Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed December 17, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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Nos. 3D24-1056, 3D24-1316, 3D24-1278 Lower Tribunal Nos. 18-42110-CA-01, 1842205-CA-01, 18-42463- CA-01 ________________
USAA Casualty Insurance Company, et al., Progressive Advanced Insurance Company, et al., and MGA Insurance Company, Inc., etc., Appellants,
vs.
MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, etc., et al., Appellees.
Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, David C. Miller, Judge.
Akerman LLP, Alexander J. Hall, Valerie B. Greenberg, and Nancy A. Copperthwaite, for appellants.
MSP Recovery Law Firm and Ryan H. Susman, for appellees.
Before EMAS, FERNANDEZ and LINDSEY, JJ. FERNANDEZ, J.
In case numbers 3D24-1056, 3D24-1278, and 3D24-1316,
defendants/appellants USAA Casualty Insurance Company and USAA
General Indemnity Company (“USAA”); MGA Insurance Company; and
Progressive Advanced Insurance Company, et al. (“Progressive”),
respectively, appeal the trial court’s orders in each of their appeals denying
their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs/appellees
MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC (“MSP Recovery”); MSPA Claims 1, LLC
(“MSPA Claims”); MSP Recovery Claims Series 44, LLC; and Series PMPI
(all three referred to collectively as “plaintiffs”) are represented by the same
counsel in these cases. USAA, MGA, and Progressive, et al. are represented
by the same counsel before this Court and in the trial court.
The three appeals arise from circuit court actions filed by plaintiffs for
pure bills of discovery under the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault (“PIP”)
Statute, section 627.376, Florida Statutes (2018). The subject complaints in
each case make the same allegations regarding personal jurisdiction. In
each case, the trial court denied the insurance companies’ motions to
dismiss based on personal jurisdiction. Each motion to dismiss relied on
Florida and federal caselaw finding no personal jurisdiction in similar cases
filed by plaintiffs. Accordingly, because the three related appeals raise the
2 same legal issue, we now consolidate them for purposes of this opinion. For
the following reasons, we reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss
each case for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Facts Related to the Three Underlying Cases
In each of plaintiffs’ complaints, plaintiffs sought information about
unspecified insureds who were involved in auto accidents and who also had
Medicaid coverage. Plaintiffs filed the lawsuits after assignments were
allegedly obtained from managed care organizations and related entities.
No merits discovery took place while plaintiffs were trying to disqualify
the insurance companies’ counsel. Plaintiffs started to prosecute the three
underlying lawsuits after this Court rejected their disqualifications motions
and after the Florida Supreme Court denied plaintiffs further review.
When the merits litigation resumed, plaintiffs amended their
complaints, increased the number of assignors, and added claims involving
Medicare beneficiaries in addition to Medicaid beneficiaries. They also
sought relief as a class action. Plaintiffs now seek declarations that contrary
to federal requirements, the Insurers “must coordinate benefits with
Secondary Payors”; the Insurers must “alert Secondary Payors of their
primary obligations”; that contrary to Florida law, Secondary Payors “are not
3 obligated to submit a demand for reimbursement on a properly completed .
. . standard form”; and Secondary Payors need not “comply with the strict
requirements” of the PIP Statute. 1
The three insurers moved to dismiss the new complaints on various
grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction. The insurers argued that
plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient ultimate facts to establish either general or
specific jurisdiction over them. In support of their motions to dismiss, the
insurers cited to MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Coloplast
Corporation, 353 So. 3d 705 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“Coloplast I”); MSP
Recovery Claims Series v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2021 WL 355133 (S.D.
Fla. Feb. 2, 2021) (granting motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction); and MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. 21st Century
Centennial Ins. Co., 2023 WL 11903567 (Fla. 11th Cir. Jan. 25, 2023)
(same). In Coloplast I, this Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal for lack
of personal jurisdiction and rejected plaintiffs’ argument to extend long-arm
1 Plaintiffs define “Secondary Payors” as “all nongovernmental organizations, including but not limited to Medicaid Managed Care Organizations [‘MCOs’], Medicare Advantage Organizations [‘MAOs’], first-tier and downstream entities and their assignees, that provide health and prescription benefits in the State of Florida.” The Assignors allegedly are Secondary Payors.
4 jurisdiction for a pure bill of discovery in the manufacturing context. Coloplast
I, 353 So. 3d at 706-07.2
The USAA appeal – 3D24-1056
Plaintiffs filed the underlying action for a pure bill of discovery regarding
PIP claims then amended their pleading and added a second count for
declaratory relief. USAA moved to dismiss both complaints. There was no
hearing or ruling on either motion.
The proceedings were paused from 2020-2023 while plaintiffs sought
to disqualify USAA’s counsel, which was not successful. Akerman LLP v.
MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC, 338 So. 3d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022), rev.
denied, 2022 WL 4930534 (Fla. Oct. 4, 2022).
After the action resumed in the trial court, plaintiffs amended their
complaint again. USAA moved to dismiss the second amended complaint on
various grounds, including that the complaint had insufficient allegations as
to personal jurisdiction. The trial court at first denied USAA’s motion to
2 Later, in Coloplast Corporation v. MSP Recovery Claims, Series, LLC, 415 So. 3d 353, 353 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (“Coloplast II”), this Court reversed the trial court’s denial of Coloplast’s second motion to dismiss. This Court rejected MSP’s position that it had established jurisdiction for a pure bill of discovery against a foreign medical device manufacturer, including under the business-venture prong of Florida’s long-arm statute. § 48.193(1)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (2023).
5 dismiss “in all respects except on the grounds asserting lack of personal
jurisdiction.” The trial court reserved ruling on the jurisdictional issue until the
evidentiary class certification hearing on May 17, 2024.
At the evidentiary class certification hearing, the trial court rejected
USAA’s jurisdictional argument. Because the trial court required USAA to
participate in a class certification hearing before ruling on its jurisdictional
defense, at the court’s suggestion, plaintiffs stipulated that USAA’s “actions
in engaging in discovery to defend against the motion for class certification
would not constitute a waiver of Defendants’ argument that the Court lacks
personal jurisdiction over them.” However, the trial court ruled that USAA
waived its personal jurisdiction defense by not raising it earlier. The trial court
granted the motion for certification.
USAA appealed the dismissal order (and the certification order) to this
Court. See Third District Court of Appeal Case No. 3D24-1116, USAA
Casualty Insurance Co. v. MSP Recovery Claims. The trial court denied
USAA’s motion to stay the trial court proceedings pending the conclusion of
its interlocutory appeals, but this Court entered a stay on USAA’s motion.
The MGA Appeal – 3D24-1278
6 Plaintiffs filed the underlying action for a pure bill of discovery
regarding PIP claims, and MGA moved to dismiss the complaint. About one
year later, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and then later amended
again, adding a claim for declaratory relief. MGA moved to dismiss the
Second Amended Complaint. There was no hearing or ruling on either of
MGA’s motions to dismiss.
As with USAA, the merits proceedings were paused for two years while
plaintiffs tried to disqualify MGA’s counsel. Plaintiffs eventually withdrew their
disqualification request, and MGA renewed its motion to dismiss. The trial
court held hearings in April 2023, June 2024, and July 2024 on MGA’s
motions to dismiss. In its Answer and afterwards, MGA maintained its
jurisdictional defense that it was not incorporated in Florida and does not
operate its principal place of business in Florida, thus plaintiffs’ allegations
regarding personal jurisdiction were insufficient. MGA raised its personal
jurisdiction defense before the April 2023 hearing where the trial court issued
its first ruling on MGA’s motion. Eventually, the trial court denied MGA’s final
motion to dismiss in the trial court’s Second Dismissal Order and Third
Dismissal Order.
7 MGA appealed the trial court’s Second and Third Dismissal Orders.
The trial court denied MGA’s motion to stay the trial court proceedings
pending the appeal, but this Court granted MGA’s motion to stay.
The Progressive Appeal – 3D24-1316
Plaintiffs filed an action for a pure bill of discovery regarding PIP claims.
Plaintiffs amended their pleading and added a second count for declaratory
relief. Progressive moved to dismiss the complaint and amended complaint
for various reasons, including that there were insufficient allegations
regarding personal jurisdiction. There was no ruling or hearing on
Progressive’s motions.
As with the other two insurance companies’ cases, the case was
stayed for two years while plaintiffs tried to disqualify Progressive’s counsel.
Plaintiffs eventually withdrew their disqualification request, and Progressive
renewed its motion to dismiss. The trial court held hearings in March 2023
and July 2024 on Progressive’s motions to dismiss. Progressive raised its
personal jurisdiction defense at the beginning of the case before any hearing
or ruling on its motions. The trial court denied the renewed motion and
ordered Progressive to answer the amended complaint.
8 In its Answer and afterwards, Progressive maintained its jurisdictional
defense that it was not incorporated in Florida nor operated their personal
place of business in Florida. The trial court eventually denied Progressive’s
final motion to dismiss. Progressive appealed the second dismissal order,
and the trial court stayed the proceedings pending resolution of this appeal.
Standard of Review
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s rulings on a motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction. Coloplast I, 353 So. 3d at 707; Facebook,
LLC v. Grind Hard Holdings, LLC, 390 So. 3d 142, 144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024).
In addition, when reviewing such a motion, the appellate court must construe
the long-arm statute “strictly . . . in favor of non-resident defendants.”
Blumberg v. Steve Weiss & Co., Inc., 922 So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 3d DCA
2006).
Discussion
The insurers now argue that the trial court erred in denying their
motions to dismiss because plaintiffs did not allege any basis for the court to
assert jurisdiction over the non-resident insurers. They further assert that
each insurer properly raised its jurisdictional defense before the trial court
9 issued any dismissal ruling; thus, they did not waive their jurisdictional
defenses. We agree.
“Under Florida law, ‘personal jurisdiction . . . [is] necessary before a
defendant, either an individual or business entity, may be compelled to
answer a claim brought in a court of law.’” Facebook, 390 So. 3d at 144
(quoting Borden v. E.-Eur. Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 2006)). “The
initial inquiry is whether ‘the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to
bring the action within the ambit of [Florida’s long-arm] statute[.]’” Id. (quoting
Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989)).
Florida’s Long-Arm statute provides, in part:
(1)(a) A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself for herself and, if he or she is a natural person, his or her personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from any of the following acts: 1. Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state. ... 4. Contracting to insure a person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting. ... (2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.
See § 48.193(1)(a)(1) and (4), Fla. Stat. (2018); 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (2018).
10 For plaintiffs to sue the insurers in Florida, they must establish general
jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. Facebook, 390 So. 3d at 145. Here,
plaintiffs have not met their burden under either prong of the long-arm
statute.
In their pleadings, plaintiffs alleged specific jurisdiction. They did not
cite to section 48.193(2), and they did not allege facts regarding general
jurisdiction. They only mentioned that the insurers “engaged in substantial
and not isolated activities in Florida.” “To satisfy the requirements of section
48.193(2), a corporation’s contacts must constitute ‘“affiliations with the State
[that] are so ‘continuous and systemic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in
the forum State.”’” Meraki Invs., Ltd. v. Unit 1805 Inc., 319 So. 3d 718, 721
(Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs have not shown the
“exceptional” circumstances required for the trial court to exercise general
jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation that is not its place of
incorporation or its principal place of business. MSP Recovery Claims
Series, LLC v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2021 WL 355133 at *3 (S. D. Fla.
Feb. 2, 2021). Plaintiffs’ allegation of “substantial and not isolated activities”
does not meet this requirement. Id. at *4 (“None of these bare allegations,
alone or taken together, comes even close to establishing fact[s] that show
any of the Insurance Companies’ operations in Florida are ‘so substantial
11 and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in’ Florida.”)
(granting non-resident insurers’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction).
In addition, the insurers emphasize that plaintiffs conceded this point
in other similar suits against non-resident insurers. See MSP Recovery
Claims, Series LLC v. Hanover Ins. Co., 2024 WL 4026198, at *1 (Fla. 11th
Cir. Ct. Aug. 28, 2024) (“The Plaintiff has withdrawn its claim of general
jurisdiction over the Defendants[.]”); MSP Recovery Claims v. Zurich Am.
Ins. Co., 2024 WL 4037212, at *1 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Aug. 28, 2024) (same);
MSP Recovery Claims Series v. Northland Ins. Co., 2022 WL 2341158, at *2
(“Plaintiff implicitly concedes that the Court does not have general jurisdiction
over the [non-resident] Defendants, as Plaintiff makes no argument that the
general jurisdiction provision of the Florida long-arm [statute] . . . applies.”)
(citations omitted); MSP Recovery Claims v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 2021 WL
8343191, at *3 n.2 (“The parties agree there is no basis for general
jurisdiction over either Defendant.”); MSP Recovery Claims v. Westfield Ins.
Co., 2021 WL 8343201, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2021) (“Defendants argue
that Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient affiliations required for general
jurisdiction within Florida. . . . Plaintiffs do not dispute this.”) (citations
omitted).
12 Plaintiffs alleged specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)(1)
(operating a business in Florida) and section 48.193(1)(a)(4) (contracting to
provide insurance in Florida). For specific jurisdiction to apply, plaintiffs must
allege that each “defendant does one of the enumerated acts occurring
within Florida, and [ ] that the plaintiff[s’] cause of action arise from one of
the enumerated acts occurring in Florida.” Banco de los Trabajadores v.
Cortez Moreno, 237 So. 3d 1127, 1135 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). These two
requirements “are known as the [long-arm] statute’s connexity requirement.”
Id.; Great Am. Ins. Co., 2021 WL 8343191, at *3 n.3 (“It is not enough that
Plaintiff’s claims may in some way ‘relate to’ Defendants’ business in Florida
or their insurance contracts with Florida residents. Florida’s long-arm statute
expressly requires a plaintiff’s claims to ‘aris[e] from’ one or more of the
delineated activities.”).
Here, plaintiffs did not connect their equitable claims to the insurers’
alleged Florida activities. Plaintiffs sued the three insurers for a pure bill of
discovery and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs, who hold assignments from
Secondary Payers and not the insureds, do not assert legal claims in their
actions. For example, they do not assert any breaches of Florida insurance
contract claims.
13 In the pure bill of discovery claims, plaintiffs request that the non-
resident insurers collect information and produce documents relating to their
auto insurance policies and payments made for the assignors’ enrollees.
They seek this information about all claims so they can use the information
to bring future damages actions against the insurers under the Medicare
Secondary Payer Act. This is improper. And as the insurers point out, such
a search would not give rise to specific jurisdiction in Florida because
plaintiffs do not allege that the insurers’ acts of locating information and
documents would take place in Florida, instead of at the insurers’
headquarters.
In their claim for declaratory relief, plaintiffs seek declarations as to
various legal questions. For example, plaintiffs want to know whether the
insurers must prevent Secondary Payers from making payments and
whether Secondary Payers must submit claims to the insurers on specific
forms. Plaintiffs also ask the trial court for a declaration that they are not
required to provide certain information to the insurers. Just as with the pure
bill of discovery claims, these declarations the plaintiffs seek relate to the
insurers’ activities outside Florida.
Furthermore, plaintiffs’ equitable claims do not arise from the insurers’
business ventures in Florida or from any Florida insurance policy. In their
14 complaints, plaintiffs allege that their claims are “based on the practice and
common course of conduct of the … Defendants in failing to identify and alert
… Secondary Payors as required by” the PIP statute. However, plaintiffs do
not provide any information or details of the insurers’ failure to identify and
alert Secondary Payers. Nor do plaintiffs connect these alleged failures to
the insurers’ Florida business ventures or Florida insurance policies.
As the insurers demonstrate, other trial courts have analyzed similar
claims brought by the same plaintiffs against other insurers and concluded
that the claims do not establish specific personal jurisdiction under section
48.193(1)(a). See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2021 WL 355133, at *4 (“[T]he
Plaintiffs utterly fail to connect their own particular claims against the various
Insurance Companies to those Florida-related acts.”) (italics in original);
Great American Ins. Co., 2021 WL 8343191, at *3 (“Although these facts
suggest Defendants conduct business in Florida and issue insurance
policies to Florida residents, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing its
particular causes of action directly ‘aris[e] from’ those Florida-related acts.”);
Westfield Ins. Co., 2021 WL 8343201, at *4 (“The Court agrees with
Defendants that Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient connexity between
Defendants’ failure to pay and an enumerated act under the long-arm
statute.”); MSP Recovery Claims, Series, LLC v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am.,
15 2024 WL 3517758, at *1 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. July 17, 2024) (“The Court finds
that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendants for the reasons stated
on the record and argued by Defendants. The Court finds the cases of MSP
Recovery Claims Series, LLC v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 20-21573-CIV,
2021 WL 355133 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 2, 2021) and MSP Recovery Claims, Series
44 LLC v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 20-24094-CIV, 2021 WL 8343191 (S.D. Fla.
June 11, 2021) to be persuasive.”); 21st Century Centennial Ins. Co., 2023
WL 11903567, at *3-4 (finding no personal jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(a)1
and 4; “Without specific allegations that the insurer Defendants' alleged
failure to comply with ‘reporting obligations’ to ‘Government Healthcare
Programs’ or other alleged misconduct arises from Defendants' business
activities within the state of Florida, Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy Fla. Stat.
§ 48.193(1)(a)(1) of the long-arm statute, and they have failed to establish
personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. . . .The claims as alleged in the
Amended Complaint do not arise out of the Insurance Companies' business
or contracts with their insureds themselves, but rather out of the non-resident
Defendants' alleged reporting obligations to ‘Government Healthcare
Programs,’ which does not satisfy Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(4).”).
Just as in these cases, plaintiffs’ causes of action in the underlying
cases to these three appeals do not arise from the insurers’ business of
16 insurance in Florida. Thus, plaintiffs cannot show specific jurisdiction under
sub-sections (1)(a)1 and (1)(a)4 of the Long-Arm Statute.
Plaintiffs argue that the insurers did not timely raise their jurisdictional
defenses. However, the records in each case reflects that each insurer did,
in fact, raise its jurisdictional defense before the trial court heard or ruled on
each insurers’ motion to dismiss. In Waxoyl, A.G. v. Taylor, Brion, Buker &
Green, 711 So. 2d 1251, 1254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), this Court held that a
defendant does not waive a jurisdictional defense that it raises in the first
motion to dismiss that the trial court addresses.3
In addition, the insurers never sought “affirmative relief inconsistent
with the defense of personal jurisdiction.” Modway, Inc. v. OJ Com., LLC,
331 So. 3d 723, 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (holding defendant did not waive
jurisdictional defense by first seeking to vacate a default and to quash
service). Here, each insurer defended against plaintiffs’ disqualification
3 The Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal agree with this reasoning. See Cepero v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., N.A., 189 So. 3d 204, 206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (“Where the initial motion to dismiss does not include a claim of lack of jurisdiction or insufficiency of service of process, those claims are not waived if, prior to a ruling on the initial motion, the defendant amends the motion to assert the issue.”); Re-Emp. Servs., Ltd. v. Nat’l Loan Acquisitions Co., 969 So. 2d 467, 470-71 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). The First and Second District Courts of Appeal do not. See Retherford v. Kirkland, 363 So. 3d 132, 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023); Gannon v. Cuckler, 281 So. 3d 587, 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019).
17 proceedings; however, each insurer raised its jurisdictional defense before
the first dismissal hearing.
USAA raised its personal jurisdiction defense in the first motion to
dismiss the trial court addressed, which was USAA’s motion to dismiss
plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. In addition, USAA preserved the
jurisdictional defense in the certification proceeding that came later. USAA
did not engage in discovery, nor did it seek affirmative relief before it moved
to dismiss plaintiffs’ second amended complaint.
MGA raised its jurisdictional defense in the first motion to dismiss the
trial court addressed, which was MGA’s renewed motion to dismiss. MGA
preserved the jurisdictional defense in its later filings. This included the
motion to dismiss that underlies this appeal and MGA’s Answer to plaintiffs’
final complaint. In addition, like USAA, MGA did not engage in discovery nor
did it seek affirmative relief before the trial court denied MGA’s motion to
dismiss and before the underlying appeal was filed.
Progressive raised its personal jurisdiction defense in its motion to
dismiss plaintiffs’ initial complaint. Progressive preserved the defense in its
later filings, including in the motion to dismiss that led to this appeal and in
its Answer. Just like the other two insurers, Progressive did not engage in
discovery nor did it seek affirmative relief before the trial court ruled on
18 Progressive’s motions to dismiss and before this appeal was filed. As the
insurers emphasize, the trial court did not find that Progressive waived its
jurisdictional defense and stayed the trial court proceedings so that this Court
could consider Progressive’s defense.
Conclusion
In Coloplast I, we declined to extend long-arm jurisdiction for a pure bill
of discovery claim in the manufacturing context. In Coloplast II, we declined
to extend long-arm jurisdiction for a pure bill of discovery against a foreign
medical device manufacturer, including under the business-venture prong of
Florida’s long-arm statute. § 48.193(1)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (2023). Now, in the
three cases before us, we reject plaintiffs’ positions and decline to extend
long-arm jurisdiction for a pure bill of discovery in the insurance context as
illustrated in the three underlying cases to these appeals. The trial court erred
in each of the three cases when it allowed plaintiffs to sue USAA, MGA, and
Progressive for equitable claims that do not arise from the non-resident
insurers’ activities within Florida. Furthermore, we find that each of the
insurers timely asserted their jurisdictional defenses before any hearing or
ruling by the trial court on their motions to dismiss. For these reasons, we
19 reverse the underlying orders on appeal and remand the three cases so the
trial court with instructions to dismiss the action in each case.
Reversed and remanded with directions.