Vaca Prado v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 26, 2026
• Docket: 25-161
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAVIER VACA PRADO, No. 25-161 Agency No. Petitioner, A209-145-337 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 21, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: WARDLAW, BEA, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Javier Vaca Prado (“Petitioner”) appeals an order of the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which dismissed his appeal of an immigration

judge’s (“IJ”) decision, which had denied Petitioner’s application for cancellation

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) and his request for post-conclusion

voluntary departure. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny in

part and dismiss in part the petition. Because the parties are familiar with the facts,

we recite them only as necessary to explain our decision.

Under § 1229b(b)(1), the Attorney General may exercise discretion to cancel

an alien’s removal if the alien “(A) ha[s] been physically present in the United

States for a continuous period of ten years or more, (B) ha[s] been a person of good

moral character during that time, (C) ha[s] not been convicted of certain

enumerated offenses, and (D) ‘establish[es] that removal would result in

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child,

who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent

residence.’” Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2025)

(quoting § 1229b(b)(1)). Only the fourth criterion is at issue in this appeal.

We “review only the BIA’s opinion, except to the extent that it expressly

adopted portions of the IJ’s decision.” Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d

1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062,

1064 (9th Cir. 2020)). “[W]e … apply a deferential standard of review to the

primarily factual mixed question at hand—whether the BIA erred in applying the

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard to a given set of facts—by

reviewing for substantial evidence.” Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1003 (footnote

2 25-161 omitted) (citing Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 (2024)). Under the

“highly deferential” substantial evidence standard of review, “we may grant a

petition only if the petitioner shows that the evidence ‘compels the conclusion’ that

the BIA’s decision was incorrect.” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th

Cir. 2021) (internal citations omitted).

First, the evidence does not compel the conclusion that Petitioner’s removal

would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for Petitioner’s U.S.-

citizen wife or son.1 See § 1229b(b)(1)(D); Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1007–

08. The BIA found that Petitioner’s wife and son would remain in the U.S. in the

home of Petitioner’s mother-in-law, and Petitioner’s wife would continue to

receive health benefits to treat her diabetes. The BIA acknowledged that

Petitioner’s wife and son would face “financial hardship,” but concluded that any

economic hardship did “not rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual.”

These findings are supported by substantial evidence. Thus, we deny in part the

petition for review.

Second, under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229c(f) and 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we lack

jurisdiction to review the IJ’s discretionary denial of voluntary departure. See

1 By the time the case came to the BIA on appeal, Petitioner’s son was over the age of 21, and the BIA noted that he was thus “no longer a qualifying relative.” See also Matter of Isidro-Zamorano, 25 I. & N. Dec. 829, 832–33 (BIA 2012). The BIA considered the claims of exceptional and extremely unusual harm to Petitioner’s son in any case.

3 25-161 Gomez-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We do not have

jurisdiction to review the denial of voluntary departure.”). Thus, we dismiss in

part the petition for review.

PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.2

2 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The motion for a stay of removal, Dkt. 6, is otherwise denied.

4 25-161