VACORP v. Young

CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedApril 9, 2020
Docket190356
StatusPublished

This text of VACORP v. Young (VACORP v. Young) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
VACORP v. Young, (Va. 2020).

Opinion

PRESENT: Goodwyn, Mims, Powell, Kelsey, McCullough, and Chafin, JJ., and Koontz, S.J.

VACORP OPINION BY v. Record No. 190356 JUSTICE STEPHEN R. McCULLOUGH April 9, 2020 MIASIA YOUNG, ET AL.

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND Gregory L. Rupe, Judge

The School Board for the City of Richmond has contracted for coverage of its vehicles

via a self-insurance risk pool managed by the Virginia Association of Counties Group

Self-Insurance Risk Pool, or VACORP. Miasia Young, who was injured while riding a school

bus, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking resolution of the scope of coverage with respect

to the school board’s uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. She argued that the School

Board’s UM/UIM coverage was $1 million, as provided in the contract between the School

Board and VACORP, and that the legislature has imposed a floor, not a cap, on UM/UIM

coverage for entities that self-insure. VACORP responded that the interplay of several statutes

imposes a cap on UM/UIM coverage in the amount of $50,000. The trial court agreed with

Young. For the reasons noted below, we agree and affirm.

BACKGROUND

According to the allegations in the underlying tort suit, Miasia Young was riding as a

passenger in a City of Richmond school bus when a car collided with the bus. Margaret Allen

was driving the school bus. Clara Kelly was the driver of the car. Young filed suit against

Kelly, Allen, and the City of Richmond School Board, seeking damages of $499,000 for her

personal injuries, later increased to $1.2 million. Kelly had insurance from various sources totaling $125,000. The City of Richmond School Board is self-insured through a self-insurance

risk pool managed by VACORP.

The contract between the City of Richmond and VACORP provides UM/UIM coverage

to anyone who is injured while “occupying” a “Covered Auto.” A school bus qualifies as a

“Covered Auto.” The contract contains a limit of $1 million for coverage relating to an

uninsured/underinsured motorist. The contract specifies that the fund administered by VACORP

agrees “to pay all sums the Covered Person is legally entitled to recover as damages from the

owner or driver of an Uninsured/Underinsured Motor Vehicle.” Any person “Occupying a

Covered Auto” is a “Covered Person.” Young is a “Covered Person.”

When VACORP and Young disagreed on the extent of the coverage available to the

School Board for the City of Richmond under the UM/UIM provisions of its contract, Young

filed a declaratory judgment action to settle the issue. The parties filed cross-motions for

summary judgment. VACORP maintained that, by statute, $50,000 is the maximum amount of

such coverage available. Young responded that these statutes set a minimum, not a cap, and that

the maximum available is what is specified in the contract entered into by the School Board,

namely, $1 million. The Circuit Court agreed with Young. We awarded VACORP an appeal

from this decision. 1

1 VACORP’s assigns the following two errors:

I. The trial court erred when it granted Young’s motion for summary judgment (and denied VACORP’s motion for summary judgment) because Virginia Code § 22.1-194 limits the self-insurance for school boards to $50,000 in UM/UIM coverage.

II. The trial court erred when it granted Young’s motion for summary judgment (and denied VACORP’s motion for summary judgment) because Virginia Code § 38.2-2206 prohibits UM/UIM limits from exceeding the liability limits.

2 ANALYSIS

VACORP contends that the interplay of several statutes compels the conclusion that its

coverage is capped at $50,000. Young contests VACORP’s reading of those statutes. We

review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Ricketts v. Strange, 293 Va. 101,

106 (2017). We also review a trial court’s construction of statutory provisions de novo. “[A]n

issue of statutory interpretation is a pure question of law which we review de novo.” Conyers v.

Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104 (2007).

At the outset, we note that our decision in Frederick Cty Sch. Bd. v. Hannah, 267 Va.

231, 239 (2004), is not controlling on the question before us, namely, whether Code § 22.1-190

and Code § 22.1-194, among other statutes, provide a statutory cap of $50,000 on UM/UIM

coverage, irrespective of any contrary contractual arrangements by the parties. We simply did

not answer that question in Hannah because it was not before us. Instead, the case turned on

whether the school board was required to obtain a certificate from the Commissioner of the

Department of Motor Vehicles.

Under Code § 22.1-190, school boards must insure every vehicle unless the school board

receives a certificate of self-insurance under Code § 22.1-194. Code § 22.1-190 provides in

relevant part:

A. Every vehicle shall be covered in a policy of liability and property damage insurance issued by an insurance carrier authorized to transact business in this Commonwealth, in the amounts of at least $50,000 for injury, including death, to one person; $500,000 for injury, including death, to all persons injured in any one accident; and $50,000 for damage, including destruction, to the property of any person, other than the insured. In addition, the policy of insurance shall provide coverage for loss or damage caused by an uninsured motorist in accordance with the provisions of § 38.2-2206 and in the amounts required by this section.

3 ....

D. This insurance shall not be required in cases where pupils are transported in vehicles which are owned or operated by a county, city, town or school board which has qualified for and received a certificate of self-insurance from the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles, following a certification of financial responsibility equal to that required under subsection A of this section.

Nothing in the text of Code § 22.1-190 forbids a school board that has self-insured from

obtaining a contract through a pool for more than the minimum amount of $50,000.

Consequently, Code § 22.1-190 does not operate as a statutory cap for the school board’s

UM/UIM coverage.

VACORP also relies on Code § 22.1-194. That statute provides as follows:

In case the locality or the school board is the owner, or operator through medium of a driver, of, or otherwise is the insured under the policy upon, a vehicle involved in an accident, the locality or school board shall be subject to action up to, but not beyond, the limits of valid and collectible insurance in force to cover the injury complained of or, in cases set forth in subsection D of § 22.1-190, up to but not beyond the amounts of insurance required under subsection A of § 22.1-190 and the defense of governmental immunity shall not be a bar to action or recovery.

VACORP contends that this statute establishes a limit of $50,000 on UM/UIM coverage. It

reasons that because the School Board for the City of Richmond is self-insured under subsection

D of § 22.1-190, it can be liable “up to but not beyond the amounts of insurance required under

subsection A of § 22.1-190.” In turn, subsection A of Code § 22.1-190 contemplates coverage of

“at least $50,000 for injury.”

We disagree with VACORP’s proposed construction of Code § 22.1-194. As the circuit

court noted, it is not clear whether the phrase “up to but not beyond the amounts of insurance

required under subsection A of § 22.1-190” refers exclusively to the $50,000, and thus imposes a

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Related

Conyers v. MARTIAL ARTS WORLD OF RICHMOND
639 S.E.2d 174 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 2007)
Frederick County School Board v. Hannah
590 S.E.2d 567 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 2004)
Catron v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
496 S.E.2d 436 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1998)
USAA Casualty Insurance v. Alexander
445 S.E.2d 145 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1994)
Commonwealth v. Va. Ass'n of Counties Grp. Self Ins. Risk Pool
787 S.E.2d 151 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 2016)
Ricketts v. Strange
796 S.E.2d 182 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 2017)

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VACORP v. Young, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/vacorp-v-young-va-2020.