Utley v. Pence

175 S.W.2d 372, 295 Ky. 673, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 335
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedNovember 9, 1943
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 175 S.W.2d 372 (Utley v. Pence) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Utley v. Pence, 175 S.W.2d 372, 295 Ky. 673, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 335 (Ky. 1943).

Opinion

Opinion oe the Court by

Judge Ratliee

Affirming.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Jefferson circuit court confirming an award made by the Workmen’s Compensation Board to appellee who received an injury on June 14,1940, while in the employ of appellant. It was stipulated that appellee and appellant had both accepted and were operating under the Kentucky Workmen’s Compensation Act, KRS 342.001 et seq.; that appellee was in the employ of appellant on June 14, 1940, and received an average weekly wage of $50 per week; that he received an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment for which appellant admits liability; that all the facts as to the employment and liability are stipulated and agreed to be existing, and that the only question for the board to determine are the amount and extent of the injury.

The evidence was heard before a referee of the board who rendered an opinion making his finding and award, allowing appellee $15 per week for twelve weeks temporary total disability, but denied compensation for permanent disability in any degree. Appellee petitioned the board for a hearing before the full board and on June 4, 1941, the full board entered an order in which it stated, in substance, that the medical testimony contained in the record was so conflicting that it created a doubt in the minds of the members of the board as to *674 whether a proper conclusion could be reached from the record as it then stood, and set aside the original order of submission and reopened the case for further investigation of appellee’s injuries. The board then directed appellee to submit himself for an examination by Dr. John B. Thawick who examined appellee, and being unable to satisfy himself about his condition, referred him to Drs. R. Glenn Spurling and Everett G. Grantham who also examined appellee and reported that there was no demonstrable pathology to account for his complaints. Dr. Thawick thereafter made a report to the board based upon his own examination and the report received from Dr. Grantham, and after stating the symptoms, condition, etc., of appellee he concluded his report as follows: “This man, in my opinion, is lacldng in essential vitamins, and has not been able therefore, to react normally to a jarring shake-up he received. He impresses me as being a man who is entirely lacking in the elements which the vitamin B„ preparations might supply. I have taken the liberty, therefore, of prescribing that line of treatment. You will immediately ask, will this line of treatment cure the condition in the hip and knee. No, I am afraid not, and it is on this that I am basing my recommendations for 25% permanent, partial disability. The man is not totally disabled, but at his age and with his temperament, with the long established nutritional deficiency from which it will be difficult for him to recover, the disabling in his knee and hip, left side, are apt to be, as I have said, permanent. I believe therefore, it would be fair to pass over all consideration of total disability, permanent or otherwise, and give this man a 25% permanent, partial. If the Board desires, let this ruling be established and send the man back again after six months for additional investigation. I do think he should be referred to a competent internist who can follow up his constitutional defects. I will recommend such a doctor to the Board, if you so desire.”

On October 21, 1941, the board entered another order reciting the uncertain condition of the evidence and directed that the case be continued until January, 1942. In the meantime, Dr. Thawick referred appellee to Dr. Raymond Heitz for treatment, and on January 29, 1942, Dr. Heitz made his report to the board in which he stated that he saw appellee on December 29, 1941, January 14, 1942, and January 22, 1942; that at the time of *675 his first examination appellee complained of suffering pain in the left hip and groin and walked with a definite limp, and that his condition had changed very little at the last examination on January 22, 1942. He said he was of the opinion that appellee still had a' partial disability of at least 25% and was still under his treatment. After receiving the report from Dr. Heitz the board delivered an opinion on April 21, 1942, in which it found that appellee had suffered a 50% disability, and awarded him $6 a week for a period of 322 weeks. Appellant appealed from the order of the board to the Jefferson circuit court which, as stated above, was confirmed.

Appellant urges a reversal of the judgment insisting (1) that there is no evidence of a substantive or probative nature tending to show that appellee is now suffering any permanent disability, and (2) if he has any permanent disability in any degree it is not as much as 50% as found by the full board. This brings us to a consideration of the evidence heard before the referee, in addition to the reports of the doctors indicated above, which, by agreement of parties, were treated as their evidence.

Appellee testified that a ladder on which he was working tripped and threw him off and he fell on a pile of lumber two and one-half feet high and the end of the lumber hit and bounced up and hit him across the back and doubled his legs back under his body and the lumber fell on him. He said the timber struck him across the sacrum and injured his sacrum, hips and back. They immediately sent him to the hospital where he remained three weeks and four days, during which time he was attended by Dr. Bate. He said Dr. Bate came in one morning and said: ‘ ‘ Sit up' as much as you can today and get up tomorrow and walk around. The next day you are going home.” He said when he got up to walk the only way he could get around was with his hands on a chair. Later he was examined and treated by Dr. Humphrey, who prescribed a brace for his back and taped his back for the first time. Dr. Humphrey asked him where his brace was and he told him that he did not have one and the doctor said: “You mean the doctor let you out of the hospital in that condition without a brace?” He described other treatments given by Dr. Humphrey and Dr. Humphrey finally suggested that he see Dr. Glenn Spurling, and later said that Mr. Whitfield, a representative of the insurance company, sent *676 him to see Dr. Spurling who gave him an examination and prescription and suggested that he see his family-doctor. He told Dr. Spurling that he had no doctor himself but that Dr. Charles Bush had taken care of his daughter and family. He said that Dr. Bush told him that there was nothing further that a medical doctor could* do and that no further treatment he could give would do him any good. He said he was still wearing the brace prescribed by Dr. Humphrey and that he could not get along without it; that he stayed in bed 16 or 18 hours a day and still suffered as a result of the injury and could not walk without the support of a cane. He said he had been a carpenter for about 16 years and during that time he had been disabled only about one day because of a “turned ankle” about four years ago; that he had never had any venereal disease of any kind and suffered no disability or illness previous to the in-' jury complained of. He was asked if he was able to do carpenter work at that time and he answered and further testified as follows:

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Bluebook (online)
175 S.W.2d 372, 295 Ky. 673, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 335, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/utley-v-pence-kyctapphigh-1943.