The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY October 29, 2020
2020COA151
No. 19CA1162, Teran v. Regional Transportation District — Government — Colorado Governmental Immunity Act — Immunity and Partial Waiver
A division of the court of appeals holds for the first time that,
under section 24-10-106(1)(a), C.R.S. 2019, a plaintiff need not
show that a public employee operating a motor vehicle acted
negligently in operating the motor vehicle for the waiver of sovereign
immunity for injuries “resulting from . . . [t]he operation of a motor
vehicle” to apply, provided that the plaintiff shows that the
operation of the motor vehicle was a cause of the injuries. Thus,
sovereign immunity did not bar plaintiff’s claim for injuries caused
by RTD’s negligent maintenance of the bus’s handrail, because she
demonstrated that her injuries resulted from the bus driver’s sudden stop, even though the jury determined that the driver was
not negligent.
We also hold that, to be entitled to prejudgment interest, a
plaintiff must specifically request interest in the complaint; a
generic request for “all allowable relief that is just and proper and
allowable under Colorado law” is insufficient. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA151
Court of Appeals No. 19CA1162 City and County of Denver District Court No. 18CV32155 Honorable Elizabeth A. Starrs, Judge
Maria Teran,
Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
v.
Regional Transportation District,
Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AND ORDERS AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE TOW Navarro and Lipinsky, JJ., concur
Announced October 29, 2020
Muhaisen and Muhaisen, LLC, Mark J. Malone, Wadi Muhaisen, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant
James Stadler, Marisela D. Sandoval, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant and Cross-Appellee ¶1 Defendant, Regional Transportation District (RTD), appeals the
trial court’s judgment entered for plaintiff, Maria Teran, on a jury
verdict finding RTD negligent. RTD also appeals the trial court’s
order denying its post-trial motions for relief from the judgment, in
which it claimed RTD was entitled to immunity under the Colorado
Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), §§ 24-10-101 to -120, C.R.S.
2019.
¶2 To resolve RTD’s appeal, we explore the breadth of the CGIA’s
provision waiving immunity “in an action for injuries resulting from
. . . [t]he operation of a motor vehicle.” § 24-10-106(1)(a), C.R.S.
2019. In doing so, we conclude that Teran’s injuries “result[ed]
from” an RTD driver’s sudden stop within the meaning of the
provision, even though the driver’s actions may not have been the
most direct cause of her injuries, because Teran claimed, in part,
that (1) the handle she had been holding had been negligently
maintained; and (2) the sudden stop dislodged the handle, leading
to her fall. Because RTD’s immunity was thus waived under section
24-10-106(1)(a), we affirm the trial court’s order denying RTD’s
post-trial motions. We also affirm the trial court’s judgment against
RTD.
1 ¶3 Teran cross-appeals the trial court’s order denying, in part,
her motion to amend the judgment for costs and interest. We affirm
the order.
I. Background
¶4 In July 2016, Teran was a passenger on an RTD bus travelling
eastbound on Evans Avenue in Denver. As the RTD bus was
proceeding on its route, a vehicle suddenly, and apparently in
violation of traffic laws, emerged from a cross street and began
driving across Evans Avenue toward the left side of the bus. The
bus driver slammed on the brakes, narrowly avoiding a collision
and bringing the bus to an abrupt stop.
¶5 Teran, who was standing up and holding on to one of the bus’s
handrails, fell when the bus driver suddenly stopped the bus. She
claimed that the handrail she was holding came loose when the
driver braked, and thus failed to prevent her from falling. Teran
sustained injuries to her back and shoulder as a result of the fall.
¶6 Teran filed suit against the bus driver and RTD asserting two
distinct claims of negligence. The first claim alleged that RTD was
negligent in failing to properly maintain the handrail that Teran was
using for support. The second claim alleged that the bus driver was
2 negligent in suddenly stopping the bus without warning. Teran’s
second claim also asserted that RTD was liable for the bus driver’s
negligence under a theory of respondeat superior.
¶7 Following a trial, the jury found that the bus driver had not
acted negligently. However, as to Teran’s first claim, the jury found
that RTD was negligent in maintaining the handrail and that RTD’s
negligence had caused Teran’s injuries. Accordingly, the trial court
entered a judgment in favor of Teran and against RTD for its
negligent maintenance of the handrail.
¶8 RTD then filed two separate, but nearly identical, post-trial
motions seeking relief from the judgment — one under C.R.C.P.
12(h)(3) and one under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3). Specifically, it argued in
each motion that it was entitled to immunity under the CGIA, and
thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Teran’s claim.
The trial court, however, found that RTD’s negligent maintenance of
the handrail constituted the “operation of a motor vehicle” and thus
RTD’s immunity was waived under section 24-10-106(1)(a).
Accordingly, it denied each of RTD’s motions.
3 II. RTD’s Post-Trial Motions
¶9 RTD maintains that it has immunity from Teran’s first claim
under the CGIA. Thus, it argues, the court erred by denying its
Rule 12(h)(3) and Rule 60(b)(3) motions challenging the court’s
jurisdiction to hear the claim. We disagree.1
A. Standard of Review
¶ 10 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(h)(3) challenges whether a
court has subject matter jurisdiction — a question of law. See, e.g.,
Lee v. Banner Health, 214 P.3d 589, 594 (Colo. App. 2009) (“A trial
court’s determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction is a
question of law . . . subject to de novo review.”). Thus, where, as
here, there are no factual disputes relevant to the issue of
jurisdiction, we review a trial court’s ruling on a Rule 12(h)(3)
motion de novo. See id.; see also Tulips Invs., LLC v. State ex rel.
Suthers, 2015 CO 1, ¶ 11. We also review de novo a trial court’s
ruling on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion. Oster v. Baack, 2015 COA 39, ¶
11.
1 Because both of RTD’s motions were premised on the same jurisdictional argument, we address the court’s denial of the motions under the same analysis.
4 ¶ 11 Additionally, whether the trial court erred by denying RTD’s
post-trial motions turns on the interpretation of section
24-10-106(1)(a), which we also review de novo. Robinson v. Ignacio
Sch. Dist., 2014 COA 45, ¶ 8.
B. Applicable Law
¶ 12 Under Rule 60(b)(3), “the court may relieve a party . . . from a
final judgment . . . [if] the judgment is void.” As relevant here, “[a]
judgment is void if the court lacked . . . subject matter jurisdiction
over the cause of action.” Nickerson v. Network Sols., LLC, 2014 CO
79, ¶ 9. Similarly, Rule 12(h)(3) requires that a court dismiss an
action “[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter.”
¶ 13 “[S]overeign immunity is a jurisdictional question, an absolute
bar to suit, and prevents the court from maintaining subject matter
jurisdiction over the suit.” Gallagher v. Bd. of Trs. for Univ. of N.
Colo., 54 P.3d 386, 394 (Colo. 2002), abrogated on other grounds
by Martinez v. Estate of Bleck, 2016 CO 58; see also Walton v. State,
968 P.2d 636, 643 (Colo. 1998) (“Governmental immunity is an
issue of subject matter jurisdiction.”). Hence, in support of its
5 post-trial motions, RTD sought to establish a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction by claiming immunity under the CGIA.
¶ 14 The CGIA provides that “[a] public entity shall be immune
from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort . . . .”
§ 24-10-106(1). However, the CGIA’s grant of immunity is not
without exception. Indeed, as pertinent here, “[s]overeign immunity
is waived by a public entity in an action for injuries resulting from
. . . [t]he operation of a motor vehicle, owned or leased by such
public entity, by a public employee while in the course of
employment.” § 24-10-106(1)(a). “Because the CGIA is in
derogation of Colorado’s common law, the grant of immunity is to
be strictly construed against the public entity, and the waiver
provisions are to be deferentially construed in favor of victims.”
Young v. Jefferson Cty. Sheriff, 2012 COA 185, ¶ 8; accord
Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082, 1086 (Colo. 2000) (courts
should broadly interpret immunity waivers to favor victims);
Springer v. City & Cty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 798 (Colo. 2000)
(same).
6 C. Analysis
¶ 15 To determine whether the trial court erred by denying RTD’s
post-trial motions, we must examine whether RTD’s governmental
immunity was waived under section 24-10-106(1)(a) as to Teran’s
first claim of negligence. We conclude that it was.
¶ 16 RTD argues that its negligent maintenance of the handrail
cannot be construed as “the operation of a motor vehicle.”
Accordingly, it argues, Teran’s injuries did not “result[] from” the
operation of the bus. Moreover, RTD points out that Teran alleged
that RTD itself, not a specific public employee, failed to maintain
the handrail at issue. Thus, RTD contends that section
24-10-106(1)(a) does not apply. But RTD, in our view, reads the
statute too narrowly, ignoring that it was the bus driver’s sudden
stop that led to Teran’s injuries.
¶ 17 First, RTD concedes, and we agree, that the bus driver’s
sudden stop constituted “[t]he operation of a motor vehicle . . . by a
public employee while in the course of employment.”
§ 24-10-106(1)(a); see Harris v. Reg’l Transp. Dist., 15 P.3d 782, 784
(Colo. App. 2000) (interpreting “operation of a motor vehicle” as
“actions of the operator related to physical control of the functions
7 of the motor vehicle”). Whether RTD’s immunity was waived, then,
turns on whether Teran’s injuries can be said to have “result[ed]
from” the sudden stop.
¶ 18 Section 24-10-106(1)(a) does not state that the operation of a
motor vehicle must be the most direct, proximate, or only cause of
an injury for immunity to be waived. Nor does it purport to limit
the waiver of immunity to only those causes of action where
negligent operation of a vehicle is the basis of the claim. Rather, it
states simply that, for immunity to be waived, an injury must
“result[] from” the operation of a motor vehicle. Construing that
language, as we must, broadly and deferentially in favor of victims,
see Young, ¶ 8, we conclude that section 24-10-106(1)(a) may waive
immunity even where, as here, the operation of a motor vehicle is
neither the most direct cause of an injury nor the basis for the
cause of action. The pertinent question, to be addressed on a case
by case basis, is simply whether an injury is sufficiently
attributable to the operation of a motor vehicle to have “result[ed]
from” it.
¶ 19 Our reading of the statute is supported by at least one other
division of this court. In Harris, a division of this court rejected an
8 argument that there is no waiver of immunity under section
24-10-106(1)(a) for injuries that result from a lack of maintenance.
15 P.3d at 784-85. In doing so, the division noted, in dictum, that
“if injuries otherwise result from the operation of a bus, even if the
underlying cause may have been faulty maintenance, the waiver of
immunity is applicable.” Id. at 785. In other words, the division in
Harris suggested that where the operation of a motor vehicle is not
the only, or even primary, cause of an injury, the waiver provision
may still apply. Finding that scenario before us now, we agree with
the Harris division’s interpretation of the statute.
¶ 20 We are mindful of the potential burden our interpretation may
place on RTD to ensure that its buses are diligently maintained.
But to hold differently would have consequences of equal import, as
it would effectively allow RTD to escape liability wherever its lack of
maintenance, rather than a bus driver’s action, is a primary cause
of injury. And we reiterate that we are obligated to “broadly
construe the CGIA provisions that waive immunity in the interest of
compensating victims of governmental negligence.” Springer, 13
P.3d at 798. We note, too, that a determination of the absence of
9 governmental immunity is not a finding of liability. Harris, 15 P.3d
at 785.
¶ 21 We turn now to applying these principles to Teran’s negligence
claim against RTD. True, the bus driver’s sudden stop may not
have been as direct a cause of Teran’s injuries as RTD’s negligent
maintenance of the handrail. Moreover, it was the lack of
maintenance, not the bus driver’s actions in avoiding the collision,
that was the negligent conduct on which RTD’s liability rested. But,
as we have concluded above, neither of these facts bars the
applicability of the waiver provision. And, in our view, Teran’s
injuries were sufficiently traceable and connected to the driver’s
sudden stop to have “result[ed] from” it within the meaning of the
statute. Thus, because Teran’s claim sought damages for injuries
resulting from the sudden stop, RTD’s immunity was waived under
section 24-10-106(1)(a).
¶ 22 RTD argues, however, that because the jury found that the
driver was not negligent and not a cause of Teran’s injuries, the
injuries cannot be said to have resulted from the operation of the
bus. But nothing in the language of section 24-10-106(1)(a)
indicates that a driver must act negligently in the operation of a bus
10 for immunity to be waived. Rather, as noted above, the only
requisite is that an injury “result[] from” the driver’s operation of
the bus.2
¶ 23 Furthermore, as to the jury’s finding on causation, RTD
mischaracterizes the jury’s answers to the interrogatories on the
verdict form. The jury was asked: “Was the negligence, if any of the
[driver], a cause of any of the injuries, damages or losses claimed by
the plaintiff?” The jury, answering in the negative, determined only
that the driver’s negligence was not a cause of Teran’s injuries. The
jury did not specifically find, as RTD claims, that the driver’s
operation of the vehicle was not a cause of Teran’s injuries.
¶ 24 In sum, RTD’s governmental immunity was waived under
section 24-10-106(1)(a) as to Teran’s negligence claim against it.
Thus, the CGIA did not confer immunity on RTD so as to deprive
the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over Teran’s claim.
2Robinson v. Ignacio School District appears to suggest that immunity may be waived under section 24-10-106(1)(a), C.R.S. 2019, only if an injury results from a driver’s tortious act. 2014 COA 45, ¶ 20. To the extent it does so, we disagree. See Chavez v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70, ¶ 13 (“[D]ivisions [of the court of appeals] are not bound by the decisions of other divisions.”).
11 Accordingly, we discern no error in the court’s denial of RTD’s
post-trial motions.3
III. Jury Instructions
¶ 25 RTD contends that the trial court erred by rejecting three of its
tendered jury instructions. We disagree.
A. Additional Background
¶ 26 RTD proposed an instruction requiring that, to establish
negligence, Teran must prove that (1) a dangerous condition existed
on the bus which created an unreasonable risk of injury and (2)
RTD was negligent for failing to use reasonable care in the
maintenance of the bus. RTD also proposed instructions with the
CGIA’s definitions of the terms “dangerous condition,” which
includes a notice component, and “maintenance.”
¶ 27 The CGIA defines “dangerous condition” as
either a physical condition of a facility or the use thereof that constitutes an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public, which
3 The trial court determined that RTD’s immunity was waived under section 24-10-106(1)(a) because RTD’s negligent maintenance of the handrail was within the scope of “[t]he operation of a motor vehicle.” We make no judgment as to the trial court’s conclusion, and we affirm on other grounds. See Taylor v. Taylor, 2016 COA 100, ¶ 31 (“An appellate court may . . . affirm on any ground supported by the record.”).
12 is known to exist or which in the exercise of reasonable care should have been known to exist and which condition is proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity or public employee in constructing or maintaining such facility.
§ 24-10-103(1.3), C.R.S. 2019.
¶ 28 As to “maintenance,” the CGIA defines the term as
the act or omission of a public entity or public employee in keeping a facility in the same general state of repair or efficiency as initially constructed or in preserving a facility from decline or failure. “Maintenance” does not include any duty to upgrade, modernize, modify, or improve the design or construction of a facility.
§ 24-10-103(2.5).
¶ 29 The trial court rejected all three of RTD’s tendered
instructions.4 Instead, it instructed the jury that to recover from
RTD for her claim of negligence, Teran had to prove that (1) she was
injured; (2) RTD was negligent in the maintenance of the handrail;
4 Because RTD never filed its proposed instructions with the trial court (instead, apparently, emailing them to the court’s clerk), the precise language of each proffered instruction is absent from the appellate record. But Teran does not dispute RTD’s recollection of the instructions as stated in its opening brief. Thus, in addressing this issue, we accept RTD’s description of the proposed instructions.
13 and (3) RTD’s negligence was a cause of Teran’s injuries. The court
defined negligence as “a failure to do an act which a reasonably
careful person would do, or the doing of an act which a reasonably
careful person would not do, under the same or similar
circumstances to protect others from bodily injury.”
B. Standard of Review
¶ 30 We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to
reject a particular jury instruction. Danko v. Conyers, 2018 COA
14, ¶ 54. “A trial court’s ruling on jury instructions is an abuse of
discretion only when the ruling is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair.” Day v. Johnson, 255 P.3d 1064, 1067
(Colo. 2011).
¶ 31 To the extent RTD suggests that the trial court failed in its
duty to correctly instruct the jury on the governing law, see id., we
review de novo whether the court’s instructions as a whole
accurately did so. Id.
C. Law and Analysis
¶ 32 First, RTD appears to contend that it was entitled to each of
its tendered instructions simply because the court construed RTD’s
maintenance of the handrail as the “operation of a motor vehicle,”
14 thereby waiving immunity under section 26-10-106(1)(a). But to
the extent RTD suggests that finding alone entitled it to the
tendered instructions, we disagree. As we have concluded above,
RTD’s immunity was waived not necessarily because RTD’s
maintenance constituted the “operation of a motor vehicle,” but
because Teran’s injuries resulted from the bus driver’s sudden stop
during the operation of the bus. Thus, insofar as RTD’s argument
relies on a connection between its maintenance of the handrail and
the applicability of the waiver provision, its reliance is misplaced.
¶ 33 Second, RTD argues that it was entitled to an instruction on
negligence that mirrors the CGIA’s immunity waivers for physical
conditions of public buildings and certain enumerated facilities.
Specifically, RTD contends that the jury should have been
instructed, as its tendered instructions proposed, that it could not
find RTD negligent unless it found that the loose handrail
constituted an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the
public and that RTD had notice of the condition. We are not
persuaded.
¶ 34 As a preliminary matter, the CGIA generally concerns only
whether a public entity is entitled to governmental immunity from a
15 specific claim — an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See
§ 24-10-106(1). Should immunity be waived for a negligence claim
against an entity such as RTD, and subject matter jurisdiction
bestowed, the CGIA does not purport to define what standard of
care should then apply — which is an issue concerning liability. In
other words, whether a public entity is entitled to immunity and
whether a public entity is liable under a theory of negligence are
two separate considerations, with the CGIA governing the former
but not the latter. See Springer, 13 P.3d at 803 (“[T]he purpose of
the CGIA is to allow Colorado’s law of negligence to operate against
governmental entities, except to the extent that it has barred suit
against them.”). RTD appears to conflate the two.
¶ 35 Moreover, even assuming it would be proper to draw from the
CGIA in crafting a negligence instruction where an entity’s
immunity is waived under a CGIA provision, RTD’s instructions
drew language from waiver provisions that were wholly inapplicable
to Teran’s claim. Indeed, an RTD bus is neither a public building
nor an enumerated facility in any CGIA provision waiving immunity
for public facilities. See § 24-10-106(1). Furthermore, neither the
term “maintenance” nor the term “dangerous condition” appear in
16 section 24-10-106(1)(a), the waiver provision relevant here. And the
CGIA states that its definitions of those terms are applicable only as
used in CGIA provisions. See § 24-10-103 (CGIA definitions apply
“[a]s used in this article 10.”). We see no reason why having its
immunity waived under one CGIA provision entitled RTD to an
instruction mirroring other, inapplicable waiver provisions.
¶ 36 RTD further argues that failing to instruct the jury as it
requested contravened legislative intent because it allowed the jury
to find RTD liable regardless of whether it had notice of the loose
handrail and whether the loose handrail was a “dangerous
condition” under the CGIA. But whether RTD had notice of the
condition was not rendered irrelevant to the jury’s determination of
liability, as RTD suggests. Rather, whether RTD had notice fell
under whether it had acted reasonably under the circumstances,
which the jury was instructed to consider. Certainly, RTD was not
held to a strict liability standard simply because there was no
notice instruction modeled after the CGIA. Moreover, as noted
above, the CGIA applied here only in determining the extent of
RTD’s immunity, not its liability. Thus, we cannot see how a
negligence instruction that did not draw on the CGIA’s “dangerous
17 condition” requirement found in an unrelated waiver provision
contravened the legislature’s intent.
¶ 37 Finally, to the extent RTD suggests the trial court otherwise
did not properly instruct the jury on the standard of care, we
disagree. RTD cites to no authority, and we are aware of none in
Colorado, that entitles a party in RTD’s position to a standard of
care instruction other than that given by the trial court. Indeed,
simply because Teran’s negligence claim concerned a maintenance
issue did not compel an instruction on notice, as would a claim
rooted in, for example, the Premises Liability Act. See, e.g.,
Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 570-71
(Colo. 2008).
¶ 38 In sum, we see no error in the trial court’s instruction on
negligence. Nor, for the reasons articulated above, do we conclude
that the trial court’s decision to reject RTD’s tendered instructions
was manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair. Thus, we discern
no abuse of discretion. Day, 255 P.3d at 1067.
IV. Prejudgment Interest
¶ 39 Teran cross-appeals, contending that the trial court erred by
denying, in part, her motion to amend judgment for costs and
18 interest. Specifically, she argues that the trial court erroneously
denied her request to amend the judgment against RTD to include
prejudgment interest. We disagree.
¶ 40 Whether the trial court erred by denying Teran’s request turns
on the interpretation of section 13-21-101(1), C.R.S. 2019, which
we review de novo. Munoz v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2018 CO 68,
¶ 9. That section provides that “[i]n all actions brought to recover
damages for personal injuries . . . it is lawful for the plaintiff in the
complaint to claim interest on the damages claimed from the date
the action accrued.” § 13-21-101(1) (emphasis added).
¶ 41 Interpreting section 13-21-101(1), our supreme court held that
“the plaintiff must claim . . . interest in the complaint” to be
awarded prejudgment interest under the statute. Munoz, ¶ 11.
Here, however, Teran did not specifically request prejudgment
interest in her complaint. Rather, she simply requested “damages
for injuries enumerated above and for all allowable relief that is just
and proper and allowable under Colorado law.” Because the statute
must be strictly construed, we agree with the trial court that
Teran’s catchall prayer for relief was insufficient to satisfy the
statute’s pleading requirement. See Sperry v. Field, 205 P.3d 365,
19 367 (Colo. 2009) (“Because an interest statute is in derogation of
the common law, the language of the statute must be strictly
construed by the court.”). Indeed, Teran cites to no case of binding
authority, and we are aware of none, in which a plaintiff was
awarded prejudgment interest without at least using the word
“interest” in the complaint’s prayer for relief. Because, in our view,
Teran failed to adequately claim interest in her complaint, we affirm
the court’s denial of her request for prejudgment interest. See
Munoz, ¶ 11.
V. Conclusion
¶ 42 The trial court’s judgment in favor of Teran and against RTD is
affirmed. The court’s orders denying RTD’s post-trial motions and
Teran’s request for prejudgment interest are also affirmed.
JUDGE NAVARRO and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.