Uvino v. Uvino, No. Fa96-0252984s (Sep. 10, 1998)

1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 10620
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedSeptember 10, 1998
DocketNo. FA96-0252984S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 10620 (Uvino v. Uvino, No. Fa96-0252984s (Sep. 10, 1998)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Uvino v. Uvino, No. Fa96-0252984s (Sep. 10, 1998), 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 10620 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The court has before it a number of postjudgment motions for modification of a judgment which was entered by agreement of the parties on January 6, 1998. The judgment file indicates that after finding the necessary elements of jurisdiction the court made a finding that the marriage had broken down irretrievably, dissolved the marriage and ordered that the plaintiff and the defendant share joint legal custody of the minor children. The court made a further order that visitation would continue until such further order of the court as per a handwritten agreement between the parties dated January 13, 1996, and as on file designated Item 111 in the court file. This agreement reads as follows:

"Visitation Schedule shall be as follows on a rotating four-week schedule until school begins:

Week One — Monday, Wednesday, Friday, Saturday, Sunday with Plaintiff and Tuesday, Thursday with Defendant.

Week Two — Wednesday, Thursday, Sunday with Plaintiff and Monday, Tuesday, Friday, Saturday with Defendant.

Week Three — Monday, Wednesday, Friday, Saturday, Sunday with Plaintiff and Tuesday, Thursday with Defendant.

Week Four — Monday, Tuesday, Friday, Saturday with Defendant and Wednesday, Thursday, Sunday with Plaintiff. CT Page 10621

Weekday overnights begin at 5:00 p. m. and end at 7:00 a.m. the next morning.

Sundays when the Defendant has the Children and the Children are not spending the night with the Defendant, Defendant shall bring Children to the Plaintiff at 5:00 p. m.

Said arrangement for visitation shall remain in effect until further orders of the Court."

The agreement also provided that this visitation shall remain in effect until further orders of the court. As noted, the agreement was entered into at a time when school was on vacation and specifically indicated or contemplated some type of a different agreement when school began. At the time of this agreement, the parties were not living in the family dwelling house at 345 Thorpe Avenue, Meriden, Connecticut. The plaintiff had left the dwelling and was apparently residing with the children at her father's house.

The agreement Item 111 was silent as to the physical custody of the children or the principal place of residence of the children; the judgment does not contain a specific order with regard to these elements. Defendant now contends that the agreement provided for joint physical as well as joint legal custody. Plaintiff disputes this.

The agreement also provided that the matter was referred to the family relations for a mediation with a study to follow if the family relations office deemed it appropriate to determine the issue of physical custody and a permanent visitation-parenting access schedule.

A review of the file indicates that the initial complaint of the plaintiff sought legal custody with the principal residence with the plaintiff. Shortly thereafter, the defendant filed a cross complaint seeking joint custody of the minor children. On July 23, 1996, by Motion No. 116, the plaintiff sought leave to file an amended complaint to seek sole custody, both legal and physical. By way of Motion No. 119, dated July 29, 1996, the defendant sought to amend his cross complaint to seek sole custody both legal and physical. These motions were not ruled upon by the court prior to the dissolution proceeding. CT Page 10622

On or about October 7, 1996, the defendant filed a motion for contempt accusing the plaintiff of refusing to abide by the visitation schedule. At the same time, the defendant moved to modify custody to give him primary physical custody. In October of 1996, the parties reconciled for a short period of time.

The reconciliation failed, and on October 31, 1996, the defendant filed an amended motion seeking to modify custody alleging that the agreement of June 13, 1996, provided for joint legal and physical custody and asserted again that the plaintiff was denying him access to the children. This motion did not come before the court for a ruling prior to the dissolution in January of 1998.

In June of 1997, the defendant filed a second request for a leave to amend the cross complaint, Item No. 147 in the file. This request sought sole legal and physical custody of the children, and in the alternative, joint legal and joint physical custody of the children.

It is apparent from this review of the file that although the court order of June 13, 1996, was based upon the agreement of the parties and has remained in place without modification until the time of judgment on January 6, 1998, neither party was satisfied with these arrangements. At the hearing before Judge Levine, in January of 1998, the parties came to another agreement. This agreement was the basis for the dissolution and provided orders for unallocated alimony and support, health insurance for the children, life insurance for the children, a transfer of the jointly owned property known as 345 Thorpe Avenue, Meriden, Connecticut, to the defendant in consideration of a payment of $8,750.00 to the plaintiff. The court also entered an order for a lump payment to the plaintiff and made a distribution of the defendant's 401(k) and profit sharing plan to the plaintiff. The final orders of the court also concerned personal property, tax-exemptions, automobiles and a specific order with regard to a nail compressor and gun which was used by the plaintiff for cosmetic purposes in conjunction with the beauty work which she conducted in her home. The court determined that this nail compressor and gun was either in the possession of the defendant or had been in his possession at the time that it was lost. The court gave the defendant the option to either replace the nail compressor and gun or to pay the plaintiff the sum of $500. At the request of the parties, the judge permitted them to go forward with a divorce and property settlement and refer the CT Page 10623 matter of visitation and physical custody to a judge trial referee.

Immediately after the January 6, 1998 dissolution hearing, the plaintiff filed a motion for modification of custody and support in accordance with Judge Levine's order that this matter be referred to a judge trial referee. Shortly thereafter, on January 20, the parties agreed that an attorney should be appointed for the minor children, and the court appointed Attorney Laura Zullo to serve in this capacity.

The court held hearings on these motions on July 13, 1998, and July 14, 1998.

Both parties testified at length, and each introduced witnesses to support their position. The plaintiff's basic complaint was that the current midweek overnight visitation order exacerbates her difficulties in communicating with her former husband, interferes with her custodial schedule, frustrates normal day-to-day family life during the school year and presents her with considerable difficulties in getting her eldest son to school on a timely basis, presents her with difficulty in getting the children to school as a result of the weekly overnight visitation which the defendant enjoys during the school year. The plaintiff also testified that she found it extremely difficult to communicate with her former husband over the visitation schedule and has stopped trying to communicate with him directly, instead using one of the children as a medium of communication. Plaintiff attributes this lack of communication between the parties to the husband's vulgarity and rudeness. The plaintiff offered testimony to corroborate the defendant's use of vulgar language directed toward her in the presence of the children.

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Bluebook (online)
1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 10620, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/uvino-v-uvino-no-fa96-0252984s-sep-10-1998-connsuperct-1998.