Vaden v. United States

397 F. Supp. 163, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11911
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedJune 13, 1975
DocketCiv. A. No. 75-0025 (D)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 397 F. Supp. 163 (Vaden v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Vaden v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 163, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11911 (W.D. Va. 1975).

Opinion

OPINION and JUDGMENT

DALTON, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Mary Ann Vaden, has brought this action to enjoin the sale of certain firearms that she alleges she owns and an agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Department of the Treasury, illegally seized. She further seeks to have these firearms returned to her.

. The firearms were seized on June 27, 1974 because of violations of Chapter 53 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq., which requires the payment of taxes on and the registration of certain firearms.

The firearms were declared forfeited under 26 U.S.C. § 5862(a). That section provides that “[a]ny firearm involved in any violation of the provisions of this chapter [Chapter 53] or any reg[164]*164ulation promulgated thereunder shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture, and . all the provisions of the internal revenue laws relating to forfeiture of unstamped articles are extended to and made to apply to the articles under this chapter . . . . ”

The basic provision of the internal revenue laws dealing with forfeiture procedures for property valued at less than $2500, as was the property seized in this action, is 26 U.S.C. § 7325. That section provides that before a court can adjudicate the legality of a seizure and forfeiture of property, the person claiming an interest in the property seized must execute a bond to the United States in the amount of $250.1 Failure by a person to follow this procedure within thirty days from the first date notice of seizure and forfeiture of the property is published constitutes a waiver of the right to contest the forfeiture in this court. DeBonis v. United States, 103 F.Supp. 123 (W.D.Pa.1952). This administrative procedure is the exclusive method to attack the propriety of the seizure and forfeiture. Milkint v. Morgenthau, 92 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1937); Chesapeake Vending Company v. DeCarlo, 237 F.Supp. 554 (D.Md.1965). Because the plaintiff failed to follow these procedures, this court is without jurisdiction to entertain this action and must therefore dismiss it. Milkint v. Morgenthau, supra; Newstead v. United States, 258 F.Supp. 250 (E.D.Mo.1966). The case is accordingly dismissed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
397 F. Supp. 163, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11911, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vaden-v-united-states-vawd-1975.