USA v. Vincent Mann

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: April 20, 1999
• Docket: CV-99-09-B
• Status: Published

Opinion

USA v. Vincent Mann CV-99-09-B 4/20/99

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Criminal No. NH-99-09-B RI-98-035L Vincent E . Mann

O R D E R

Vincent Mann has moved to suppress cocaine seized from him

at the time of his arrest. For the reasons discussed below, I

deny his motion.

I.

The government has proved the following facts by a

preponderance of the evidence:

1. In February 1998, Detective Joseph Colanduono arrested

several individuals on drug charges who told him that an

individual known to them as Vincent was supplying drugs to

dealers in the Lockwood Plaza area of Providence. These

individuals provided a general description of Vincent and the

make, model, and color of the vehicle that he was driving. 2. Detective Colanduono subsequently observed Mann, who fit

the description he had been given for Vincent, speaking with

other individuals in areas that are known by the Providence

Police to be drug trafficking areas.

3. Detective Colanduono received a tip from a confidential

informant on February 16, 1998, stating that Vincent would be

dropping off a large supply of cocaine in the Loungo Square area

of Providence later that evening. The informant also described

Vincent's vehicle and gave Detective Colanduono its license plate

number. The informant had provided reliable information to

Detective Colanduono on several prior occasions and, on at least

one prior occasion, the informant's information had led to the

arrest and conviction of a suspect on drug charges.

4. Relying on the informant's tip. Detective Colanduono and

Detective Gregory Scion set up surveillance in the area where the

transaction was to occur. They subsequently observed the vehicle

described by the informant approach the Loungo Square area at

about 10:30 p.m. Detective Colanduono recognized Mann, the

vehicle's driver, as the person whom he had previously identified

as Vincent. Detective Colanduono saw the vehicle make a U-turn

and come to a stop in front of a residence. 5. As Detective Scion approached Mann's vehicle, he saw

Mann stuff something into the front of his pants. He then

removed Mann from his vehicle and frisked him. During the frisk,

he felt a bulge in the front of Mann's pants which, based upon

his training and experience, he believe was crack cocaine. He

then reached inside Mann's pants and removed the cocaine.

II.

I use the following legal standards in ruling on Mann's

motion to suppress evidence:

1. A police officer may stop a vehicle and briefly detain

the driver based upon reasonable suspicion that the driver has

engaged in or is about to engage in criminal activity. See

United States v. Tavlor, 162 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1998) . To

satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, a "police officer must

be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken

together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably

warrant that intrusion." I d . (guoting United States v. Kimball,

25 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1994) (guoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,

21 (1968).

-3- 2. The police may frisk a temporarily detained suspect if

they have reason to believe that the suspect may be armed and

dangerous. See i d .; United States v. Schiavo, 29 F.3d 6 , 8 (1st

C i r . 1999).

3. The police may lawfully seize an object discovered

during a frisk if its incriminating character is "immediately

apparent." Schiavo, 2 9 F.3d at 8 (guoting Minnesota v. Peterson

508 U.S. 366 (1993)).

4. The police have probable cause to arrest a defendant if

based on the totality of the information known to the police

officers involved in the investigation, they have a reasonable

basis to believe that the defendant has committed a crime. See

United States v. Diallo, 29 F.3d 23, 25 (1st Cir. 1994) .

5. The police may search a person incident to a lawful

arrest on a felony drug charge. See United States v. Meede, 11

F .3d 190, 198 (1st Cir. 1997).

III.

Considering the facts of the case in light of the above­

described legal principles, I conclude that: 1. Detectives Colanduono and Scion were justified in

stopping Mann on February 1 6 , 1998, because they were aware of

specific and articulable facts amounting to a reasonable

suspicion that Mann was about to engage in criminal activity.

Specifically, they had received information from a reliable

informant that Mann was about to engage in a drug transaction.

2. The nature of the criminal conduct being investigated,

the time of night at which the stop occurred and Mann's

suspicious conduct when the police approached his vehicle all

reasonably caused Detective Scion to believe that Mann may have

been armed and dangerous. Accordingly, Detective Scion was

entitled to remove Mann from his vehicle and frisk him.

3. Detective Scion was entitled to reach into Mann's pants

to remove the cocaine because he had probable cause to believe

that the lump he felt in Mann's pants during the frisk was crack

cocaine.

4. Alternatively, Detective Scion had probable cause to

arrest Mann when he frisked him and felt what he reasonably

believed was crack cocaine. At that point, he was justified in

arresting Mann and the subseguent seizure of the cocaine can be

justified as a search incident to arrest. Defendant's motion to suppress is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Paul Barbadoro Chief Judge

April 20, 1999

cc: Stephanie Browne, Esq. George J. West, Esq. Clerk, USDC-RI

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