Vagalebre v . SAU 47 CV-97-135-JD 02/24/98 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Vagalebre, et a l .
v. Civil N o . 97-135-JD
SAU 4 7 , et a l .
O R D E R
Plaintiffs George Vagalebre, Marilynn Vagalebre, William
Hornak, and Toni Hornak are the parents of student athletes who
attend Conant High School (Conant). William and Toni Hornak sue
individually and on behalf of their minor child, Michael Hornak.
Michael Hornak, a student at Conant, is also a plaintiff. The
defendants are the Jaffrey-Rindge School District, Jules
D’Agostino, the superintendent of the school district, Tom
Brennan, the principal of Conant, Jim Adams, the athletic
director of Conant, and the Jaffrey-Rindge school board (board). 1 The plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated their
constitutional rights through a number of acts, and they seek
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, the
plaintiffs allege that the defendants: (1) violated their right
to freedom of speech under the First Amendment; (2) violated
their right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
1 The court need not differentiate between particular plaintiffs and defendants in light of its conclusions, unless otherwise noted. under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (3) violated
Michael Hornak’s rights under the New Hampshire Constitution and
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Federal Constitution.
Before the court is the defendants’ motion to dismiss the case
because it is moot and because the plaintiffs have failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted (document n o . 6 ) .
Background2
On December 1 8 , 1995, the Jaffrey-Rindge School Board voted
to implement a random drug testing policy for students at Conant
High School who wished to participate in interscholastic
athletics. See Compl. at 4 . The policy required the students
and a parent or guardian to sign a form consenting to the random
drug testing. See id. at 5 . The form stated that the signer
“voluntarily agree[d]” to be subject to the policy’s procedures,
and accepted all aspects of the procedure as described in the policy statement. See id. The policy was implemented in the
Spring of 1996. See id. at 4 . Between September 1996 and
December 1996, fifty-five people had been tested, none of whom
tested positive for drug use. See id. at 6.
Plaintiff Michael Hornak refused to sign the statement in
the fall of 1996 and was precluded from participating in
2 The facts described herein are either alleged by the plaintiffs or are not in dispute.
2 athletics. See Compl. at 5 . On or around September 4 , 1996,
George Vagalebre altered the form and changed “voluntarily agree”
to “submit” and “agree” to “will submit.” He also appended
language to the effect that the policy violated his civil rights,
and that he was forced to sign the form so that his daughter
could participate in athletics. See id. His daughter, Marilee,
was thereafter precluded from participating in athletics unless
she and her father signed an unaltered form. See id. Apparently
they then signed an unaltered form as Marilee was later subjected
to random drug testing. See id. at 7 .
In addition to this drug testing policy, the school also had
a policy of searching student bags when the students participated
in field trips. See Compl. at 6. The search policy was applied
uniformly to all students, without a requirement of reasonable
suspicion or probable cause. See id. On January 3 1 , 1996, an
employee of the school district walked down the aisle of a school
bus and searched each student’s bag and belongings, including
those of Michael Hornak and Marilee Vagalebre. See id.
The plaintiffs complained of these policies at school board
meetings. See id. Prior to the incidents at issue in this case,
on October 1 , 1990, the school board had adopted a policy that
requires an individual who wishes to speak at a meeting to
arrange in advance to be put on the agenda. See Defs.’ Mem. of
Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 5 (“Defs.’ Mem.”); D’Agostino
3 Aff. at 2 . This policy, however, was not followed until the
plaintiffs began speaking out against the random drug testing.
See Compl. at 6. The board also requires that questions be put
in writing, and apparently refuses to answer questions that are
not in writing. See id.
On February 2 6 , 1997, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in
the New Hampshire Superior Court in Cheshire County. On March 8 ,
1997, the Annual School District Meeting for the Jaffrey-Rindge
School District was held. At the meeting the voters passed an
advisory warrant article by a margin of 194-134 which recommended
to the school board that it withdraw its random testing policy.
See Defs.’ Mem. at 4 . On March 1 0 , 1997, the school board voted
to withdraw the random drug testing program, effective March 1 0 ,
1997. See Defs.’ Mem., Ex. C at 2 . Moreover, at an earlier
school board meeting on March 3 , 1997, the board decided that it
would not conduct further field trip searches of school bags and
personal belongings until the school board acted on a policy
revision at its April 1997 meeting. See Defs.’ Mem., Ex. D at 3 .
On June 2 , 1997, the school board adopted a search policy that
does not include the uniform search of bags and personal
belongings during field trips. See Defs.’ Mem., D’Agostino Aff.
at 2 . The policy was effective as of August 2 7 , 1997, for the
1997-1998 school year. See id.
In count one of their complaint, the plaintiffs assert that
4 the defendants violated their right to free speech under the
First Amendment. See Compl. at 7 . Specifically, they argue that
their rights were violated when they were forced to sign the
consent form, when they were unable to speak out against the
random drug testing policy at the school board meeting contrary
to the board’s prior practices, and when they were denied access
to information regarding the drug testing policy. See id. In
counts two and three, the plaintiffs argue that the random drug
testing policy and the searches of bags and personal belongings
during field trips violates their right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. See id. at 8 . Finally, in
count four, the plaintiffs assert that the school’s refusal to
allow Michael Hornak to participate in athletics deprives him of
the rights secured by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Federal Constitution, and of his rights under the New Hampshire
Constitution. See id. at 8 , 9. The plaintiffs sought injunctive
relief and attorney’s fees from the court.
On March 2 0 , 1997, the defendants removed the plaintiffs’
action to this court. On June 3 0 , 1997, the defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the case on a number of grounds. See Defs.’
Mot. to Dismiss at 1-4. As elaborated upon in their memorandum
of law, the defendants first argue that the claims seeking
injunctive relief from policies providing for random drug testing
and suspicionless searches should be dismissed as moot because
5 the policies have been repealed. See Defs.’ Mem. at 2 . Second,
they argue that the facts alleged regarding the policies fail to
state a claim on which relief can be granted. See id. Finally,
the defendants argue that the First Amendment complaints arising
from the school board’s procedural policy governing its meetings
should also be dismissed because they fail to state a claim on
which relief can be granted. See id.
Discussion
A. Mootness
“In general a case becomes moot ‘“When the issues presented
are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable
interest in the outcome.”’” Murphy v . Hunt, 455 U.S. 4 7 8 , 481
(1982) (quoting United States Parole Comm’n v . Geraghty, 445 U.S.
388, 396 (1980) (quoting Powell v . McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496
(1969))). “[V]oluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct
does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the
case, i.e., does not make the case moot,” unless the defendant
demonstrates that “‘there is no reasonable expectation that the
wrong will be repeated.’” United States v . W.T. Grant Co., 345
U.S. 629, 6 3 2 , 633 (1953) (quoting United States v . Aluminum Co.,
148 F.2d 416, 448 (1945)). The defendants’ burden “is a heavy
one.” W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633. The court should
consider “the bona fides of the expressed intent to [dis-
6 continue], the effectiveness of the discontinuance and, in some
cases, the character of the past” behavior. Id. at 633.
In Habetz v . Louisiana High School Athletic Ass’n., the
plaintiff was a female student who sought to enjoin the
defendant, the Louisiana High School Athletic Association, from
enforcing an exclusionary rule that prevented her from ‘trying
out’ for her high school baseball team. See 842 F.2d 136, 137
(5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). The relief was denied, and while
on appeal the defendant revised its rules to allow females to try
out for the team. The Fifth Circuit found that the defendant’s
revision of the rules rendered the case moot. See id. The
defendant in Habetz had exhibited no bad faith in its revision of
the statute, had given no indication that it would revert to its
past practices, and had done “all that it [could] to change the
conditions” of which the plaintiff had complained. See id. at
138.
The facts in this case bear a close resemblance to those in
Habetz. On February 2 6 , 1997, the defendants filed their
complaint. On March 8 , 1997, at the annual school district
meeting, voters in the school district passed by a substantial
margin an article supporting the repeal of the school’s drug
testing policy. On March 1 0 , 1997, the school board repealed the
drug testing policy. The minutes of the meeting indicate that
the decision to repeal was driven by the vote at the annual
7 school board meeting. Hope was expressed that with the policy
rescinded “the community would work together, rather than apart,
to fight drugs,” and that “there has to be a better way” to do so
than with the policy. Defs.’ Mem., Ex. C at 1 , 2 . Moreover, the
board members stated their disappointment at the lack of
community support, but resolved that “those who came [to vote]
have told us what to do,” and that without “the support of the
community” the board “should vote [the policy] down.” Id. at 2 .
The school board did not mention the plaintiffs’ lawsuit in its
discussion.
The behavior of the school board indicates that it is
unlikely they will return to the drug testing policy. The school
board has not vacillated between revoking, revising, and
reenacting the policy. Nothing suggests that the school board
was seeking to circumvent the judicial proceedings or that it was
otherwise acting in bad faith.
The school board’s recision of the policy to conduct uniform
searches of bags and personal belongings during field trips is
similar to its recision of the drug testing policy. On March 3 ,
1997, the school board voted to suspend the search policy. The
minutes of the March 3 meeting indicate that the decision was
intended to better conform the school’s policy to constitutional
requirements. See Defs.’ Mem., Ex. D at 2 , 3 . Although people
present at the meeting had discussed possible alternative
8 policies, the board concluded that it would check with an
attorney and research applicable “case law.” See id. at 3 . At
the school board’s June 2 , 1997, meeting, when the school board
ultimately chose to eliminate the policy of conducting searches
of bags on field trips, there was no indication of any ulterior
motive or bad faith. See Defs.’ Mem., Ex. E at 4 ; Julius
D’Agostino Aff. at 2 . Nor was the plaintiffs’ lawsuit even
mentioned by the board. Finally, there is no suggestion that the
school board has vacillated between revoking and reenacting the
policy of the field trip searches.
The defendants have “done all that [they] can to change” the
drug testing and search and seizure policies of which the
plaintiffs complain. Habetz, 842 F.2d at 138. In revoking both
of the challenged policies, there is no evidence that the school
board acted in bad faith, nor is there any indication that it
will revert to the challenged practices in the future. Any
assertion that the board might renew the old policies is mere
speculation. Given the general disposition of the community, the
school board’s responsiveness, and the school board’s shift in
policies, this court cannot agree with the plaintiffs that there
is some reasonable expectation that the defendants will revert to
the allegedly unlawful conduct. See W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at
633.
In their opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss,
9 the plaintiffs liken this case to City of Mesquite v . Aladdin’s
Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 287 (1982). See Pls.’ Mem. of Law in
Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 8 (Pls.’ M e m . ) . In Mesquite,
the Supreme Court found that the defendant city’s voluntary
cessation of its conduct did not render the case moot. See id.
at 289. The city had exempted the plaintiff from a local
ordinance establishing an age restriction on its potential
patrons. See id. at 286. However, the city refused to grant the
plaintiff an operating license on other grounds. See id. at 287.
After a state court issued an injunction requiring the city to
grant the license, the city revoked the exemption on the age
restriction. See id. at 288. When the plaintiff then filed suit
in federal court, the city revised the ordinance and asserted
that the issue was moot. See id. Because the factual
circumstances indicated that it was likely the defendants would
reenact the previous ordinance if the suit was dismissed, the
Supreme Court did not find the case to be moot. See id. at 289.
The case at hand is readily distinguishable from City of
Mesquite on the same grounds that the Fifth Circuit distinguished
Habetz. In Mesquite the defendant’s prior conduct indicated a
likelihood that it would return to its challenged practices once
the threat of a lawsuit had passed. See Habetz, 842 F.2d at 137.
There is no such conduct in the case at hand. Moreover, as in
Habetz, in this case there is no indication of bad faith or a
10 likelihood that the defendants will attempt to reverse their
actions. See id. at 138.
Similarly, the plaintiffs’ reliance on City of Los Angeles
v . Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), and Northeastern Florida Chapter of
Associated General Contractors v . Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656
(1993), is misplaced. In Lyons, the Supreme Court held that a
moratorium on chokeholds by the Los Angeles Police Department did
not render the plaintiff’s suit to enjoin the use of chokeholds
moot. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101. However, the moratorium by
its own terms was not permanent. It was effective only while the
board of police commissioners reviewed various studies on
alternative control techniques, and the defendant acknowledged
that it could be lifted at anytime. See id. at 1 0 0 , 101. In
Jacksonville, the Supreme Court found the case was not moot
because “[t]here [was] no mere risk that Jacksonville [would]
repeat its allegedly wrongful conduct; it [had] already done so.”
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. at 661-62.
The court consequently finds that the plaintiffs’ claims
seeking injunctive relief from the random drug testing policy and
the field trip search policy are moot. Therefore, counts two,
three, and four of the plaintiffs’ complaint are dismissed, as
well as that portion of count one which alleges a First Amendment
violation arising from the requirement that the plaintiffs sign a
consent form.
11 B. Failure to State a Claim
The plaintiffs assert that several acts of the defendants
violated their First Amendment rights under the Federal
Constitution as well as their rights under the New Hampshire
Constitution.3 See Compl. at 7 . The court has already addressed
the plaintiffs’ argument that their First Amendment rights have
been violated by the requirement that they sign unmodified
consent forms, supra. The plaintiffs also assert that the
defendants violated their rights by enforcing a pre-existing but
previously unenforced policy requiring participants at the
meeting to register in advance. See id. Additionally, in their
memorandum of law, the plaintiffs argue that the policy itself is
facially unconstitutional under both the New Hampshire and
Federal Constitutions. See Pls.’ Mem. at 2 2 , 2 3 ; but see Compl.
at 7 . Finally, the plaintiffs argue that their First Amendment
rights were violated by the fact that the drug testing policy
“was not discussed in an open forum” before it was implemented,
see Pls.’ Mem. at 1 6 ; but see Compl. at 4 , 7 , and that certain
information regarding the random drug testing policy was not
provided to them, see Compl. at 7 . The defendants move to have
3 The court assumes for the purposes of this motion that the plaintiffs’ complaint is broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs’ arguments expressed in their memorandum of law, despite the fact that some of their arguments appear to be beyond the scope of the complaint. See Compl. at 7 ; but see Pls.’ Mem. at 16-23.
12 these First Amendment claims dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
Because the defendants have already filed an answer to the
plaintiffs’ complaint, the pleadings have closed under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 7 ( a ) . As such, the court will treat the defendants’
motion to dismiss as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The standard for evaluating a Rule 12(c)
motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as
the standard for evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Republic
Steel Corp. v . Pennsylvania Eng’g Corp., 785 F.2d 1 7 4 , 182 (7th
Cir. 1986). In both cases, the court’s inquiry is a limited one,
focusing not on “whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but
whether [he or she] is entitled to offer evidence to support the
claims.” Scheuer v . Rhodes, 416 U.S. 2 3 2 , 236 (1974) (motion to
dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). Great specificity is
not required to survive a Rule 12 motion. “[I]t is enough for a
plaintiff to sketch an actionable claim by means of ‘a
generalized statement of facts.’” Garita, 958 F.2d at 17
(quoting 5A Charles A . Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1357 (1990)). However, a plaintiff
cannot rely on “bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, and
‘opprobrious epithets.’” Chongris v . Board of Appeals, 811 F.2d
3 6 , 37 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Snowden v . Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 , 10
(1944)). In the end, the court may grant a Rule 12 motion to
13 dismiss “‘only if it clearly appears, according to the facts
alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable
theory.’” Garita, 958 F.2d at 17 (quoting Correa-Martinez v .
Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 4 9 , 52 (1st Cir. 1990)).
The ability of the state to regulate First Amendment
activities turns in part upon the forum in which the speech
occurs. See Grossbaum v . Indianapolis-Marion County Bldg., 100
F.3d 1287, 1296 (7th Cir. 1996). There are three types of fora
recognized by the Supreme Court: public fora, limited public
fora, and nonpublic fora. See Perry Educ. Assoc. v Perry Local
Educators’ Assoc., 460 U.S. 3 7 , 45-46 (1983). School board
meetings have been categorized as “limited public fora.” For
speech that is within the parameters of the limited public forum,
a state is bound by the constitutional requirements that are
applicable to traditional public fora. See Perry, 460 U.S. at
46. In such fora, “[r]easonable time, place, and manner
restrictions are permissible . . . .” Id. Such restrictions are
reasonable if they “are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample
alternative channels of communication.” United States v . Grace,
461 U.S. 1 7 1 , 177 (1983) (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 4 5 ) .
Additionally, “[t]he necessities of confining a [limited public]
forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was
created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups
14 or for the discussion of certain topics.” Rosenberger v . Rector
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). Content discrimina-
tion may therefore be permissible “if it preserves the purposes
of that limited forum,” while “viewpoint discrimination . . . is
presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise
within the forum’s limitations.” Id. at 830.
The plaintiffs argue that the school board policy is
facially invalid. See Pls.’ Mem. at 22-23. Whether restrictions
are reasonable time, place, and manner limitations, and whether
content-based restrictions are reasonable in light of the
purposes served by the forum, are issues of law to be determined
by the court. See, e.g., Tollis Inc. v . San Bernardino, 827 F.2d
1329, 1332 (1987). In this case, the school board stated in its
policy that it desired “citizens of the district to attend its
sessions so that they may become better acquainted with the
operations and programs of the schools and that the Board may
have opportunity [sic] to hear the wishes and ideas of the
public.” Defs.’ Mem., Ex. F. To “assure that persons who wish
to appear before the Board may be heard and, at the same time,
conduct [the board’s] meetings properly and efficiently,” the
board’s procedural policy governing its meetings: (1) requires
participants to “register” in advance; (2) requires the
presentation to be as brief as possible; and (3) permits
“[s]peakers [to] offer such objective criticisms of school
15 operations and programs as concern them . . .” but prohibits
“personal complaints [against] school personnel [or] against any
person connected with the school system . . .” as such issues
against individuals are to be handled through other channels.4
Id. The policy does not otherwise provide for any kind of
discretionary selection by the school board of either: (1) the
participants; (2) the subject matter discussed; or (3) the
viewpoints expressed on the subject matter discussed.
In Kindt v . Santa Monica Rent Control Board, 67 F.3d 266
(9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit upheld a rent control board’s
regulations governing its meetings that were similar to those in
this case. The regulations required participants to fill out
“chits” in advance indicating their desire to participate in the
meeting, and limited them to three minutes. See id. at 267. The
board’s regulations were found to be reasonable time, place and
4 Registration required the participant to “inform the Superintendent of the desire to [participate] and of the topic to be discussed as early as possible, but at least seven days before the meeting.” Defs.’ Mem., Ex. F. George Vagalebre alleges that special meetings are on occasion announced with less than one week notice. Pls.’ Mem., George Vagalebre Aff. at 3 . Simply because the school board creates a limited public forum at regular meetings does not mean that a limited public forum is also created at special meetings, and there is nothing to suggest that such a forum has indeed been created at special meetings. Nonetheless, the court concludes that the policy is valid as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction governing the special meetings for the reasons discussed infra, and because the policy leaves open the opportunity for the public to otherwise speak at the regular meetings.
16 manner regulations, and the district court’s grant of summary
judgment was upheld. See id. at 271-72.
In this case, the registration and brevity requirements are
similarly reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions: (1)
they are content-neutral; (2) they are narrowly tailored to the
board’s significant interest in engaging in a responsive dialogue
with the public while conducting an efficient meeting; and (3)
they leave ample opportunity for the public to communicate.
Moreover the forum, the school board meeting, is designed to
address the general “operation and programs” of the schools, and
is opened to public discussion on this topic. See Defs.’ Mem.,
Ex. F. The court concludes the limitation prohibiting discussion
of personal grievances limits the content, not the viewpoint, of
the meeting, and is therefore “‘reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum.’” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-830
(quoting Cornelius v . NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 804-06 (1985)); see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 4 9 .
Relying on New Hampshire v . Chong, 121 N.H. 860 (1981), the
plaintiffs argue that the policy violates Articles 32 and 22 of
the New Hampshire Constitution, which guarantee the people’s
right to freedom of speech and to assemble in an orderly and
peaceful manner to petition the public or their representatives.
See N.H. Const. p t . 1 , arts. 2 2 , 3 2 . In Chong, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court found a city ordinance unconstitutional because it
17 required activists to obtain a permit from the chief of police
before they could pass out handbills on city streets, and it
endowed the chief of police with unfettered discretion in issuing
the permits. However, the plaintiffs’ reliance on Chong is
misplaced. Chong is readily distinguished from the case at hand
because: (1) a limited public forum is at issue here; and (2) the
school board policy confers no discretion on the board to
determine who can speak and on what issues, beyond excluding
issues involving personal grievances.
Finally, the plaintiffs assert in their complaint that the
school board practiced viewpoint discrimination by applying the
policy only after the plaintiffs had begun to voice their
disapproval of the school’s drug-testing and “field trip” search
policies. The administration of regulations or policies in such
a manner as to discriminate against particular viewpoints is an
abridgment of First Amendment rights. See Gay Lesbian Bisexual
Alliance v . Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543, 1149 (11th Cir. 1997)
(“Viewpoint discrimination, however, is impermissible ‘when
directed against speech that is otherwise within the forum’s
limitations.’”) (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 8 3 0 ) . Because
the plaintiffs allege that the policy, otherwise left in a
dormant state, was revived only so as to suppress their viewpoint
on issues properly within the forum’s limitations, the plaintiffs
18 have stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.5 Given the resolution of the other claims asserted by the
plaintiffs, the court strongly recommends that the parties engage
in good faith efforts to reach a non-trial disposition of this
remaining claim.6 The parties shall file a status report with
the court on or before March 1 1 , 1998.
Conclusion
The court denies the defendants’ motion as to that portion
of count one which asserts viewpoint discrimination in the
application of the procedural policy governing the school board
5 The plaintiffs also claim that the defendants violated the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by enacting policies without an open forum discussion, see Pls.’ Mem. at 1 6 ; but see Compl. at 7 , and by failing to provide certain information, see Compl. at 7 . The plaintiffs have not supplied any authority in support of these claims, despite the defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims under Rule 1 2 , nor is the court aware of any such authority. Indeed, the plaintiffs have failed even to mention these claims in their memorandum of law, except in one passing reference to the open discussion claim. See Pls.’ Mem. at 1 6 . The plaintiffs cannot rely upon such “bald assertions,” Chongris, 811 F.2d at 3 7 , and these claims are therefore dismissed. 6 This claim only implicates George and Marilynn Vagalebre, Toni Hornak, the school district, and the school board.
19 meetings, and grants the motion as to the remainder of count one
as well as counts two, three, and four (document n o . 6 ) .
SO ORDERED.
Joseph A . DiClerico, J r . District Judge
February 2 4 , 1998
cc: Dawn E . Caradonna, Esquire Diane M . Gorrow, Esquire