Utz v. Utz

Opinion

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LORRAINE A. UTZ v. PETER D. UTZ, SR.

(AC 47777) Alvord, Westbrook and DiPentima, Js.*

Syllabus

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant had been dissolved in 2007, appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying several of her postjudgment motions, including motions for contempt. The defendant failed to pay certain amounts required by the terms of the dissolution judgment, and, in 2017 and 2019, the parties entered into agreements with respect to certain arrearages and amounts owed, which became orders of the court. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly denied her motion for contempt regarding a home equity line of credit. Held: The trial court properly declined to hold the defendant in contempt for his failure to comply with the terms of the dissolution judgment requiring him to pay off and close a home equity line of credit, as the court properly determined that the 2017 and 2019 agreements were ambiguous in that respect, which precluded a finding of contempt. The trial court’s finding that the parties intended to settle all monetary debts except as pertaining to the children pursuant to their 2017 and 2019 agreements was clearly erroneous, as the reference to “property settlement” in the 2017 and 2019 agreements was intended to refer to the lump sum alimony amount owed and the agreements therefore did not address the defendant’s obligation, contained within the dissolution judgment, to pay off and close a home equity line of credit on the marital home, and this court was left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been committed. The trial court did not improperly deny the plaintiff’s motion for contempt on the basis that the defendant’s incomplete financial affidavit could not have supported any credibility finding in his favor, as the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant should have been found not credible was inadequately briefed, and the court had before it the defendant’s testimony with respect to the assets that the plaintiff claimed were omitted from his financial affidavit, and it was for the trial court to accept or reject that testimony. The trial court properly determined that no interest was awarded on the amounts to be repaid by the defendant to the children’s Uniform Gifts to Minors Act accounts, as the court declined to read into a previous memorandum of decision an order of interest that was not plainly stated.

Argued February 4—officially released September 15, 2026

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New London at Norwich, where the defendant

*

The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.

filed a cross complaint; thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Swienton, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain other relief; subsequently, the court, Diana, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for contempt and issued certain financial orders; thereafter, the court, Connors, J., approved an agreement of the parties as an order of the court; subsequently, the court, Hadden, J., approved an agreement of the parties as an order of the court; thereafter, the court, Spallone, J., rendered judgment denying the plaintiff’s motions for contempt; subsequently , the court, Spallone, J., denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings.

Lorraine A. Utz, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff ).

Brandon H. Marley, with whom was Drzislav Coric, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

ALVORD, J. In this postdissolution matter, the self- represented plaintiff, Lorraine A. Utz, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying several postjudgment motions she filed against the defendant, Peter D. Utz, Sr. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) denied her motion for contempt alleging that the defendant had failed to comply with the terms of the dissolution judgment requiring him to pay off and close a home equity line of credit on the marital home, (2) found the defendant credible despite his submission of an incomplete financial affidavit, and (3) determined that no interest had been awarded on the amounts that the defendant was ordered to repay to the parties’ children following his withdrawal of money contained within their Uniform Gifts to Minors Act accounts (UGMA accounts).1 We reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.2 1 We have consolidated and reordered the plaintiff’s claims. See footnotes 2 and 12 of this opinion. 2 The plaintiff also claims that the court improperly denied her motion for reconsideration. Because we reverse the judgment in part with

The following facts and procedural history are relevant . “The parties were married on August 18, 1990. The court dissolved the parties’ marriage by a memorandum of decision filed on March 29, 2007. At the time of dissolution , the parties had two minor children. The court found that the marriage had broken down irretrievably, and, in addition to a stipulated custody and visitation order, it entered various financial orders. In relevant part, it ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff $435 per week in child support, $1 per year in nominal alimony,3 $1000 per week in periodic alimony4 and a lump respect to her motion alleging that the defendant had failed to pay off and close the home equity line of credit on the marital home, we need not address the claim with respect to the motion for reconsideration on that issue. Because we reject the remainder of the plaintiff’s challenges, which formed the basis of her motion for reconsideration, we need not review the appropriateness of the court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. See Hohorst v. Easton, 237 Conn. App. 665, 699, 353 A.3d 263 (2026) (“[b]ecause we conclude that the court properly granted [the] motion for summary judgment, we need not review the propriety of its denial of the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration”).

Additionally, we note that the plaintiff’s appeal form identifies only the order denying her motion for reconsideration as the order from which she appeals. However, the plaintiff asserts in her preliminary statement of the issues that one of the issues that she intends to present on appeal is “[w]hether the trial court erred by entering judgment based on a misapprehension of facts.” Moreover, she includes in her principal appellate brief arguments challenging the underlying judgment. Mindful of the plaintiff’s self-represented status, we construe the plaintiff’s appeal to be from both the denial of her motion for reconsideration and the underlying judgment. See Prioleau v. Agosta, 232 Conn. App. 94, 95 n.1, 335 A.3d 93 (2025).

3 “The court ordered nominal alimony of $1 per year ‘until such time as the property settlement [entered by the court was] paid in full and the liens and encumbrances on the [marital home], which the defendant is obligated to indemnify on account of [the property settlement, were] paid in full and, or, released, or he exercises his option to purchase the residence and acreage.’ It further stated that the order of $1 per year alimony would be ‘modifiable to the extent necessary to ensure that the defendant satisfies all of his obligations’ under the property settlement, periodic alimony and lump sum alimony orders.” Utz v. Utz, 112 Conn. App. 631, 633 n.1, 963 A.2d 1049, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 908, 969 A.2d 173 (2009).

4 “The court ordered periodic alimony of $1000 per week ‘until the death of either party, the remarriage of the [plaintiff] or March 31, 2017, whichever shall sooner occur’ with the intent that the order sum alimony payment of $150,000. The defendant also was ordered to pay all counsel fees for the minor children and guardian ad litem, plus make a $50,000 contribution toward the plaintiff’s counsel fees.” Utz v. Utz, 112 Conn. App. 631, 632–33, 963 A.2d 1049, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 908, 969 A.2d 173 (2009).

With respect to the marital home, the court ordered: “The defendant shall transfer all of his right, title and interest in and to the home and all the acreage located at 735 Fire Street, Oakdale, Connecticut [(marital home)], including its contents, which transfer shall relate back to the plaintiff’s lis pendens dated September 6, 2005. The plaintiff shall be responsible for the payment of the balance of the recorded first mortgage on the property to John and Anna Utz. The defendant shall pay off and close the line of credit on the [marital home] within [ninety] days of this memorandum.

“The defendant shall have the option to purchase the property for [$750,000] and shall notify the plaintiff by certified mail within [ninety] days of this memorandum if he intends to exercise the option to buy out. . . . In the event the defendant does not exercise his option to buy the property, he shall make all necessary arrangements to remove the Assignment of Right of Usage, recorded at volume 485, page 755, of the Montville Land Records, and any recordation of the promissory notes (plaintiff’s exh[ibit] 2) so that the plaintiff shall have uninterrupted and exclusive use of the home and property. Said arrangements shall include facilitating a possible quiet title action, [with] which the defendant shall fully cooperate and pay all legal fees and costs.”

Nine years after the judgment of dissolution, on May 11, 2016, the court, Diana, J., adjudicated a motion for contempt filed by the plaintiff, which alleged that the ‘shall be nonmodifiable by either party as to term.’ ” Utz v. Utz, 112 Conn. App. 631, 633 n.2, 963 A.2d 1049, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 908, 969 A.2d 173 (2009).

defendant had failed to pay the lump sum alimony owed. In that decision, the court determined that the “financial orders of the 2007 judgment remain unsatisfied.” The court set a payment order requiring the defendant to pay $50 weekly until the lump sum alimony order was fully satisfied. The court further ordered that following the expiration of the periodic $300 weekly alimony obligation on March 31, 2017, the defendant then would pay $350 weekly toward the lump sum alimony order.

In May 2017, the self-represented plaintiff filed a motion for contempt, in which she alleged that the defendant had failed to comply with orders contained in the dissolution judgment. Relevant to this appeal, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant owed an arrearage balance of $17,591.31 with respect to “child support and alimony,” was “behind on his monthly tax payments in the amount of $3250” as to the total real estate taxes owed in the amount of $18,839.77,5 and was “behind on his weekly lump sum alimony payments in the amount of $1300” as to the total lump sum alimony award of $150,000. The motion for contempt did not include allegations with respect to the marital home or any related financial obligations.

On June 8, 2017, the court, Connors, J., approved an agreement of the parties (June 2017 agreement), making it an order of the court. The June 2017 agreement provided: “Defendant will pay plaintiff $450 per week until the total amount of unallocated support arrearage of $17,531.31, property tax of $17,376.95, and $146,250 of property settlement are fulfilled according to their divorce decree, totaling $181,158.26. Any changes to these payments of amounts owed will only be altered as mutually agreed on by both parties.”

In November 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt , in which she referenced the June 2017 agreement and alleged that the defendant was behind on the payment obligations set forth in that agreement. In that motion 5 In the 2016 decision, the court, Diana, J., had ordered the defendant to pay real estate taxes on the marital home in the amount of $18,839.77.

for contempt, the plaintiff also noted that the dissolution judgment required the defendant to “pay off a [home equity line of credit] he took out during the divorce.” Relatedly, the plaintiff alleged that “[t]he defendant did not pay off the . . . loan, resulting in a foreclosure sale [which] is now pending appeal, thus resulting in homelessness.”6 The November 2017 motion for contempt was not adjudicated.

On October 17, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion, which was coded in the court file as a motion for modification of child support. She identified as the current unallocated support amount $450 weekly, and the order to be modified as expressed in the June 2017 agreement. The plaintiff checked the box asking the court to modify child support and represented in the motion “[w]e have come to an agreement on [Docket] Entry [No.] 366 [the June 2017 agreement].” Immediately following this document in the paper file is a document signed by both parties on October 3, 2019 (October 2019 document). The October 2019 document states that the parties have “mutually agreed to a lump sum settlement payment,” which payment “satisfies the [June 2017 agreement]. . . . In the [June 2017 agreement, the defendant] was to pay [the plaintiff] $181,158.26 in total. To date, the outstanding balance that [the defendant] owes totals $126,508.26.” (Citations omitted.)

The October 2019 document states: “The mutually agreed upon payment amount is $66,000. Through executing this agreement, [the defendant] agrees to pay [the plaintiff] $66,000 in three installments each equaling $22,000. The installments shall be tendered on the third of every month for the next three months. The first installment shall be conveyed on October 3, 2019.

6 The plaintiff alleged: “The defendant has the ability to pay and has offered to pay various lump sums of $60,000 and $30,000 in cash as a settlement of these claims.”

The second on November 3, 2019. The final installment on December 3, 2019. . . .

“This agreement is executed when [the defendant] delivers the first installment payment to [the plaintiff] and both parties sign below. This agreement will be submitted to the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut for the District of Norwich, from which the Dissolution Order originated. . . .

“The parties hereby certify that the terms above are true and accurately represent the will of the parties. The [p]arties further certify this agreement settles all debt [the defendant] owes to [the plaintiff], except for any and all monies owed pertaining to the children.”

On October 10, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion coded in the court file as a motion for modification of alimony and child support. Therein, she identified as the current alimony amount $450 weekly and checked the boxes asking the court to modify both alimony and child support and represented in the motion, “[w]e have an agreement. Please see attached.” There is no attachment in the court file following the October 10, 2019 motion to modify.

On November 7, 2019, the court, Hadden, J., following a brief canvass, approved and made an order of the court an agreement of the parties, finding it “fair and equitable under the circumstances of this matter.” The November 7, 2019 agreement (November 2019 agreement) provided: “The parties agree: On June 8, 2017, the parties agreed that the defendant owed the plaintiff a total amount of $181,158 which included support arrearage, property tax and property settlement. The parties agree that the amount owed is to be reduced to $66,000 to be paid in three installments each equaling $22,000. The defendant has paid the first two installments and the third installment shall be paid on December 3, 2019. All other orders will remain in full force and effect.”

In 2022, the plaintiff filed several motions. The plaintiff filed a motion to modify alimony, in which she requested, inter alia, that the court modify the alimony orders to require the defendant to make weekly alimony payments in the amount of $650 until the defendant’s obligation with respect to the marital home as ordered in the dissolution judgment was satisfied. The plaintiff filed a motion for modification of child support, in which the plaintiff sought an order requiring the defendant to continue making $1000 payments to the parties’ daughter until satisfaction of the $6460.98 balance owed her for postsecondary educational support. The plaintiff subsequently amended this motion. The plaintiff filed a motion for contempt, in which she alleged that the defendant had failed to comply with orders regarding payment of the children’s postsecondary educational expenses, including allegations that he owed $26,686.54 to the parties’ son. The plaintiff subsequently amended this motion. Finally, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt alleging that the defendant had failed to pay off and close the home equity line of credit on the marital home. The plaintiff sought an order requiring the defendant to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the marital home to foreclosure.7 The court, Spallone, J., held a hearing on the motions filed by the plaintiff in 2022 over three dates in March, April and November 2023. Between the first and second hearing dates, the plaintiff retained counsel. Both parties testified, along with the defendant’s brother, and introduced documents into evidence. The parties submitted posttrial briefing on December 22, 2023.

On April 19, 2024, the court issued its decision on the plaintiff’s 2022 motions. The court first considered the text of the June 2017 agreement and the May 2017 motion for contempt that preceded the agreement. The court next considered the filings in 2019, including the motions for modification and the November 2019 agreement. The court stated that it “listened to the official court recording of the canvass” that occurred on 7 The plaintiff also filed a motion for contempt alleging that the defendant had failed to comply with orders of the court regarding life insurance . The plaintiff does not raise any claims on appeal with respect to the court’s denial of this motion.

November 7, 2019, and noted that neither party asked a question of the court or expressed any concern regarding the November 2019 agreement.

The court next turned to the parties’ arguments. The defendant’s position was that the November 2019 agreement was “dispositive of almost all the issues before the court.” The plaintiff’s position was that the November 2019 agreement “only addressed certain issues raised in a motion for contempt and did not include, particularly, a home equity line of credit . . . on the marital residence that she alleges the defendant failed to pay off.” The plaintiff argued that she never had agreed that the defendant was no longer obligated to pay off and close the home equity line of credit. The court recited the plaintiff’s framing of the principal issue as “whether the November . . . 2019 agreement precludes the plaintiff from making a claim that the defendant still owes her the value of the [marital home] which was lost to foreclosure by the bank for nonpayment of the [home equity line of credit] in 2019, and, if yes, how much does the defendant owe the plaintiff and what schedule of payments ought to be entered.”

In its analysis, the court concluded that the June 2017 agreement, which was referenced in the November 2019 agreement, was “comprehensive, encompassing the then known financial disputes between the parties.” The court concluded that, “[b]ased on all the information before the court, including the content of the motions, the canvass, the content of the agreement, the relevant circumstances gleaned from the record and briefs and the reference to the [October 2019 document], the court concludes that the parties intended to settle all monetary debts between them except as pertaining to the children through [the June 2017 and November 2019] agreements.”

The court then turned to the plaintiff’s claims that the defendant owed money to the parties’ adult children , which claims the court noted were addressed only in passing in the plaintiff’s posttrial brief. The court stated: “The record reflects that on May 11, 2016 . . .

[Judge Diana] found that the defendant owed the parties ’ daughter . . . $22,581.78 as of February 23, 2016, and their son . . . $24,632.82 as of February 23, 2016. The court went on to order that the obligations be repaid within three years. The defendant points out in his brief that there were exhibits presented during the hearing itemizing payments made to the children since 2011. The exhibits point to $61,018 being paid to [the daughter] and $34,424 being paid to [the son] between 2011 and 2022, including $54,542 to [the daughter] and $30,315 to [the son] since the May 2016 order. The defendant alleges he exceeded his court-ordered obligation to the children. The exhibit pertaining to [the son] is defendant ’s exhibit C, while the exhibit pertaining to [the daughter] is defendant’s exhibit D. The exhibits consist of spreadsheets supported by contemporaneous documents including copies of receipts, money orders and the like. Significantly, [Judge Diana’s order] from 2016 does not mention interest, and . . . it is not reasonable to infer the interest was ordered. Therefore, the motions pertaining to moneys owed to the children are denied.”

The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration , and the defendant filed an objection. On June 14, 2024, the court denied the motion for reconsideration with the statement that it had “articulated its factual findings and conclusions of law in its comprehensive memorandum of decision addressing each of the plaintiff ’s motions. Additionally, the plaintiff argues facts outside of the record in her motion for reconsideration that the court cannot consider.” This appeal followed.

I

We first address the plaintiff’s claim that the court improperly denied her motion for contempt alleging that the defendant had failed to comply with the terms of the dissolution judgment requiring him to pay off and close the home equity line of credit. The plaintiff contends that the court improperly construed the parties’ agreements, in that the agreements had “misidentified” as property settlement the defendant’s lump sum alimony obligation.

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the trial court properly found that the parties’ agreements were ambiguous but erroneously resolved the ambiguity in favor of the defendant. In light of the agreements’ ambiguity , we conclude that the court properly declined to hold the defendant in contempt but that the matter requires a remand for a new hearing and determination of whether remedial orders should issue.

We begin by setting forth general principles of law and our standard of review. An agreement of the parties that has been incorporated into a judgment “must be regarded as a contract and construed in accordance with the general principles governing contracts. . . . When construing a contract, we seek to determine the intent of the parties from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction. . . . [T]he intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and . . . the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract. . . . When only one interpretation of a contract is possible, the court need not look outside the four corners of the contract. . . . Extrinsic evidence is always admissible, however, to explain an ambiguity appearing in the instrument. . . . When the language of a contract is ambiguous, the determination of the parties’ intent is a question of fact. . . . When the language is clear and unambiguous, however, the contract must be given effect according to its terms, and the determination of the parties’ intent is a question of law. . . .

“A contract is unambiguous when its language is clear and conveys a definite and precise intent. . . . The court will not torture words to impart ambiguity where ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity. . . . Moreover , the mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous . . . .

“In contrast, a contract is ambiguous if the intent of the parties is not clear and certain from the language of the contract itself. . . . [A]ny ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used by the parties. . . . The contract must be viewed in its entirety, with each provision read in light of the other provisions . . . and every provision must be given effect if it is possible to do so. . . . If the language of the contract is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the contract is ambiguous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nation- Bailey v. Bailey, 316 Conn. 182, 191–92, 112 A.3d 144 (2015). The threshold question of whether contractual language is itself ambiguous is a question of law over which our review is plenary. Simpson v. Simpson, 352 Conn. 81, 95–96, 335 A.3d 472 (2025).

We first turn to the threshold question of whether the language of the agreements is ambiguous. Although the court did not expressly state that it had found the agreements ambiguous, it is clear from the court’s memorandum of decision that it looked outside the four corners of the agreements. Following its examination of “the plain language of the [November 2019] agreement,” the court stated that “[s]ome historical context is helpful .” It then examined the motions in the file and the October 2019 document. The court then stated that it had determined the parties’ intent “[b]ased on all the information before the court, including the content of the motions, the canvass, the content of the agreement, the relevant circumstances gleaned from the record and briefs and the reference to the [October 2019 document] . . . .” Having considered that range of information, the court concluded “that the parties intended to settle all monetary debts between them except as pertaining to the children . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Finally, in denying the plaintiff’s motion for contempt regarding the home equity line of credit, the court stated that it was denying the motion “based upon the extensive review of the testimony, evidence and record set forth above.”8 See Chang v. Chang, 197 Conn. App. 733, 742 n.3, 232 8 Although the court referenced its review of the testimony, we note that the court did not make any factual findings regarding the testimony of the parties as bearing on its determination of intent.

A.3d 1186 (2020) (“[w]itness testimony as to his or her interpretation of language in an order is extrinsic evidence , which should only be considered when the order is found not to be clear and unambiguous”). Thus, the trial court necessarily determined that the agreements were ambiguous.

We agree with the trial court’s implicit conclusion that the agreements are ambiguous. As the trial court correctly pointed out, the agreements use a “broad term”— property settlement—and attached a specific sum to that term. As the trial court found, the agreements “[do] not directly reference” the marital home. Thus, we conclude that the language of the agreements is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, rendering the agreements ambiguous.

We next turn to the court’s finding that, through the June 2017 and November 2019 agreements, “the parties intended to settle all monetary debts between them except as pertaining to the children . . . .” “When the language of a contract is ambiguous, the determination of the parties’ intent is a question of fact, and the trial court’s interpretation is subject to reversal on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous. . . .

“A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . Because it is the trial court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its findings. . . . In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not examine the record to determine whether the [court] could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . Instead, we make every reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the trial court’s ruling.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Reiner v. Reiner, 214 Conn. App. 63, 76–77, 279 A.3d 788 (2022).

In the present case, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed and that the trial court’s finding that the parties intended to settle all monetary debts except as pertaining to the children is clearly erroneous. For the reasons that follow , we conclude that the reference to “property settlement ” in the June 2017 and November 2019 agreements was intended to refer to the lump sum alimony amount owed. Therefore, the agreements did not address the defendant’s obligation, contained within the dissolution judgment, to pay off and close the home equity line of credit on the marital home.

First, we note that, although the court recognized that “the parties’ briefs do not address the calculation of the property settlement amount in the [June] 2017 agreement ,” a careful review of the record suggests the basis for the sum identified. The amount identified in the June 2017 agreement as “property settlement” is $146,250, which figure is slightly less than the $150,000 lump sum alimony amount ordered by the court in the dissolution judgment. Despite more than nine years having passed since the dissolution judgment, as of May 11, 2016, when adjudicating the plaintiff’s motion for contempt regarding the defendant’s failure to pay the lump sum alimony, Judge Diana explained that the “financial orders of the 2007 judgment remain unsatisfied.” As noted previously, Judge Diana set a payment order requiring the defendant to pay $50 weekly until the lump sum alimony order was fully satisfied. Judge Diana further ordered that, following the expiration of the periodic $300 weekly alimony obligation on March 31, 2017, the defendant would pay $350 weekly toward the lump sum alimony order. Were the defendant to be credited with making all payments in accordance with the orders issued on May 11, 2016, a balance of approximately $144,550 would remain on the obligation.9 In the plaintiff’s May 2017 motion for contempt, she alleged that the defendant was “behind on his weekly lump sum alimony payments in the amount of $1300,” which would mean that the defendant would have owed approximately $145,850. We note that there remains only a $400 difference between the amount owed as lump sum alimony and the $146,250 amount, which reasonably could be accounted for as a $350 and a $50 payment.

Unlike the correspondence between the amount owed for lump sum alimony and the amount stated in the June 2017 agreement, the dissolution judgment contains no amounts under the heading of “property settlement” that can be identified as the source of the $146,250 sum. The following orders were contained within the “[p]roperty settlement” section of the dissolution judgment: orders related to the marital home, the defendant shall retain his interest in two businesses, orders related to motor vehicles, each party shall retain their respective bank accounts, the plaintiff shall retain her lot in Florida, the parties shall share equally in the defendant’s shares of Pfizer stock and Putnam Fund (worth a combined total of $25,313), the plaintiff shall retain the proceeds from the sale of a property in Killington, Vermont (proceeds of approximately $25,000), and no claims were made regarding home furnishings and personal property.

As to the specific term “property settlement,” we are convinced that the term was inaccurately used in the June 2017 and November 2019 agreements. See 11 S. Williston , Contracts (4th Ed. 1999) § 32:6, p. 432 (“The context and subject matter of a contract may indicate that an ordinary word or phrase has an unusual meaning in a given sentence. The context and subject matter may even show that a word or phrase of otherwise clear meaning has been inaccurately used by the parties. In either case, 9 This sum is calculated by multiplying forty-six weeks by $50, which totals $2300, and multiplying $350 by nine weeks, which totals $3150. Subtracting both total amounts from the $150,000 total owed equals $144,550.

the parties’ true intention will control notwithstanding the conventional meaning.”).

Our determination in this regard is buttressed by our review of the plaintiff’s motion for contempt, the resolution of which resulted in the June 2017 agreement. In that motion, she specifies the obligations of the defendant for which she is seeking a finding of contempt. She alleges that he had failed to provide proof of life insurance, had “not paid the child support and alimony consistently and thus owes an arrearage balance of $17,591.31,” was behind on his monthly tax payments, was “behind on his weekly lump sum alimony payments in the amount of $1300,” and had not made efforts to repay amounts due to the children’s UGMA accounts. Absent from the motion for contempt is any reference to property division. The trial court decision underlying the present appeal downplayed the significance of that omission from the motion by stating that “issues could be settled through an agreement that are not necessarily raised or referenced in a motion.” Interpreting the June 2017 agreement to refer to a settlement regarding property division, however, would mean that the agreement did not encompass the lump sum alimony obligation. We find it unlikely that the parties would resolve the plaintiff’s motion for contempt, with the largest amount alleged owing therein being the lump sum alimony, by omitting from their agreement that obligation entirely, and instead setting forth an agreement regarding property division, which was not a claim in the motion for contempt.10 We are persuaded that the more reasonable interpretation of the June 2017 agreement is that it addressed the arrearages identified in the plaintiff’s motion for contempt and that the label of “property settlement” erroneously was applied to the lump sum alimony obligation. See R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 171 Conn. App. 61, 237, 156 A.3d 539 (2017) (“we should avoid construing 10 We note that the plaintiff filed, in November 2017, another motion for contempt. In this motion, the plaintiff expressly alleged that the defendant had failed to pay off and close the home equity line of credit, as ordered in the dissolution judgment. The motion was not adjudicated.

the contract language in a manner that has no rational explanation, especially when a more reasonable interpretation is readily available”), aff’d, 333 Conn. 343, 216 A.3d 629 (2019).

Although we cannot identify the specific source of the term “property settlement” as used in the June 2017 agreement, we note that the record reveals prior instances of the defendant seeking to have the lump sum alimony award categorized as a property settlement. In 2014, the court, Adelman, J., rejected the defendant’s contention that the lump sum alimony award constituted a property settlement, which interpretation the defendant argued in support of his efforts to have the spousal support obligation discharged under the Bankruptcy Code. Judge Adelman analyzed the judgment and concluded that the dissolution court clearly intended for the lump sum obligation to constitute alimony.

The court in this matter placed emphasis on the timing of the November 2019 agreement, explaining that the plaintiff had stated in her July 2022 motion for modification that the defendant had taken advantage of her “dire situation” at the time of the November 2019 agreement when she was being forced to move out of the marital home due to the foreclosure. The court states that this acknowledgment in her motion “indicates that the plaintiff was, indeed, concerned about the loss of the [marital home] on November 7, 2019, but entered into an agreement that does not directly reference it. While she may have regretted that decision three, four, or five years on, that does not provide a basis for the court to revisit it now.” We are not persuaded that the plaintiff’s concern about losing the marital home leads to a conclusion that the parties intended that the November 2019 agreement encompass the defendant’s obligations with respect to the marital home, particularly because the November 2019 agreement settled the obligations contained within the June 2017 agreement, which we previously have interpreted as not addressing the defendant’s obligation with respect to the marital home.

Next, we examine the court’s consideration of the October 2019 document in interpreting the intent of the parties with respect to the November 2019 agreement.11 “[W]hen the words used in the contract are uncertain or ambiguous, parol evidence of conversations between the parties or other circumstances antedating the contract may be used as an aid in the determination of the intent of the parties which was expressed by the written words.”12 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hirschfeld v. Machinist, 181 Conn. App. 309, 324, 186 A.3d 771, cert. denied, 329 Conn. 913, 186 A.3d 1170 (2018). As the court noted, the October 2019 document states that the parties certify that “this agreement settles all debt [the defendant] owes to [the plaintiff], except for any and all moneys owed pertaining to the children.” We conclude that the October 2019 document does not support a conclusion that the parties intended to settle all debts because that language does not appear within the November 2019 agreement. Instead, the November 2019 agreement states that “[a]ll other orders will remain in full force and effect.” The court addresses this difference by merely stating that “[t]he document that was approved by the court does not contain the language regarding the scope of the agreement, but does again use the broad term ‘property settlement.’ ” As previously discussed, we are convinced that the use of the term “property settlement” was intended to refer to the lump sum alimony. As to the omission in the November 2019 agreement of the language regarding settling all 11 We note that the defendant did not defend the motion for contempt by arguing that the October 2019 document was an enforceable contract but, rather, argued that the November 2019 agreement “was supported by” the October 2019 document.

12 The plaintiff additionally claims on appeal that the court improperly admitted into evidence the October 2019 document. In light of our resolution of the plaintiff’s claim that the court improperly interpreted the parties’ agreements, we need not address her arguments with respect to the October 2019 document.

debts, we find helpful guidance in the related general rule of construction that, “if a contract includes a level of specificity in one context and then omits that specificity in a similar context, such an omission is purposeful and should be given meaning.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., supra, 171 Conn. App. 269.

We also consider the court’s reliance on the canvass of the parties, performed in connection with the November 2019 agreement. The court stated that it has “listened to the official court recording of the canvass that occurred on that date. Both parties . . . stated that the agreement was fair and equitable under the circumstances, and then they wanted it to be made [an] order of the court.” The court additionally found significant that “neither party raised a question with the court, expressed concern or a feeling of duress, or otherwise sounded hesitant regarding entry of this agreement on the record.” We are not persuaded that the canvass supports the interpretation of the agreement reached by the court.

The entire canvass relied upon by the court comprised fewer than three pages of transcript in its entirety13 and directed to the plaintiff only the following questions:

“The Court: So, Ms. Utz, is that, in fact, the term[s] of your agreement?

“[The Plaintiff]: Yes. “The Court: Are those the terms of your agreement? “[The Plaintiff]: Yes. 13 The court stated the agreement on the record as follows: “The written agreement provides that on June 8, 2017, the parties agree that the defendant owed the plaintiff a total amount of $181,158, which included support arrearage, property tax, and property settlement.

“The agreement goes on to state that the parties agree that the amount owed is to be reduced to $66,000 to be paid in three installments, each equaling $22,000. The defendant has paid the first two installments, and the third installment shall be paid on December 3, 2019, and all other orders will remain in full force and effect.”

“The Court: All right. Did you agree to anything other than that?

“[The Plaintiff]: No. “The Court: All right. Do you feel you fully understand these terms?

“[The Plaintiff]: Yes.

***

“The Court: And do you also agree, Ms. Utz, that these terms are fair and equitable under all the circumstances?

“[The Plaintiff]: Yes.” The court inquired similarly of the defendant and then found “that the terms are fair and equitable under the circumstances of this matter and [the court] will accept the agreement and enter the terms of the agreement as orders of the court.”

We conclude that the canvass was not sufficiently detailed to bear on the question to be resolved, as stated by the trial court: “[W]hat did the parties mean by the term ‘property settlement’ with respect to the $146,250 figure?” Significantly, the canvass did not address the parties’ understanding of the terms of the agreement. Cf. Halperin v. Halperin, 196 Conn. App. 603, 608– 609, 230 A.3d 757 (2020) (“[f]ollowing the individual canvasses by counsel, the court sought clarification, ‘given the complexity of th[e] agreement’ ” and asked about parties’ understanding of “total income” as used in agreement, ensuring that reference to line 22 on federal form 1040 was “ ‘deliberate and not accidental’ ”). To the contrary, the brief canvass conducted in the present case reveals nothing regarding the parties’ understanding of the amount identified as “property settlement” in the agreement.14 Finally, we note that the trial court’s conclusion that the parties intended to settle all monetary debts except 14 This court was provided with the transcript of only the November 2019 canvass. The trial court stated in its decision that “[b]oth [the June as pertaining to the children does not account for the omission of the lump sum alimony award. The agreements expressly addressed unallocated “support arrearage,” “property tax,” and “property settlement.” Interpreting the term “property settlement” to include the defendant’s obligations in relation to the marital home would mean that the defendant’s lump sum alimony obligation is unaddressed by the agreement, and the agreement’s provision that “[a]ll other orders will remain in full force and effect” would necessitate a conclusion that the lump sum alimony remained due and owing. As the plaintiff represents in her brief to this court, she did not file a motion for contempt regarding the lump sum alimony obligation because she believed that obligation was encompassed within the November 2019 agreement.

Although the trial court’s determination of the parties’ intent was clearly erroneous and, thus, the court improperly interpreted the agreement, the court’s implicit determination that the agreement was ambiguous was proper. That finding of ambiguity precludes the defendant from being found in contempt. See Parisi v. Parisi, 315 Conn. 370, 382, 107 A.3d 920 (2015) (“[a] sufficiently clear and unambiguous [order] is a necessary prerequisite for a finding of contempt because [t]he contempt remedy is particularly harsh . . . and may be founded solely upon some clear and express direction of the court” (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Chang v. Chang, supra, 197 Conn. App. 742 n.3 (noting that extrinsic evidence should only be considered upon finding that order is ambiguous and, thus, cannot support finding of contempt). Accordingly, the court properly declined to hold the defendant in contempt. 2017 agreement and the November 2019 agreement] were accepted by the court and made orders, in open session, with the parties appearing and being canvassed under oath.” The trial court additionally stated that the June 8, 2017 canvass did not “shed light on the [home equity line of credit] issue.” Neither party has challenged on appeal the court’s statement that the June 8, 2017 canvass did not address the home equity line of credit issue. Thus, any absence of the transcript of that canvass does not impact our analysis.

The determination that the agreement was ambiguous, however, does not preclude the trial court from issuing an appropriate order of compliance. We note that the plaintiff ’s motion for contempt alleged that the defendant was obligated, pursuant to the terms of the dissolution judgment, to pay off and close the home equity line of credit on the marital home. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to pay off and close the line of credit, resulting in foreclosure proceedings. The plaintiff alleged that the marital home ultimately was “sold at auction in June 2019.” In addition to requesting that the defendant be held in contempt, the plaintiff requested as relief that the defendant be ordered “to compensate for the loss of the [marital home]” and “such other and further relief the court may find equitable and appropriate.”

“[I]t is well established that after a judgment has been rendered, a trial court has inherent authority and continuing jurisdiction to fashion a remedy appropriate to the vindication of [that] . . . judgment . . . . Accordingly, when there is an ambiguity in the language of a judgment , the court may effectuate its prior [judgment] . . . by interpreting [the] ambiguous judgment and entering orders to effectuate the judgment as interpreted . . . so long as that interpretation is merely a clarification, and not an alteration, of the original judgment. . . . The court’s inherent authority to effectuate its prior judgments, either by summarily ordering compliance with a clear judgment or by interpreting an ambiguous judgment and entering orders to effectuate the judgment as interpreted, is not dependent upon a predicate finding that a noncompliant party is in contempt. . . . Finally, as a general matter, the trial court has wide discretion and broad equitable power to fashion relief in the infinite variety of circumstances which arise out of the dissolution of a marriage.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Parisi v. Parisi, supra, 315 Conn. 381. Thus, the trial court, on remand, may exercise its discretion to determine whether an order of compliance should be issued. See id., 386 (concluding that court improperly found agreement to be clear and, on remand, after clarifying meaning of agreement, court should enter accompanying order of compliance); see also Sablosky v. Sablosky, 258 Conn. 713, 723, 784 A.2d 890 (2001) (“even if the court determines that because of such an ambiguity contempt would not be warranted, it may nonetheless enter an appropriate order of payment based on its interpretation of the judgment”).

II

We next address the plaintiff’s claim that the court erroneously denied her motion for contempt on the basis that the defendant’s incomplete financial affidavit could not have supported any credibility finding in his favor. We are not persuaded.

It is well established that “[i]t is within the province of the trial court, when sitting as the fact finder, to weigh the evidence presented and determine the credibility and effect to be given the evidence. . . . Credibility must be assessed . . . not by reading the cold printed record, but by observing firsthand the witness’ conduct, demeanor and attitude. . . . An appellate court must defer to the trier of fact’s assessment of credibility because [i]t is the [fact finder] . . . [who has] an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and the parties; thus [the fact finder] is best able to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to draw necessary inferences from them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cimino v. Cimino, 174 Conn. App. 1, 11, 164 A.3d 787, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 929, 171 A.3d 455 (2017).

We first note that the plaintiff’s general contentions that the defendant should have been found not credible are inadequately briefed. The plaintiff points to prior findings, made by other judges during the prolonged period of time that this case has been pending, as supporting a finding that the defendant was not credible during the present hearing. However, the plaintiff does not identify any specific credibility finding made by the trial court in the present matter and merely provides that “his testimony was inconsistent and evasive,” without identifying the specific pieces of testimony she challenges . See C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630, 273 A.3d 271 (2022) (brief containing minimal citations to record was inadequate).

The plaintiff argues that the defendant omitted trailer park income and a Fidelity account from his financial affidavit.15 The defendant was questioned regarding the trailer park income, and he testified that he is “not allowed to collect the money. That’s why the fiduciary does and gets the bills except for a few that I pay that are personal.” The defendant also was questioned at length regarding the Fidelity account. He testified that he owned the account, that he did not list it on his financial affidavit , and that he did not list it because it was “a probate issue, so I have to kind of wait.” The court had before it the defendant’s testimony with respect to the assets that the plaintiff claims were omitted from his financial affidavit, and it was for the trial court to accept or reject that testimony. See L. K. v. K. K., 226 Conn. App. 279, 309–10, 318 A.3d 243 (2024) (“[T]he trial court is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the evidence presented by any witness, having the opportunity to observe the witnesses and gauge their credibility. . . . This court defers to the trial court’s discretion in matters of determining credibility and the weight to be given to a witness’ testimony. . . . We cannot retry the matter, nor can we pass on the credibility of a witness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Accordingly, we reject the plaintiff’s claim.

III

The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly determined that no interest was awarded on the amounts 15 The plaintiff mentions in passing that the defendant omitted from his financial affidavit “other vehicles that he owned.” The only vehicle identified in the plaintiff’s brief, however, is a truck that the defendant testified he no longer owned and had “resold . . . as junk . . . .”

to be repaid to the children’s custodial UGMA accounts.16 We are not persuaded.

The following procedural history is relevant to this claim. In a July 8, 2011 decision on a motion for contempt filed by the plaintiff, the court, Boland, J., found that the defendant “withdrew all balances in the UGMA accounts in 2008—[the son’s] in July and [the daughter’s] in September—and deposited all the proceeds into his personal checking account. He then used this money to pay his personal obligations.” Judge Boland found the withdrawals to be a clear violation of the dissolution judgment and entered a remedial order requiring the defendant to repay the funds. Specifically, Judge Boland concluded: “[C]onsidering the circumstances and the fact that the defendant has had the use of this money for three years, the court will impose upon him interest from September 15, 2008, to date of payment at the rate of 8 percent per annum. The court finds that he withdrew $14,155.35. Annual interest (not compounded) amounts to $1132.43 per year, and as of August 1, $3254.57 of interest will have accrued. Accordingly, his debt to [his daughter] as of that date is $17,409.92, with a per diem thereafter of $3.1025.

“As to [the son’s] account, the only distinction is that, since he is just sixteen, the restoration of the money held therein does not possess the same degree of urgency. The defendant withdrew $18,009.65 from his son’s account on July 24, 2008, and on the third anniversary of that date two weeks from now the interest computed in the same fashion will amount to $4322.32, or a total due of $22,331.97, with per diem interest after July 24, 2011, of $3.9565.”17 16 We note that the plaintiff’s claim on appeal is limited to her contention that the court improperly determined that no interest was awarded. To the extent that she alludes in passing to an argument regarding payments made prior to Judge Diana’s decision, she did not adequately brief any claim that the court improperly determined that the defendant had repaid the principal amounts owed.

17 Judge Boland ordered: “The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff, as trustee for [the son], the sum of $22,331.97 on or before July 24, 2012, together with interest thereon from July 24, 2011, through the date of payment in the per diem amount of $3.9565.”

In 2016, Judge Diana, addressing a motion for contempt filed by the plaintiff with respect to educational support, stated: “The defendant has satisfied the terms of the court order (Boland, J.) (#269.00). The defendant owes his daughter . . . $22,581.78 as of February 23, 2016. The defendant owes his son . . . $24,632.82 as of February 23, 2016. No monthly order of repayment is ordered at this time; however, these obligations shall be repaid within three years.”

In the present matter, the court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant owed interest on the amounts repaid to the children.18 The court found significant that Judge Diana’s “order . . . from 2016 does not mention interest . . . and it is not reasonable to infer the interest was ordered.”

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that no interest was owed. She argues that Judge Boland’s 2011 decision imposed interest and Judge Diana’s 2016 decision, although not expressly addressing interest, contained calculations that reflected an award of interest. We are not persuaded.

“It is well established that the construction of a judgment presents a question of law over which we exercise plenary review. . . . In construing a trial court’s judgment , [t]he determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment. . . . The interpretation of a judgment may involve the circumstances surrounding the making of the judgment. . . . Effect must be given to that which is clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed. . . . The judgment should admit of a consistent construction as a whole.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Silver v. Silver, 200 Conn. App. 505, 515–16, 238 A.3d 823, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 973, 240 A.3d 1055 (2020).

Although Judge Diana, in his 2016 decision, appeared to have calculated the amount the defendant owed to the children by including per diem interest imposed by 18 The court noted that the plaintiff had mentioned her claim that the defendant continued to owe money to the children only in passing in her posttrial brief.

Judge Boland in his 2011 decision, we interpret Judge Diana’s decision as declining to impose additional interest going forward. First, we note that the court did not expressly state that interest would continue to accrue. Nor is it implicit in the court’s ordering of a sum certain. Additionally, Judge Diana declined to impose a payment schedule but rather ordered only that the amounts be repaid within three years. Finally, Judge Diana expressly imposed interest on other payment obligations in his memorandum of decision. Specifically, he ordered the defendant to pay the real estate taxes “in the amount of $18,839.77 plus interest (8 percent per annum) to the plaintiff to be paid at the rate of $500 per month . . . .” Like the trial court, we decline to read into Judge Diana’s memorandum of decision an order of interest that is not plainly stated. Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly construed Judge Diana’s decision. Thus, the plaintiff’s claim fails.

The judgment is reversed with respect to the denial of the plaintiff’s motion for contempt alleging that the defendant had failed to pay off and close the home equity line of credit on the marital home and the case is remanded for a new hearing limited to that issue, after which the trial court in its discretion may impose reasonable remedial orders as appropriate; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.