by the trial court, we

will not review them. In re Marriage of Bennett, 225 Ill. App. 3d 828, 830 (“Courts of review

function to review rulings and judgments of the circuit courts and generally will not pass upon any

question as to which the circuit court failed to make a decision.”)

¶ 23 Accordingly, we remand for the court to (1) consider the postjudgment fee petition; (2)

determine whether the lease entitled plaintiff to attorney fees and costs for his postjudgment

enforcement efforts and, if so; (3) enter an appropriate award of attorney fees and costs.

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County and

remand for further proceedings.

¶ 26 Reversed and remanded.

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